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Lay Summary 
Is theology a science? If so, to what extent is it a science? If it is not a science, why is this the 
case? Does theology deserve a place in the contemporary secular university? How should the 
contemporary theologian practise theology in the university? This study explores the answers 
to these questions offered by the turn-of-the-century Dutch theologian Herman Bavinck. 
Bavinck studies has flourished in the past decade. However, no single work has focused 
on Bavinck’s idea of theology as the science of God, that is, the science about God and of 
knowing God. This study argues that the idea of scientific theology as explained in this study 
furnishes a hermeneutical angle from which the fundamental characteristics and themes of 
Bavinck’s dogmatic system can be integrated. To this end, this study highlights Bavinck’s 
twofold view of science––the visible and the invisible. The visible science is preoccupied with 
the sensual-perceptible world, whereas the invisible science has the spiritual as its object 
investigated.  
Then, it points out that Bavinck argued for theology as a science that takes God as its 
object, openly acknowledging and defending its basis in assumptions that this God exists and 
reveals Himself. As such, theology as a science is concerning God through and through. To 
demonstrate this, the thesis identifies a range of key aspects of Bavinck’s articulation of 
scientific theology, which, taken together, show that scientific theology is from God, by God, 
and for God. 
For Bavinck, this scientific theology is operative in the sphere of science, especially the 
university. He refashions the Medieval slogan “theology as the Queen of the sciences”, arguing 
that theology should take spiritual and moral dominion in the university. While this argument 
might seem surprising in the twentieth-first century academy, as a largely secularised academic 
environment, my thesis argues that Bavinck’s view remains useful in examining the work of 
the contemporary university theologian. Given various challenges to Christian theology in the 
contemporary secular university, three observations can be made from Bavinck’s system. First, 
the university theologian needs to be humble yet courageous. Second, the theologian should 
remember the identity of theologian qua theologian and theologian qua university academic, 
and discern the priority of theological identity. Third, given the moral character of theology’s 
Queenship, theological ethics can serve as the interdisciplinary point of contact between 
theology and the other sciences.  
In short, reading Bavinck’s system according to the hermeneutical angle of scientific 
theology, it will demonstrate not only that Bavinck is a unified thinker, but that he develops 
11 




The revival of Calvinism in the nineteenth-century Netherlands entailed the neo-Calvinist 
movement. With Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck became a brand name of neo-Calvinism. 
Nonetheless, not until the first decade of the twentieth-first century was scholarly interest in 
Bavinck’s work increasing. The conventional “two Bavincks” model used to read his work for 
much of the twentieth century argues that some contradictory and irreconcilable themes do 
exist in Bavinck’s system, which makes Bavinck a self-contradictory thinker. This dualistic 
reading characterised most of Bavinck scholars in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Since James Eglinton’s new reading of Bavinck’s organic motif, the conventional model 
became untenable and scholars are seeking for a reunited Herman Bavinck. Bavinck as a 
holistic theologian has become the industry standard of Bavinck studies. Following the new 
hermeneutical criterion, several theses and numerous articles have construed various themes 
of the unified Bavinck’s system. Like them, this study aims on the one hand to maintain “one 
Bavinck”, on the other hand, and more importantly, to fill in a notable gap in Bavinck 
scholarship––that is, no single work hitherto has focused on Bavinck’s idea of theology as the 
wetenschap (science) of God. 
This study shall demonstrate that the idea of scientific (wetenschappelijke) theology could 
be used as the hermeneutical meta-paradigm for understanding Bavinck’s system. By meta-
paradigm, I mean that the idea of scientific theology as explained in this study furnishes the 
cardinal model that incorporates the fundamental characteristics and themes of Bavinck’s 
dogmatic system. To this end, I will begin with Bavinck’s twofold notion of wetenschap (the 
visible and invisible science). The visible science is preoccupied with the sensual-perceptible 
world, whereas the invisible science has the spiritual as its object investigated. Then, I will 
point out that Bavinck’s view of theology as the science of God encompasses three defining 
factors: (1) the reality of God as the object of this science; (2) a reliance on faith-based 
assumptions regarding God’s existence and self-revelation; (3) a character that is bound up 
with God. Next, I will analyse Bavinck’s dogmatics and construct the Trinitarian grammar of 
his scientific theology. This grammar consists of five rationales: (1) positive revelationalism; 
(2) theological organicism; (3) critically organic realism; (4) dialectical catholicity; and (5) 
doxological teleology. These five rationales are not discrete but rather exist in concatenation; 
they constitute a united Trinitarian grammar, which proves Bavinck as a Trinitarian theologian. 
Meanwhile, the grammar underlies the meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s system from 
the perspective of wetenschappelijke theology. 
13 
The meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s theology is not restrained within the confines 
of dogmatics. Rather, Bavinck’s scientific theology makes an attempt to engage with the other 
sciences. This interdisciplinary character of scientific theology is associated with Bavinck’s 
ideas of the sovereignty of science and theological encyclopaedia, which are embodied in his 
understanding of the moral and spiritual dominion of theology as the Queen of the sciences. 
While this argument might seem surprising in the twentieth-first century academy, as a largely 
secularised academic environment, my thesis argues that Bavinck’s view remains useful in 
examining the work of the contemporary university theologian. Given various challenges to 
Christian theology in the contemporary secular university, three observations can be made from 
Bavinck’s system. First, the university theologian needs to be humble yet courageous. Second, 
the theologian should remember the identity of theologian qua theologian and theologian qua 
university academic, and discern the priority of theological identity. Third, given the moral 
character of theology’s Queenship, theological ethics can serve as an interdisciplinary point of 
contact between theology and the other sciences. 
In short, reading Bavinck’s system according to the meta-paradigm of scientific theology, 
it will demonstrate not only that Bavinck is a unified thinker, but that he also develops the 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Exploring the New Perspective on Bavinck 
More than seventy years ago, Emil Brunner (1889-1966) enthusiastically argued that ‘outside 
the sphere of the German-speaking peoples, too, especially in England and in Holland, the 
dogmatic spirit was not destroyed by the spirit of the Enlightenment. I need only remind the 
reader of the dogmatic works of Forsyth, Kuyper and Bavinck.’1  However, although his 
Dogmatik was translated into English, Brunner’s point seems not to have been heard widely in 
the English-speaking world. In contrast to the Scottish theologian P. T. Forsyth (1848-1921) 
and the Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) who was already well-known in the 
Anglophone world even in his own lifetime, their contemporary Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) 
seems not to draw due attention in anglophone theological academia, especially the British 
academia. Indeed, Bavinck gave the Stone Lectures at Princeton Theological Seminary (1908-
1909), which was entitled Philosophy of Revelation and published in English. He also travelled 
to London to give a lecture on John Calvin in 1909.2 In addition, his pedagogical work was 
known internationally. Nonetheless, it is certainly true that after 1921, the year Bavinck passed 
away, the English-speaking scholarship focused far more on Karl Barth as a dogmatician.3 
Hence, it is only in recent decades that Bavinck has received renewed attention. 
In the past two decades, Bavinck studies has flourished and relevant literature (both the 
primary and the secondary) has proliferated in the Anglophone world. After the publication of 
the first volume of his magnum opus Reformed Dogmatics in 2003, numerous books and 
articles by Bavinck have been translated and published, which have presented  his dogmatics, 
theological ethics, public theology, pedagogy, interdisciplinary studies between theology and 
other sciences, and so forth, to a wider international audience. Against that backdrop, scholars 
have become more interested in this turn-of-the-century Dutch thinker, who was reared on 
conservative and pietistic Reformed (Gereformeerde) theology yet received his theological 
education at the University of Leiden, the bastion of Dutch liberalism at the time; who 
painstakingly safeguarded the due place of theology in the academy and was faithfully 
 
1 Emil Brunner, Dogmatics Vol. I: The Christian Doctrine of God, trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth 
Press, 1949), 92-93. 
2 Herman Bavinck, Johannes Calvijn: Eene lezing ter gelegenheid van den vierhonderdsten gedenkdag 
zijner geboorte. 10 Juli 1509-1909 (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1909); Herman Bavinck, “John Calvin: A Lecture 
on the Occasion of his 400th Birthday, July 10, 1509-1909,” trans. John Bolt, TBR 1 (2010): 57-85. 
3 What happened at Princeton Theological Seminary in the 1920s and 1930s could be used as an account for 
the enchantment with Barth’s theology and the consequent conflict with neo-Calvinism in the first half of 
twentieth century. See George Harinck, “‘How Can an Elephant Understand a Whale and Vice Versa?’: The 
Dutch Origins of Cornelius Van Til's Appraisal of Karl Barth,” in Karl Barth and American Evangelicalism, 
ed. Bruce L. McCormack and Clifford B. Anderson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 13-41. 
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committed to his church; who was immersed in the history of the Reformed tradition yet sought 
to articulate a distinctively modern Reformed theology. 
In tandem with the increasing availability of primary literature, secondary scholarship on 
Bavinck has also increased considerably. Although several short English-language accounts of 
Bavinck’s life have been published, Ron Gleason’s Herman Bavinck (2010) is the first English 
biography that sketches Bavinck’s life in detail by tracing out Bavinck’s fourfold identity as 
pastor, churchman, statesman and theologian. 4  Having critiqued Gleason’s work as 
hagiographical and as neglecting Bavinck’s crisis of faith in Leiden period, James Eglinton has 
more recently provided a new critical biography of Herman Bavinck. 5  By virtue of the 
accessibility of Bavinck’s English-language biographies, I will not set forth the narrative of 
Bavinck’s life in detail. Nonetheless, the historical contexts described in the following chapters 
will reflect some information of his life. 
The rise of Bavinck studies can also be evidenced by the founding of the Bavinck Institute 
at Calvin Theological Seminary (Grand Rapids, Michigan) in 2009. The Institute draws a great 
deal of scholarly attention around the world, which is proved by the international membership 
of its Bavinck Society.6 Moreover, the online journal The Bavinck Review published by the 
Bavinck Institute is ‘devoted to scholarship in the theology of Herman Bavinck and the 
Bavinck tradition.’7 A large number of articles––including some translations of Bavinck’s 
writings––have been published in this journal in the past decade. 
The thriving academic activities and publications on Bavinck raise the question of whether 
one should recognise Bavinck studies as an important development in the twentieth-century 
theological academia. This entails several consequent questions. How should we read 
Bavinck’s work and theology? Is there any meta-language that can serve for the meta-paradigm, 
which describes and qualifies Bavinck’s theology or dogmatics as a whole? Is Bavinck’s 
theology relevant today? Can we make an effective use of his theology, as constructed more 
than one hundred years ago, in the twenty-first century? As will be seen, this study attempts to 
seek answers by focusing on Bavinck’s view of theology as a science (wetenschap). 
 
4 Ron Gleason, Herman Bavinck: Pastor, Churchman, Statesman, and Theologian (Phillipsburg: P&R, 
2010). On short biography, see Henry Elias Dosker, “Herman Bavinck,” Princeton Theological Review 20, 
no. 3 (1922): 448-464; Eric D. Bristley, Guide to the Writings of Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) (Grand 
Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2008), 9-27. 
5 James Eglinton, Bavinck: A Critical Biography (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2020); James Eglinton,  
review of Herman Bavinck: Pastor, Churchman, Statesman, and Theologian. By Ron Gleason, Scottish 
Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 29, no. 1 (2011): 127-128. I wish to thank Dr Eglinton for sharing with me 
the advanced e-copy of his new biography of Bavinck. 
6 Cf. John Bolt, “Why a Bavinck Institute? Why at Calvin Seminary,” TBR 8 (2017): 13. 
7 John Bolt, “Introducing The Bavinck Review,” TBR 1 (2010): 2. 
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I. The Conventional Reading of Bavinck’s Theology 
The answers to the questions above depend upon the interpretative paradigm that one employs 
to read Bavinck’s work. As such, we cannot refrain from engaging with the hermeneutical 
history of the reception of Bavinck’s thought. 
The traditionally normative reading, relied on throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century, posited “two Bavincks” in order to describe seemingly orthodox and modern traits in 
his thought. James Eglinton has described this dualistic model as follows: ‘[Bavinck] is 
seemingly a Jekyll and Hyde theologian who vacillates between moments of “orthodoxy” and 
“modernity” without ever resolving his own basic crisis of theological identity.’8 Accordingly, 
Bavinck is not a holistically integrated theologian; “two Bavincks” represents two conflicting 
lines of theological thinking. The import of that reading was that Bavinck’s readers needed to 
be attentive to the two differing lines and follow either of them (on the grounds that it was not 
possible for Bavinck to be both modern and orthodox). 
That paradigm first emerged some decades ago. As early as 1961, R. H. Bremmer has 
pointed out that Bavinck’s theology somewhat compromised to new scientific discoveries since 
Bavinck wished to show an open mind to modern culture. For Bremmer, the reception of the 
results of modern science and historical research was the cause of the gulf between historic 
Christian orthodoxy and modern liberalism.9 Granted, Bremmer did not directly use dualistic 
terms. Nevertheless, his assertion was more or less reflective of the dualistic approach to 
Bavinck’s thought. This stance was taken and strengthened by Cornelius Van Til in the same 
year. Van Til appealed to Bavinck’s followers that they needed to go beyond Bavinck to be his 
true followers since Bavinck was under the influence of modern philosophy.10 Implied in Van 
Til’s appeal was his appreciation of Bavinck that Reformed orthodox thinking overwhelms the 
modern in Bavinck’s system, though he recognised the influence of modernism on Bavinck as 
undeniable. 
 
8 James Eglinton, Trinity and Organism: Towards a New Reading of Herman Bavinck's Organic Motif 
(London: T&T Clark, 2012), 28; James Eglinton, “How Many Herman Bavincks? De Gemeene Genade and 
the “Two Bavincks” Hypothesis,” in Revelation and Common Grace, ed. John Bowlin, The Kuyper Center 
Review, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 279. 
9 R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus (Kampen: Kok, 1961), 144-146. 
10 Cornelius Van Til, “Bavinck the Theologian: A Review Article,” Westminster Theological Journal 24, no. 
1 (1961): 48-64. Van Til also observed that Bavinck’s followers should avoid Bavinck’s tendency to 
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Neither Bremmer nor Van Til provided a comprehensive account of a dualistic approach 
to Bavinck’s system. By contrast, Jan Veenhof is the representative advocator of the 
conventional paradigm. He suggested that there were ‘two poles’ in Bavinck’s system: one was 
strongly related to Reformed orthodoxy, the other was to modernism. These two poles were 
especially embodied in Bavinck’s use of organic language and imagery. By etymological 
genetic study on the word “organic”, Veenhof seemed to provide a universal explanation to the 
sense of this word. Given Bavinck’s nineteenth-century climate, he asserted that Bavinck’s 
organicism actually appropriated German idealist organic thinking, which entailed a tension 
throughout Bavinck’s life.11 This philosophical reading of Bavinck’s organic thinking intrudes 
into Gleason’s biography without resistance. Gleason argues that Bavinck’s organic language 
originated in nineteenth-century philosophy.12 Hence, in describing Bavinck in his later years, 
Gleason judges that, although Bavinck was still a Reformed confessor, he was no longer 
committed to a solid Reformed theology and under the sway of modern theology.13  It is 
apparent that Veenhof’s reading of Bavinck’s system is characterised by the conflict between 
orthodoxy and modernism. This characteristic feature derives the inter-contradictions of 
Bavinck’s thought, which are reflective of Bavinck’s certain compromises to modern 
philosophy. 
Veenhof’s interpretation of Bavinck’s system is so seminal that it has been being 
influential until the first decade of the twenty-first century. In his doctoral thesis (1998), for 
example, Syd Hielema argued that Bavinck’s doctrine of God is characterised by ‘[a] tension 
between a more relationally-oriented doctrine of God and a more abstract, philosophical one,’ 
and Bavinck is closer to the former.14 In contrast with Hielema, for another example, David 
VanDrunen endorsed the dualistic paradigm from the perspective of relationship between 
church and culture. He contended, ‘I am not convinced that Bavinck has left us with an entirely 
coherent portrait of Christians’ basic relationship to this world and of the fundamental nature 
of their cultural endeavours.’15 
It can be perceived that the conventional interpretative paradigm of Bavinck’s system has 
variegated application. The difference between theologians who follow the conventional 
 
11 Jan Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspiratie: De Openbarings en Schriftbeschouwing van Herman Bavinck in 
Vergelijking met die der Ethische Theologie (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1968), 108-111. 
12 Gleason, Herman Bavinck, 477-478. 
13 Ibid., 402-404. 
14  Syd Hielema, “Herman Bavinck's Eschatological Understanding of Redemption” (ThD dissertation, 
Wycliffe College, 1998), 108. 
15 David VanDrunen, “The Kingship of Christ Is Twofold: Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms in the 
Thought of Herman Bavinck,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 162. 
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reading consists in the fact that they use the model of “two Bavincks” to deal with differing 
tensions in Bavinck’s system, which they construe as irreconcilable. This variegated 
application gives rise to the questions: Are the tensions within Bavinck’s theology really 
irreconcilable? Is there any principle that is taken or inferred from Bavinck’s theology giving 
an explanation to and somehow to reconcile these tensions? These are the underlying questions 
that have motivated the search for a new reading of Bavinck’s theology, which aims to search 
for theological principles to mitigate the tensions and integrate Bavinck’s system as a united 
whole. 
II. The New Organic Reading of Bavinck’s Theology 
A. Initial Explorations 
The shift of the interpretative paradigm of Bavinck’s theology happened in the course of 
scholarly debates at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Thus, during the 
years of the publication of the English Reformed Dogmatics (2003-2008), the conventional 
dualistic interpretation still dominated in Bavinck studies. John Bolt was the representative of 
such a dualistic approach during that period. Whilst illustrating Bavinck’s influence in North 
America, Bolt laid down a principle: ‘We must begin by reminding ourselves that any 
consideration of Herman Bavinck's influence has to start with the annoying acknowledgment 
that there is not just one but rather two Bavincks.’16 
In that context, a debate between David VanDrunen and Nelson Kloosterman challenged 
scholars to re-consider the plausibility of the dualistic reading of Bavinck’s system. As noted 
earlier, VanDrunen was of the opinion that Bavinck’s view of the relationship between 
Christianity and culture was not coherent due to Bavinck’s insistence somewhere on ‘the 
synthesis of Christianity and culture’.17 VanDrunen’s estimation was largely grounded in his 
two-kingdom theology, arguing that Bavinck blurred the boundaries between Christianity and 
culture (that is, the boundaries between the civil and the spiritual kingdoms), with particular 
reference to the cultural significance of classical education.18 
VanDrunen’s observation had two drawbacks. First, VanDrunen seemed not to realise the 
historical context of Bavinck’s ‘Classical Education’ (Klassieke opleiding) (1918), that is, the 
 
16 John Bolt, “Grand Rapids between Kampen and Amsterdam: Herman Bavinck's reception and influence 
in North America,” Calvin Theological Journal 38, no. 2 (2003): 264-265. 
17 VanDrunen, “The Kingship of Christ Is Twofold,” 162. 
18 Ibid., 162-163, note 76; Herman Bavinck, “Classical Education,” trans. Harry Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres, 
in Essays on Religion, Science, and Society, ed. John Bolt (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 242. 
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end of the First World War.19 Going through the article, one will be impressed with Bavinck’s 
awareness of the disruptive impact of the First World War on Western nations. With the 
outbreak of the War, Christian nations were mutually warring, and their unity and cooperation 
collapsed. That being so, Bavinck stressed the pre-War unity of Christian nations, in which 
Western culture was deeply rooted in Christianity. In this light, by arguing for classical 
education as the foundation of re-uniting Christian nations, Bavinck underscored the Christian 
faith as the antidote to the chaos caused by the War. Hence, Bavinck concluded the article with 
the rhetorical question: ‘How will these nations ever again become a power for mankind if they 
do not possess an inner unity in Scripture and do not draw from one communal well?’20 
The second defect of VanDrunen’s observation consisted in his incomprehension of 
Bavinck’s contention of the unity of Christ’s mediatorial work in both creation and recreation. 
VanDrunen maintained that Bavinck’s claim led to ‘two distinct works of the Son’, assigning 
the title Logos to the Son as Creator and the title Christ to the Son as Recreator, which referred 
to the twofold kingship of the Son. Thereby, Bavinck implicitly developed a two-kingdom 
theology, which contradicted his synthesis of culture and Christianity.21 It was this point that 
became the pivot of Nelson Kloosterman’s response to VanDrunen. Rather than pitting 
Christianity against culture to some extent, Kloosterman contended: 
In contrast to positing a continuing duality between the Logos and the Incarnate 
One, Bavinck saw Jesus Christ as revealing himself progressively in human history 
through his unitary and mediatorial activity. Before his incarnation, the second 
person of the Trinity was indeed the Logos Asarkos, and after his incarnation he 
indeed remained the Logos Ensarkos. The profound significance of the Incarnation 
is precisely that Christ's work in the creation is taken up within and made 
serviceable to his work of redemption. This has implications for the relationship 
between the church and the world.22 
Over against VanDrunen’s view of the incoherence, Kloosterman traced the Christocentric 
foundation of the unity of Bavinck’s system. Meanwhile, Kloosterman corrected John Bolt’s 
mistaken translation of the Dutch word “onweersprekelijke” in G. C. Berkouwer’s writing: 
‘Bavinck’s theology contains so many irreconcilable [onweersprekelijke] themes in tension’. 
Kloosterman (correctly) suggested that “onweersprekelijke” should be translated “undeniable”. 
 
19 Herman Bavinck, “Klassieke opleiding,” Stemmen des Tijds 7, no. 1 (1918): 46-65, 113-147. 
20 Bavinck, “Classical Education,” 243; emphasis added. 
21 VanDrunen, “The Kingship of Christ Is Twofold,” 149-150. 
22 Nelson D. Kloosterman, “A Response to 'The Kingdom of God is Twofold': Natural Law and the Two 
Kingdoms in Thought of Herman Bavinck by David VanDrunen,” Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 
(2010): 170. 
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Thus, there were undeniable, not irreconcilable, tensions in Bavinck’s system.23 It should be 
noted that Bolt’s translation was adopted by VanDrunen without hesitation to endorse the “two 
Bavincks” model.24 That is to say, having rectified Bolt’s translation, Kloosterman ipso facto 
undercut the hermeneutical presupposition of VanDrunen’s reading of Bavinck’s view of 
Christianity and culture. 
John Bolt joined the VanDrunen-Kloosterman debate at a later stage. In so doing, he 
showed great scholarly integrity by admitting his own erroneous translation and Kloosterman’s 
proper correction. 25 This means that Bolt eventually sided with Kloosterman to defend the 
coherence of Bavinck’s thought.26 On the matter of the debate on Christianity and culture, Bolt 
cited Bavinck’s Trinitarian claim in Reformed Dogmatics to strengthen his stance: ‘Certainly, 
all God’s works ad extra are undivided and common to all three persons. Prominent in these 
works, therefore, is the oneness of God rather than the distinction of persons.’27 For Bolt, by 
arguing for the unity of the work of the Triune God, the synthesis of culture and Christianity, 
which are respectively the fruits of God’s creation and recreation, becomes tenable.28 
Kloosterman’s and Bolt’s initial explorations evidence the want of a new reading. They 
set forth two slightly different entrance points (Christology or Trinitarianism) of articulating a 
new interpretive paradigm of Bavinck’s theology. Nonetheless, they reached a consensus that 
the conventional dualistic reading was untenable. 
B. Brian Mattson’s Preliminary Elaboration 
Although the unity of Bavinck’s system was defended by Kloosterman and Bolt, their 
arguments did not advance a clear motif that expresses the concatenation of various parts of 
Bavinck’s system. At around the same time, however, Brian Mattson did take a preliminary 
step in this direction. 
 
23 Ibid., 174-175. Bolt, “Grand Rapids between Kampen and Amsterdam,” 265; G. C. Berkouwer, Zoeken 
en Vinden: Herinneringen en Ervaringen (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1989), 55. 
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25 John Bolt, “Herman Bavinck on Natural Law and Two Kingdoms: Some Further Reflections,” TBR 4 
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The task of Mattson’s work is, as the title Restored to Our Destiny shows, to demonstrate 
the formative role of eschatology in Bavinck’s theological anthropology.29 His preoccupation 
with specific loci did not lead him to ignore the hermeneutical issue in reading Bavinck’s 
theology.30 Rather, he was clearly conscious of the fact that the unity of Bavinck’s dogmatic 
system is the cornerstone of the interpretation of a particular doctrine of Bavinck’s system. 
Thus, after the introductory chapter, Mattson moves on to elaborate on the metaphysical 
foundations of Bavinck’s theology (chapter 1). In this chapter, Mattson deals with the 
hermeneutical issue caused by Bavinck’s use of organic language. 
Mattson’s basic stance is rooted in the doctrine of the Trinity. According to him, 
Bavinck’s view of nature and grace is unitive, holistic and organic, on the ground of Bavinck’s 
claim that the Triune God as the Creator made the covenant with creation.31 Following this, 
Mattson accounts for the notion and sources of Bavinck’s “organic” language briefly. This 
structure indicates that, for Mattson, Bavinck’s organic thinking is theological rather than, as 
Veenhof argues, philosophical or idealistic (i.e. that Bavinck takes it from nineteenth-century 
German philosophy). Indeed, having denied Veenhof’s explication of the source of Bavinck’s 
organicism, Mattson lays down the basic principle of reading Bavinck’s organic thinking. 
Granted, the overall climate of the 19th century certainly provided its own 
situational motivations for using the terms, but it is at least possible that Kuyper 
and Bavinck were speaking to the critical issues of their day out of resources 
internal to their own historical-theological tradition. In fact, this hypothesis makes 
for a far more satisfying account.32 
By appealing to the study on Reformed orthodoxy led by Richard Muller, Mattson sheds light 
on the resources internal to Bavinck’s tradition as follows: ‘the progressive or organic 
unfolding of God’s purposes in history is “given” with Reformed covenant theology.’33 With 
this in mind, Bavinck’s theological organicism can be considered as a contextualised form of 
Reformed orthodox theology in the modern age.  
Mattson’s monograph makes a strong case for the unity of Bavinck’s system. It cogently 
demonstrates the holism of Bavinck’s theology, and thereby overthrows the dualistic approach 
 
29 Brian G. Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny: Eschatology & the Image of God in Herman Bavinck's 
Reformed Dogmatics (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 4-9. 
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to Bavinck studies. However, with the focus on anthropology and eschatology, Mattson’s 
comments on the promise of organicist thought in reading Bavinck afresh are made in passing. 
As such, his monograph does not provide an extended, thoroughgoing treatment of Bavinck’s 
organic thought. Such a dearth paves the way for giving a warm welcome to James Eglinton’s 
new reading of Bavinck’s organic motif. 
C. The New Reading of Organic Motif 
Eglinton’s new reading came out at an opportune time for the development of Bavinck 
studies. In fact, Mattson’s own work has realised that he had to leave the task of explicating 
Bavinck’s organic motif to Eglinton, in order to focus his attention on his own task. Hence, at 
the end of his brief engagement with Bavinck’s organic thinking, Mattson pointed us to 
Eglinton’s ‘far more robust evaluation of Veenhof’s account of Bavinck’s organicism.’34 
Having taken the baton handed over from Mattson, Eglinton dedicated his monograph to 
the treatment of organicism as a motif in Bavinck’s theology. Eglinton’s cardinal 
hermeneutical principle is as follows: ‘The Trinity ad intra leads to organism ad extra.’35 Two 
notes can be made here. First, for Eglinton, Bavinck’s organicism has a theological origin. 
Eglinton argues that Bavinck’s organic motif was not taken from philosophy in the genetic 
sense. Rather, this motif is rooted in the Trinitarian theology of Christianity, standing in line 
with the theological traditions of the patristic and Reformation eras.36 Second, any alleged 
disunity in Bavinck’s system concerns the themes in the organism ad extra rather than the 
immanent Trinity, who is the ultimate ideal of unity. However, if those themes are construed 
according to the divine unity, the tensions and incongruity in Bavinck’s system will be not so 
striking as the conventional reading claims. Eglinton’s fundamental hermeneutical principle is 
corresponding with Bavinck’s own concise description of ‘organism’ in Gereformeerde Ethiek 
(Reformed Ethics). 
The genuine, normal condition—that is, the health—of an organism consists in the 
following: (a) A vital principle from its centre animates, controls and regulates 
everything. (b) All organs, parts, or members of an organism, animated from that 
centre, do not isolate themselves from but cooperate with each other. … (c) With 
and through the one vital principle, all members together with each other work 
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toward one telos and consider themselves instruments for achieving the one task of 
life.37 
This condensed definition of the organic is unpacked in detail in Bavinck’s Christelijke 
Wereldbeschouwing (Christian Worldview) par excellence with four facets of organicism. 
First, organicism denotes the simultaneity of unity and diversity in creation. 38  To 
Bavinck’s mind, such a kind of simultaneity is not impossible insofar as the diversity in 
creation is ultimately rooted ‘in the one, wise, and holy will of God Almighty.’39 Grounded on 
this theocentric foundation, Bavinck contends that ‘[t]here are lifeless and living, inorganic and 
organic, inanimate and animate, unconscious and conscious, material and spiritual creations, 
which differ, respectively, in character but are still taken up in the oneness of the whole.’40 
Thus, Bavinck positions himself in competition against pantheistic, monistic and pluralistic 
views of unity and diversity. Pantheistic and monistic systems simplify ‘variety to an 
appearance of reality’, whereas the pluralistic view anchors variety in ‘eternal multitude of 
gods or spirits.’41 For Bavinck, the pantheism, monism and pluralism of his day fell short of 
the doctrine of the Trinity as the foundation of unity and diversity. 
Second, unity is prioritised over diversity. Bavinck argues that ‘the organic view proceeds 
from the whole to the parts, from the unity to the multiplicity.’42  Again, the theoretical 
foundation of Bavinck’s sentiment here is the Triune God. The Christian monotheistic doctrine 
of the Trinity inevitably entails the precedence of oneness (unity) to threeness (diversity). In 
this light, Bavinck contends:  
Christian theology, however, allowing itself to be instructed by the Holy Scriptures, 
took a different and deeper view of reality, and it proclaimed, especially in the 
mouths of Augustine and Calvin, that all difference and inequality among 
creatures had its final cause and deepest ground in the one, wise, and holy will of 
God Almighty. Thus, there is indeed a unity that holds everything together, but this 
unity is not to be found within the world itself by erasing the differences and 
contrasts; it rests in the hand of Him who as King of kings reigns over all things.43  
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43 Bavinck, “Modernism and Orthodoxy,” 107; emphasis added. 
25 
It is clear that, for Bavinck, the precedence of unity to diversity is conceptually internal to the 
Christian tradition and the Christian belief in the Triunity. It is from the Christian tradition that 
he draws the constituent parts of his organic thinking. 
Third, ‘the organism’s shared life is orchestrated by a common idea’ by virtue of God’s 
wisdom that created and recreates the universe. 44  To Bavinck’s mind, the vitality of an 
organism is contingent upon its common idea. 
Organic life cannot be explained by the laws of mechanisms. Every attempt 
devoted to doing so has been fruitless to this point. As soon as we come into contact 
with an organism, we see at work a force, a principle, a vis vitalis or whatever 
people may term it, which, rather than being explicable by physical and chemical 
laws, instead governs them, stands above them, not destroying and suspending 
them in any way, but putting them in service and directing them. That mysterious, 
hidden power is exactly what comprises the organic, and is the constitutive and 
supportive principle of the organic.45 
Whist speaking of creation as organism, for Bavinck, the common idea is doubtless given by 
the Creator, the Triune God. Hence, he maintains that ‘God’s thoughts, spoken in his Word, in 
his Son, are the causae exemplares of things’ and the foundation of the created existence.46  
Fourth, an organism has its own definite telos which has been laid down by God’s wisdom 
in creation and recreation. More importantly, although things differ in their substances and 
properties, they serve together for an ultimate goal.47 In Bavinck’s theology, no matter in what 
spheres, the ultimate telos is the glory of God. As he writes, ‘[f]rom the lowest forms of life it 
strives upward to where the light and life of God is, and at the same time it moves forward to 
a God-glorifying end.’48 
Bavinck’s concise definition in Gereformeerde Ethiek and detailed explication elsewhere 
(particularly in Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing) together prove the theological origin of his 
organicism––that is, Bavinck’s organic thinking is grounded in the doctrine of the Triune God. 
In this sense, although Veenhof accounts for the four facets of Bavinck’s organicism, Veenhof 
and Eglinton differ in their points of departure. Whereas Eglinton recognises Bavinck’s 
speaking from his tradition to his time, Veenhof judges that the terminologies of organicism in 
Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing are clearly reflective of a philosophical bearing on Bavinck’s 
thoughts.49 In this light, Eglinton’s Trinitarian reading of Bavinck’s organic motif provides an 
 
44 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 69. 
45 PCDS, 91. 
46 CWB, 57; CWV, 79-80 
47 CWB, 65-68; CWV, 89-91; Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 69-70. 
48 RD, 2:436; GD, 2:400. 
49 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 82, 208; Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspiratie, 264, 267. 
26 
alternative interpretative paradigm of Bavinck’s theology. Thereafter, Bavinck scholars can 
confidently speak of the unity of Bavinck’s system by construing his thought through the lens 
of the doctrine of the Trinity and then theological organicism. 
III. A Promise of the New Reading 
A. The Emergence of the Eglintonian School 
Eglinton’s new reading of Bavinck’s organic motif is seminal. As John Bolt––who is a 
well-known Bavinck scholar and who previously held “two Bavincks” model––argues, 
‘Eglinton’s careful research and persuasive argument casts this entire enterprise [two Bavincks] 
into serious doubt.’50 It is hardly an exaggeration to say that this new reading has become the 
industry standard of Bavinck studies. To name one example: Having Eglinton’s cardinal 
hermeneutical principle (the Trinity ad intra leads to organism ad extra) as the point of 
departure, Daniel Ragusa argues that Bavinck’s apologetics is articulated on the ground of 
organic ontology––that is, ‘the archetypal unity-in-diversity of the triune God of Scripture 
necessitates an ectypal unity-in-diversity in the creation.’51 
Frequent appearances of the new reading of Bavinck’s organic motif in articles prove its 
broad influence. The depth of the bearing of the new reading on Bavinck studies can be seen 
in the emergence of the Eglintonian school through three completed doctoral theses, each of 
which has tested and advanced its new reading. 
Cory Brock’s doctoral thesis is the first extended study based on the new reading since 
Eglinton’s work. Under Eglinton’s supervision, Brock explores Bavinck’s appropriation of 
Schleiermacher’s theology. The title ‘Orthodoxy yet Modern’ has indicated that, for Brock, 
there is no such an irreconcilable tension between Reformed orthodoxy and liberalism in 
Bavinck’s system. 
Brock begins his thesis by discussing Bavinck’s interpreters. Having rejected the 
conventional dualistic interpretation, he points out the threefold significance of the new reading 
for his own study. First, the new reading ‘provides a fundamental hermeneutical key to 
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interpreting Bavinck’s texts in tension.’ Second, it prompts Bavinck scholars to re-examine 
‘the most salient themes in Bavinck scholarship’ from the perspective of a unified Bavinck 
without disregarding the tensions thereof. Third, the new reading of organic motif is pertinent 
to Brock’s research in the sense that the organic motif and ‘the concept of immediate self-
consciousness’ (a key theme in Schleiermacher’s theology) are interdependent.52 
That being so, Brock demonstrates Bavinck’s critical appreciation and appropriation of 
Schleiermacher’s theology. He even asserts that Bavinck was ‘the mouthpiece that brought 
Schleiermacher’s conceptual framework into the context of the confessional, separatist 
environment.’53 In other words, Bavinck is orthodox yet modern insofar as he subordinates 
philosophical thinking and the concepts of modern theology to Reformed orthodox and 
confessional traditions. ‘Bavinck took some of the philosophical tendencies of post-Kantian 
thought, particularly Schleiermacher’s central philosophical motifs (the borrowed 
propositions), and subsumed them under the strictures of his Reformed orthodox commitments 
in their theological applications.’54 By arguing this, Brock forcibly overthrows the alleged 
irreconcilable tension of Reformed orthodox and modernism in Bavinck’s system, and thereby 
furthers Eglinton’s new reading of a holistic Bavinck. 
Following Brock is Nathaniel Gray Sutanto’s thesis, which was also supervised by 
Eglinton. Sutanto’s work explores Bavinck’s theological epistemology, which is qualified as 
‘Reformed-organic-realism’ or ‘organic epistemology.’55  Like Brock, Sutanto grounds his 
work in Eglinton’s new reading. Following this, he lays out the main argument in the discussion 
on Bavinck’s organic motif: ‘Bavinck’s unique organicism resulted in a theologically 
reinterpreted synthesis of classical and modern patterns of thought, between critical realism 
and absolute idealism, the emphasis on the specialization of the sciences on the one hand and 
its underlying unity on the other.’56 From this vantage point, Sutanto accounts for Bavinck’s 
holistic and organic wetenschap (science), not only theological epistemology but also 
theology’s relationship with the other sciences. As Sutanto argues, 
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Bavinck respects the integrity of the independence of the sciences, and yet unites 
them all by the principles of Christian-theism––wetenschap conforms to an organic 
shape of unity-in-diversity such that the principia of theology (Scriptural revelation 
and the doctrinal content of faith) remain the principia of the other sciences in 
addition to their own individual principia.57 
The third doctoral thesis, supervised by James Eglinton, is Bruce Pass’s methodological 
study on the heart of Bavinck’s dogmatics. Pass’s basic contention is that Christology ‘forms 
the trunk of Bavinck’s system from which all the other dogmas branch out.’58 Prior to pinning 
the central dogma down, Pass explicates Bavinck’s view of dogmatics as a wetenschappelijke 
(scientific) system by virtue of the new reading of organic motif. One merit of Pass’s work, 
which the previous two theses fall short of, is his comparative study on Bavinck’s and F. W. J. 
Schelling’s (1775-1854) organic thinking. Pass points out the similarities of Bavinck’s and 
Schelling’s (idealistic) organicism, arguing that ‘Bavinck’s concept of the organism thus 
mirrors the formal properties of the organism as it was developed by the first generation of 
post-Kantian idealists.’59 He makes it clear that Bavinck is self-consistent in the sense that 
Bavinck does not oscillate between theology and philosophy (i.e. nineteenth-century German 
idealism).  
Based on the organic system of Bavinck’s scientific dogmatics, Pass’s thesis is unfolded 
through the exegesis of the following programmatic statement: 
The doctrine of Christ is not the starting point (uitgangspunt), but it is indeed the 
centre (middelpunt) of the whole system of dogmatics. All other dogmas either 
prepare for it or are inferred from it. In it, as the heart of dogmatics, pulses the 
whole of the religious—ethical life of Christianity. It is the μυστήριον εὐσεβείας 
(1 Tim 3:16). The whole of Christology has to proceed from here.60 
The result of Pass’s exegesis is the demonstration of how Christology functions as the centre 
and heart of Bavinck’s scientific dogmatics. In this sense, Pass seems to seek for a 
Christological meta-language in Bavinck’s system. 
All the three theses exhibit the sympathy with Eglinton’s new reading. On this score, they 
seem to establish the Eglintonian school that commits itself to delve into various themes in 
 
57 Ibid., 60. 
58 Bruce R. Pass, “‘The Heart of Dogmatics’: The Place and Purpose of Christology in the Theological 
Method of Herman Bavinck” (PhD dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 2018), 5. 
59 Pass, “‘The Heart of Dogmatics’,” 20; emphasis added. The words “formal properties” are reflective of 
Bavinck’s Reformed eclecticism, as proposed by Cory and Sutanto, which is indicative of Bavinck’s 
theological appropriation of philosophy; Cory Brock and Nathaniel Gray Sutanto, “Herman Bavinck's 
Reformed Eclecticism: On Catholicity, Consciousness and Theological Epistemology,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 70, no. 3 (2017): 310-332. 
60 GD, 3:254; rev.; RD, 3:274; Pass, “‘The Heart of Dogmatics’,” 6. 
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Bavinck’s system under the auspices of Eglinton’s Trinitarian reading of Bavinck’s organic 
motif.61 
B. Scientific Theology as a Promise 
In closing his celebrated monograph Trinity and Organism, James Eglinton qualifies his 
research as follows: ‘In probing the consequences of a reunited view of Bavinck’s thought to 
this one particular area, that of the organic, one has also only made the first steps in a wider 
movement in Bavinck studies.’62 The statement is not merely a qualification but also an earnest 
appeal for a deeper study on Bavinck’s system. Granted, as the three theses have achieved, this 
study is to respond to the appeal, and is reflective of the ethos of the Eglintonian school, with 
the explication of Bavinck’s notion of theology as the science of God. In this sense, this study 
seeks to fulfil one aspect of the promise of the new reading. 
Concentrating on Bavinck’s conception of wetenschappelijke (scientific) theology, my 
thesis shall argue that, in developing theology as the science of God since his early career 
onwards, Bavinck methodologically constructs dogmatics with the singular Trinitarian 
grammar that has five rationales in concatenation––that is, positive revelationalism, theological 
organicism, organically critical realism, dialectical catholicity, and doxological teleology. This 
idiosyncratic grammar of Bavinck’s scientific theology leads to his insistence on the place of 
theology in the academy (and not merely in a private seminary), which is of significance for 
the justification of Christian theology in the university of the twentieth-first century. Thus, the 
notion of wetenschappelijke theology could be used as the hermeneutical meta-paradigm for 
understanding Bavinck’s system. More specifically, since Eglinton’s new reading, numerous 
fundamental aspects of Bavinck’s theology have been explored, such as the doctrine of the 
Trinity, Christology and the doctrine of revelation. These themes can offer some paradigms of 
the interpretation of Bavinck’s dogmatic system. For example, organicism has developed an 
organist interpretative paradigm of Bavinck’s thought. However, whether there is an apparatus 
that can handles differing paradigms remains to be explored. Such an apparatus more robustly 
evidences a holistic Bavinck by blending well together differing theological themes. This study 
seeks for the meta-paradigm, which means that the idea of scientific theology as explained in 
this study furnishes such an apparatus that coordinates various fundamental characteristics and 
themes of Bavinck’s thought in order to set forth a big picture of his dogmatic theology.  
 
61 One should take note of Pass’s more critical attitude to organicism than Brock and Sutanto’s, as will be 
discussed in chapter five.  
62 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 195. 
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a. The Heritage of Christian Theology 
Although this thesis will explore Bavinck’s late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-
century arguments for the nature of theology as a science (and will make constructive claims 
about theology in the twentieth-first-century academy), it must begin with the recognition that 
Bavinck himself regarded “scientific theology” as having a long historical pedigree. In setting 
out his case for theology as a science, Bavinck positioned himself in-line with Augustine and 
Aquinas. 
As early as Augustine, theology was depicted as something akin to science. Added to the 
saying “I believe in order that I understand” (credo ut intellegam), Augustine stressed the 
necessity of both scientia (science) and sapientia (wisdom). 
But all these things which the Word made flesh did and suffered for us in time and 
place belong, according to the distinction which we have undertaken to point out, 
to science [knowledge], and not to wisdom. But because the Word is without time 
and without place, He is co-eternal with the Father and is wholly present 
everywhere. And if anyone is able, insofar as he is able, to bring forward a truthful 
utterance about this, then that utterance will belong to wisdom; and, therefore, the 
Word made flesh, which is Christ Jesus, possesses the treasures of wisdom and 
knowledge.63 
Although Augustine qualified scientia as relevant to the temporal and sapientia as related to 
the eternal, he perceived that the incarnation necessitates both science and wisdom. 
Nonetheless, scientia is the means by which human knowledge moves upward sapientia as the 
telos. Both the end and the means leading to that end are of importance to Augustine. In this 
light, Gijsbert van den Brink rightly discerns the distinction between scientia and sapientia yet 
fails to perceive their affinity. Hence, he does injustice to drawing the corollary that Augustine 
denies the scientific status of theology.64 
The dominance of Aristotelian philosophy in the Medieval ages broadened the notion of 
scientia––science is a knowledge derived and demonstrated from its first principles––which 
incorporated theology. As a response to the claim that theology is not a science insofar as 
‘every science proceeds from self-evident principles’, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) asserted 
that ‘sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles established by the light 
of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed.’65 In this sense, theology is a 
 
63 Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, ed. Hermigild Dressler (Washington: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1963), 13.19.24. 
64 Gijsbert Van den Brink, “How Theology Stopped Being Regina Scientiarum––––and How Its Story 
Continues,” Studies in Christian Ethics 32, no. 4 (2019): 445.  
65 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns 
Oates & Washbourne, 1920-22), I.Q1.A2.O1, Answer. 
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subalternate science that is derived from a higher science. Despite the subalternate status, 
Aquinas argued that ‘[o]ther sciences are called the handmaidens of this one.’66 Van den Brink 
is probably right by saying that ‘the idea that during the Middle Ages theology was generally 
known as the queen of the sciences’ was invented.67 Indeed, Aquinas did not define theology 
as the Queen. Nonetheless, the hierarchical relationship between theology and the other 
sciences is evident.68 Now that the other sciences are the handmaidens, theology would be the 
King even if it is not the Queen; in any case, theology did occupy a higher status than the other 
sciences. 
The Reformation did not rule out the theological terminologies of the Medieval 
Christianity. Richard Muller points out that both scientia and sapientia were still recognised as 
the two most suitable forms of knowing that were applied to theology, though differing 
Reformed orthodox theologians would prefer one or the other. The key change consists in 
refashioning the term scientia in a Ramistic way over against Aristotelian philosophy. That is, 
theology as a scientia is not deductive in such a sense that the first principle is the basis for 
conclusion. Instead, theology is the scientia of ‘living blessedly forever.’ Moreover, theology 
as a science cannot be categorised into Aristotle’s paradigm of intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, 
prudentia and ars since ‘the orthodox hesitancy to equate theology precisely with any human 
discipline permitted their systems to remain open to forms and patterns of knowing.’69 
The retaining the term scientia as one predicative of theology in the post-Reformation era 
proves the continuance of Aquinas’s idea of theology as a subalternate science. It should be 
noted that, by inheriting Thomistic terms, Reformed scholastics imported into them the notions 
of archetypal and ectypal theology, in order to defend the stance that the first principles of the 
subalternate science are self-evident by virtue of the ectypal knowledge of God as the revealed 
archetypal divine knowledge.70  Synopsis of a Purer Theology, the textbook of Reformed 
theology composed in the first quarter of the seventeenth century in the Netherlands, is an 
apparent instance. The first Disputation of the Synopsis begins with the elaboration on 
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archetypal theology (God’s self-knowledge) and ectypal theology (the revealed knowledge of 
God). In discussing the latter, it defines theology as a science:  
And if Theology is viewed insofar as it is the knowledge [scientia] that God either 
has communicated to created beings endowed with understanding in this age, or 
that He will share in the age to come, it is ectypal theology. And this knowledge 
communicated by God has been, so to speak, reproduced from the original in 
various ways and degrees of communication in people living on this earth, 
obviously through the grace of revelation.71  
As a Dutch Reformed theologian, Bavinck partook of the Reformed heritage of theology 
as a scientia. It is salient to note that early in his career, Bavinck edited the sixth edition of 
Synopsis of a Purer Theology.72 In the latest Bavinck biography, Eglinton points out that 
Bavinck made the decisions to be a minister of the church of Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk 
(Bavinck’s denomination) in Franeker and to edit the Synopsis at the same time, which together 
served for his future theological career. To be a minister, Bavinck expected for the appointment 
several years later in the Theological School in Kampen, the seminary of Christelijke 
Gereformeerde Kerk. Meanwhile, he turned to the Synopsis in order to become familiar with 
Reformed orthodoxy, as he had not learned enough about it in the University of Leiden. Both 
showed Bavinck’s ambition to be ‘a scientific theologian.’73  Hence, it is not surprising to find 
that Bavinck leaned heavily on this aspect of his heritage in constructing his own system. As 
will be seen, his elaboration on scientific theology and archetypal-ectypal theology goes some 
way to proving this observation. 
b. A Hermeneutical Meta-Paradigm and Its Threefold Promise 
Given this heritage, it is surprising that no Bavinck scholar hitherto has dedicated a 
monograph to construing Bavinck’s idea of theology as a science, namely theology as the 
science about God and of knowing God. Although Sutanto devotes his thesis to the exegesis of 
Bavinck’s idea of wetenschap, his work focuses on epistemology rather than figuring out the 
extent to which the term wetenschap could be a meta-language that can serve for the 
hermeneutical meta-paradigm of Bavinck’s system. As will be seen, both Sutanto’s work and 
this study unpack Bavinck’s stance on theology’s relation to the other sciences. However, they 
differ in that this study will first of all ascertain Bavinck’s view of scientific theology, from 
 
71 Dolf te Velde, ed., Synopsis of a Purer Theology, Volume 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 33. The Synopsis defines 
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which vantage point the affinity between theology and the other sciences will be explicated. 
That is to say, this study insists that it is Bavinck’s fundamental dogmatic methodology that 
determines theology’s relationship with the other sciences. In contrast with Sutanto, the work 
of Abraham Flipse elucidates much less Bavinck’s view of scientific theology. His purpose is 
to explore the nineteenth-century neo-Calvinist and neo-Thomistic efforts to articulate the 
relationship between Christianity and the natural sciences, which are reflective of their 
scientific ideals respectively. Hence, he engages with Bavinck briefly (leaving space for the 
elaboration on the whole neo-Calvinist movement) and focuses on Bavinck’s view of 
theology’s relation to the natural sciences.74 However, much more remains to be said. For that 
reason, in light of the now well-established new reading of Bavinck’s holistically integrated 
thought, the lacuna that is Bavinck’s idea of scientific theology needs to be filled in; otherwise, 
the methodological shortage in reading Bavinck’s theology will remain. Moreover, by filling 
in this gap, this thesis sets out to strengthen claims of a unified Bavinck, in particular regarding 
the holism of Bavinck’s system: Immersed in his own heritage, it will be argued, Bavinck 
articulated a scientific theology in the modern world. 
The importance of this study consists not only in the construal of the united Bavinck’s 
system (contra “two Bavincks”) but also in its attempt to go beyond the new reading of the 
organic motif. I need to clarify that going beyond does not deny, devalue or combat the new 
reading. On the contrary, this study is consciously undertaken as part of the Eglintonian school. 
Nonetheless, as Eglinton says, the new reading ‘has also only made the first steps in a wider 
movement in Bavinck studies.’75 This means that numerous further steps need to be taken.  
My thesis aims to make one step to demonstrate wetenschap as the meta-language of 
Bavinck’s system. Scientific theology or theology as a science is the referent of Bavinck’s 
theology. In this light, wetenschap is used to articulate an interpretative meta-paradigm of 
Bavinck’s theology. Thus, the significance of going beyond the new reading is found in the 
claim that the organic motif is subordinate to and serves for the meta-language of wetenschap. 
In other words, Bavinck loads “scientific” with a higher methodological status than “organic.” 
As will be seen in chapter four, “organic” is a part of the grammar of Bavinck’s scientific 
theology. 
This meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck leads to three promises: the analytic, the 
constructive, and the relevant. These promises correspond with three questions: (1) What is 
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natuurwetenschap, 1880-1940 (Torenlaan: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2014), 97-105. 
75 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 195. 
34 
Bavinck’s notion of scientific theology? (2) How does Bavinck attempt to construct scientific 
theology? (3) To what extent, if any, is Bavinck’s scientific theology relevant in the twentieth-
first century? 
The analytic promise aims to unpack Bavinck’s scientific theology (chapter 3) in view of 
his historical context (chapters 2). I will single out the rise of Religiewetenschap (the science 
of religion or religious science) and the movement of theological modernism as two contextual 
aspects to which Bavinck’s scientific theology responds. Then, I move on to shed light on 
Bavinck’s idea of theology as the science of God, that is, the science about God and of knowing 
God. I will set forth Bavinck’s twofold notion of wetenschap (the visible and the invisible) and 
three factors of his definition of scientific theology (God as the real object, assumptions in faith, 
and divine object-defining). At this point, a clarification needs to be made: the Dutch terms 
“wetenschap” and “wetenschappelijke” will be translated “science” and “scientific” throughout 
my thesis. 76  Of course, these two Dutch words can also be rendered “scholarship” and 
“scholarly” or “academic”. However, as will be pointed out in chapter 3, Bavinck himself takes 
issue with the restraint of the sense of wetenschap within the confines of natural science. 
Wetenschap has a broader connotation, as does its German cognate Wissenschaft. In this light, 
the English equivalents “science” and “scientific” are more faithful to Bavinck’s thinking. In 
short, the analysis of chapters 2-3 makes an attempt to sketch the landscape of Bavinck’s 
project of scientific theology.  
The constructive promise is, first, to explore the way in which Bavinck constructs his 
theological system. I will put forward five rationales––positive revelationalism, theological 
organicism, organically critical realism (chapter 4), dialectical catholicity, doxological 
teleology (chapter 5)––that constitute the single Trinitarian grammar of Bavinck’s scientific 
theology. It should be acknowledged that Bavinck himself did not comes up with these five 
rationales or labels them as the rationales of scientific theology in his work. Thus, the second 
aspect of the constructive promise consists in my construction of the Trinitarian grammar of 
Bavinck’s system. By doing so, my intention is to propose a hermeneutical meta-paradigm of 
Bavinck’s theology. Nonetheless, I do not mean that the five rationales have already exhausted 
the Trinitarian grammar, though I believe these rationales have ranged over most if not all that 
is quintessential to his Trinitarian grammar. This gives birth to the third aspect of the 
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constructive promise––that is, more scholarly attention can be drawn to illustrate Bavinck’s 
idea of scientific theology. 
The relevant promise concerns the Bavinckian practice of scientific theology in the 
contemporary university. As chapter 2 will show, Bavinck wrestled with the debate on the due 
place of theology in the academy from the outset of his career. Hence, I will first of all unfold 
Bavinck’s stance on theology’s relation to the other sciences in the academy in view of his 
immediate milieu (chapter 6). Unlike Sutanto’s epistemologically-focused demonstration, my 
argument shall begin with the Kuyper-Lindeboom debates on whether theology should be 
practised in the Free University in Amsterdam or the Theological School in Kampen, 
concentrating on their opposing views of sphere sovereignty and theological encyclopaedia. I 
will point out that Bavinck adopts a Christological approach (resembling Gregory Nazianzus’s 
slogan “the Unassumed is the unhealed”) to dealing with this debate, arguing for theology’s 
due place in the university without separation from the institutional church. This basic principle 
underlies Bavinck’s formulation of the Medieval idea “Theology as the Regina Scientiarum”–
–which is to say, theology’s Queenship is primarily spiritual and moral.  
Chapter 7 explores whether a Bavinckian approach to the practice of scientific theology 
can be developed in the university of the twentieth-first century. The history of Western 
universities seems to chart the decline of theology’s status as Queen. The question of how 
theological studies should be practised in the university of this century continues to draw a 
great deal of scholarly (and popular) attention. As a turn-of-the-century thinker, Bavinck’s 
scientific theology is not outdated. It gives us threefold promise at least: (1) The theologian 
needs to be humble yet to be courageous; (2) the identity of theologian has the ontological 
priority over that of university academic; (3) theological ethics can function as the point of 
contact between theology and the other sciences. With these three principles, Bavinck reminds 
the contemporary university theologian that they are not only the human agent qua academics 
who are conceived of as value-free or just producing scholarly work, but also, more importantly, 
the human agent qua theologian who should be the confessor of the Triune God and faithful to 
the object of scientific theology and play the role of leaven in the academy. 
Now, we turn to the narrative of Bavinck’s own historical contexts. Therein, one will see 
the challenging circumstances faced by the Reformed orthodox theology in the nineteenth-
century Netherlands. These hindrances make up the backdrop of Bavinck’s articulation of 
theology with the meta-language of wetenschap.
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Chapter 2 Against the Stream: Bavinck’s Refusal of the Unscientific Portrayals of 
Scientific Theology in the Nineteenth-Century Netherlands 
I. Introduction 
Born in 1854 and undertaking theological studies in the University of Leiden in the 1870s, 
Herman Bavinck engaged with the theological and historical legacies of the first half of the 
nineteenth century on the one hand, and on the other hand wrestled with various crises and 
challenges to the Christian faith thereafter. Numerous contextual aspects need be taken into 
consideration in order to grasp how Bavinck understood “scientific theology” in that particular 
historical milieu. Amongst them, two contextual factors are of particular importance: (1) the 
emergence of the “science of religion” or “religious science” (religiewetenschap)1  in the 
nineteenth-century Dutch academy, and (2) the movement of theological modernism. 
It should be noted that by exploring these two factors, no attempt is taken to absolutise 
their influences on Bavinck. Over against historicism, Bavinck’s scientific theology was not 
shaped by these contexts essentially and ultimately. Since the beginning of his theological 
career, Bavinck has already been aware that innate to the Christian faith, the Reformed faith 
par excellence, is scientificity.2 Hence, by inheriting Reformed legacies of theology as scientia, 
Bavinck’s scientific theology was, in some sense, contextually articulated to stand against his 
contemporary stream, particularly the science of religion and theological modernism. It is 
worth noting that other historical events shall be considered as well, such as the revolution of 
higher education in the nineteenth century, the Union of the Reformed Churches (which saw 
Bavinck’s denomination merge with the Doleantie church led by Abraham Kuyper) to produce 
the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland (1892) and the relationship between Theological 
School in Kampen and the Theological Faculty of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. These 
factors will be explored at pertinent places in the chapters that follow. 
 
1 Arie Molendijk points out that the use of the term “science of religion” ‘[depends] on whether it is seen as 
a special discipline or as a comprehensive designation for every kind of scholarly study of religion’; see Arie 
L. Molendijk, “Introduction,” in Religion in the Making: The Emergence of the Sciences of Religion, ed. 
Arie L. Molendijk and Peter Pels (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 15. Here, the term “science of religion” will be used 
inclusively to describe the scholarly study of religion emerged in the nineteenth-century Netherlands. Some 
other terms are also used, such as “history of religion”, “religious studies” and “comparative studies of 
religion”.  
2 Eglinton observes that the concern for scientific theology was a standard part of Bavinck’s heritage as a 
child of the seceder Church; Eglinton, Bavinck, 34-37; 61-62. 
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II. Religiewetenschap in the Nineteenth-Century Dutch Academy 
A. The Nineteenth-Century Dutch Religious Science 
The emergence of Religiewetenschap in the nineteenth-century Netherlands was seminal 
for the continuing development of this discipline around the world. 3  In the Netherlands, 
religious science has already been institutionalised as early as the 1870s by the Higher 
Education Act (1876). In that decade, Bavinck undertook theological studies in the University 
of Leiden, which was the centre of the Dutch modern theology at the time. The theological 
modernism in the Netherlands was not just generic “modern theology”, referring to the post-
Enlightenment liberal Protestantism. Moreover, as will be seen below, it was specific to 
Leiden.4 This Act was intended to replace the faculty of theology with the faculty of religious 
science in Dutch universities, albeit whilst retaining the subject name ‘Theology’ 
(Godgeleerdheid). Despite the Act’s intention, the education provided by Dutch theological 
faculties was a mixture of classical theology and religious studies. Not all of Leiden’s 
theologians conformed to the Act. For that reason, the science of religion began to clash with 
theology on the level of university education officially and publicly. 
It can be argued that the emergence and flourishing of religious science in the nineteenth-
century Netherlands was grounded in the Enlightenment. Rather than transforming religion to 
be rational, Els Stronks observes, ‘[t]he Protestant Dutch enlightenment was a moderate 
movement, in which religion and reason were carefully balanced and connected … all 
potentially controversial theological issues were avoided.’5 This moderate hallmark paved the 
way for the striving for religious toleration in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. Although the Dutch Republic held a religious policy of ‘ambivalent semi-tolerance’, 
as Jonathan Israel argues, a great extent of religious toleration could be discerned in those 
years. 6  This moderate attitude toward religion continued to be present in Dutch culture, 
particularly expressed in its critical reception of the French Revolution.7 Notwithstanding that 
the separation of the Church and the State in the Netherlands was largely influenced by the 
 
3 On the reputation of the early Dutch science of religion, see Arie L. Molendijk, The Emergence of the 
Science of Religion in the Netherlands (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 23-47. 
4 A helpful analysis of Dutch modern theology, see Eldred C. Vanderlaan, Protestant Modernism in Holland 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924). 
5 Els Stronks, Negotiating Differences: Word, Image and Religion in the Dutch Republic (Leiden: Brill, 
2011), 297. 
6  Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic : Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477- 1806 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 674-676. 
7  On neo-Calvinism and the French Revolution, see James Eglinton and George Harinck, eds., Neo-
Calvinism and the French Revolution (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
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Revolution, the Revolution’s hostility toward religion was refused because of the Anti-
Revolutionary movement led by Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876), the godfather 
of both Bavinck and Kuyper.8 The pursuit of pluralism in a society, which featured in the 
Revolution, stimulated the exploration of the other religions than Christianity. In other words, 
the Revolution matured the Dutch Enlightenment’s religious toleration and then set the scene 
for the flourishing of religious science in Dutch universities. What is more, the science of 
religion was reinforced by the development of interdisciplinary dialogue in the nineteenth-
century Netherlands. ‘Boundaries between disciplines were not yet established, and the 
scholars involved in the study of religion did communicate with each other.’9 
B. Cornelis Petrus Tiele on Religious Science 
In the period of the institutionalisation of religious science, the Netherlands had several 
leading scholars in this field, including the likes of Cornelis Petrus Tiele (1830-1902), P. D. 
Chantepie de la Saussaye (1848-1920) and Abraham Kuenen (1828-1891). Amongst the Dutch 
scholars of religious science in the nineteenth century, Tiele was the most eminent. He was 
born on 16 December 1830 and educated in the Athenaeum Illustre and the Seminary of the 
Remonstrant Church in Amsterdam. After that, he became a minister of the Remonstrant 
Brotherhood. In 1877, Tiele obtained a full professorship at the University of Leiden, 
occupying the first Dutch chair in history of religion until 1900. He is considered as the 
founding father of religious science in the Netherlands.10 Given this, Tiele’s view of religious 
 
8 Van Prinsterer perceived that the French Revolution had not been over at his time and its essence was none 
other than ‘the hatred of the Gospel’ and Christian faith; further, he asserted that ‘[t]he same principle of 
unbelief operated in philosophy proper, in the various branches of learning, and even in literature’; 
Guillaume Groen Van Prinsterer, Unbelief and Revolution, ed. and trans. Harry Van Dyke (Bellingham: 
Lexham, 2018), 94-95. Bavinck certainly grasped the core of van Prinsterer’s critique of the French 
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science would be a preferred lens through which the nature and character of this discipline 
could be discovered.11  
Tiele’s project of religious science is comprehensively set out in his Gifford Lectures 
Elements of the Science of Religion (1896-98). In the first pages, Tiele describes the science of 
religion by pointing out its object:  
The object of our science is not the superhuman itself, but religion based on belief 
in the superhuman and the task of investigating religion; as a historical-
psychological, social, and wholly human phenomenon undoubtedly belongs to the 
domain of science.12 
Three features of the science of religion can be perceived with respect to the statement above. 
First, this science must be bound up with religion rather than the object of religious faith. This 
means that religious science in essence differs from theology, whose object, according to 
Bavinck, is God Himself. Second, religious science is preoccupied with religious phenomena 
and manifestations. This point of view is fundamentally determined by Tiele’s idea of religion, 
as will be demonstrated. Third, religious science needs to engage with various disciplines, such 
as historical, psychological and social studies. For Tiele, the development of the other sciences 
largely ‘[makes] the existence of a science of religion possible.’13 
Tiele’s view corresponds with P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, who, although he is 
probably best known for Ethical theology, is reckoned by some among the founding fathers of 
religious science in the Netherlands. Chantepie de la Saussaye argues that ‘[t]he object of the 
science of religion is the study of religion, of its essence and its manifestations.’14 As with 
Tiele, Chantepie de la Saussaye sets forth three factors that are essential to religious science. 
First, ‘religion ... should become an object of philosophical knowledge’, which excludes the 
consideration of the divine revelation but is founded on Kant’s, Schleiermacher’s and Hegel’s 
thoughts. It should be noted that Chantepie de la Saussaye does not mean the lack of the idea 
of revelation in Kant’s, Schleiermacher’s and Hegel’s systems. His intention is to argue that it 
is modern philosophy, rather than Christian dogmatics, that first regards religion as the object 
of philosophical study. Second, the science of religion is conditioned by the philosophy of 
 
11 Bavinck appreciatively draws on Tiele’s religious science in Reformed Dogmatics many times, which will 
be illustrated in chapter 7, III.A.c. 
12 C. P. Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897-99), 
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13 C. P. Tiele, De Plaats van de Godsdiensten der Natuurvolken in de Godsdienstgeschiedenis (Amsterdam: 
P. N. van Kampen & Zoon, 1873), 5. 
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history, which delves into the history of civilisation and finds out the relation of religious 
phenomena to other aspects of human life. Third, the science of religion should interact with 
other disciplines, employing the fruits of the scientific studies of language, archaeology, 
philosophy, psychology and so forth.15 
By the comparison of Tiele’s and Chantepie de la Saussaye’s views of religious science, 
it could be affirmed that central to this science are the idea of religion and that of development. 
In the beginning of his Gifford Lecture, Tiele sets out the definition of religion: 
By religion we mean for the present nothing different from what is generally 
understood by that term that is to say, the aggregate of all those phenomena which 
are invariably termed religious, in contradistinction to ethical, aesthetical, political, 
and others. I mean those manifestations of the human mind in words, deeds, 
customs, and institutions which testify to man’s belief in the superhuman, and serve 
to bring him into relation with it.16 
It is plain that for Tiele religious phenomena, which are also called ‘[the] manifestations of the 
human mind’, are essential to the proper understanding of religion. The meaning of 
“manifestations” is further illustrated in the second part of these lectures. Therein, Tiele 
contends that the essence or being of religion should be interpreted in a psychological sense.17 
To a certain degree, Bavinck would be in sympathy with Tiele’s contention, as he argued early 
in 1897 that psychology is of considerable significance to all aspects of dogmatics.18 One 
decade later, Bavinck reasserted that ‘dogmatics … must become more psychological.’19 
Nonetheless, Bavinck and Tiele differ in that Bavinck maintains that the psychological 
dimension of religion depends upon the ‘objective knowledge of God’ as God has revealed.20 
In contradistinction, Tiele submits that ‘we must seek for [the being of religion] in the 
religiosity, or religious frame of mind, in which it has originated. Although in reality the two 
things are inseparable, we must try to distinguish between the ever-changing manifestations of 
religion and the sentiment which underlies them.’21 Given this, it could be argued that Tiele 
methodologically attempts to build a bridge between the external religious phenomena and the 
human internal religiosity. As Arie Molendijk rightly notes, Tiele’s view of religion cannot 
 
15 Ibid., 3-5. 
16 Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, 1:4. Emphasis added. 
17 Ibid., 2:188. 
18  Herman Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1897), 65; Herman Bavinck, 
“Foundations of Psychology,” trans. Jack Vanden Born, Nelson D. Kloosterman, and John Bolt, ed. John 
Bolt, TBR 9 (2018): 93. 
19 PR, 209. 
20 PR, 208. 
21 Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, 2:191. 
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simply be viewed as psychological in character. Rather, Tiele adopts an approach of from-the-
outside-to-the-inside: ‘Manifestations express underlying constituents.’22 On this score, Tiele’s 
project of religious science betrays the flavour of his contemporary positivism, which relies 
completely upon human perception as the way to obtain knowledge. 
Molendijk’s observation could be attested by Tiele’s analysis of the two aspects of 
religion. Tiele argues that ‘religion has a subjective and an objective side namely, religiosity 
and religion and it is only in the constant action and reaction of these two elements upon each 
other that the true nature of religion is fully revealed.’23 Notwithstanding his emphasis on the 
double aspect of religion, Tiele locates the nature of religion in the subjective side. He writes: 
[Religion] must be sought for in a certain sentiment or disposition in religiosity. 
Religion is essentially a frame of mind in which all its various elements have their 
source. Religion is piety, manifesting itself in word and deed, in conceptions and 
observances, in doctrine and in life.24  
This religiosity essentially and ultimately originates in ‘[the human] original, unconscious, 
innate sense of infinity’.25 This is ‘instinct, or an innate, original, and unconscious form of 
thought, or form of conception––it is the specifically human element in man, the idea which 
dominates him.’26 Interestingly, the concept of instinct is of importance to Abraham Kuyper 
(1837-1920), the leading neo-Calvinist theologian alongside Bavinck. He grounds the human 
instinct in God’s wisdom, being endowed by the human creation after the image of God. The 
human instinctive life consists in social, moral, religious and other realms. Furthermore, by 
referring to John Calvin, he maintains that “the seed of religion” reflects the reality of the 
instinctive foundation in religious realms.27  It is plain that Kuyper seeks to maintain the 
harmony of the subjective and the objective aspects of the human instinctive life. By contrast, 
Tiele takes a subjectivist way to account for the human instinct. 
For Tiele, the a priori sense of infinity is the precondition to religious science. Inasmuch 
as this sense is innate to human beings, it is worthwhile for religious science to explain religious 
phenomena in a psychological way. This is reminiscent of Ernst Troeltsch’s theory of 
“religious a priori.” According to Troeltsch, religious a priori refers to the a priori law of 
 
22 Molendijk, The Emergence of the Science of Religion in the Netherlands, 133. 
23 Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, 2:183. 
24 Ibid., 2:196. 
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26 Ibid., 2:231. 
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religious formation of ideas lying in the essence of human reason.28 In his view, the religious 
a priori is vital to religious science: ‘Religious science allows religion to exist as religion and 
regulate it only according to its own a priori.’29 Likewise, by insisting on the innate sense of 
infinity, Tiele safeguards the science of religion as a self-governed science that is devoted to 
the study of ‘how that one great psychological phenomenon which we call religion has 
developed and manifested itself in such various shapes among the different races and peoples 
of the world.’30 
The idea of development (ontwikkeling) is the other important factor of the science of 
religion.31 For Tiele, this idea is particularly significant. His contemporary Chantepie de la 
Saussaye contends that ‘the main idea of Tiele’s whole science of religion is development.’32 
Tim Murphy even asserts that Tiele’s Gifford Lectures are ‘[t]he clearest and most adamant 
post-Darwinian use and defence of the concept of development.’ 33  According to Tiele, 
‘[r]eligion too, like every human phenomenon, is governed by the all-embracing law of 
development from the lower to the higher, from the natural to the spiritual.’34  
Generally, the term “development” or “evolution” has two senses. First, ‘the object 
undergoing development is a unity’, within which ‘[t]he one does not merely succeed or 
supersede the other, but the one grows out of the other.’35  Thereby, Tiele articulates the 
universal unity of religion, having all religious sects become the object of religious science. 
Second, ‘each phase of the evolution has its value, importance, and right of existence, and that 
it is necessary to give birth to a higher phase, and continues to act in that higher phase.’36 This 
reflects Tiele’s optimistic attitude toward the development of religion, confirming the raison 
d’être and independence of every stage of the development.  
One might ask: How do the independence and the unity of various religious forms co-
exist? Tiele maintains the balance between the unity and the independence by the laws of 
 
28 Ernst Troeltsch, Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik, Gesammelte Schriften.II (Tübingen: 
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Carpenter, 7th ed. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd, 1905), x. 
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32 P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Portretten en Kritieken (Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn, 1909), 116. 
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36 Ibid., 1:30. 
43 
development. According to him, these laws govern and are indispensable to religious 
development.37 It should be noted that for Tiele the laws of religious development are not 
theorems but rather are presupposed. Hence, he designates these laws ‘[the] working 
hypothesis’, which is necessary for every science.38 He argues that ‘a complete system of laws 
of development’ can be distilled from various religious phenomena in history.39 Therefore, 
Chantepie de la Saussaye offers the critique that since ‘historical knowledge does not derive 
its method from the natural science’, such laws of religious development, as Tiele claims, lie 
outside of the human mind and can never be discovered by humans.40 
For Tiele, due to these laws of religious development, human religiosity, or a priori sense 
of infinity, appears in differing forms in the course of development. As he writes: 
the development of religion does not imply that religion develops locally or 
temporarily, in one form or another, but that religion, as distinguished from the 
forms it assumes, is constantly developed in mankind. Its development may be 
described as the evolution of the religious idea in history, or better as the progress 
of the religious man, or of mankind as religious by nature.41 
One may argue that Tiele is under the influence of idealism, particularly Hegel’s philosophy. 
However, Thomas Ryba reminds us that Tiele’s religious science is not simply Hegelian, but 
is also influenced by the philosophies of science which differ from the absolute idealism. More 
specifically, Tiele depends on ‘a conception of scientific structure which was both older than 
Hegel’s and more firmly grounded in the way scientists actually conducted empirical research 
in the 19th century.’42 
It is thus indisputable that Tiele’s idea of development lays a great emphasis on the 
development of religious phenomena, through which the essence of religion can be explicated. 
In this light, underlying Tiele’s science of religion is ‘a morphological development’, which 
means studying ‘religion as a psychological and ethnological phenomenon.’43  The whole 
project of Tiele’s science of religion could be summed up by the following statement: 
It is a special science or branch of study, and does not belong to general philosophy; 
but it is the philosophical part of the investigation of religious phenomena – a study 
which seeks to penetrate to their foundations. It is not a philosophic creed, or a 
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dogmatic system of what is commonly called natural theology, or a philosophy 
with a religious tinge, and still less a philosophy regarding God Himself. All this 
is beyond its province. It leaves these matters to theologians and metaphysicians. 
It is in fact literally the philosophy of religion … a philosophy which we must have 
the courage to reform, in accordance with the demands of science in its present 
state of development.44 
Tiele is confident that a thorough, intensive and extensive investigation of religious 
phenomena in the history of religious development can attain the knowledge of the essence of 
religion. In this regard, Tiele anticipates a potential question on the validity of religious science: 
How can an individual person grasp the knowledge of religions in all nations and places in his 
or her lifetime? He responds with the definition of science. Tiele argues that ‘science is ... an 
aggregate of researches, all tending to the same purpose, though independent yet mutually 
connected, and each in particular connected with similar researches on other domains, which 
thus serve as auxiliary sciences.’45 This is reminiscent of Tiele’s insistence on the contributions 
of the other sciences to the science of religion. With the assistance of the other sciences, 
religious sciences can ‘[seek] to penetrate to their foundations’ by the study of ‘religious 
phenomena’ in history and all over the world. 
The block quote above also reflects Tiele’s ambition to reform religious studies and 
theology. This ambition has already been embodied in his earlier work. According to 
‘Theologie en godsdienstwetenschap’ (Theology and Religious Science) (1866), Tiele’s 
project of religious science serves to generate a scientific study of theology. Tiele points out 
that there are three factors which hinder the appearance of the scientific study of theology.  
The first is the narrow-mindness, which dares not to be outside the borders of 
[theology’s] own religion. … [Second], the so-called pagan religions were still 
known too little, the notions that one formed from them were too superficial and 
defective, the sources that were requisite for their precise knowledge were still not 
accessible for all. … [The third factor] was the speculative method. … [I]f 
[theology] wants to become a science, it then must extend its borders and abandon 
the method of contemplation which is condemned in all other sciences, in order to 
enter the way of experience, to make the method of induction as much as hers.46 
 
44 Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, 1:15. Emphasis added. 
45 Tiele, “On the Study of Comparative Theology,” 588-589. 
46 C. P. Tiele, “Theologie en godsdienstwetenschap,” De Gids 30, no. 2 (1866): 216-8. Dutch original: ‘De 
eerste is die bekrompenheid, die zich buiten de grenzen harer eigene godsdienst niet waagt. … De 
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vormde te oppervlakkig en gebrekkig, de bronnen die tot haar juiste kennis noodig waren, nog niet voor 
allen ontsloten. … Het was de spekulatieve methode. … En daarom, wil zij een wetenschap worden, dan 
moet zij hare grenzen uitzetten, en de methode der bespiegeling die in alle andere wetenschappen 
veroordeeld is, mede verlaten, om den weg der ervaring te betreden, de methode der induktie evenzeer tot 
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With this in mind, Sigurd Hjelde maintains that Tiele’s intention is by no means to replace 
theology with the science of religion, but to undertake theology in the new way of religious 
science so as to safeguard theology within the Dutch academy.47 However, Hjelde’s estimation 
overlooks the commonality pertaining to religious science in the nineteenth century, that is, 
that ‘[it is] a more or less radically empirical affair, informed by sound philosophical and 
historical method.’ 48  Hence, Hjelde seems oblivious to the net result of Tiele’s method 
regarding religious science. Eventually, Tiele’s ambition was realised by the Higher Education 
Act (1876), which introduced religious science into universities and turned theology into 
religious studies, though the name “faculty of theology” was retained. In Bavinck’s view, by 
this reform, ‘theology is maimed and robbed of its heart and life.’49  Theology becomes 
preoccupied with numerous religious phenomena occurring in history rather than with God’s 
self-revelation. 
C. Summary 
It should be conceded that the science of religion rigorously safeguards the place of 
religion in the modern world. By investigating religious phenomena extensively, it proves that 
religion is by no means a phase of the development of human beings, which shall fade away 
eventually. Instead, religion is universal and intrinsic to humanity. However, Tiele’s 
developmental approach to exploring the essence of religion by investigating religious 
phenomena inevitably leads to the denial of religious particularity, which resonates with Ernst 
Troeltsch’s denial of the absoluteness of Christianity. Troeltsch writes:  
The Christian religion is in every moment of its history a purely historical 
phenomenon, subject to all the limitations to which any individual historical 
phenomenon is exposed, just like the other great religions. It is to be investigated, 
in every moment of its history, by the universal, verified methods of historical 
research.50 
Accordingly, the Christian faith is merely an accident and not a unique religious phenomenon. 
In view of this, Tiele’s claim for the uniqueness of Christianity, which presents the harmony 
 
47 Sigurd Hjelde, “The Science of Religion and Theology: The Question of Their Interrelationship,” in 
Religion in the Making: The Emergence of the Sciences of Religion, ed. Arie L. Molendijk and Peter Pels 
(Leiden: Brill, 1998), 105. 
48 Molendijk, “Introduction,” 3. 
49 Herman Bavinck, “Theology and Religious Studies in Nineteenth-Century Netherlands: Appendix B,” 
trans. Harry Boonstra, in Essays on Religion, Science and Society, ed. John Bolt (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2008), 283. 
50  Ernst Troeltsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions, trans. David Reid 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 85; emphasis added. 
46 
of transcendency and immanency, sounds pale and frail somewhat. 51  In addition, it is 
unconvincing for him to infer the kernel of all religion, that is the spiritual unity of God and 
the human being, from the union of Jesus Christ’s two natures. 52  Moreover, the idea of 
revelation becomes redundant; what theology inquiries into is nothing other than what is 
perceptible and sensible, which can be investigated by general empirical methods. If such were 
a case, how could theology claim to be the science of the invisible God? How could theology 
be called “the Queen of the sciences”? How could Christian dogmatics be a science that is 
grounded in God’s revelation and attains the certainty of the knowledge of God? In a letter to 
his friend and fellow Leiden alumnus Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), therefore, 
Bavinck emphatically argues that the transformation of theology into religious science is 
actually to acknowledge that ‘God cannot be known and thus the eternal life is unattainable.’53 
Bavinck acutely discerned the challenges of religious science to theology. In 
Godgeleerdheid en godsdienstwetenschap (1892), Bavinck drew a conclusion that ‘theology 
and religious studies are incompatible and cannot be contained in one department.’54 The most 
important reason is that God is the object of theology, which is the fundamental principle of 
the discipline of theology.55 To be sure, with the rise of religious science in the nineteenth-
century Netherlands, Bavinck on the one hand tried to maintain the scientific nature of theology 
and its valid place in the Dutch academy, and on the other hand painstakingly defended the 
essential distinction between theology and religious science. 
III. Theological Modernism 
If the emergence and flourishing of religious science was the external challenge to the validity 
of theology as a science in Dutch universities, the nineteenth-century theological modernism 
was the internal factor that undermined the scientificity of theology. At this point, it is 
significant to consider how Dutch theologians in that century dealt with the relationship 
between theology and the other sciences as well as the view of the scientificity of theology. 
Before the nineteenth century and particularly under the sway of the Enlightenment, the 
Western worldview underwent change: the supernatural was being replaced by the natural, with 
the authority of religion being made subordinate to the autonomy of human reason and 
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conscience. In the Netherlands, this radical change did not take place at the pace of what 
happened in the other European countries. In the first three decades of the nineteenth century, 
mainline Dutch Protestant theology committed itself to a high view of the divine revelation in 
the Bible and the Bible’s reliability. Theology played a significant role in society. Kant, Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel were widely refused by Dutch theologians at the time because of these 
German thinkers’ surrendering of revelation to reason.56 A historical factor of this refusal might 
be the Dutch positive reception of an earlier stage of the Enlightenment at the pre-Kant time, 
as early as the time of Spinoza. However, around 1700, the Dutch scholars gradually called 
into doubt that reason can enable humans to establish the true religion and religious uniformity. 
This distrust of the function of reason in religion had already put down roots so that the Dutch 
scholars struggled to accept the thoughts of Kant and other German thinkers. 57  Eldred 
Vanderlaan argues that not until the 1840s did the modern worldview first gain ground in the 
Netherlands through the study of German philosophy and the influence of scientific realism. 
In those years, Dutch theologians were not enthusiastic in re-interpreting old doctrines, as 
German liberal theologians had done.58 Dutch modernism was more preoccupied with natural 
science and the influence thereof, which exerted a great impact on their understanding of the 
Christian faith and the hermeneutics of the Bible.  
This can be proved by D. T. Huet’s Wenken opzigtelijk de Moderne theologie 
(Deliberately Beckoning Modern Theology). According to James Eglinton, this is the first work 
in the Netherlands to define the term “modernism” theologically. By this work, theological 
modernism was defined as a theological movement occasioned by Johannes Scholten’s De leer 
der Hervormde Kerk (The Doctrine of the Reformed Church) and Cornelis Opzoomer’s De 
weg der wetenschap (The Way of Science).59 Huet argued that the theological modernism in 
the nineteenth-century Netherlands was characterised by ‘a critical handling of the Bible.’60 
This critical method was conditioned by the appreciation of natural science at the time. As a 
response to this, Huet set out an absolute antithesis between natural science and the Bible: 
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These two [the Bible and science] would not easily be brought into agreement. 
Certainly: the Bible presupposes faith, and science is unbelieving; the Bible is 
faithful, and science is suspicious; the Bible is childlishly simple, and science is 
finely cunning; the Bible gives itself openly, and science aims for exposed points; 
the Bible speaks the language of religion, and science speaks it from sifting mind; 
the Bible belongs to God’s foolishness and weakness, and science is the wisdom 
and strength of human beings.61 
Numerous theologians in the nineteenth-century Netherlands painstakingly wrestled with this 
antithetical relationship between the Christian faith and natural science, which could be traced 
back as far as to the Groninger school in the 1830s. 
A. The Groninger School 
The Groninger school, whose thought centred on the University of Groningen, shaped its 
theology under the influence of Phillip Willem van Heusde (1778-1839), who was one of the 
first Dutch advocates of Enlightened German theology and philosophy.62 One aspect of van 
Heusde’s legacies for the Groninger theologians was the reception of the German 
Vermittlungstheologie (mediation theology), one of whose goals was to reconcile the 
traditional Protestant doctrines of the Reformation confessions with the modern studies of 
science, philosophy and history.63 This was express in the Groninger school’s refashioning the 
idea of faith. The Groninger school argued that the Christian faith by no means referred to 
dogmatic articles and teachings. Rather, faith was ‘a trustful self-giving to Christ and God,’ 
which was generated by the human experience of God’s love.64  K. H. Roessingh is thus 
convinced that the Groninger theologians’ approach to the relationship between Christianity 
and scientific culture must differ from that of old liberalism, which subordinated Christian faith 
 
61 Huet, Wenken Opzigtelijk Moderne Theologie, 17. Dutch original: ‘Zij zullen het niet ligt eens worden, 
deze twee. Natuurlijk: de Bijbel onderstelt geloof, en de Wetenschap is ongeloovig; de Bijbel is ter goeder 
trouw, en de Wetenschap is achterdochtig; de Bijbel is kinderlijk eenvoudig, en de Wetenschap is fijn gesle 
pen; de Bijbel geeft zich bloot, en de Wetenschap mikt op de onbedekte punten; de Bijbel spreekt de taal der 
godsdienst, en de Wetenschap die van het ziftend verstand; de Bijbel behoort tot het dwaze en zwakke Gods, 
en de Wetenschap is de wijsheid en sterkte van den mensch.’ 
62 Further on the Groninger school and its theology, see Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 6-11; James Hutton 
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45-82. 
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indigentiae) and the “feeling of love” (sensus amoris); see Roessingh, De Moderne Theologie in Nederland, 
30. 
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to modern science. 65  For Groninger school, there was no longer contradiction between 
scientific statements and those of faith insofar as the latter were predicated upon religious 
feeling. In other words, the criterion to judge the place of a statement in dogmatics lays in one’s 
pious mind rather than in the natural, historical or philosophical sciences. Nonetheless, it does 
not mean that the Groninger school repudiated historical and scientific truth. Rather, based on 
human inner experience, dogmatics began to seek for the truth of Christianity as ‘known from 
the Bible, from the history and from its own experience.’ 66  It could be argued that the 
Groninger school advocated the mediation between theology and modern natural science by 
the prioritisation of religious feeling. In essence, it articulated an independence model that cut 
theology off from the other sciences. 
B. The Leiden School 
The concern of Vermittlungstheologie did not disappear in the Leiden school, though the 
Leiden theologians disagreed with the Groninger school on the practice of mediation between 
theology and the natural sciences. This disagreement was due to the founder of the Leiden 
school, Johannes Scholten (1811-1885), who lived with his uncle van Heusde while studying 
in Utrecht. Despite that in his inaugural lecture at the University of Franeker in 1840 Scholten 
broke with the Heusdiaans by critiquing their Christology as inherently Arian and Docetic, it 
was probable that van Heusde’s advocation of Vermittlungstheologie continued to make an 
impact on Scholten.67 
In order to understand Scholten’s modernist view of theology and its relation to the other 
sciences, first of all, his theory of the two principles of the Reformation should be set out. In 
De leer der Hervormde Kerk in hare grondbeginselen (The Doctrine of the Reformed Church 
in Its Fundamental Principles), Scholten argues that the formal principle of the Reformation is 
the Holy Scripture that is the source and criterion of Christian theology (volume 1), and that 
the material principle is the absolute sovereignty of God, that is, God’s absolute supremacy 
and the particularity of His free grace in Jesus Christ (volume 2).68 The latter, which reflects 
Scholen’s idealism and theological determinism, contributes significantly to shaping 
 
65 Roessingh, De Moderne Theologie in Nederland, 27. 
66 Ibid., 32. 
67 See Mackay, Religious Thought in Holland during the Nineteenth Century, 88; Eglinton, Trinity and 
Organism, 13-14. 
68 Johannes Scholten, De leer der Hervormde Kerk in hare grondbeginselen, 4th ed., 2 vols. (Leiden: P. 
Engels, 1861), on the formal principle, particularly see 1:76-96; on the material principle, particularly see 
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reformierten Kirche, Dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt, 2 vols. (Zürich: Orell, Füssli und Com, 1844-
1847). 
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Scholten’s views of theology, nature and the world. On the other hand, Scholten’s debate with 
Cornelis Willem Opzoomer (1821-1892), who was championed as the second father of 
theological modernism in the Netherlands, brought about a great change in Scholten’s thinking, 
that is, the transfer of his emphasis largely from the ideal to the empirical.69 
These two factors lay down the monistic and mechanical character of Scholten’s 
theological predestinationism. For Scholten, this predestinationism is the fundamental 
principle for the Reformed Church’s engagement with the world and nature: ‘The Reformed 
Church has the calling to build further on its premise that the final result of the development 
of the world must fulfil God’s eternal plan, to abolish dualism out of the power of its 
principles.’70 One would be impressed that Scholten’s optimistic gesture toward the natural 
world falls short of a healthy view of the supernatural. As Bavinck has noted, notwithstanding 
that Scholten’s theology has the merit that ‘God is immanent and reveals Himself in all created 
things’, he nevertheless belittles special divine revelation insofar as God has revealed Himself 
in all His works, in nature, in history.71 Bavinck’s judgment can be attested by Scholten’s 
methodological statement in De leer der Hervormde Kerk: 
My point of view is, as one intends, empirical, insofar as, according to my 
conviction, all science must begin with the observation of facts, but not, as if I 
would think, that science was limited to the empirically observed, but to come from 
the empirically ascertained to the knowledge of invisible truth, which is recognised 
in observation by reason. Thus, there is no observation without reflection, also no 
reflection without observation, but reflection is grounded in observation.72 
Accordingly, Vanderlaan rightly estimates that central to Scholten’s theological system is the 
rationale of ‘from nature and man to God.’73 Given this, Scholten reckoned modern natural 
science to provide the indispensable tools of seeking for and validating what is God’s revelation 
in nature. 
This high view of natural science was not unfamiliar to Cornelis Willem Opzoomer, who 
was the best representative of the empirical school in the nineteenth-century Netherlands. 
 
69 Hendrikus Berkhof, Two Hundred Years of Theology: Report of a Personal Journey, trans. John Vriend 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 102. 
70 Scholten, De leer der Hervormde Kerk in hare grondbeginselen, 2:418-419. 
71  Herman Bavinck, “Recent Dogmatic Thought in the Netherlands,” trans. Geerhardus Vos, The 
Presbyterian and Reformed Review 3, no. 10 (1892): 215. 
72 Scholten, De leer der Hervormde Kerk in hare grondbeginselen, 1:lxi. Dutch original: ‘Mijn standpunt is, 
zoo men wil, empirisch, inzoover, naar mijne overtuiging, alle wetenschap met de waarneming van feiten 
beginnen moet, doch niet, alsof ik meenen zou, dat de wetenschap tot het, empirisch waargenomene te 
beperken ware, maar om van het empirisch geconstateerde te komen tot de kennis der onzigtbare waarheid, 
die door de rede in het waargenomene erkend wordt. Dus geene waarneming zonder bespiegeling; ook geene 
bespiegeling zonder waarneming; maar bespiegeling gegrond op waarneming.’ 
73 Vanderlaan, Protestant Modernism in Holland, 33. 
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Three years after Scholten’s arrival at the University of Leiden, Opzoomer took the post of the 
professor of philosophy at the University of Utrecht in 1846 and occupied the chair until 1889. 
As has been mentioned earlier, Opzoomer had a debate with Scholten, which exerted a great 
impact upon the latter. This debate originated in the conflict between Opzoomer’s empiricism 
and positivism and Scholten’s idealism. Opzoomer’s positivistic and empiristic philosophy is 
clearly laid out in De Twijfel des Tijds (The Doubt of the Age), which was a speech for the 
commencement of the academic lessons at the University of Utrecht in 1850. There, Opzoomer 
maintained that what philosophy could offer is uncertainty, doubt and inter-contradictory 
points of view.74 By contrast, he maintained, the conflict between different parties could be 
subsided by the natural sciences, wherein observation and experience furnishes fully satisfied 
proof for all propositions.75  This positivism and high praise of the natural sciences were 
reinforced by Opzoomer’s definition of truth. He wrote: 
The common answer to the question what truth is, granted, is completely useless. 
An accurate distinction between the two differing kinds of received truths, and the 
attention to the way which has brought us to them, make us arrive at a different 
answer and explanation for truth: 1. everything that is merely the simple, not 
contaminated by conclusions, the explanation of our perceptions; and 2. everything 
that is derived from the perceptions, without being repudiated by others, according 
to the method of the natural sciences, and moreover competent to make predictions 
which affirms the result.76 
What is plain here is Opzoomer’s emphasis on a positivistic view of knowledge and the 
methodological significance of the natural sciences for acquiring truths, no matter the 
immediate or the mediate. 77  Without hesitation, Opzoomer applied this epistemological 
method to religion, arguing that two philosophies could deal with religious phenomena. The 
first is the philosophy of positivism, whose principle is that knowledge does not stand outside 
of the sphere of experience. The second is the philosophy of experience, which can defend 
religion and Christianity.78 
 
74 Cornelis Willem Opzoomer, De Twijfel des Tijds. De Wegwijzer der toekomst (Leiden: J. H. Gebhard & 
Comp, 1850), 16-17. 
75 Ibid., 26. 
76 Opzoomer, De weg der wetenschap, 17; emphasis added. Dutch original: ‘Het gewone antwoord, op de 
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78 Opzoomer, De Twijfel des Tijds, 29. 
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To contrast Opzoomer with Scholten, it is striking that although they held differing (even 
opposing) positions, they finally agreed in the high value of empirical reality and the natural 
sciences. They would concur that by the natural sciences the complete truth about God can be 
found in the visible world. Hence, Roessingh rightly notes that notwithstanding the conflict 
between Scholten and Opzoomer, ‘the actual content of their systems, the result of their 
research, is evidently to be of one spirit.’79 In short, this naturalism and modern scientism 
rendered the Christian faith cold, merely propositional and subordinate to human perceptions, 
which the ethical theology resolutely condemned. 
C. The Ethical School 
In the nineteenth-century Netherlands, the movement of ethical theology occurred at 
nearly the same time as theological modernism. Hendrikus Berkhof describes this movement 
as a ‘parallel to the theologies of mediation’ which had appeared in Germany and England.80 
It sought to mediate between traditional orthodoxy and theological modernism, between the 
Christian faith and other sciences, by laying the emphasis on the ethical factor of the Christian 
faith. This could be clearly seen in the theological system of Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye 
(1818-1874), who co-founded the ethical theology with J. H. Gunning (1829-1905).81  
With a Reformed upbringing in his youth, Chantepie de la Saussaye went to study 
theology at the University of Leiden in 1836. One of his teachers was Johan Frederik van Oordt 
(1794-1852), who brought the theology of the University of Groningen to Leiden and exerted 
a great influence on Chantepie de la Saussaye. After participating in ministry in Leeuwarden, 
Leiden and Rotterdam successively, he became a professor at the University of Groningen in 
1872. 
In order to seek a via media between faith and reason, between theology and the other 
sciences, Chantepie de la Saussaye aligned himself with Vermittlungstheologie.82 He first 
recognised the value of the outcomes of modern sciences. According to him, to deny the true 
sciences, which bring about irrefutable results on fixed grounds, is de facto antithetical to ‘the 
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foundational principles of Christian faith’, which, in other words, is ‘the unbelief in God’s 
word, in the future of humankind, in the promise of the Lord, in the guidance of the Spirit.’83 
Interestingly, Bavinck argued in a similar way that the ‘facts advanced by geology … are just 
as much words of God as the content of Holy Scripture and must therefore be believingly 
accepted by everyone.’84 In spite of the similar appreciation of the findings of science, they 
differ in that, whereas Bavinck highlighted the importance of dogmatic system to the Christian 
faith, Chantepie de la Saussaye relocated the essence of the Christian faith not in doctrinal 
expressions but rather in the ethical manifestations of the Christian life. Chantepie de la 
Saussaye’s ethical principle to deal with the Christian faith can be summarised as follows: ‘the 
recognition of the objective nature of truth was more a matter of manifestation – not in the 
intellect, but in the conscience and life of the Christian.’85 It should be clarified here that for 
Chantepie de la Saussaye the term “ethical” refers to something more than morality. Rather, it 
indicates ‘something close to what we mean by “existential”.’86 Given this, Bavinck rightly 
observed that for ethical theologians the human being ‘knows and understands the truth not by 
reason and intellect, but by his soul, his heart, his conscience, in his capacity as a true man, a 
moral being.’87 In this way, truth and life are inseparably bound together.88 Chantepie de la 
Saussaye hence contended that the true zeal for Reformed orthodoxy does not consist in 
doctrinal battles, but rather in the expressions of the practical goal of life.89 In this light, he 
held fast to a bidirectional movement between doctrine and life as two polarities. Meanwhile, 
he maintained that theology has the legitimate right to exist in the academy. 
The doubt about the right of the existence of theological faculty rests on the doubt 
about the scientific right of theology itself. Is it not that it was called the Queen 
before but now is narrowly tolerated as maidservant (ancilla) that indeed refers to 
religious faith, but not to a science of faith, a science about God and divine things? 
Science–– so is claimed–– has only to do with phenomena, with their connection, 
not with their ultimate and deepest ground. This is not investigated. The subject 
matter of what is called theology so far is divided under the sections, philology, 
history and philosophy, but what held together the subject matter is the religious 
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idea, which is the idea of God and of his relation to the world in general and to 
humanity in particular, remains outside the field of science.90 
It is plain that Chantepie de la Saussaye’s mediating approach is to separate theology from the 
other sciences by withdrawing the Christian faith from the realm of empirical reality. This 
corresponds with the model of independence advocated by the Groninger school, as has been 
demonstrated earlier. However, Chantepie de la Saussaye’s approach deprives theology of its 
scientificity and renders theology thoroughly non-empirical. Taking his method further, 
theology would lapse into mysticism or agnosticism. Now that God is outside the empirical 
world, either the idea of God is generated by human imagination and fantasy, or humans cannot 
attain the veracious knowledge of God. 
D. Malcontents 
When it comes to the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the Second Golden Age 
(the early twentieth century), the situation changed. An increasing number of students chose to 
study technical sciences and the natural sciences rather than theology or law. According to Jan 
Bank and Maarten van Buuren, there were over sixty percent of students studying theology and 
law in 1890; however, the number dramatically declined in the last ten years of the nineteenth 
century. At the turn of the twentieth century, technical science, commerce, math and physics 
became favourite among most students.91 This is because partly of the creation of the Higher 
Burgher Schools by the prime minister Johan Rudolf Thorbecke (1798-1872)––to educate the 
new middle class in professional training without sending them to universities, partly of a series 
of strategies of educational reform in the 1870s, which triggered the expansion of university 
research.92 
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3807 20.1 1739 9.7     29.8 18894 
1890/91-
1899/00 
4969 18.0 3644 13.2     31.2 27606 
1900/01-
1909/10 
6575 17.7 4869 13.1 5719 15.4   46.2 37119 
1910/11-
1919/20 
9332 16.1 5814 10.0 15762 27.1 2214 3.8 57.0 58083 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % % No. 
Table 1 The Statistics of Students and Subjects from 1880-192093 
In those years, Dutch natural science and scholarship attained high achievements. Jacobus 
van ’t Hoff (1877-96) was awarded the very first Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1901. In the 
following year, the Nobel Prize for Physics was granted to Hendrik Lorentz (1877-1910) and 
Pieter Zeeman (1894-1935). At the national and the social levels, the natural sciences were 
being prioritised over theology.94 Interestingly and notably, the idea of godless religion had 
almost perished in the Netherlands in the 1890s and the early twentieth century; to ground 
theology in human moral nature was increasingly rejected.95 The supernatural characteristics 
of religion were re-introduced into religion and theology. In Bavinck’s words, ‘the “period of 
[Ernest] Renan” (with its scientific materialism, its religious modernism, its moral 
utilitarianism, its aesthetic naturalism, and its political liberalism) is no longer the spirit of the 
age.’96 ‘Doctrines that had long since been viewed as outdated and dismissed … have again 
come into conversation … The richness of religion speech in believing circles has awakened 
jealousy, and the ancient Christian confession has found an appreciative verdict among 
many.’97 This new tendency is labelled ‘young moderns’, ‘malcontents’ or ‘moderns of the 
 
93 Joh. de Vries, “De academicus en het bedrijfsleven: historisch perspectief,” in Jonge academici en het 
bedrijfsleven, ed. A. L. Mok (Rotterdam: Universitaire Pers, 1972), 123. 
94 On further, see Bank and van Buuren, 1900, 249-268. 
95 Vanderlaan, Protestant Modernism in Holland, 96-97. 
96  CWV, 23. The philosophy of Ernest Renan (1823–1892), which advocated scientific materialism, 
dominated the climate of the Netherlands of the late nineteenth century. Cf. George Harinck, “The Religious 
Character of Modernism and the Modern Character of Religion: A Case Study of Herman Bavinck's 
Engagement with Modern Culture,” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 29, no. 1 (2011): 71-72. 
97 Bavinck, “Modernism and Orthodoxy,” 87; also see 92; cf. Herman Bavinck, Geleerdheid en Wetenschap 
(Amsterdam: Höveker & Wormser, 1905), 19-20. 
56 
right.’98 Nonetheless, it does not say that there was no anti-supernatural voice. B. D. Eerdmans 
(1868-1948) asserted that however attractive the supernatural worldview might be, it would be 
repudiated by sober perception.99 
By the survey of the relation and tensions between theology and the other sciences, 
particularly the natural sciences, the contour of theological modernism has been sketched 
clearly. Briefly, as Mackay observes, ‘[theological modernism] was an attempt to combine a 
positivist or naturalistic view of life and of the world with the Christian faith.’100 In so doing, 
all modernist theologians, without any exception, treated theology under the guidance of the 
other sciences rather than under the authority of Holy Scripture. This theological modernism 
was one of the targets of Bavinck’s scientific theology. Bavinck held an opposing position: ‘At 
every moment science and art come into contact with Scripture, the principia for the entire life 
are given in Scripture.’101 
IV. Concluding Remark: On Defending the Authentic Scientificity of Theology against 
the Stream 
The investigations of Religiewetenschap and theological modernism in the nineteenth-century 
Netherlands show that a number of Bavinck’s contemporaries attempted either to subordinate 
theology to the other sciences, or to transform theology into a scientific study of religion, or to 
judge and deny the scientificity of theology under the criteria of the other sciences. Given these, 
it suffices to say that Bavinck’s mission was to safeguard and demonstrate the scientificity of 
theology per se and to debunk the relevant criticism. 
To what extent do these historical contexts contribute to the formation of Bavinck’s view 
of theology as a science? Are Religiewetenschap and theological modernism the ultimate 
causes of his scientific theology? As laid down in the beginning of this chapter, historicism is 
repudiated here. These historical contexts are the accidents, the “stream”, against which 
Bavinck makes use of received Reformed traditions, the substance. In this light, one would 
find, without denying the development of his theology, the consistency of Bavinck’s view of 
theology as a science in the years before and after the 1890s, when the content of modernism 
changed.102 
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In the year of being appointed as the professor at the Theological School in Kampen, 
Bavinck emphatically argued in ‘De Wetenschappelijke Roeping Onzer Kerk’ (The Scientific 
Calling of Our Church) (1882): 
Now a Church without theology is a body without head. A theology without a 
Church dies. Church without theology languishes. The Christian Church has felt 
that from the beginning. ... And the Protestant churches were conscious of it equally 
well and much better. Protestantism and science belong together. A university was 
Calvin’s ideal. And his example was followed in the Reformed churches 
everywhere.103  
For Bavinck, scientificity is intrinsic to the Christian faith; its seed has already been sown in 
Christianity at the outset. Thus, he encouraged his Reformed orthodox contemporaries to live 
out ‘a flourishing scientific life’ in adhering to the scientific tradition of Christianity.104 
Bavinck’s point of view is not unique but corresponds with that of Kuyper. In his 
Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid, Kuyper writes:  
first, although theology is no abstract speculation, but as a positive science has its 
origin from life itself, in this first period it furnished a so-many-sided intellectual 
activity, that to-day there is almost no single department of theology which does 
not trace its beginnings to this first period. And, secondly, in that in this first period 
the several tendencies which henceforth were to dominate the study of theology 
delineate themselves almost completely.105 
Plainly, although Kuyper maintains that it was not until Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae 
that theology matured into a science, his argument nevertheless presses the claim that the seed 
of scientific theology was first sown many centuries ago.106 Therefore, in his fourth Stone 
Lecture, Kuyper defends the scientificity of the Christian faith and explicates what benefits 
modern sciences could gain from theology, particularly of the Calvinist sort. He argues that 
‘[t]here is found hidden in Calvinism an impulse, an inclination, an incentive, to scientific 
investigation.’107 More importantly, Calvinism ‘has fostered love for science and restored to 
science its domain’, and ‘has advanced its indispensable liberty.’108 This high view of Calvinist 
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contribution to modern sciences, Bavinck and Kuyper argue, is a hallmark of neo-Calvinism–
–the nationwide movement in the nineteenth-century Netherlands, which aimed to revive 
Calvinism to penetrate every facet of national life and within which Bavinck was deeply 
involved.  
Given this, it is beyond doubt that Bavinck’s defence of theology’s scientificity treated as 
fact that scientificity is innate to Christian theology (especially Protestant theology), and that 
the scientific nature of theology had been mishandled by modernist theologians and the 
scholars of religious science in the nineteenth-century Netherlands. To this extent, 
Religiewetenschap and theological modernism were the occasions by which Bavinck sought to 
demonstrate the scientific nature of theology. 
Now that theology is, for Bavinck, intrinsically scientific, what is the character of a 
distinctly scientific theology? How does Bavinck define scientific theology? Are there any 
rationales weaving together various doctrinal loci into a scientific system? Has Bavinck 
robustly and convincingly responded those challenges to scientific theology? Or as Katherine 
Sonderegger has argued, does Bavinck belong rather in the ranks of the mediating 
theologians?109
 
109 Katherine Sonderegger, Systematic Theology, Volume 1: The Doctrine of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2015), xxi, notes 1. 
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Chapter 3 Herman Bavinck on Theology as the Science of God 
Bavinck was first and foremost a man of science.1 
W. B. Kristensen 
I. Introduction 
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) enrolled as a theological student together with 
Bavinck at the University of Leiden in 1874. Although their careers went in different ways––
Snouck Hurgronje became a scholar of Islam and the foremost advisor of the Dutch 
government on affairs in the East Indies, whereas Bavinck became a pastor and then 
dogmatician––they built a lifelong friendship from their student years in Leiden onwards.2 On 
18 June 1895, Snouck Hurgronje wrote a letter to Bavinck after reading the first volume of the 
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. He said: 
It is true that I imagine myself in your faith somewhat but cannot call myself your 
fellow believer; however, I do not regard myself as being in possession of an 
unbelief or a science or theory which would stand higher than your conviction. … 
For myself, I disregard the world of the absolute as the object of science and all 
scientific discussions of metaphysical subjects give me the impression of a 
description of colours by the blind, who, for example, would give the name of a 
sound or tone to each colour.3 
Clearly, despite Bavinck’s comprehensive and lengthy discourse on the scientific nature of 
theology in the Reformed Dogmatics, Snouck Hurgronje persisted in rejecting the legitimacy 
of theology as a science due to theology’s metaphysical character. Is Snouck Hurgronje’s 
informal criticism of Bavinck’s scientific theology justified? How did Bavinck respond to his 
close friend’s euphemistic objection?  
In fact, we cannot ascertain if Bavinck wrote in reply to Snouck Hurgronje to account for 
his view of scientific theology in a more detailed way. No such letter is extant. Nonetheless, it 
could be imagined how Bavinck would demonstrate the scientific nature of theology according 
to his holistic view of scientific theology as elaborated in his numerous writings. In this way, 
we can find out, on the one hand, how Bavinck wrestled with the various threats to the scientific 
 
1 W. B. Kristensen, “On Herman Bavinck's Scientific Work,” trans. Laurence O'Donnell, Reformed Faith & 
Practice 3, no. 1 (2018): 41. 
2 Further on the friendship between Snouck Hurgronje and Bavinck, see J. de Bruijn and George Harinck, 
“Inleiding,” in J. de Bruijn and George Harinck, eds., Een Leidse Vriendschap. De briefwisseling tussen 
Herman Bavinck en Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje 1875-1921 (Baarn: Ten Have, 1999), 7-13. 
3  “Snouck Hurgronje aan Bavinck, Weltevreden, 18 juni, 1895,” de Bruijn and Harinck, Een Leidse 
Vriendschap, 144-145. This letter was Snouck Hurgronje’s reply to Bavinck’s earlier letter, which was not 
preserved. 
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nature of theology in the nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Netherlands by his 
project of scientific theology, and on the other hand, what the rationales of Bavinck’s scientific 
theology are. In the course of examining Bavinck’s project of scientific theology, the 
fundamental idea therein can be perceived: theology is the science of God, that is, the science 
about God and of knowing God. By pinning down this core idea, “scientific theology” can be 
articulated as a meta-paradigm that epitomises the fundamental characteristics and themes of 
Bavinck’s system to set forth a big picture of his dogmatic theology. 
Before the discourse on the rationale of Bavinck’s scientific theology in next two chapters, 
this chapter will first explore Bavinck’s view of theology as the science of God and his 
scientific theology in neo-Calvinism more broadly, particularly by the comparison with 
Abraham Kuyper’s and Geerhardus Vos’s scientific theologies. It is worth noting that one 
significant trait of Bavinck’s discourse on scientific theology is his simultaneously and 
continuously having in mind both theology and the other sciences. This is significantly related 
to Bavinck’s ambition to defend theology as an independent discipline in the university in 
confrontation with religious science and the natural sciences. Given this, Bavinck’s definition 
of science in general needs be presented prior to the analysis of his view of theology as a 
particular science. 
II. Bavinck’s General Definition of Science 
A. Twofold Wetenschap  
In the Anglophone world, the word “science” excludes humanities disciplines, let alone 
theology. However, that is not the case in the Dutch language, where the term wetenschap 
applies generally to higher reflective forms of knowledge and includes humanities disciplines. 
In particular, while delivering the Stone Lectures to English-speaking audiences at Princeton 
Theological Seminary, Bavinck emphatically argues that ‘natural science is not the only 
science, and cannot be.’4 Evidently, he holds a broader sense of wetenschap (science). Prior to 
the analysis of this broader sense, Bavinck’s view of the landscape of science should be 
presented first. From this vantage point, his definition of science will be grasped more properly.  
Bavinck holds fast to a twofold notion of wetenschap, which is the motif dominating his 
notion of science. In Bavinck’s corpus, Christelijke Wetenschap is the ideal one presenting to 
us this motif. This booklet was Bavinck’s response to the Remonstrant professor Herman IJ. 
 
4 PR, 84. 
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Groenewegen (1862-1920), who held a positivistic view of science––that is, knowledge is 
confined within the sphere of perceivable physical objects––and with whom Bavinck debated.5 
While teaching in Kampen in the 1880s-90s, Bavinck developed his theory of science, 
and his view of wetenschap has largely matured before moving to the Vrije Universiteit in 
1902.6 In Christelijke Wetenschap (1904), Bavinck’s purpose is to overthrow the positivistic 
sense of science and spell out what Christian science is. In the nineteenth century, generally 
speaking, positivism denoted that knowledge can be, or can only be, obtained through human 
sense and perception, which was the ground of human science and stood against idealism at 
the time.7 Bavinck incisively perceived the ethos of science in his era, that is, that all sciences 
were predicated on empiricism and induction so that ‘the human mind cannot rise to the 
invisible and eternal things, neither can it penetrate into the ground of phenomena.’8 In this 
sense, science is merely positivistic and restrained within the visible and perceptible world. In 
response to positivism of his time, Bavinck first argued that the positivistic view of science 
was just one of numerous definitions of science, judging that this narrower notion actually 
contradicts the nature of science and the character of truth.9 Moreover, by laying emphasis on 
human perception, he maintained that positivism eventually leads to subjectivism, scepticism 
and the destruction of all knowledge of truth.10 
For Bavinck, the Achilles heel of positivism is its ignorance of the two dimensions of 
science: the visible and the invisible.11 This means that one science is preoccupied with the 
visible world, whereas the other science, say theology, investigates what is beyond human 
perception. Although the outward world has impacts on the human mind, internal to human 
beings are the impressions, emotions and the decisions of human will, which never produce 
real things outside of humans. This means that human consciousness is capable of being clearly 
aware of ‘the difference between the physical and the psychical, between object and subject, 
between material and spirit.’ In this light, Bavinck believes, it is untenable to argue that there 
 
5 On the debates between Bavinck and Groenewegen, see Marinus de Jong, “The Heart of the Academy: 
Herman Bavinck in Debate with Modernity on the Academy, Theology, and the Church,” in The Kuyper 
Center Review Volume 5: Church and Academy, ed. Gordon Graham (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 62-
75; Eglinton, Bavinck, 228-229. 
6  Herman Bavinck, De Wetenschap der Heilige Godgeleerdheid (Kampen: Zalsman, 1883); Herman 
Bavinck, Het Recht der Kerken en de Vrijheid der Wetenschap (Kampen: Ph. Zalsman, 1899); Eglinton, 
Bavinck, 133-210. 
7 Rom Harré, “Positivist Thought in the Nineteenth Century,” in The Cambridge History of Philosophy 
1870–1945, ed. Thomas Baldwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11-26. 
8 CW, 23. 
9 CW, 32. 
10 CW, 34-35. 
11 Bavinck usually refers to “the invisible” by “the spiritual”. 
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is only a sensual-perceptible world, which is the sole object and content of science.12 As such, 
Bavinck’s view of the inner experience of human beings forms an important part of his critique 
of positivism. 
What is the intention of the psychical study of these inner phenomena of human beings? 
Bavinck contends that psychical study by no means refers back to the sensual and physical 
nature. ‘[Mental impressions] also point back to reality, not of the sensual but of the spiritual 
nature. In our consciousness, we find awareness, perceptions, impressions, etc., which refer 
back to a true, good and beautiful realm.’13 This echoes Bavinck’s saying in Beginselen der 
Psychologie (Foundations of Psychology) (1897) that the human mind can penetrate into ‘the 
essence, the idea, the logos of things’ so as to ‘ascend to the highest ideas.’14 The action of 
penetration and ascension is further explained in the second edition (1923): ‘And the human 
spirit can also raise itself from all the earthly and visible to the eternal, invisible things, to the 
highest ideas, to God, the origin and ultimate goal of everything.’15 It is explicit that Bavinck 
relates science to the invisible and spiritual world regardless of the limitation of the physical 
world. This means that he thinks of the object of science as consisting in two worlds, that is, 
the visible and the invisible, the natural and the spiritual. Therefore, he argues that the ‘whole 
magnificent invisible world is as much a reality to us as the “real world” that we perceive with 
our senses.’16 In short, Bavinck applies realism to both the visible and the invisible worlds. 
Having investigated the twofold nature of science in Christelijke Wetenschap, it can be 
anticipated that Bavinck’s definition of science will be broad. Moreover, this outlook on 
science paves the way for the justification of scientific nature of theology in terms of its 
spiritual character. 
B. The Notion of Science 
Bavinck’s idea of twofold science is pervasive in his works since his very first journal article 
‘Geloofswetenschap’ (The Science of Faith) (1880).17 Therein, Bavinck argued that believing 
and knowing are not separated and do not contradict one another; rather, he argued, believing 
in a hypothesis is the point of departure for every science. Hence, theology of course has its 
 
12 CW, 38-39. 
13 CW, 40.  
14 Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, 19. 
15 Herman Bavinck, Beginselen der Psychologie, 2nd ed. (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1923), 40. This argument is 
absent in the first edition. This observation is not made in the English translation; Cf. Bavinck, “Foundations 
of Psychology,” 47. 
16 RD, 1:221; GD, 1:194. 
17 Herman Bavinck, “Geloofswetenschap,” De Vrije Kerk 6, no. 11 (november 1880): 510-527; reprinted in 
“Geloofswetenschap (1880),” in Kennis en Leven, ed. C. B. Bavinck (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1922), 1-12. 
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place in the sphere of science. Notably, this article was published in De Vrije Kerk several 
months after Bavinck obtained his doctorate in theology from the University of Leiden but 
several months before he became the minister of the Christelijke Gereformeerde church in 
Franeker. The historical contexts prove the significance of Bavinck’s article. On the one hand, 
while the Free University was founded in 1878, it was officially opened on 20 October 1880, 
several weeks before the publication of this early article. Although Bavinck did not state his 
intention to lend support to the Free University, this article apparently furnished a strong 
endorsement of the University, demonstrating the due place of theology in the university. On 
the other hand, the journal De Vrije Kerk was established by Bavinck’s denomination, the 
Christian Reformed Church. Although not all seceders of the Christian Reformed Church were 
anti-science, a stream of seceders combatted wetenschap fiercely, who were conservative and 
attempted to limit theology within the confines of the Church and seminary.18 In this sense, 
Bavinck’s article was a reminder to his conservative fellows that theology should reach the 
sphere outside the Church and seminary. The publication of the article signifies that Bavinck’s 
reminder was, at least, recognised by some of Christelijke Gereformeerde theologians, albeit 
that not all members of the Christelijke Gereformeerde church would agree with him. As has 
been mentioned in chapter 1, Bavinck has already had the aspiration to practise theology in the 
university in 1880. Hence, it seems clear that from the beginning of his career Bavinck has held 
a broader notion of wetenschap, which did certainly strengthen his view of scientific theology. 
Prior to explicating Bavinck’s notion of scientific theology, his specific and perspicuous 
definition of science, as laid out in Gereformeerde Dogmatiek volume 1, needs to be examined 
first. 
Every science that can claim the name and status of a science must have its own 
object that exists in the real world. There is, furthermore, an assumption that such 
an object is knowable, and that the science is, accordingly, bound to that object as 
rigorously as possible.19 
According to this statement, science has three defining factors. First, science must have a real 
object. Although he rejects the positivistic view of science, Bavinck recognises the positive 
character of human knowledge, arguing that knowledge is attained by the perception of real 
things. He thus concedes that scientific knowledge is empirical, though ‘humans do not confine 
their knowledge to the sensually perceptible things, but extend it to those that are invisible and 
 
18 Further on this, see Eglinton, Bavinck, 32-37. 
19 RD, 1:90; GD, 1:66. 
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spiritual.’20 From this it can be deduced that Bavinck insists on the reality of both the spiritual 
and natural worlds, the visible and invisible worlds, underlying which is God’s creation out of 
nothing.21 This articulation of the affinity of creation and science can be seen in Bavinck’s 
early years. In ‘Het voor en tegen van een Dogmatisch System’ (The Pros and Cons of a 
Dogmatic System) (1881), Bavinck writes: 
Thus, a scientific system may be nothing other than a reproduction in words, a 
translation into language, a description, a reflection in our consciousness, of the 
system present in things themselves. Science does not have to create and to 
fantasize, but only to describe what exists. We contemplate what God has thought 
eternally beforehand and has given embodied form in the creation.22  
Clearly, the term “embodied form in the creation” conveys Bavinck’s firm belief in realism. 
This means that science cannot be undertaken in separation from objective reality and with 
one’s speculative reason alone, which will bring about disappointment and delusion.23 In other 
words, this scientific view of objective reality puts an end to subjectivism and an incessantly 
metaphysical speculation. 
This does not mean that Bavinck expels metaphysics from the domain of science. In 
repudiating positivism, he insists that the place of metaphysics in science must be retained.24 
The preservation of metaphysics is predicated upon the second defining factor in Bavinck’s 
account of science: all sciences begin with unproven and unprovable assumptions, which are 
concerned with human epistemic ability and the knowability of the objects of science. 
Throughout their lives, Bavinck and Snouck Hurgronje differ dramatically in this regard (as 
we have their letters from 1874-1921, and they remain opposed). Snouck Hurgronje 
underscores the empirical approach to increasing knowledge and ‘considers the scientific 
notions concerning the transcendental as unattainable.’25 By contrast, Bavinck maintains that 
scientific research cannot get rid of philosophy and metaphysics insofar as all sciences are 
grounded on axioms that are metaphysically assumed. 26  He even describes science as a 
 
20 CW, 44. Bavinck further differentiates empirical knowledge from scientific knowledge. The former is 
concerned with specific and isolated phenomena, whereas the latter seeks to know the general, the law that 
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21 RD, 2:406-507; GD, 2:370-471. 
22 PCDS, 93; emphasis added. 
23 CW, 52. 
24 RD, 1:37; also see Bavinck, “Modernism and Orthodoxy,” 91. 
25  “Snouck Hurgronje aan Bavinck, Weltevreden, 18 juni, 1895,” de Bruijn and Harinck, Een Leidse 
Vriendschap, 147. 
26 CW, 37. 
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philosophical notion that is acquired by human thinking.27 This metaphysical character of 
science is clearly present in Bavinck’s description of science in general. He argues: 
Science always has to do with the knowledge of causes. It does not rest in the that 
but seeks after the wherefore. Irrespective of whether it reaches this goal (all 
science is a knowing in part), this is the ideal that it keeps in sight and that it pursues 
with all its might. It is not satisfied with a dry summary of the phenomena but traces 
out the universal in the particular, the substance in the phenomenon, the rule in 
the random, the idea in the real, and the logos in what exists.28 
As such, metaphysical thinking is indispensable to scientists in accomplishing their tasks.  
Bavinck’s metaphysical concern regarding presupposition in science hinges on his view 
of faith. That is to say, his presuppositionalism results from faith, not vice versa. This logical 
order is vital; otherwise, science would slip into subjectivism and ignore objective reality, as 
will be explained later. It should be clarified that Bavinck accords faith with both religious and 
epistemological significance.29  With regard to science in a general sense, the intellectual 
function of faith is of considerable importance. Bavinck writes: 
Believing in general is a very common way in which people gain knowledge and 
certainty. In all areas of life we start by believing. Our natural inclination is to 
believe. It is only acquired knowledge and experience that teach us skepticism. 
Faith is the foundation of society and the basis of science. Ultimately all certainty 
is rooted in faith.30 
It is evident that all knowledge and science, for Bavinck, should be acquired in faith, which 
brings with it the certainty of knowledge. 
The knowledge acquired in such a way implies the twofold implication of faith. For 
Bavinck, ‘the starting point of all human knowledge is sense perception.’31 Accordingly, a 
fundamental presupposition in science, which runs through Bavinck’s works, is a twofold faith, 
that is, the trustworthiness of our sense organs and the belief in the reality of the world.32 
‘Knowledge is the result of research. And for research, the belief that the object of research 
exists, that our sense organs do not deceive us, that we will be able to come to knowledge by 
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research, is necessary. Without that faith, there is no research or science.’33 By faith, the 
hypotheses of science ‘are accepted a priori and serve as starting point for all argumentation 
and proof.’34 Hence, Bavinck maintains that all sciences begin with faith.35 
The third decisive factor in Bavinck’s view of science is its binding with the object 
investigated. This object-defining character denotes that an authentic science should be 
undertaken on its own, and has its own task and purpose. Unlike the view of Medieval 
Christianity, which defines the other sciences as handmaidens to and being dependent upon 
theology, Bavinck contends that, ‘[a]ll science has inherent value and purpose, apart from 
whether it has practical utility or yields benefits for life.’36 He argues, for example, the natural 
sciences refer to sciences that have ‘the entire cosmos as the object and the systematised 
knowledge of that as the purpose.’37 Hence, the natural sciences seek to know ‘what constitutes 
nature, what are its origin, its essence, and its end.’38 Given this independence of every science, 
Bavinck opposes the positivistic view of science that religion and morality are dominated and 
replaced by empirical sciences. He insists that religion, morality and empirical sciences have 
their own laws and purposes.39 
Bavinck moreover stresses that this object-defining character underlies the organic unity 
of science. In the discussion on natural science in Christelijke Wetenschap, Bavinck argues that 
the unity of science is the guarantee of the healthy development of its specialisation. All 
subjects of science have the same idea; the specialisation of subjects refers to the different 
application of this idea to the investigation of a particular object. This application is requisite 
insofar as the world is a unity that is characterised by diversity.40 To put it in another way, the 
application of the common idea means various scientific explorations on the pertinent nature, 
law and character of the object, which is de facto to interpret the thoughts that have been laid 
down by God in His creation.41 These thoughts were endowed by God in creation via the 
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Logos.42 In this light, Bavinck tackles the compatibility of unity and independence of sciences 
by the continuous sway of the Logos in creation. This compatibility is foundational to 
Bavinck’s defence of the place of theology in the academy. He contends that ‘[i]n the university, 
both the unity of science and the independence and peculiarity of all particular sciences must 
come into its own.’43 This compatibility of the unity and independence of sciences is further 
embodied in scientific methodology. Bavinck maintains that there is no alleged common 
method for all sciences.44 A particular scientific method is largely dependent on the affinity 
between subject and object. This is because the task of all sciences is to account for the fact of 
the relationship between subject and object.45 Hence, despite the unity of science, particular 
sciences could be distinguished from each other by their own qualities and methods. 
In short, from the vantage point of this twofold view of science, Bavinck formulates a 
general definition of science, which stresses the reality of the object, the necessity of 
presumption and object-defining character. Later on, it will be demonstrated that this threefold 
factor is explicitly present in Bavinck’s idea of theology as a science. Prior to this, we need 
first to examine Bavinck’s view on theology itself. 
III. Bavinck’s Definitions of Dogma, Dogmatics and Theology 
Bavinck begins his Gereformeerde Dogmatiek with a terminological study of dogma and 
dogmatics. Etymologically, Bavinck observes, the term “dogma” (δογμα) means ‘that which is 
definite, that which has been decided, and is therefore fixed.’ The notion that dogma refers to 
decree, decision and truth was espoused by early Christian writers.46 
From this Bavinck deduces four implications of the word “dogma”. First, dogma indicates 
the existence of a great deal of truths, commands, propositions and rules which are 
unquestioned. In theology, Bavinck argues, this unquestionableness of dogma consists in the 
principle that Deus Dixit (‘God has said’), that is, the Word of God in Holy Scripture.47 Second, 
dogma implies social function in that it is authoritative in a certain circle of people. Bavinck 
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associates this social character with the Church and its ‘ministerial and declarative’ confession. 
In this regard, he differentiates dogma quoad se and dogma quoad nos. The former refers to 
the given proposition that is objectively grounded in God’s authority even without human 
recognition. By contrast, the latter means the dogma for us, which consists in the Church’s 
confession.48 As he has already written in 1881, ‘a dogma is not a private opinion or an 
individual sentiment, but the faith-truth declared and confessed by the Christian Church as a 
whole or by one of its branches.’49 Third, theological or religious dogma combines both divine 
authority and ecclesiastical confession. This means that dogma cannot be identified as the 
absolute divine truth on the one hand, and on the other hand that a religious person must 
perceive ‘an unchanging and permanent element’ in dogma.50 Given this divine authority as 
conveyed through human work, dogmatics could be thought of as having a divine-human 
quality. In this sense, Bavinck contends that ‘the definition of dogmatics … contains the idea 
that it sets forth the knowledge of God that is laid down in his Word to the Church.’51 This 
reflects the divine-human character of dogmas, that is, that dogma is grounded in the Word of 
God but articulated by human beings. Hence, ‘[e]very dogmatics is not the word of God itself, 
but a human, fallible description of the word of God. It is not the original, but always more or 
less, never a perfectly similar image of the divine truth.’52 Fourth, dogma has the dual sense 
that is both narrow and broad. In a broader sense, dogma ‘denotes the Christian religion as a 
whole’; in a narrower sense, it refers to ‘the articles of faith that were based on the Word of 
God and therefore obligated everyone to faith.’ Following this dual sense, Bavinck defines 
dogmatics as ‘the systems of the articles of faith.’53 In this light, dogmatics encompasses the 
principle of Deus Dixit, an ecclesiastical and a confessional character, a divine-human quality, 
and the entirety of Christianity. 
Generally, Bavinck uses the terms “dogmatics” and “theology” interchangeably. 54 
Nonetheless, he accentuates that ‘originally dogmatics was an adjective used to describe the 
main concept of theology.’55 This means that, for Bavinck, the essential content of theology is 
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dogmatics. ‘The content of dogmatics is the knowledge of God as he has revealed it in Christ 
through his Word.’56 As such, the principle of Deus Dixit underlies dogmatic theology. 
An anticipatory critique of Bavinck’s view of dogmatics and theology is that he seems to 
elevate dogmatics to such a high place that all other theological disciplines are subordinate or 
secondary to it. In particular, biblical theology––namely, theological study on the content of 
Holy Scripture––cannot be conceptualised without dogmatics. Bavinck argues that biblical 
theology, which ‘stops at the words of Scripture’, should be undertaken with the commitment 
to particular ecclesial confessions.57  It seems that Bavinck thinks of biblical theology as 
descriptive rather than prescriptive. Contemporary biblical theologians must take issue with 
Bavinck. James Mead insists that ‘the normative aspect of biblical theology ought not to be 
dismissed altogether, insofar as the biblical books contain implicit theological claims that 
readers who regard the Bible as authoritative would naturally seek.’ 58  Even many 
contemporary dogmaticians disapprove Bavinck’s point of view. Thomas F. Torrance (1913-
2007) contends that dogmatics and biblical theology (studies) serve the Word of God together 
and are dedicated with a single end to the unfolding of the economy of God’s revelation. Hence, 
they should be reconciled, coordinated but differentiated, and then construct a unity.59 For 
Bavinck, as one who lived in the nineteenth-century Dutch Reformed world, Mead’s and 
Torrance’s arguments would be unimaginable. Indeed, how could the biblical theologian not 
read the Bible as a child of his time? Worth noting is that Bavinck’s conception of biblical 
theology is not merely the result of his identity as a dogmatician. His intention is to combat 
alleged scientific neutrality, which is applied to religious science and strips theology of its 
confessional character.60 For Bavinck, dogmatics is essential to theology, whose confessional 
character lays bare the fact that scientific theology always starts from somewhere. 
Grounded on this dogmatic essence of theology, Bavinck takes issue with Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804), whose dualistic philosophy of the noumenal and the phenomenal restrains 
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theology within the confines of experience. Eventually, Kant’s philosophy grounds dogma in 
morality and personal faith. Bavinck observes that despite Schleiermacher’s opposition to 
Kant’s view of religion, the former aligns himself with the latter by the emphasis on religious 
feeling and thus renders dogmas only to be something subjective. Following this path, Bavinck 
argues, dogmatics after Kant and Schleiermacher becomes ‘the account of the historic 
phenomenon that is called the Christian religion and manifests itself in a unique faith and 
doctrine.’61 It is beyond doubt that Bavinck’s arguments reflect his resolution to repudiate any 
effort to deviate theology from the knowledge of God, which one can perceive in the religious 
science at his time. This fundamental stance was established early on in the development of his 
theology. Therein, he criticised Schleiermacher as having led theology away from the 
knowledge of God, and religious science as being by no means aimed at the knowledge God.62 
In the background of his oppositions to the various dogmatic tendencies since Kant and 
Schleiermacher is a constant desire to safeguard the scientific nature of theology. Immediately 
after the criticism of the dogmatic method of the historical account of Christianity, Bavinck 
writes: ‘But it is science to do truth. If dogmatics intends to be real science, it is then not content 
with the account of what is but should point out what must count as truth. It should demonstrate 
not the that but the cause, not reality but truth, not the real but the ideal, the logical, the 
necessary.’63 It suffices to say that Bavinck judges the historical account of Christianity as an 
unscientific theology. In his letter to Snouck Hurgronje, Bavinck argues that historical studies 
is a pre-study but never the goal of science.64 A genuine scientific theology must be prescriptive 
rather than descriptive. As Bavinck argues, ‘dogmatics is a normative science that prescribes 
what we must believe.’65 In the end, he concludes the discourse on the dogmatic essence of 
scientific theology by saying that ‘dogmatics is and cannot exist other than as the scientific 
system of the knowledge of God.’66 It is within the context of this concern for the scientificity 
of theology that Bavinck’s definition of scientific theology is laid out. 
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IV. Bavinck’s Project of Theology as the Science of God 
A. Bavinck’s Engagement with Julius Kaftan 
In 1886, nine years before the publication of the first edition of Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, 
Bavinck visited the University of Berlin and audited Kaftan’s lecture on the distinction between 
the gewöhnliche and the wissenschaftliche knowledge.67 In Bavinck’s lengthy discourse on 
scientific theology, Julius Kaftan (1848-1926) is the main interlocutor. This engagement with 
Kaftan, which takes up some pages in the Dutch edition, was added by Bavinck to the second 
edition of Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. It should be noted that Bavinck has already engaged with 
Kaftan in the first edition of Gereformeerde Dogmatiek by several references to Kaftan’s Die 
Wahrheid der Christlichen Religion (1888), Das Wesen der Christlichen Religion (1881), and 
‘Glaube und Dogmatik’ (1891). In the preface to the second edition, Bavinck concedes that 
‘recent published literature’ is ‘consulted and incorporated’, but he does not enumerate the 
titles. However, the addition of the engagement with Kaftan’s Dogmatik and ‘Zur Dogmatik’ 
in the second edition does not merely aim to keep pace with theological scholarship. In the 
preface, Bavinck also mentions that ‘many expressions are altered or clarified’ as responses to 
the comments on the first edition. In the Dutch edition, the addition of Kaftan’s latest works 
forms three new sections.68 Evidently, Bavinck believes that an analysis of Kaftan’s dogmatics 
can sharpen his own project of scientific theology, responding to the critiques of the first edition, 
including those by Snouck Hurgronje. 
Kaftan was born in Schleswig-Holstein in Germany. After receiving his education at 
universities of Erlangen, Berlin, and Kiel, he took the post of associate professor of systematic 
theology at University of Basel in 1873. He was granted a full professorship there in 1881. 
Two years later, he became the professor of apologetics and the philosophy of religion at the 
University of Berlin. Along with Wilhelm Herrmann (1846-1922) and Adolf von Harnack 
(1851-1930), Kaftan is a prominent Ritschlian theologian. 
In spite of his emphatic rejection of the theology of Albrecht Ritschl (1822-89), Bavinck 
engages with Kaftan’s view of dogmatics both critically and eclectically.69 He begins the 
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demonstration of the scientific nature of theology by pointing out the commonality of various 
objections to dogmatics as the scientific system of the knowledge of God: ‘All of these 
objections come down to saying that the object of dogmatics is not the knowledge of God but 
the content of faith, that dogmatics is not a science, and that it can never be made into a 
system.’70 A tentative judgment can be made that Bavinck’s ensuing analysis of Kaftan’s 
project of dogmatics is intended to affirm the scientificity of theology––that is, dogmatics is to 
do with the knowledge of God and can be articulated as a scientific system. 
With reference to Kaftan’s Dogmatik and the articles on dogmatics––‘Zur Dogmatik’––
as published in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Bavinck argues that Kaftan is the most 
prominent dogmatician who sides with the aforementioned objections. He summarises the 
character of Kaftan’s dogmatics in three aspects. First, grounded on the authority of revelation, 
dogmatics is prescriptive and normative of the Christian faith, which is real knowledge and 
thus includes the knowledge of God. 71  For Kaftan, this normativity is continuous in the 
Christian faith. ‘The [Christian’s] faith originates in the Word of God (revelation) and exists 
as this revelation of God is living to him at present.’72 Only on the basis of the authority of 
revelation can the Christian faith be spoken of in an absolute tone.73 Moreover, the object of 
the faith is none other than God. ‘The whole doctrine of faith is hence in a certain sense nothing 
but the doctrine of God, the doctrine of his eternal essence and his attributes, the doctrine of 
his revelation and activity in the world.’74 Second, dogma is the expression of faith which is 
religious-moral rather than intellectual and scientific. Although faith is the knowledge of God, 
‘dogmatics is not the science of God’ insofar as ‘[faith] is not scientific and demonstrable but 
gained through personal experience by the activity of the moral will.’75 In this light, ‘dogmatics 
belongs to ethics.’76 As Kaftan writes, ‘[t]his faith is knowing itself. But it is knowing of its 
own kind, which is in peculiar inner relations that comes about only by human learning to obey 
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God. It is this close connection with the personal life that significantly matters in faith and 
faith-knowledge.’77 Plainly, the religious-moral character of faith asserted by Kaftan is rooted 
in piety.78 Thus, as George Foster has noted, there should be ‘a complete transformation of 
dogmatics,’ that is, a transformation ‘from being a science of God and of his relations to the 
world’ to ‘a science of the Christian faith.’79 
Bavinck commends Kaftan’s contributions, arguing that what deserve orthodox 
theologians’ appreciation is Kaftan’s emphasis on the epistemological significance of faith, the 
authority of revelation and God as the object of faith-knowledge. He thus argues that ‘at first 
blush it surprises us that orthodoxy did not accord this dogmatics a more favourable welcome 
than in fact it did.’80 Nonetheless, he points out two vital defects of Kaftan’s dogmatics, which 
could account for the opposition of orthodoxy. First, Kaftan differentiates Christian knowledge 
of God from the scientific knowledge of the world.81 This differentiation is grounded on the 
religious-moral character of the Christian faith. Kaftan endorses a mediating method and 
considers theology as separated from science. His purpose is to avoid subordinating 
Christianity to natural science. 82  For Bavinck, Kaftan’s model of independence is not 
unfamiliar. In Bavinck’s day, the Groninger school in the Netherlands cut off Christian faith 
from science by laying emphasis on religious feeling.83 Moreover, it is not difficult to find that 
the Dutch parallel of Kaftan’s model is Chantepie de la Saussaye’s ethical theology, which 
associates truth with the life and conscience of the Christian and maintains the essence of the 
Christian faith as its ethical manifestations. 84  To be sure, Bavinck’s notion of twofold 
wetenschap definitely rejects this dualistic approach, which undermines the unity of science. 
In ‘De Theologie van Albrecht Ritschl’ (1888), he has already indicated that Ritschl’s theology 
is characterised by Kant’s differentiation between the noumenal and the phenomenal, which 
leads to ‘the radical disjunction between religion and science, between a theoretical and 
religious worldview.’85 
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Bavinck’s second criticism of Kaftan’s view of dogmatics is of greater importance. He 
avers that Kaftan mistakenly presents the relation between faith and theology. Granted that 
faith is the organ of knowledge rather than the source, Bavinck disagrees with Kaftan that 
‘revelation must also—even if not exclusively—consist in the making known of truth, in 
communicating the thoughts of God; it is not only manifestation but also inspiration, not only 
deed-revelation but also word-revelation.’86 As such, Bavinck’s eclectic attitude toward Kaftan 
comes to the fore. For him, Kaftan’s emphasis on religious-moral character of the Christian 
faith needs be retained. Added to this is the intellectual character, which is essential to a 
scientific enterprise. This means that the knowledge of God consists not only in faith but also 
in external divine revelation. This objective knowledge of God is appropriated by faith. Hence, 
God cannot be investigated by the method of natural science; God is instead known in His self-
revelation in deeds and words.87 Bavinck maintains that ‘without God’s acts the words would 
be empty, without his words the acts would be blind.’88 
Given this cognitive function of faith and the pre-existence of the knowledge of God to 
faith, Bavinck maintains that a system of theology or dogmatics is attainable.89 Here, he targets 
Kaftan’s renouncement of everything that pertains to the notions of system and systematic 
construction.90 For Bavinck, one goal of scientific theology is to construct a unity of the 
knowledge of God. Moreover, he observes that due to an incorrect view of science, Kaftan 
articulates a mistaken relation between dogmatics and faith.91 Although Bavinck does not delve 
into Kaftan’s definition of science, it can be perceived in the latter’s writings that the word 
“science” (Wissenschaft) cannot be used to refer to the study of invisible or unperceivable 
things. 92  Following this, rather than the objective knowledge of God, the human faith-
knowledge (Glaubenserkenntnis), which is primarily the knowledge of God, is the object of 
human reflections.93  In the concluding estimation, Bavinck identifies Kaftan’s project of 
dogmatics as subjectivist, which is preoccupied with ‘the religious experience of the subject.’ 
Both Kaftan’s recognition of the knowledge of God and rejection of the science of God prove 
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his alignment with neo-Kantianism. 94  Bavinck’s estimation corresponds with the general 
features of neo-Kantianism as described by Christopher Adair-Toteff, who posits that most 
neo-Kantians oppose systematic construction as futile; meanwhile, they recognise the value of 
empiricism and reject materialism and scepticism.95 It is explicit that the neo-Kantian slogan, 
Zurück zu Kant, forces Kaftan to espouse the dualism that the knowledge of God is unattainable 
in the phenomenal world. In order to avoid Kaftan’s subjectivism and neo-Kantianism, 
therefore, Bavinck argues in an eclectic way that with the endorsement of Kaftan’s view of 
faith-knowledge, one should further assert that ‘[p]recisely because a true faith-knowledge of 
God exists, dogmatics has the knowledge of God as part of its content and can rightly claim to 
be a science.’96 
Before the elaboration on theology as the science of God, Bavinck clarifies that he does 
not belittle the subjective aspect of scientific theology. He recognises that ‘the subjectivity and 
personality of the scientific investigator play a larger role.’ For example, science involves 
human perception. This subjective aspect of science underlies that God’s self-revelation can 
be appropriated by humans and serve for scientific study of theology.97 On the one hand, 
Bavinck’s affirmation of human subjectivity corresponds to his insistence on the confessional 
character of dogmatics and theology. How could a church confession be articulated without 
human subjective involvement? On the other hand, implied in Bavinck’s clarification here is 
his intention to maintain the correspondence between the subject and object of scientific 
theology, which reflects the universal authority of dogma. He contends that ‘[u]niversals are 
not “after the fact” [post rem] as empiricism maintains; nor are universals “before the fact” 
[ante rem] as rationalism dreams. Rather, they are “in the fact,” [in re] and then in both the 
subject and the object.’98 For Bavinck, this correspondence is grounded in God’s creation and 
maintained by the Logos, as will be spelled out in the next chapter. 
On the basis of what has been stated above, the purpose of Bavinck’s engagement with 
Kaftan can be summed up in three points. First, science cannot be understood in an empiristic 
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way alone. This has already been emphatically repudiated by Bavinck’s notion of twofold 
wetenschap. Without a doubt, a broader conception of science functions as the precondition to 
scientific theology. Second, faith is decisive in articulating a scientific theology. Both in 
soteriological and epistemological senses, faith is essential to the science of God. Third, a 
healthy correspondence between the subject and object of scientific theology is demanded, 
which denotes the truth that the knowledge of God is not only subjective faith-knowledge but 
also the objective knowledge consisting in God’s self-revelation. In some sense, Kaftan’s view 
of dogmatics is the example deployed by Bavinck to indicate these key respects of scientific 
theology. 
B. Bavinck’s Definition of Scientific Theology 
As mentioned in the beginning, while speaking of theology as a science, Bavinck always 
has in mind the notion of science in general. Hence, it is helpful to pause here to recap the three 
key points of science in general after the lengthy discourse above and before unfolding 
Bavinck’s definition of scientific theology. On the basis of the notion of twofold science (the 
science of the visible things and that of the invisible things), Bavinck describes science in 
general with three essential factors: the reality of the object of investigation, the acceptance of 
unproven and unprovable presuppositions in faith, and its object-defining character.  
Having set out the definition of science in general, Bavinck applies these three factors to 
dogmatics immediately. He writes: ‘For dogmatics the requirements are identical: it must have 
its own object; the object must be knowable; and it is strictly bound to that object.’99 Note that 
Bavinck’s view of these three factors of scientific dogmatics does not burst into view. His 
unambiguous definition of scientific theology has already been formulated many pages earlier.  
Theology as a particular science assumes that God has revealed Himself in an 
apparent way in religion or, more specifically, in Christianity; in other words, it 
assumes the existence, the revelation and the knowability of God and therefore 
proceeds from a highly significant dogma.100 
Suffice it to say that these three factors are innate to Bavinck’s definition of scientific theology. 
Hence, scientific theology is a particular kind of wetenschap. Theology and the other sciences 
are congeneric. The parallel of theology with the other sciences strengthened Bavinck’s 
opposition to the substitution of religious science for theology in the Dutch universities of his 
day. Meanwhile, this parallel relentlessly repudiates any attempt that is taken to subordinate 
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theology to the standards of natural science. In other words, this parallel undergirds Bavinck’s 
criticism of Opzoomer and Scholten, who deploy the criteria of the natural sciences in 
theological studies and then seek for the truth about God in the visible world.101 
a. God as the Real Object 
Bavinck argues that scientific theology has its own real object, that is, the God who is 
known in His revelation. ‘Theology was the knowledge of God. The object of theology was 
God himself, as he had made himself known to people in nature and grace. The whole discipline 
of theology was unfolded and ordered from this principle.’102 As will be explicated later, 
Bavinck considers the doctrine of God as a higher dogma in which scientific theology is rooted. 
It is explicit that Bavinck’s engagement with Kaftan serves to clarify this aspect. It is not faith-
knowledge but God Himself that is the object of scientific theology. 
By insisting on God as the object of theology, Bavinck repudiates the view of theology as 
a historical description of Christian religion, Christian faith and doctrines, as commonly 
described by thinkers after Kant and Schleiermacher. As noted earlier, Bavinck believes that 
Kant’s and Schleiermacher’s influences on dogmatics divert the tendency of theological studies 
of Protestant orthodoxy. That is, Kant’s dualism restrains theology within the confines of the 
phenomenal world so that God can never be the real object of theology. For Schleiermacher, 
‘[t]heology is a positive science, the parts of which join into a cohesive whole only through 
their common relation to a distinct mode of faith, that is, a distinct formation of God-
consciousness.’103 This distinct mode of faith or formation of God-consciousness is related to 
linguistic and cultural elements; hence, theology must refer to the historical data which became 
diverse in the course of history.104 Both Kant and Schleiermacher lay the emphasis on the 
phenomenal world so as to undermine the scientificity of theology that has God, who is in the 
noumenal world, as its object. Thus, as Eglinton observes, ‘writing post-Enlightenment, 
Bavinck is required to justify his epistemological foundations in a way that Calvin never 
was.’105 For Calvin, as Bavinck argues, ‘[t]he Gospel is at the same time the source of our 
knowledge of God and the means of grace.’106  This means that for Calvin, that God be 
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maintained as the object of theology is beyond questioned. For him, ‘both conceptually and 
spiritually the knowledge of God has an involvement with the physical and sensory … The 
Spirit is not in opposition to the material, the external, but dwells in it, uses it and stimulates 
man from all sides to permit himself to be taken along.’107 By contrast, rather than considering 
God as the object of theology directly, post-Kantian theologians have to wrestle with the chasm 
between the noumenal and the phenomenal.108 
Bavinck, moreover, deploys the argument that God is the real object of theology to reject 
the subordination of theology to religious science. In his view, what is pursued in religious 
science is not the knowledge of God but rather the knowledge of various religions of all peoples 
and in all ages.109 Indeed, Bavinck’s critique would be repudiated by many practitioners of 
religious studies nowadays. Contemporary religious studies is involved with various views of 
gods in different religions.110 Nonetheless, the core of Bavinck’s criticism is still telling. For 
him, the science of religion at his time methodologically took a bottom-up approach to dealing 
with religion. This approach is untenable insofar as the idea of revelation is common and 
essential to all religions.111 In other words, the idea of revelation proves that religion can only 
be comprehended by the top-down approach. 
Despite the challenges posed by the Enlightenment, Bavinck is never embarrassed by 
placing God as the real object of theology. He is not perplexed, for example, by the 
anthropologised theology of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72). In The Essence of Christianity, 
Feuerbach argues that the human ideal is the consequence of the projection of human 
consciousness. God is the very human ideal, that is, the projected human nature – what we 
really want and aspire to do.112 Thus, as Alister McGrath observes, the central and foundational 
idea of The Essence of Christianity is: ‘human beings have created the gods, who embody their 
own idealized conception of their aspirations, needs and fears.’ 113  Bavinck responds to 
Feuerbach’s philosophy in the first and second volume of Reformed Dogmatics respectively. 
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First, in response to Feuerbach and those who consider God as the product of human wishes, 
Bavinck puts forward five questions, the first of which is: ‘But why, one may ask, are human 
beings not content with the forces present in nature?’ 114  Bavinck’s second response to 
Feuerbach could be considered as the supplement to the first one. Having offered a detailed 
analysis of various forms of philosophical agnosticism, including Feuerbach’s atheism, 
Bavinck contends that the fundamental reason for the opposition to the knowability of God is 
that ‘[h]uman beings are bound to sense perception and always derive the material of thought 
from the visible world. They do not see the spiritual and cannot elevate themselves to the world 
of invisible things, inasmuch as they always remain bound to space and time.’115 For Bavinck, 
the vital issue of Feuerbach’s philosophy is its ignorance of the invisible world. By recognising 
the science of invisible things, Bavinck underscores his refutation of Feuerbach’s 
anthropologisation of theology.116  
b. Assumptions in Faith 
The second factor of scientific theology is the assumptions of God’s existence, self-
revelation and knowability.117 None of these hypotheses can be proved but rather must be 
accepted as a priori by faith. By insisting on the significance of hypotheses, Bavinck 
purposefully repudiates alleged scientific neutrality.118 However, this claim would entail two 
questions. (1) By saying that theology begins with hypothesis, does Bavinck run the risk of 
making theology a product of fantasy? (2) How does Bavinck describe the role of faith in 
articulating scientific theology? Essentially, these two questions are interrelated. 
The first question could be answered by Bavinck’s critique of positivism. He argues that 
the philosophical foundation of positivism is that our knowledge is acquired through sensual 
perception and experience. This means that all positivistic sciences assume without proof the 
reliability of sensual perceptions and the objectivity of the perceived world.119  However, 
positivistic science falls short of its capacity of exploring what is beyond human sensual 
perception, such as the essence and cause of things. Given this incompetence, therefore, 
Bavinck judges that ‘[p]ositivism leaves room for all sorts of alleged compensation of religion, 
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for a cult of humanity, for a reverence of dead spirits, for an altar for the unrecognised God, 
even for a service of Satan.’120 On the one hand, this means that positivism cannot be applied 
to religion exclusively; otherwise, religion would fade away. On the other hand, as positivistic 
science assumes the reality of the perceived world, scientific theology presupposes the reality 
of the unperceived world, which has been unveiled in God’s revelation in nature and grace. 
Hence, Bavinck stresses God’s revelation in religion, particularly in Christianity. ‘As science 
never precedes life, but always follows it and flows from it, so the science of the knowledge of 
God rests on the reality of his revelation.’121 Bavinck’s parallel of scientific theology with the 
other sciences serves to reinforce the fact that all sciences should hold fast to realism. 
This parallel leads to the conclusion that scientific theology is as rooted in faith as the 
other sciences are. This viewpoint has been established in the beginning of Bavinck’s 
theological career. In ‘Geloofswetenschap’ (1880), Bavinck writes: ‘faith always says: [God] 
is indeed there; investigating further and deeper, you will finally find Him and see that God is 
the Hypothesis, on which all things rest and without which nothing can be explained finally.’122 
Clearly, faith and hypothesis are inseparable in theological studies. At this point, one needs to 
recall Bavinck’s view of the epistemological function of faith, which is associated with God’s 
revelation. He writes: ‘all faith … includes a certain kind of knowing. And this knowledge is 
not produced but accepted by faith.’123 With this in mind, Bavinck argues that the bond of faith 
and the hypothesis is attested by the Word of God, that is, Holy Scripture: ‘[Holy Scripture] 
states that all knowledge of God comes to us from his revelation and that we on our own part 
cannot appropriate its content except by a sincere and childlike faith.’124 Explicitly, for Bavinck, 
the solid ground of faith in assumptions of God’s revelation, existence and knowability is 
nothing other than the Word of God. Therefore, by saying that theology begins with hypothesis, 
Bavinck does not make theology a product of fantasy. Rather, Holy Scripture is the foundation 
and guarantee of these assumptions insofar as God the Hypothesis has revealed Himself in the 
Word of God. 
The answer to the first question leads to the solution to the second. For Bavinck, revelation 
is the principium externum of theology, and faith is the principium internum. Specifically, 
Bavinck insists that Holy Scripture, where God has revealed Himself, is the sole principium 
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externum of theology, and believing reason is the only principium internum.125 Interestingly, 
Bavinck describes faith as believing reason. Again, the intellectual character of faith is 
heightened here. Meanwhile, this designation is also concerned with the fact that faith is 
generated by revelation in which the knowledge of God is communicated.126 For Bavinck, the 
correspondence between the external principium and the internal principium is indispensable 
to scientific theology. Bavinck was probably made aware of the significance of principium 
when he was the minister of the Christian Reformed congregation in Franeker from 1881 to 
1882. In a letter to his friend Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje from that period, Bavinck indicated 
that in editing the sixth edition of Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, his theology underwent a great 
influence. He started to explore the fundamental principles (Prinzipienlehre) of theology, 
which he had not learned in Leiden.127 If it would be an exaggeration to say that Bavinck’s 
theology was transformed thoroughly, it must be convincing that Synopsis afforded Bavinck a 
great deal of fresh and essential theological insights that served for his articulation of scientific 
theology. This can be seen that the first disputation of Synopsis begins with Holy Scripture as 
the principium of theology, and sheds light on the notions of principium essendi and principium 
cognitionis.128 By arguing for “assumptions in faith”, Bavinck takes in the theology of Synopsis 
and considers faith as the principium internum of scientific theology. Nonetheless, one will 
continue to ask: How does faith function in scientific theology specifically? 
In terms of theological method, faith is the subjective organ in human beings that 
appropriates the objective revelation of God.129 This appropriation can be accomplished on the 
ground that ‘[t]he Holy Spirit is the great and powerful witness to Christ, objectively in 
Scripture, subjectively in the very hearts of human beings.’130 More specifically, 
it is the Logos himself who through our spirit bears witness to the Logos in the 
world. It is the one selfsame Spirit who objectively displays the truth to us and 
subjectively elevates it into certainty in our spirit. It is his witness given in our 
consciousness to the thoughts God embodied in the creatures around us. … All 
cognition of truth is essentially a witness that the human spirit bears to it and at 
bottom a witness of the Spirit of God to the Word, by whom all things are made.131 
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The cooperation of the Logos and the Holy Spirit guarantees that scientific theology is not 
subjectivist by virtue of faith. It encompasses a correspondence between what objectively 
exists and a subjective consciousness, which is requisite for all science.132 
Hendrikus Berkhof offers the critique that for Bavinck faith is merely an ‘intellectual 
assent and submission to Scripture.’133 At the first glance, the assumptions of God’s existence, 
self-revelation and knowability seem to denote that faith is merely intellectual. However, 
Bavinck contends that faith is both intellectual and religious; moreover, these two dimensions 
of faith are interrelated. Bavinck maintains that faith is not exhausted by the intellectual sense 
on the ground that ‘it also includes a heartfelt trust in a total surrender to God, who has revealed 
himself in Christ, and a personal appropriation of the promises extended in the gospel.’134 This 
means that in faith the assumptions of God’s existence, self-revelation and knowability indicate 
that scientific theology should be bound up with the object, God, not only intellectually but 
also personally. Scientific theologians must undertake theology in their personal relationship 
with God. In this regard, Bavinck is not unique but finds resonances in other modern 
theologians. Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) argues, for example, that ‘[t]heologia sacra—it 
originates in prayerful kneeling before the mystery of the divine child in the stable.’135 By the 
same token, Karl Barth (1886-1968) writes: ‘in its totality [theological work] is peculiar and 
characteristic of theology that it can be performed only in the act of prayer.’136 Evidently, both 
Bonhoeffer and Barth are in alliance with Bavinck with respect to the significance of one’s 
personal faith and spirituality in theological studies. All that has stated above leads to the third 
factor of scientific theology. 
c. Divine Object-Defining  
According to Bavinck, the third decisive factor of scientific theology is that it ‘proceeds 
from a highly significant dogma’, which denotes that it is bound up with its object, God. The 
third factor is closely associated with the previous two. If God is the real object of theology, 
and if God’s existence, self-revelation and knowability are assumed in faith, the whole project 
of scientific theology must be predicated on God.  
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The divine object-defining hallmark of scientific theology consists in the fact that 
theology stems from nothing other than the knowledge of God. As Bavinck writes,  
the knowledge of God is the only dogma, the exclusive content, of the entire field 
of dogmatics. All the doctrines treated in dogmatics … are but the explication of 
the one central dogma of the knowledge of God. All things are considered in light 
of God, subsumed under him, traced back to him as the starting point. Dogmatics 
is always called upon to ponder and describe God and God alone, whose glory is 
in creation and re-creation, in nature and grace, in the world and in the church.137 
From this quotation, it can be inferred that the knowledge of God as the highest dogma 
dominates scientific theology.138 All loci of scientific theology should be governed by this 
dogma. This is reminiscent of Bavinck’s organic motif, which stresses that organism is bound 
by a common idea.139  Considering scientific theology as an organism, the dogma of the 
knowledge of God is the common idea that combines and incorporates the other dogmas into 
one big entirety. This thinking is clearly present in Bavinck’s ‘Confessie en Dogmatiek’ 
(Confession and Dogmatics): 
This knowledge [of God], as revealed by God Himself in nature and Scripture, was 
the midpoint and the organic principle of the entire dogmatics. Thus, everything 
belonging in this science, directly or indirectly, straight or obliquely, was 
connected with the knowledge of God, out of which the dogmatic material was 
organised into a more or less ordered system.140 
What is more, the dominant place of the dogma of the knowledge of God indicates that 
scientific theology is the ectype of God’s self-knowledge. Bavinck writes: 
The relation of God’s self-knowledge to our knowledge of God used to be 
expressed by saying that the former was archetypal theology and the latter ectypal 
theology. Our knowledge of God is the imprint of the knowledge that God has of 
himself but always in a creaturely sense. The knowledge of God in his creatures is 
only a weak likeness, a finite, limited sketch, of God’s absolute self-consciousness 
accommodated to the human or creaturely consciousness. But however great the 
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distance is, the principium essendi of our knowledge of God is solely God himself, 
who reveals himself freely, self-consciously, and genuinely.141 
This means that whether scientific theology stands or falls is determined by God; it is not 
identified with God’s self-knowledge. Bavinck’s conjoining of scientific theology and the idea 
of archetype-ectype is reflective of the Reformed scholastic appropriation of Thomistic 
terms.142 Moreover, the ectype of God’s self-knowledge echoes the second implication of the 
term “dogma”, that is, the divine-human character, as stated earlier. Hence, one significant task 
of scientific theology is to expound the Christian faith under the guidance of the highest dogma. 
This is clearly embodied in Bavinck’s sentiment: ‘All things are considered in light of God, 
subsumed under him, traced back to him as the starting point.’143 
This divine object-defining character of scientific theology undergirds the independence 
of theology as the science of God. We should pause here to recall Bavinck’s principle of “no 
common method for all sciences” in his definition of science in general. Methodologically, 
theology as a science must be independent of the other sciences. This is also the reason why 
Bavinck firmly objects to replacing theology with the science of religion.144 More than the 
methodological reason, however, the independence of theology is ultimately grounded in the 
truth: ‘Science exists also for God’s sake and finds its final goal in his glory. Specifically, this 
then is true of theology; in a special sense it is from God and by God, and hence for God as 
well.’145 What is explicit in this statement is the unique ultimate goal of theology, that is, to 
glorify God. On the other hand, this ultimate goal lays bare the impotence of the other sciences 
to realise their final goal. In view of this, Bavinck argues that theology is the Queen of sciences; 
theology finds the particular ultimate goal to which all sciences are directed.146 Now that the 
other sciences cannot find their final goal anywhere other than in theology, they should not 
dominate theology or transform it according to their own methodologies. Without a doubt, by 
the ultimate goal of scientific theology, Bavinck resolutely rejects the approach of Dutch 
theological modernism to subjecting theology to the criteria of natural science, as described in 
chapter two. 
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What is more, the ultimate goal of scientific theology is again reminiscent of Bavinck’s 
organic motif, which accentuates the definite telos of organism.147 In terms of theology, the 
only telos is none other than God, which is clearly manifest in “from God”, “by God” and “for 
God”. This theocentric goal reveals that scientific theology is not only to lay out the knowledge 
of God but is also essentially devotional and doxological. On the one hand, scientific theology 
is devotional insofar as it is theocentric through and through. This means that scientific 
theology cannot be achieved unless relying on God’s grace and being committed to His 
revelation humbly. In this light, the devotional character is associated closely with faith. As 
has been demonstrated earlier, faith refers not only to the intellectual assent to God’s revelation 
but also to personal relationship with the God who revealed Himself in grace and nature. Hence, 
as Bavinck notes, ‘[t]heology is ultimately nothing other than interpretation of the gratia Dei 
[grace of God] in the arena of science.’148 On the other hand, scientific theology is doxological. 
Bavinck maintains that God wishes human beings to love and glorify Him by a scientific 
theology. 149  In other words, a genuine theology is a science that serves to glorify God. 
‘Dogmatics, therefore, is not a dull and arid science. It is a theodicy, a doxology to all God’s 
virtues and perfections, a hymn of adoration and thanksgiving, a “glory to God in the 
highest.”’150 
C. The Task of the Science of God 
a. The Organic System of the Knowledge of God 
Having demonstrated the three decisive factors of Bavinck’s definition of scientific 
theology, it is not difficult to infer three primary tasks of the science of God. First, scientific 
theology is intended to articulate an organic system of the knowledge of God. This task is 
maintained by Bavinck as against Kaftan’s devaluation of the systematic construction of 
theology. For Bavinck, systematic character is the common destiny of all science. ‘System is 
the supreme desideratum in all science. … For theology, too, the supreme desideratum is the 
unity of truth, the system of the knowledge of God.’151 Clearly, Bavinck’s parallel of scientific 
theology with the other sciences appears again. On this basis, he further argues that as natural 
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scientists draw truths from nature, theologians devote themselves to collecting data from Holy 
Scripture and organising them.152 In other words, the task of scientific theology should be 
accomplished on the ground of God’s revelation. The glorious task of theology is to know the 
organism of truth as revealed by God.153 More specifically, the task of theology ‘is and can, 
from its very nature, be nothing other than a scientific exposition of religious truth, a detailed 
exposition and interpretation of the Word of God.’154 
How is the organic system of scientific theology built up on the basis of the interpretation 
of the Word of God? Bavinck maintains that ‘[the dogmatician’s] duty is not to repeat Scripture 
literally word for word but to discover the ideas that are concealed in the words of Scripture 
and to explicate the relationships between them.’155 Specifically, this happens in two ways, 
respectively the analytic and the synthetic. ‘First, theology lays bare the content of Holy 
Scripture to us by the strong scientific exegesis. After that, it summarises systematically what 
has been found.’156 According to Bavinck, moreover, the discovery of the ideas embedded in 
the words of Holy Scripture is continuous to the eschaton. In view of the organic character of 
the system of theology, he believes that theology will continue to expand insofar as the 
dispensation of the Spirit has not yet ended, which is consecrated to the interpretation of the 
Word of God.157 Again, the cooperation of the Logos and the Holy Spirit is perceptible. 
b. Serving the Church 
The second task of the science of God is to serve the Church. This corresponds with the 
social character of dogma, that is, that dogma is associated with the Church and its confession, 
as has been stated earlier. In this light, scientific theology cannot be undertaken outside of the 
communion of all the saints and the fellowship of faith.158 With this in mind, he argues that the 
task of dogmatics is ‘to lead the church in understanding and knowing itself, in order to bring 
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the church to awareness of its own life and treasures.’ 159  This task is actualised in the 
contribution of dogmatics to the confession of the Church. ‘Dogmatics is nothing other than 
the scientific description of the confession of the church.’160  
How shall we understand the term “scientific description”? First of all, one needs keep in 
mind that for Bavinck it is the Holy Spirit who guides the Church in history into all truth by 
the means of the confessions of the churches.161 This means that the confessions of the churches 
are historic. Given this, the task of scientific theologians ‘is not to draw the material for his 
dogmatics exclusively from the written confession of his own church but to view it in the total 
context of the unique faith and life of his church, and then again in the context of the history 
of the whole church of Christ.’162 Therefore, the confessions of the churches are revisable 
insofar as ‘Scripture alone is the norm and rule of faith and life’; the credence of the confessions 
is to rest upon their faithfulness to Holy Scripture.163 In an unpublished and undated manuscript 
on ‘Dogmatiek’, Bavinck asks: ‘Is there biblical, critical, Christian Dogmatics?’164 He does not 
answer this question therein. Now, this question can be answered by the task of scientific 
theology to serve the Church, which indicates that dogmatics or theology is grounded on Holy 
Scripture, critically accepts and examines the confessions of the churches, and aims to 
strengthen the Christian community. 
c. Directing God’s People to Worship God 
The third task of scientific theology is to lead the people of God to glorify and worship 
God. To be sure, this task is determined by God as the object of scientific theology and its 
doxological telos. Thus, Bavinck maintains that the primary task of theology is to make God 
known to us so that we will revere and worship him.165 Furthermore, Bavinck maintains that 
this task needs to be actualised in the healthy relationship between scientific theology and the 
other sciences. One crucial aspect is that through doxologically scientific theology, the other 
sciences are directed to worship God. (Chapter six will analyse Bavinck’s view of the 
relationship between scientific theology and the other sciences in detail, particularly his notion 
of theology as the ‘Queen of the sciences’.) 
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d. Summary 
These three primary tasks of theology are theocentric through and through. 
[Theology] is driven by an internal longing to consider all of the words and deeds 
of God, to perceive their connection and to trace all of them together back to the 
divine being that is the origin and goal of all things. Theologically, it is thus from 
the beginning to the end. From God it proceeds; to Him it returns. It has no rest 
until it has found rest in Him.166 
By attaining these tasks, scientific theology has its rest in God Himself. This theocentric view 
of scientific tasks is unique to theology, which is derived from the definition of scientific 
theology per se. Without a doubt, Bavinck believes that these theocentric tasks of scientific 
theology differentiate theology from the other sciences. In this light, scientific theology cannot 
be replaced by religious science. Neither can it be subject to the criteria of natural science. This 
is because neither religious science nor natural science can accomplish the tasks of scientific 
theology. 
V. Bavinck’s Scientific Theology in relation to Neo-Calvinism More Broadly 
A. Geerhardus Vos 
Bavinck’s definition and tasks of scientific theology have the resonances in wider neo-
Calvinism, especially in the theologies of Abraham Kuyper and Geerhardus Vos. In the late 
nineteenth century and the first half of twentieth century, Geerhardus Vos (1862-1949), who 
was Bavinck’s lifelong friend, was the most important representative of Dutch neo-Calvinism 
in the United States.167 He consulted Bavinck on publishing the reviews of Dutch theological 
books in Presbyterian and Reformed Review, and translated and published Bavinck’s articles 
in this journal.168 Vos himself also reviewed the first two volumes of Bavinck’s Gereformeerde 
Dogmatiek.169 
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Vos’s alignment with the neo-Calvinist ethos notwithstanding, he is different to Bavinck 
in that he uses the term “science” primarily to describe biblical theology. In his five-volume 
Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (1896), Vos does not discuss the scientificity of dogmatic 
theology.170 On 8 May 1894, however, Vos delivered his inaugural address as the Professor of 
Biblical Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary in the First Presbyterian Church of 
Princeton, entitled ‘The Idea of Biblical Theology as a Science and as a Theological Discipline.’  
Vos spells out the scientificity of theology etymologically. He writes: ‘‘Etymology … 
tells us that Theology is knowledge concerning God, … Only when making Theology 
knowledge concerning God do we have the right to call it a separate science.’171 Moreover, he 
maintains that ‘God, as distinct from the creature, is the only legitimate object of Theology.’172 
Like Bavinck, Vos thinks of God as the only real object of theology, which means the whole 
enterprise of scientific theology is predicated upon God. Following this, Vos offers a further 
description of God as the object of theology, arguing that God ‘takes the first step to approach 
man for the purpose of disclosing His nature’ so that the created human being can receive the 
knowledge of God. This means that for Vos scientific theology cannot be achieved without 
God’s self-revelation. On the basis of revelation, he further clarifies the object of theology: 
‘not God in and for Himself, but God in so far as He has revealed Himself, is the object of 
Theology.’173  Clearly, the archetypal-ectypal thinking can be perceived in Vos’s view of 
scientific theology. Thus far, it could be argued that Vos and Bavinck hold the same view of 
the prerequisites for scientific theology. 
Vos then argues that the revelation of God is deposited in Holy Scripture.  Following this, 
biblical theology ‘consists in the appropriation of that supernatural process by which God has 
made Himself the object of our knowledge.’174 Hence, the task of scientific biblical theologians 
is to ‘let the image of God’s self-revelation in the Scriptures mirror itself as fully and clearly 
as possible in his mind.’ 175  Vos’s line of reasoning is: Since (1) scientific theology is 
determined by God and His revelation, and since (2) God’s self-revelation is preserved in Holy 
Scripture, therefore (3) scientific theology is none other than biblical theology. This means that 
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171 Vos, “The Idea of Biblical Theology as a Science and as a Theological Discipline,” 4; emphatics original. 
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the essence of scientific theology consists in its faithfulness and commitment to God’s 
revelation in Holy Scripture. In this respect, Vos believes that biblical theology surpasses 
systematic theology. This is explicit in the ensuing lengthy but requisite quotation: 
The specific character of Biblical Theology lies in this, that it discusses both the 
form and contents of revelation from the point of view of the revealing activity of 
God Himself. In other words, it deals with revelation in the active sense, as an act 
of God, and tries to understand and trace and describe this act, so far as this is 
possible to man and does not elude our finite observation. In Biblical Theology 
both the form and contents of revelation are considered as parts and products of a 
divine work. In Systematic Theology these same contents of revelation appear, but 
not under the aspect of the stages of a divine work; rather as the material for a 
human work of classifying and systematizing according to logical principles. 
Biblical Theology applies no other method of grouping and arranging these 
contents than is given in the divine economy of revelation itself.176 
Accordingly, Vos elevates biblical theology to such a high place that it is the utmost science 
of the knowledge of God. John Webster points out that Vos’s argument entails two issues: (1) 
‘classifying and systematizing according to logical principles’ is lifted to the primary place; (2) 
systematic theology is deprived of ‘[the] presentation of revelation in its canonical form.’ In 
consequence, ‘systematic theology becomes a kind of analytical theology, operating at some 
distance from the idiom of Scripture and heavily conceptual in tone and structure.’177 Bavinck, 
it would seem, must take issue with Vos in this respect. Apart from this divergence, like 
Bavinck’s description of dogmatic theology as an organic science, Vos maintains that biblical 
theology is an organism on the ground that it is guided in the economy of revelation to its 
end.178 
With this in mind, the reason why Vos did not elaborate on the scientificity of dogmatic 
theology in his five-volume Gereformeerde Dogmatiek in 1896 comes to the fore. In contrast 
with Bavinck, who subordinates biblical theology to dogmatic theology, Vos takes a reverse 
order and renders the latter inferior to the former. He contends that ‘Dogmatics is the crown 
which grows out of all the work that Biblical Theology can accomplish.’ 179  Thus, the 
scientificity of dogmatics depends on that of biblical theology. 
 
176 Ibid, 6-7; emphatics added. 
177  John Webster, The Domain of the Word: Scripture and Theological Reason (London: T&T Clark 
International, 2012), 148. 
178 Vos, “The Idea of Biblical Theology as a Science and as a Theological Discipline,” 7. Vos maintains the 
historical progress of the divine revelation, which underlies the organic character of biblical theology. He 
argues ‘Biblical Theology, rightly defined, is nothing else than the exhibition of the organic progress of 
supernatural revelation in its historic continuity and multiformity.’ (15). 
179 Ibid., 24; emphatics added. Prior to this judgment, Vos recognises the biblical character of both systematic 
and biblical theology. ‘The only difference is, that in the one case this constructive principle is systematic 
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Interestingly, Bavinck draws on Vos’s ‘The Idea of Biblical Theology as a Science and 
as a Theological Discipline’ once in Reformed Dogmatics.180 However, he never engages with 
Vos’s views of the scientificity of biblical theology. No hint in Bavinck’s work can be found 
on his silence in this respect. One of the reasons, I surmise, may be that Vos was Bavinck’s 
close friend and a significant advocator of Bavinck’s theology and neo-Calvinism in America. 
Bavinck’s public critique of Vos’s theological methodology would more or less produce a 
negative bearing on the international spread of neo-Calvinism. After all, Vos and Bavinck 
concur that a genuine scientific (both biblical and dogmatic) theology must have God as the 
real object, depend upon God’s self-revelation, and be bound up with God.  
Notwithstanding that one would have reservations on Bavinck’s subordination of biblical 
theology to dogmatics, his scientific theology challenges Vos’s scientific biblical theology on 
how dogmatics is formulated out of biblical theology. What is the function of ecclesial 
confessions in the process from biblical theology to dogmatics? Are confessions created out of 
revelation according to logical principles or purely out of the work of biblical theology? 
B. Abraham Kuyper 
George Harinck argues that ‘Kuyper and Bavinck belong together like Goldman and 
Sachs or Mercedes and Benz.’181 However, this does not mean that their theologies are identical. 
Despite this, as Syd Hielema rightly notes, ‘no consensus exists concerning how Bavinck’s 
theology differs from that of Kuyper … careful, in-depth analysis remains to be done.’182 As 
two leading neo-Calvinist theologians, both Kuyper and Bavinck painstakingly demonstrate 
the scientificity of theology. In contrast with Vos, Kuyper offers another diverging discourse 
on theology as a science.  
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Kuyper’s view of theology as a science is unfolded in detail in his three-volume 
Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid. As the title shows, Kuyper demonstrates the 
scientificity of theology in view of theological encyclopaedia. By the term “encyclopaedia”, 
generally, Kuyper refers to a science which organises chaotic human knowledge into an organic 
system and explores the relationship between different parts of science. 183  Now that 
encyclopaedia is an organic science, it encompasses various particular encyclopaedias that are 
interrelated.184  He then argues that theological encyclopaedia is a special one within the 
encyclopaedia of the entirety of human knowledge. 185  This means that theological 
encyclopaedia should have an organic relationship with the other encyclopaedias, which in turn 
indicates the affinity of theology with the other sciences.  
Kuyper anticipates objections to theological encyclopaedia, which are caused by the 
scientific nature of theology and the definition of theology.186  It is evident that Kuyper’s 
discourse on scientific theology serves to vindicate theological encyclopaedia. That is to say, 
while speaking of scientific theology, he aims on the one hand to demonstrate the independence 
of theology as a science and on the other hand to articulate the relationship of theology with 
the other sciences.187 As such, he contends that ‘theology appears first as an organic component 
of the whole of sciences and then second as having organic components within itself.’188 The 
second volume of Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid is devoted to elaborating on 
these two aspects. 
Kuyper first sheds light on the organism of science. He adopts an etymological manner of 
defining the term “science” (wetenschap). Wetenschap is related to the verb “weten” (to know 
or knowing), which means ‘look[ing] for something in order to find it.’189 Specifically, Kuyper 
argues: 
there lies in this weten not so much the thought of an analysis of the content of 
unique affair or fact, as the thought of the existence of it, that is, the antithesis 
between its being and not being. … it is only then weten when I have in my 
 
183 EST, 1-26; EHG, 1:1-27. 
184 Kuyper argues that every science is independent but related to the other sciences insofar as different 
phenomena are interrelated; EST, 37; EHG, 38-39. 
185 EST, 45; EHG, 1:46. 
186 EST, 45; EHG, 1:46. 
187 For Kuyper, one crucial rationale of dealing with the relationship between theology and the other sciences 
is palingenesis; see EST, 219-227; EHG, 2:170-178. Chapter six will further account for this point. 
188 EHG, 1:56. 
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consciousness not only this representation but also at the same time the sense that 
this representation corresponds to the real existence.190 
Accordingly, essential to the conception of science is the perception of its real object.  
Wetenschap is to know ‘what there is, that it is there, and how it is there.’191 For Kuyper, this 
perception has its ground on faith. By faith, the reliability of sense organs and the reality of 
things perceived are accepted with certainty. Faith is the point of departure of all knowledge.192 
Following this, Kuyper contends, ‘As faith provides us the starting-point for our observation 
and the axiomatic starting-point for every demonstration, it also offers us the motive for the 
construction of science.’193 
Meanwhile, this perception implies a correspondence between the subject and object of 
science.194 As with Bavinck, Kuyper maintains that this perception can take place in both 
visible and invisible worlds. He thus contends that ‘[t]here is in us a thirst after a knowledge 
of things which shall be the outcome of immediate sight, even if this sight takes place without 
the bodily eye.’195 It is evident that for Kuyper there is twofold science. Hence, he resolutely 
objects to confining wetenschap to natural science. Rather, the term “science” refers to ‘human 
science as a whole.’196 
With the notion of twofold science, Kuyper justifies scientific theology by the reality of 
God’s self-revelation. It is the Word of God that assists us in seeing religious reality 
immediately and thus acquiring the knowledge of that reality. ‘The usage of wetenschap, which 
holds fast to the conception of sight in knowing, is entirely in harmony with Revelation, which 
points us to a science that shall consist in seeing.’197 It is apparent that both Bavinck and 
Kuyper hold the same view that scientific theology is entirely predicated upon the revelation 
of God. On this basis, Kuyper argues that the material principium of theology is God’s self-
revelation. However, scientific theology springs from the proximate principium, that is, Holy 
Scripture that is the completed divine revelation. This is because theology can only begin after 
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the completion of revelation.198 The term “proximate” is indicative of the ectypal knowledge 
of God that is the foundation of scientific theology. 
Kuyper maintains that the reality of God’s revelation is not proved by evidences; rather, 
it is a hypothesis, which is presupposed for scientific theology. Given his view of faith, it could 
be argued that like Bavinck, Kuyper holds the significance of faith for the hypothesis of 
revelation. For him, moreover, there should be another hypothesis that God has imparted 
human beings the imago Dei so that they are capable of receiving this ectypal knowledge. 
Thereby, the harmony between the object and subject of scientific theology is established.199 It 
is striking that both Bavinck and Kuyper think of revelation as a hypothesis that is prerequisite 
for scientific theology. Nonetheless, they differ in that for Kuyper this hypothesis must go hand 
in hand with the hypothesis of human capacity for revelation that is derived from the innate 
imago Dei. Karl Barth offers the critique that Kuyper compromises with natural theology 
insofar as ‘[t]he concept of revelation and that of reason, history or humanity were usually 
linked by the copulative particle “and”.’200 However, Barth’s criticism cannot stand before 
Kuyper’s definition of theology and its peculiar character. Kuyper writes: 
If … theology is a knowledge which does not deal with creatures but illumines our 
minds with respect to the Creator and also the “principium and end of all things,” 
it follows that this knowledge must be of a different nature, and must be able to 
come to us along a different way. The norms that are valid for our knowledge 
elsewhere cannot be used here; the way of knowledge must here be different, and 
the character itself of this knowledge must differ from all other science.201 
In this light, Kuyper’s view of scientific theology, which presupposes revelation and human 
capacity for it, does not give way to natural theology. Rather, it is grounded in the reality of 
God as the Creator. In other words, scientific theology is entirely the gift of God, whose 
exclusive aim is to know God.202 ‘Hence the higher idea of the knowledge of God determines 
Theological science and not Theological science the idea of Theology.’ 203  Again, the 
commonality of Bavinck’s and Kuyper’s views of scientific theology is perceived. Both insist 
that scientific theology proceeds from the highest dogma, that is, the dogma of the knowledge 
of God. 
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Kuyper anticipates an objection that theology cannot be considered as a science since God 
is transcendent. In the response, he argues that ‘not the unknown Essence of God but the ectypal 
revelation (revelatio ectypa) which has been made known, is the object of Theology.’204 More 
specifically, 
the theological science finds its object of investigation in our revealed, ectypal 
knowledge of God. ... God alone knows Himself (archetypal knowledge of God), 
and that there is no created being that can know anything of Him, unless He himself 
reveals something from His self-knowledge and self-consciousness in a form that 
falls within the comprehension of the creature (ectypal knowledge of God). Had 
this revelation, now, happened in the form of perfect analysis and synthesis, it 
would at once satisfy the most rigorous requirements of our scientific wants, and 
would simply have to be merged into the result of our rest scientific work.205 
As with Bavinck, Kuyper deploys the thinking of archetypal-ectypal theology in scientific 
theology. By doing so, he not only rejects an empiristic view of science, but also reinforces the 
significance of the affinity of revelation and scientific theology. In this way, Kuyper spells out 
his argument for why scientific theology deserves its place in the organism of science. 
To summarise, the demonstration of Kuyper’s scientific theology above proves that 
Kuyper and Bavinck have many commonalities, which could be viewed as fundamental to neo-
Calvinist account of scientific theology. These commonalities include the idea of God as the 
real object, the hypothesis of God’s self-revelation, Holy Scripture as the principium, God’s 
absolute authority over scientific theology, the thinking of archetypal-ectypal theology, and the 
intellectual character of faith. Despite these, the divergence between Bavinck and Kuyper is 
obvious.206 Bavinck furnishes a sound account of scientific theology on the dogmatic level. His 
primary intention is to articulate a scientific system of dogmatic theology. By contrast, Kuyper 
presents scientific theology from an encyclopaedic angle. His primary purpose seems not to 
establish a science of dogmatics. Rather, Kuyper seeks to construct a theological encyclopaedia, 
which proves theology as an independent science and exhibits the relationship between 
theology and the other sciences. In this light, Kuyper’s scientific theology serves for public 
theology. That is, scientific theology is primarily intended to justify the relevance of theology 
to public life, especially public intellectual life. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
How would Bavinck respond Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje’s question, as stated in the 
beginning of this chapter? Central to Snouck Hurgronje’s critique is that Bavinck considers 
‘the world of the absolute as the object of science’ and has ‘metaphysical subjects’ as the 
content of scientific theology. Given that Snouck Hurgronje’s letter was composed after 
reading the first edition of Gereformeerde Dogmatiek volume 1, Bavinck’s engagement with 
Kaftan, which was added to the second edition, could be thought of as the response to his friend. 
In the analysis of Kaftan’s dogmatics, Bavinck emphatically opposes an empiristic approach 
to science, which heightens his notion of twofold science. Moreover, on the basis of faith, it is 
arguable that the correspondence between the subject and object of science consists both in the 
visible and the invisible worlds.  
This response to Snouck Hurgronje further strengthens the three factors of Bavinck’s 
definition of scientific theology: God as the real object, the necessary assumptions in faith, and 
its divine object-defining character. The core of this definition is nothing other than the truth 
that God has conveyed His knowledge in revelation to animate the science of God. Faith in the 
reality of God’s self-revelation is the same as the faith in the reality of the object of all science. 
Hence, Kristensen rightly notes: 
Science presupposes revelation, for the human intellect is not a source of truth. 
Humans stand on the foundation of creation and are established and sought after 
by God's power and wisdom. … Revelation thus denotes the divine act that gives 
life to true science. This is only another formulation of the assertion that faith 
undergirds the foundation of all science.207 
Accordingly, Bavinck’s scientific theology is not merely a dogmatic enterprise. Rather, it aims 
to have a healthy connection to the other sciences. This means that although scientific theology 
has its object in ‘the world of the absolute’, as Snouck Hurgronje claims, it condescends to 
have a fellowship with the other sciences, which will be discussed in chapters 6-7. 
The discourse thus far demonstrates that Bavinck’s scientific theology primarily has five 
rationales. First, the revelation of God is prerequisite for the science of God. Second, the system 
of the science of God is organic. Third, scientific theology must hold fast to realism. Fourth, 
the universal feature of dogma, expressed particularly in theology’s relationship with the other 
sciences, proves the catholicity of scientific theology. Fifth, the theocentric essence of 
scientific theology discloses its doxological telos. In Bavinck’s theological system, these five 
rationales are woven together as the grammar of scientific theology. Thereby, they pave the 
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way for a meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s theology. That is, the five rationales serve 
to articulate an apparatus which coordinates various fundamental characteristics and themes of 
Bavinck’s thought so as to set out the holistic fabric of his dogmatic theology. 
This grammar is the summary of this chapter; however, it raises further questions. What 
is the meaning of the grammar and its rationales? Is this grammar exempted from any challenge 
from modern theology, particularly those critiques that would be registered by the theologians 
after Bavinck? How does this grammar undergird the system of scientific theology? These 
questions warrant the following chapter.
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Chapter 4 The Grammar of Scientific Theology (I) 
All things are considered in light of God, subsumed under him, traced back to him 
as the starting point.1 
Herman Bavinck 
I. Introduction 
The preceding chapter has unfolded Bavinck’s definition of scientific theology and sketched 
the contour and five rationales of this science as per the three defining factors. As has been 
briefly mentioned, these rationales constitute Bavinck’s grammar of scientific theology. By the 
term “grammar,” it is implied that the rationales are not discrete; neither are they independent 
of one another. Yet the singularity of the term “grammar” is indicative of the unity of and the 
correlation between the rationales. The simultaneity of the five rationales is one core meaning 
of the term “grammar.” While speaking of one rationale, we need to keep in mind the other 
four. None can be dispensed with if one wishes to watch the whole landscape of Bavinck’s 
scientific theology. The five rationales exist in concatenation. 
It should be clarified that this study does not attempt to build a hermeneutical framework 
for interpreting Bavinck’s theological system arbitrarily. ‘[A]ll grammar ever does,’ Gerhard 
Ebeling notes, ‘is to derive its rules from the language as it is actually spoken; it cannot 
prescribe arbitrary rules for it.’ 2  Likewise, the grammar I am speaking of here, which 
incorporates the five rationales of Bavinck’s scientific theology, is derivative of Bavinck’s 
theological system and open to being supplemented to reach its consummation. Nonetheless, 
as will be seen, Bavinck’s grammar of scientific theology, which I shall elaborate on in this 
chapter and the next, affords a sharp lens through which Bavinck’s theology can be better 
grasped as a unity that is marked by internal harmony. 
In what follows, I will explicate this grammar by accounting in detail for the five 
rationales outlined in the previous chapters successively: positive revelationalism, theological 
organism, organically critical realism, dialectical catholicity, and doxological teleology. My 
discussion on the grammar will be divided into two chapters. The current chapter will shed 
light on the first three rationales, which is followed by chapter five on the last two. In the course 
of the following argumentation, one will find that Bavinck’s grammar of scientific theology 
possesses a Trinitarian fabric. It is the doctrine of the Triune God––the Father, the Son, and the 
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Holy Spirit––that governs the grammar and organises the five rationales into a harmoniously 
united apparatus. Moreover, one will discover the exitus-reditus scheme of the grammar––that 
is, the grammar resembles a circle, whose starting point and end point are nothing other than 
God. More specifically, notwithstanding the fact that Bavinck does not explicitly employ 
“exitus-reditus” to qualify dogmatic methodology, the meaning of this term is implied and thus 
shows that the grammar of scientific theology has divine self-revelation as the point of 
departure and divine glorification as the end point; it displays Bavinck’s belief that scientific 
theology is from God, by God, and for God. As such, the grammar on the one hand enhances 
Bavinck’s viewpoint of theology as the science of God, and on the other hand it showcases a 
meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s system. 
II. Positive Revelationalism 
A. The Experience of Revelation 
As has been strenuously argued in the previous chapter, Bavinck holds fast to the belief 
that the possibility of theology is utterly grounded in the truth that God has revealed Himself. 
‘The object of theology was God himself, as he had made himself known to people in nature 
and grace. The whole discipline of theology was unfolded and ordered from this principle.’3  
Bavinck’s firm conviction in God’s self-revelation can be described as a sort of 
revelationalism. The suffix “-ism” denotes his belief that the content and fabric of scientific 
theology should have God’s revelation as the sole foundation. In this light, Bavinck doubtless 
stands in the Patristic and the Reformation traditions. However, if one browses through the first 
two volumes of Reformed Dogmatics, it can be perceived that Bavinck stresses the role that 
human experience and consciousness play in the appropriation of God’s revelation. This 
observation may lead to a conclusion that Bavinck leans towards Schleiermacher’s theology or 
neo-Kantianism or positivism, which seems to depict Bavinck as a Jekyll and Hyde theologian 
moving back and forth orthodoxy and modernity. Indeed, this “two Bavincks” model has been 
overthrown by the recent Bavinckian scholarship. Nonetheless, the account of Bavinck’s view 
of the positivity of revelation below will underline the falsity of the dualistic methodology and, 
more importantly, exhibits the unity of Bavinck’s system based on the locus of revelation. 
Before unveiling the positivity of revelation, Bavinck’s conception of revelation should 
be laid out first. In response to the naturalist negation of revelation, Bavinck presents a succinct 
definition of revelation: 
 
3 Bavinck, “Theology and Religious Studies,” trans. Harry Boonstra in Essays on Religion, Science, and 
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Generally speaking, revelation is the communication or announcement of 
something that is still unknown and in the domain of religion includes three 
elements: (1) The existence of a personal divine being who originates the 
announcement; (2) a truth, fact, or event that up until the time of its announcement 
was not yet known; (3) a human being to whom the announcement was made.4 
Two observations are worth noting with respect to the statement above. First, the 
announcement of the unknown ‘truth, fact, or event’ proves that revelation is essentially 
theoretical and possesses specific content. The revealed content and truth consist in Holy 
Scripture, nature, and history, and is conveyed via the word of God.5 As Bavinck describes, 
‘[r]evelation certainly is not a series of sounds without content, … but a word that conveys a 
specific concept.’6  The identification of revelation and word is consistent with Bavinck’s 
principle that ‘the Deus dixit is primum principium, to which all dogmas … can be traced 
back.’7  
Unlike Karl Barth’s three forms of the Word of God (Jesus Christ as the revealed Word 
of God, Scripture as the written word of God, church proclamation as the preached word of 
God), Bavinck enumerates its fourfold meaning in Holy Scripture: (1) the word of God as 
God’s power for creation and providence; (2) the word of God as the special revelation 
communicated to the prophets and apostles; (3) the word of God as the content of revelation as 
recorded in Holy Scripture now; (4) Jesus Christ as the unique Word of God.8 By this fourfold 
implication, Bavinck intends to lay bare the Christocentric character of revelation. He contends 
immediately: ‘All God’s revelations, all God’s words, in nature and history, in creation and re-
creation, in the Old and the New Testament, have their ground, unity, and midpoint in 
[Christ].’9 The Christocentric understanding of Holy Scripture corresponds with Bavinck’s 
belief that Holy Scripture is revelation, the sole principium externum of theology.10 Such a 
belief is derivative of the conviction that Holy Scripture bears witness to Jesus Christ, who is 
the zenith of revelation. ‘The whole of revelation, summed up in Scripture, is a special 
revelation that comes to us in Christ.’11 Therefore, Bavinck is justified in upholding both the 
claim that ‘Holy Scripture is the principium of theology’, and the sentiment that ‘[t]he content 
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11 RD, 1:321; GD, 1:292. Bavinck also designates Holy Scripture as ‘the handmaiden of Christ’; RD, 1:440; 
GD, 1:411. 
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of dogmatics is the knowledge of God as he has revealed it in Christ through his Word.’12 By 
arguing so, Bavinck thinks of revelation as axiomatic for theology. 
The second observation on Bavinck’s definition above is that the personal God initiates 
revelation and communicates it to human beings. In this respect, the crucial point is concerning 
how we understand the words “personal” and “communicated.” First, the personal God as the 
initiator of revelation unveils the objectively idealistic colour of Bavinck’s theology.13 More 
precisely, Bavinck’s claim is similar to personal idealism as espoused by Keith Ward. ‘Personal 
idealism holds that there is one supreme mind on which everything else depends and that is 
personal––that knows, thinks, feels, and intends.’14 By the same token, Bavinck writes: ‘God 
is the Almighty, who is infinitely higher than all creatures, … all things in Scripture are 
described over and over as having been made by God and as being absolutely dependent on 
him.’15 The supreme mind is the almighty God who created all things; thus, all things depend 
on the infinite mind. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that there is a fundamental difference 
between Bavinck and Ward. The latter argues that ‘God [is] being changed by the inclusion of 
created things in the divine being, either now or in the future.’16 In contradistinction, on the 
ground of the doctrine of creation, Bavinck accentuates the ontological chasm between God 
the Creator and all creatures.17 Bavinck would have criticised Ward as pantheistic insofar as 
Ward seems to ascribe the idea of becoming to God. For Bavinck, ‘[t]he difference between 
the Creator and the creature hinges on the contrast between being and becoming.’18 
Despite this radical divergence in the ontological matter, the first facet of Bavinck’s 
definition of revelation can be formulated in terms of Ward’s personal idealism as the following: 
The existence of a supreme mind, that is, the divine being who knows and thinks and feels, 
intends to originate the announcement. This personal idealism is significant to Bavinck in 
illuminating the scientificity of theology by repudiating rationalism and empiricism. The 
former sacrifices being for knowing, whereas the latter knowing for being. That is, both trigger 
 
12 RD, 1:87, 110; GD, 1:63, 88. 
13 Note that the idealism under Bavinck’s critique is subjective idealism or idealistic rationalism; for example, 
RD, 1:217, 223, 565. Further on Bavinck’s assessment of idealism, see Sutanto, God and Knowledge, 123-
134. 
14 Keith Ward, The Christian Idea of God: A Philosophical Foundations for Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 1.  
15 RD, 2:417; GD, 2:380-381. 
16 Ward, Christian Idea of God, 11. 
17 RD, 2:443-507 
18 RD, 2:156; CW, 30-60. A helpful analysis of Bavinck’s notions of being and becoming can be seen in 
James Eglinton, “To Be or To Become–That is the Question: Locating the Actualistic in Bavinck's Ontology,” 
in The Kuyper Center Review Volume 2: Revelation and Common Grace, ed. John Bowlin (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2011), 105-125; Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 115-121. 
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the imbalance between subject and object.19 In contrast with them, Bavinck’s personal idealism 
reserves the space in scientific theology for the subjective appropriation of objective revelation, 
the axiomatic content and knowledge. 
This personal idealism, therefore, underlies the action of communicating the 
announcement or the revealed specific concept. In some sense, revelation connotes the 
unidirectional process of the communication from God to human beings. This gives rise to the 
questions: What is the role that the human being plays in this process? And, what is the modus 
operandi of the communication?  
In explaining the communication of God’s revelation, Bavinck underscores the role of the 
human consciousness. He contends: 
[T]he ectypal knowledge of God granted in revelation and recorded in Holy 
Scripture; and the knowledge of God in the subject, insofar as it proceeds from 
revelation and enters into the human consciousness, are all three of them from God. 
It is God himself who discloses his self-knowledge, communicates it through 
revelation, and introduces it into human beings.20 
Bavinck clarifies elsewhere the meaning of the human consciousness. He writes: 
[C]onsciousness clearly includes two elements. First, it is an awareness on the part 
of the subject regarding phenomena that occur within by which we come to know 
all sorts of things that are part of our consciousness. These include observing, 
remembering, judging, knowing; but also feelings, both sensory and spiritual; 
wishing, desiring, striving, wanting, and acting experiences … And second, it is an 
immediate awareness. It is a knowledge obtained not through external sense organs 
or through deliberate research and serious study but directly through immediate 
experience, through “an inner sense” [inneren Sinn], as Kant called it, in imitation 
of the sensus interior of Augustine and the Scholastics.21 
Now that consciousness ‘is a knowledge obtained … directly through immediate experience,’ 
it seems that Bavinck thinks of divine revelation, which is fully loaded with the knowledge of 
God, as experienced by humans immediately.22 The analysis hitherto seems to emphasise that 
Bavinck’s revelationalism has a thick colour of positivism, which exclusively accentuates the 
function of human sensory perception and experience. Even if this is not the case, it could be 
 
19 CWB, 15-16; CWV, 31-33; also see RD, 1:215, 219. 
20 RD, 1:213-214; GD, 1:185; emphasis added. 
21 Herman Bavinck, “The Unconscious,” trans. Harry Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres, in Essays on Religion, 
Science, and Society, ed. John Bolt (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 175-176. 
22 Bavinck’s notion of consciousness is undoubtedly influenced by Schleiermacher’s theology; however, 
they are not identical. For a detailed analysis of Bavinck’s critical appropriation of Schleiermacher’s 
theology of consciousness, see Brock, Orthodox yet Modern, particularly chapter 3. 
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argued at least that Bavinck highlights the positive character of revelation by underscoring 
human consciousness and experience. 
In explicating the positive character of revelation, it is noteworthy that Bavinck does not 
limit the idea of positivity to revelation. Yet he articulates the general epistemology that is 
characterised by positivity. 
In Christelijke Wetenschap (Christian Science), Bavinck makes the human self-
consciousness the correlate of science. He argues that the testimony of human self-
consciousness is crucial for science. This consciousness testifies the existence of both the 
visible and invisible worlds with certainty. Bavinck maintains that this testimony lies in human 
self-awareness (zelfbesef) and has been given to our self-consciousness (zelfbewustzijn) 
immediately. The disapproval of this testimony actually contradicts human nature. Moreover, 
this testimony is the starting point from which science begins. 23  On this basis, Bavinck 
contends that in some sense all sciences, which explore their objects in the real worlds (both 
the visible and the invisible), are positive since the existence of the psychical world needs the 
testimony of our consciousness.24 This echoes Bavinck’s argument in Reformed Dogmatics: 
All knowledge comes from without. But on the human side all that knowledge is 
mediated by their consciousness. Not feeling or the heart but the mind, 
consciousness as a whole (perception, awareness, observation, intellect, reason, 
conscience) is the subjective organ of truth.25 
This positive character of general epistemology, for Bavinck, is fundamentally rooted in the 
doctrine of creation. ‘As created beings, we stand on the foundation of creatures, and thus can 
primarily know after experience; we can only reflect.’26 By arguing so, Bavinck points out the 
fact that human knowing has its limits, that is, that it operates within the confines of the range 
of human experience. 
Like the parallel between theology as the particular science and science in general, 
Bavinck applies the idea of the consciousness of general epistemology to theological 
epistemology.27 He asserts: 
for [humans] the truth comes into being only by being made the object of our 
knowledge and an element of our consciousness. For this purpose God has 
 
23 CW, 53. 
24 CW, 72. 
25 RD, 1:565; GD, 1:534. 
26 Bavinck, “Geloofswetenschap,” 7. 
27 Further on Bavinck’s general epistemology, see Sutanto, God and Knowledge, 45-76; Nathaniel Sutanto, 
“Herman Bavinck and Thomas Reid on Perception and Knowing God,” Harvard Theological Review 111, 
no. 1 (2018): 115-134. 
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deposited the truth in nature and Scripture, that we might have it, and by knowing 
it might rule through it. In the knowledge of the truth lies the end of its revelation; 
reality is an instrument to enable us to find the truth; reality is intended to become 
truth in our consciousness and in our experience.28 
As has been indicated in the last chapter, both in scientific theology and general science, faith 
is of considerable significance for the human appropriation of knowledge. For Bavinck, 
therefore, the entry of knowledge, the knowledge of God par excellence, into the human 
consciousness is essentially associated with faith. Given this, there is no wonder that Bavinck 
designates faith as ‘believing consciousness’ or ‘the act of the human consciousness.’29  
On this basis, a tentative conclusion can be drawn that for Bavinck the revelation of God, 
which is axiomatic for theology, can be immediately experienced by humans in such a way 
that it can be appropriated by the subjective, believing consciousness (faith) of the human agent; 
this subjectively experienced revelation is the foundation only on which can scientific theology 
be erected. 
B. Positive but not Positivistic: Tackling the Anticipatory Critique of Revelatory 
Positivism 
Having demonstrated Bavinck’s viewpoint that the revelation of God is experienced by 
humans in their believing consciousness, a challenge from Barthian scholarship can be 
anticipated: Whether Bavinck lapses into the morass of revelatory positivism 
(Offenbarungspositivismus), which is described by some scholars––for example, Bonhoeffer, 
Pannenberg, and van Huyssteen––as characteristic of Barth’s theology of revelation. 
The earliest critique of Barth’s theology of revelation would be from Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
(1906-1945). Following his praise of Barth’s break with liberal theology, Bonhoeffer argues 
that ‘in the nonreligious interpretation of theological concepts [Barth] gave no concrete 
guidance, either in dogmatics or ethics. Here he reaches his limit, and that is why his theology 
of revelation has become positivist, a “positivism of revelation,” as I call it.’30 Nevertheless, 
Bonhoeffer does not further clarify the meaning of Offenbarungspositivismus. Some years later, 
Wolfhart Pannenberg offered a detailed critique of Barth’s positivism. He argues:  
Barth rightly rejects the reduction of the subject-matter of theology to human 
religious consciousness, but his use of God and his revelation as an unmediated 
premise provides no escape from these problems. Barth’s description of the 
 
28 PR, 82; emphasis added; also see GD, 1:184; RD, 1:213; rev.; ‘God’s self-revelation intends to bring His 
knowledge into the human consciousness.’ 
29 RD, 1:564, 565, 616, 
30 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, trans. Isabel Best et al., ed. Christian Gremmels et 
al., Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 8 (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010), 428-429. 
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obedience of faith as a venture shows, and his dispute with Scholz confirms, that a 
positive theory of revelation not only is not an alternative to subjectivism in 
theology, but is in fact the furthest extreme of subjectivism made into a theological 
position. Whereas other attempts to give theology a foundation in human terms 
sought support from common arguments, Barth’s apparently so lofty objectivity 
about God and God’s word turns out to rest on no more than the irrational 
subjectivity of a venture of faith with no justification outside itself.31 
Although recent Barthian scholarship has refused the critique of Barth’s theology of revelation 
as positivistic, we still need to reckon with the possibility that Pannenberg’s criticism might be 
applicable to Bavinck’s theology.32 
We should, first of all, pinpoint the critical point of Pannenberg’s argument. For 
Pannenberg, the main concern is about subjectivism. This reminds us of Henk van den Belt 
and Cornelis van der Kooi’s comments on Bavinck’s turn to the subject, which seems to 
characterise his theology as subjectivist. 33  By contrast, Pannenberg’s critique can be 
formulated another way. If the revelation of God is considered as the axiomatic concepts and 
knowledge that are appropriated by humans in faith in an unmediated way, it gives rise to the 
question of the veracity of the experienced revelation. How can one convince others that these 
alleged revealed concepts and knowledge are not the results of human fantasy? Hence, the 
critique of revelatory positivism is centred on the rejection of the reality of the knowledge 
experienced by the subjective human faith (the believing consciousness). Given this, Bavinck’s 
exemption from this critique relies upon his notion of believing consciousness, namely faith. 
Bavinck maintains that faith has the religious and intellectual dimensions as indicated in 
chapter 3. More importantly, to his mind, these two dimensions are correlative. He contends: 
Believing is an act of the mind, an immediate––unmediated by proofs––connection 
of the consciousness to revelation. But that faith presupposes a change in the 
relation of the whole person to God: it presupposes regeneration, the 
transformation of the will.34 
 
31 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, trans. Francis McDonagh (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1976), 272-273; emphasis added. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen’s earlier criticism of Barth’s 
revelatory positivism sides with Pannenberg’s argument; see J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, Theology and the 
Justification of Faith: Constructing Theories in Systematic Theology, trans. H. F. Snijders (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1989), 19, 22. 
32 On the refutation of the critique of Barth’s revelatory positivism, see D. Paul La Montagne, Barth and 
Rationality: Critical Realism in Theology (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2012), 152-179.  
33 H. Van den Belt, The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology: Truth and Trust (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 
294; Cornelis Van der Kooi, “The Appeal to the Inner Testimony of the Spirit, especially in H. Bavinck,” 
Journal of Reformed Theology 2, no. 2 (2008): 107-108. 
34 GD, 1:561; RD, 1:591; rev.; emphasis added. Bavinck equates mind with consciousness somewhere; see 
RD, 1:565; 2:328; 
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It is evident that while speaking of the experience of the revealed knowledge by faith (the 
intellectual dimension of faith), Bavinck has presupposed the already-accomplished 
regeneration, which brings about the new relations of humans to God (the religious dimension 
of faith). In this light, the new relation comes into being prior to the experience of revelation.  
Here lies the pivotal point of Bavinck’s conception of consciousness. For Bavinck, the 
human consciousness is never identical to the soul. Instead, he argues more than once that ‘the 
soul is much richer and deeper than the consciousness (Ps. 44:21; Prov. 4:23; Jer. 17:9–10; 1 
Cor. 14:25; 1 Pet. 3:4; etc.).’35 What is more, he maintains that 
[w]ithout our will or knowledge, all of that unconscious [dimension] affects our 
conscious life and gives direction and guidance. … our conscious life is 
continuously born by and animated by the unconscious. … all our convictions in 
religion, morality, science, the arts; our insights and prejudices, our sympathies and 
aversions—these all are rooted far and deep behind the consciousness in our soul.36 
Combining this statement with the dual conceptual dimension of faith, it could be argued that 
the human experience of revelation, which consists in the consciousness, is preceded by the 
regeneration of the human soul, which is God’s work that happens in the unconscious layer.37 
Then, the experience of revelation ‘is continuously … animated by the unconscious’ aspect of 
the regenerate soul. Thus, it is not the human consciousness that dominates the experience of 
revelation, that is, the communication of revelation to humans. Rather, it is God who makes 
the human being capable of experiencing revelation.38 This also construes Bavinck’s saying 
that revelation generates human faith, the believing consciousness.39 
It suffices to say, therefore, that while affirming the positive character of revelation, 
Bavinck by no means upholds a positivistic stand, which restricts human knowing within the 
confines of the perceptible world and undermines the possibility of metaphysics and idealism. 
 
35 Bavinck, “The Unconscious,” 197. Bavinck argues that it is Descartes who ‘was the first to identify the 
soul with consciousness.’ Then, the soul is no longer ‘the life principle’; 181. 
36 Bavinck, “The Unconscious,” 186. 
37 Bavinck points out that God’s regenerative work in the conscious does not draw due attention in dogmatics; 
RD, 4:73. 
38 La Montagne defends Barth’s theology of revelation in a similar way, but he stresses the actualistic 
character: ‘The reality of revelation and the justification of the assumption of revelation as a starting point 
for theological reflection depend upon the power of revelation to assert itself in the knowing relation. For 
Barth that power is the simple sovereignty of God, exercised in grace’; La Montagne, Barth and Rationality, 
116. Nonetheless, Barth and Bavinck differs in many aspects of the doctrine of revelation; Ximian Xu, 
“Herman Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Karl Barth's ‘No’: Constructing a Dialectic-in-Organic Approach to the 
Theology of General Revelation,” Modern Theology 35, no. 2 (2019): 323-351; Ximian Xu, “Appreciative 
and Faithful? Karl Barth’s Use of Herman Bavinck’s View of God’s Incomprehensibility,” Journal of 
Reformed Theology 13, no. 1 (2019): 26-46.  
39 Cf. RD, 1:91. 
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In fact, he resolutely rejects positivism.40 Underlying Bavinck’s insistence on the experience 
of revelation is the active communication of God, the initiator of revelation. This means that 
the objective reality of God and His revelation (both the general and the special) has 
ontological priority over the subjective human experience. 
Experience comes into being only when, first, there exists something to experience, 
and afterwards this something is really experienced; it cannot otherwise exist. 
Religion is without doubt a matter of the heart; but it cannot be separated from all 
objective knowledge of God through his revelation in nature and history, in 
Scripture and conscience. A subjective religion is always preceded by an objective 
religion, whatever this may be.41 
Moreover, Bavinck adopts the Trinitarian language to unveil the kernel of the positivity of 
revelation, saying: ‘it is God alone who from his divine consciousness and by way of his 
creatures conveys the knowledge of truth to our mind—the Father who by the Son and in the 
Spirit reveals himself to us.’ 42  Bruce Pass rightly remarks: ‘[i]n the writings of Herman 
Bavinck, self-consciousness is in essence a revelational concept. It constitutes a pale reflection 
of God's Triune self-consciousness … This is why the direct, immediate, and revelatory 
experience of human self-consciousness gives rise not only to the apprehension of self and the 
external world, but also of God himself.’43 Therefore, believing consciousness, namely faith, 
is the organ rather than the source of knowledge.44 
C. Summary 
The analysis hereunto leads to a confirmative conclusion that Bavinck’s revelationalism 
is positive but not positivistic.45 Only on this basis can one properly comprehend Bavinck’s 
 
40 Chapter 3, II.A. 
41 PR, 208. 
42 RD, 1:233; GD, 1:207; emphasis added. Another Trinitarian formulation of the entry of revelation into the 
human consciousness can be found in RD, 1:214; GD, 1:185-186. Elsewhere, Bavinck describes the 
communication from the divine consciousness to the human consciousness by the language of divine 
accommodation; RD, 1:212; GD, 1:184. Bavinck argues that the incarnation is primarily representative of 
the divine accommodation; RD, 2:99-103. On Bavinck's view of divine accommodation, also see Veenhof, 
Revelatie en Inspiratie, 273-278. 
43 Bruce Pass, “Herman Bavinck and the Cogito,” Reformed Theological Review 74, no. 1 (2015): 32. 
44 See chapter 3, A and B.b. 
45 In this regard, one can find Barth as parallel to Bavinck. Barth’s debate with Henrich Scholz’s view of 
scientific character of theology is reflective of Barth’s opposition to subjecting theology to logical positivism 
of the Vienna Circle, to which Scholz showed sympathy, though whether Barth offered a correct reading of 
Scholz’s writings are under debate. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume I: The Doctrine of the Word of 
God, Part 1, trans. Geoffrey William Bromiley, 2nd ed., ed. Geoffrey William Bromiley and Thomas F. 
Torrance (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 8-10; Gijsbert van den Brink, Philosophy of Science for Theologians: 
An Introduction (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), 29-30. Some scholars maintain that it is reductionist 
to identify Scholz’s point of view merely as logic positivist; Arie L. Molendijk, Aus dem Dunklen ins Helle: 
Wissenschaft und Theologie im Denken von Heinrich Scholz (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1991), 53; Arie L. 
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saying that ‘dogmatics is a positive science, gets all its material from revelation, and does not 
have the right to modify or expand that content by speculation apart from that revelation.’46 In 
ascribing positivity to theology, Bavinck’s ultimate intention is to shed light on the economy 
of the revelation of the Triune God, who is the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. On the Trinitarian 
foundation, Bavinck’s positive revelationalism yields another four rationales, which are in turn 
united with it and form the singular grammar of scientific theology. 
III. Theological Organicism 
As has been argued at the outset of the thesis, Eglinton’s new reading of Bavinck’s use of the 
organic motif has become the industry standard in the field of Bavinck’s studies.47 The core 
principle of the new interpretative paradigm is ‘The Trinity ad intra leads to organism ad 
extra.’48 Having in mind the Trinitarian character of organicism and the nature of positive 
revelationalism, a syllogism can be formulated as follows: 
 (1) Of the Triune work ad extra, revelation is an organism in which the Triune God 
manifests Himself.49 
(2) As the principium, revelation––in Scripture, nature and history––is connected to 
theology organically.50   
(3) Thus, the edifice of scientific theology is organic in terms of both its essence and 
apparatus. 
What is more, we need to recall the fourfold principle of Bavinck’s definition of the 
organic: (1) the simultaneity of unity and diversity in creation; (2) the priority of unity over 
diversity; (3) the common idea orchestrating the organism’s shared life; (4) the definite telos 
laid down by God’s wisdom. While considering organism as characteristic of scientific 
theology, one should recognise that these four principles underly the definition of the organic 
 
Molendijk, “Heinrich Scholz – Karl Barth. Een Discussie over de Wetenschappelijkheid van de Theologie,” 
Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 39, no. 4 (1985): 295-313, particularly 306. 
46 RD, 1:44; GD, 1:20; emphasis added. It should be noted that Bavinck does not belittle the function of 
reason in articulating theology, though reason is differentiated from human consciousness. In short, reason 
is a discursive process that constructs scientific theology according to the data experienced in revelation by 
faith. On this, see Bruce Pass, “Revelation and Reason in Herman Bavinck,” Westminster Theological 
Journal 80, no. 2 (2018): 237-260. Pass’s article is intended to amplify Heideman’s analysis; Eugene 
Heideman, The Relation of Revelation and Reason in E. Brunner and H. Bavinck (Assen: Van Gorcum, 
Prakke & Prakke, 1959). 
47 Chapter one, II.C. 
48 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 68, 72, 80, 81, 151, 156, 168, 170, 179, 200, 205. 
49 Bavinck, The Certainty of Faith, 61. RD, 2:318; GD, 2:285. On revelation as organic, see Sutanto, God 
and Knowledge, 37-43; Xu, “Herman Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Karl Barth’s ‘No’,” 9-12. 
50 Bavinck, “Confessie en Dogmatiek,” 267. Bavinck prefers principium to bron insofar as the latter indicates 
a mechanical relationship. 
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rationale of scientific theology. This means that scientific theology has its parts (various 
theological loci) united organically as a whole that is orchestrated and guided by the common 
idea (the dogma of the knowledge of God) and develops towards the appointed end (the 
glorification of God). 
A. Unity-in-Diversity and Diversity-in-Unity 
From early on in his career, Bavinck was particularly attentive to the first two aspects of 
the organicism––the simultaneity of unity and diversity, and the priority of unity over 
diversity––in theology. Before arguing for a dogmatic system in ‘Het voor en tegen van een 
dogmatisch system’ (1881), for example, Bavinck unveils the fact that system or unity is not 
unique to theology but rather pertains to the entire cosmos by virtue of it being God’s creation. 
From this tenet, it follows that ‘all things are oriented toward each other, exist together in an 
unbreakable connection, together constitute a system, an organism.’51 Moreover, ‘the whole 
precedes the parts, and supplies each part with its own function within the whole.’52 Having 
defined the character of the organism in general, Bavinck moves on to construe the organicity 
of theology and dogmatics. He contends: 
But then the primary requirement for our thinking mind is that the church’s dogmas 
do not stand disconnected alongside one another, but they must be contained within 
one another; that together they constitute an unbreakable whole, an organic unity, 
a true and complete system. … A dogmatic system is the requirement that science 
places upon theology, and it is the proof of the reasonableness, of the genuinely 
scientific nature, of Christianity.53 
Three observations stand out concerning the statement above. First, no dogma can be 
considered as a discrete component of theology. The ‘organic interconnectedness of dogmatics’ 
always catches Bavinck’s attention.54 Second, ‘the genuinely scientific nature’ of the Christian 
faith is tied to the organic unity of theology. Bavinck’s sentiment here is concerned with his 
contention that Christianity is the first to illuminate to us the truth of the organic unity or 
oneness of the world, of humankind and of science.55  As such, theology’s organicity and 
scientificity are inseparable; neither can their bond be broken. Third, a dogmatic system is 
characterised by the organic unity of dogmas. As has been indicated in the preceding chapter, 
 
51 PCDS, 90. 
52 PCDS, 91. 
53 PCDS, 95; emphasis added. 
54 RD, 1:94; GD, 1:71. In contrary to interconnectedness is the notion of aggregate, which is characteristic 
of the inorganic; RD, 2:390, 392, 524; PCDS, 91. 
55 Bavinck, “Christendom en Natuurwetenschap (1887),” 197. 
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the term “dogma” is reflective of an ecclesial confession.56 Hence, dogmatics is the Church’s 
expression of its confession as an organic whole. More importantly, the scientificity and 
organic unity of theology are ultimately grounded in the God who has revealed Himself. 
Bavinck argues:  
Our God himself provides us with an even infinitely higher and richer and more 
glorious system, to behold and admire, he who is one in essence, in three persons, 
in whom the one identically complete essence dwells hypostatically in a threefold 
manner. He, the Triune One, shows us in himself the entirely perfect system: origin, 
type, model, and image of all other systems.57 
This thinking is reiterated in Reformed Dogmatics: ‘For if the knowledge of God has been 
revealed by himself in his Word, it cannot contain contradictory elements or be in conflict with 
what is known of God from nature and history. God’s thoughts cannot be opposed to one 
another and thus necessarily [form] an organic unity.’58 To sum up, the unity-in-diversity and 
the diversity-in-unity of the organism of scientific theology is grounded in the divine Triunity. 
Inasmuch as dogmatics is the science of God, it must mirror the divine threeness-in-oneness 
and oneness-in-threeness. Meanwhile, the precedence of unity to diversity is reflective of the 
dogmatician’s task, which is ‘to think God’s thoughts after him and to trace their unity.’59 
B. The Common Idea in Theological Organism  
The third aspect of the organic character of scientific theology––the common idea in 
organism––involves with the dogma of the knowledge of God. In the earlier explication of the 
third defining aspect of scientific theology––namely, the divine object-defining character––it 
has been illustrated that the knowledge of God, the ectype of God’s self-knowledge, is the only 
or highest dogma, from which scientific theology proceeds, and by which dogmas are 
organised into an organic unity.60 Since the ectypal knowledge of God is presented in divine 
revelation, and since the revelation is the outward manifestation of the Father, the Son and the 
Spirit, the highest dogma in the organism of scientific theology is the knowledge of the Triune 
God. This corollary coincides with the rationale that the Trinity ad intra leads to organism ad 
extra. In this light, the idea of the Triune God orchestrates all other dogmas as an organism that 
 
56 RD, 1:30-31; GD, 1:5-6. 
57 PCDS, 92. 
58 RD, 1:44; GD, 1:20. 
59 RD, 1:44; GD, 1:21. 
60 Chapter 3, IV.B.c. 
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is grounded in the divine Triunity. Hence, this idea is ‘[t]he only true principle of the dogmatic 
system.’61 
This construal places the dogma of the knowledge of God at the centre of the organism of 
scientific theology, which gives rise to the question of the theological centrality of Christology 
in Bavinck’s theological system. This issue is exacerbated in comprehending Bavinck’s saying 
that ‘[i]n Christ, in the middle of history, God created an organic center; from this center, in an 
ever widening [steeds wijder] sphere, God drew the circles within which the light of revelation 
shines.’62 Notwithstanding that the statement is indicative of Bavinck’s view of history, it 
cannot be separated from his theology of revelation and thus is related to the organism of 
scientific theology radically. Bavinck maintains that God ‘works out his own councils in the 
course of the world’ and history is ‘rooted in revelation and … upborne by revelation.’63 
Therefore, as revelation is principium of and is thus organically connected to scientific 
theology, an inference can be drawn that Christocentrism is characteristic of scientific theology. 
This Christocentric stand seems to be affirmatively proved by Bavinck’s sentiment––which 
appears in both the first and second editions of Reformed Dogmatics––that ‘[t]he doctrine of 
Christ is not the starting point, but it certainly is the midpoint of the whole dogmatics. All other 
dogmas either prepare for it or are inferred from it.’64 On this statement, one would arrive at 
the estimation that there seems to be some incongruity within the development of Bavinck’s 
theology. 
In order to tackle this prima facie irreconcilable paradox, I proceed to engage with Bruce 
Pass’s thesis, which contends that Christology is ‘the trunk of Bavinck’s system from which 
all the other dogmas branch out.’65 Pass’s main argument is articulated on the basis of his 
taxonomy of the developmental stages of Bavinck’s theology according to the positions of 
Christology and the dogma of the knowledge of God therein, as presented in the table below. 
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63 PR, 135. 
64  GD, 3:254; RD, 3:274; rev.; Herman Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, derde deel, eerste druk 
(Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1898), 253. 




Dogma of the 
Knowledge of God 
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Dogma of the 
Knowledge of God 
Third Stage 
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Christology Christology Christology 
Table 2: Pass’s Taxonomy of the Developmental Stages66 
The first phasic shift taking place by 1895 is characterised by the conceptual differentiation 
between the midpoint of dogmatics and the central dogma. In that period, Bavinck’s view of 
revelation was characterised as historical.67 Hence, he argued that given that Christ is at the 
(organic) centre of revelation, Christology should be the midpoint of dogmatics, not the starting 
point.68 The second shift first appeared in The Sacrifice of Praise (1901).69 Pass asserts that 
Bavinck then adopted ‘the centripetal structure of a deductive system’ to erase the earlier 
conceptual contradiction between starting point and midpoint.70 
Pass’s thesis is doubtless remarkable. It challenges us with the question: How shall we 
handle the competition between the dogma of the knowledge of God, on the one hand, and 
Christology, on the other? To formulate the question differently: Which dogma is the only true 
principle or common idea of the organism of dogmatic theology? I proceed to handle the 
question by enriching Pass’s thesis in two respects. 
First, Bavinck’s theology of revelation does not only have a horizontal latitude––that is, 
the salvation-historical character, as maintained by Pass––but it also implies a vertical latitude, 
which is centred on the reality of the incarnation––that is, the vertical movement of the Second 
Person of the Trinity from heaven to earth, from the infinite to the finite, from the noumenal to 
the phenomenal. Indeed, a vertical element has been implied in Pass’s thesis: ‘Christ, although 
standing at the centre of time, functions as a kind of portal for the infinite and therefore 
constitutes the beginning, middle, and end of all things.’71 Yet Pass does not unfold the vertical 
latitude in detail. In several places in his writings, Bavinck unambiguously mentions the 
simultaneity of the horizontal and vertical latitudes. One outstanding instance is presented in 
 
66 Pass, “‘The Heart of Dogmatics’,” 26-38; Pass’s crucial analysis of the shift of the central dogma in 
Bavinck's theological system also appears in Bruce Pass, “The Question of Central Dogma in Herman 
Bavinck,” Calvin Theological Journal 53, no. 1 (2018): 33-63. 
67 Pass, “‘The Heart of Dogmatics’,” 20-21. 
68 RD, 1:110; GD, 1:87. 
69 Pass, “‘The Heart of Dogmatics’,” 34; Herman Bavinck, De Offerande des Lofs: Overdenkingen vóór en 
na de toelating tot het heilige avondmaal ('S Gravenhage: Fred. H. Verschoor, 1901); Herman Bavinck, The 
Sacrifice of Praise: Meditations before and after Admission to the Lord’s Supper, ed. and trans. Cameron 
Clausing and Gregory Parker (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2019). 
70 Pass, “‘The Heart of Dogmatics’,” 45. 
71 Ibid. 
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Our Reasonable Faith. There, Bavinck writes: ‘The deeds of God form a circle which mounts 
upward in the form of a spiral; they represent a harmony of the horizontal and the vertical line; 
they move upwards and forwards at the same time.’72 In spite of Syd Hielema’s soteriological 
reading of this statement, its immediate context is concerning the confession of the Trinity and 
His deeds in creation, which of course includes His salvation as well as revelation.73 Elsewhere, 
Bavinck argues: ‘[The doctrine of the world] is to be regarded both horizontally and vertically. 
From the lowest forms of life it strives upward to where the light and life of God is, and at the 
same time it moves forward to a God-glorifying end.’ 74  The immediate context of this 
statement is Bavinck’s discourse on the doctrine of creation, the kernel of which consists in the 
sentiment that ‘[c]reation is the initial act and foundation of all divine revelation.’75 Both 
statements above clearly present the vertical latitude of revelation in Bavinck’s thought. Note 
that for Bavinck ‘the central fact of revelation’ is nothing other than the incarnation.76 In this 
sense, the vertical latitude corresponds to Bavinck’s view of the vertical movement of the 
incarnation, ‘in the course of which [Christ] descended from heaven to earth.’77  
Apart from the direct usage of the term “vertical,” the vertical latitude of revelation is 
intrinsic to Bavinck’s theology of archetype-ectype. 78  In his concluding remarks on the 
archetypal and ectypal knowledge of God, Bavinck particularly underscores the vertical 
latitude of revelation by the language of “God has to come down to the level of his creatures” 
and “condescension.”79  A similar expression occurs later on: ‘Every vision of God, then, 
always requires an act of divine condescension (συγκαταβασις), a revelation by which God on 
his part comes down to us and makes himself knowable.’80 For Bavinck, the best representative 
of this act of condescension is the incarnation.81 
Both the direct use of the term “vertical” and the implied vertical meaning in texts prove 
that the vertical latitude of revelation in essence pertains to the incarnation. This also features 
in Calvin’s theology. Early in 1536, Calvin has stated that ‘descending to earth, he has prepared 
 
72 Herman Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, trans. Henry Zylstra (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1956), 
144. This statement is omitted in Pass’s thesis. 
73 Hielema, “Herman Bavinck's Eschatological Understanding of Redemption,” 127-128, 215, 233, 264. 
74 RD, 2:426; GD, 2:400. This argument is also left out in Pass’s thesis.  
75 RD, 2:407; GD, 2:370. 
76 RD, 1:344, 380, 434. 
77 RD, 3:411; GD, 3:402. 
78  Pass’s thesis does not probe this point, though it explores Bavinck’s thought of archetype-ectype 
somewhere. 
79 RD, 2:110; GD, 2:79. 
80 RD, 2:190; GD, 2:157. 
81 See RD, 2:100, 3:277, 3:411; also see 1:310. 
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an ascent to heaven for us.’82 Although Calvin was speaking of the sacraments, this idea was 
clearly related to his view of the human knowledge of God, which can be illustrated by his later 
writings. In the final edition of Institutes, while offering an explanation to the incarnation, 
Calvin argues: ‘Even if man had remained free from all stain, his condition would have been 
too lowly for him to reach God without a Mediator.’ Hence, he maintains that Christ’s 
descending to human beings has made it possible that humans ascend to God.83 To express 
Bavinck’s idea of scientific theology in Calvin’s language, it can be argued that the vertical 
latitude of revelation enables scientific dogmatics to reach the knowledge of God in the 
incarnate Mediator. This is thoroughly resonant with Bavinck’s claim that, ‘The purpose of 
revelation is not Christ; Christ is the center and the means; the purpose is that God will again 
dwell in his creatures and reveal his glory in the cosmos: θεος τα παντα εν πασιν.’84 
If we examine the shift of the starting point, midpoint and central dogma of Bavinck’s 
system from this vantage point, the seeming competition between the dogma of the knowledge 
of God and Christology can be removed. The vertical latitude of revelation accentuates that 
‘[t]he end returns to the beginning and yet is at the same time the apex which is exalted high 
above the point of origin.’85 With this point of gravity, we fuse together the variants of the oft-
appeared idea of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, such like “God in Christ Jesus” (1883),86 
“the knowledge of God in Christ” (1894),87 “the knowledge of God revealed in the face of 
Christ Jesus” (1899/1902), 88  and “revealed in his Word” (1895/1899/1906) 89 . It can be 
perceived that this idea crosses over the three stages as delimited by Pass. This then leads to a 
conclusion that although the starting point and midpoint have changed in the course of the 
development of Bavinck’s theology, these two points overlap materially from the downward 
angle due to the existence of the knowledge of God in Jesus Christ. This verdict sheds light on 
 
82 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1536 Edition, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1995), IV.24. 
83 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Volume 1&2, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T. 
McNeill (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), II.xii.1. Canlis demonstrates the Trinitarian 
character of the movements of Christ’s descending and ascending; Julie Canlis, Calvin's Ladder: A Spiritual 
Theology of Ascent and Ascension (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 92. 
84 RD, 1:380; GD, 1:104. 
85 Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, 144. 
86 WHG, 29. 
87 Herman Bavinck, “Common Grace,” trans. Raymond VanLeeuwen, Calvin Theological Journal 24, no. 1 
(1989): 51. 
88 Bavinck, “Religion and Theology,” 86-87, 97; Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid, 8-9, 21; Herman 
Bavinck, Het Doctorenambt (Kampen: G. Ph. Zalsman, 1899), 6. 
89  RD, 1:38; Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, Eerste deel, Eerste druk, 49; also see Bavinck, 
Doctorenambt, 5. 
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Bavinck’s contention in 1881 (during the first stage, as identified by Pass) that the incarnation 
of the Word is the ‘fundamental principle of all sciences’.90 
It is worth noting that the concept of the knowledge of God in Jesus Christ proves the 
development of Bavinck’s theology. Meanwhile, I endorse Pass’s taxonomy of three stages yet 
seek for the causes of the shifts that took place in 1895 and 1901. Pass has implicitly pointed 
out the cause of the first shift. He detects that in composing the first edition of Reformed 
Dogmatics, Bavinck was convinced that the theological system should be characterised by 
ontological, rather than the epistemological, order.91 Therefore, although Christ is at the centre 
of revelation, the knowledge of the Triune God still remains the starting point and the 
fundamental principle of dogmatics. In this light, the first shift was indicative of the 
actualisation of Bavinck’s dogmatic system, which caught his attention in his writings before 
the completion of Reformed Dogmatics in 1895.92 In short, the first shift was of necessity and 
considerable significance for Bavinck to work out a dogmatic system. 
The second shift was, if not entirely, occasioned by the religious and intellectual contexts 
that marked at the turn of the twentieth century. In the year of this shift, Bavinck’s Schepping 
of Ontwikkeling (Creation or Development) (1901) was published, which begins with an 
account of his milieu: 
Unless we are mistaken in our interpretation of the signs of the times, the twentieth 
century, upon which we have just entered, is to witness a gigantic conflict of spirits. 
Faith and unbelief … is the deepest theme of the history of the world. … And this 
it will be above all things else and in an entirely special sense in the twentieth 
century, which has just disclosed itself to us. … in the spiritual conflict which is 
now waging in every part of the civilized world, the points at issue more and more 
are the principles of Christianity itself, and the very fundamentals of all religion 
and of all morality.93 
As mentioned in chapter 2 that supernaturalism was reintroduced by young moderns or 
malcontents at the turn of the twentieth century, Bavinck thus sought for, as per George 
Harinck’s argument, a theistic coalition with his modernist colleagues to withstand the threats 
 
90 Herman Bavinck, “The Kingdom of God, the Highest Good,” trans. Nelson D. Kloosterman, TBR 2 (2011): 
146-147. Pass’s thesis does not take this contention into account. 
91 RD, 1:529; Pass, “‘The Heart of Dogmatics’,” 43. 
92 Bavinck, “De Wetenschappelijke Roeping Onzer Kerk,” 105-106. 
93 Herman Bavinck, “Creation or Development,” trans. J. Hendrik de Vries, Methodist Review 17, no. 6 
(1901): 849; emphasis added; Herman Bavinck, Schepping of Ontwikkeling (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1901), 7-
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to religion.94 One should not neglect a concomitant concern of Bavinck’s theology, that is, the 
essence of Christianity. 
Bavinck’s ‘Het Wezen des Christendoms’ (The Essence of Christianity) (1906) was his 
response to Adolf von Harnack’s lectures of Das Wesen des Christentums.95 Bavinck hence 
contends that ‘[t]he question about the essence of Christianity first arose in rather recent 
times.’96 Nonetheless, Eglinton reminds us that Bavinck’s ultimate objective was to wrestle 
with ‘the age of Nietzsche’, in which ‘Nietzsche’s deathly shadow was cast upon Christians of 
every stripe’ so that there were only two sharply conflicting worldviews––the theistic and the 
atheistic.97 The correlation of theistic coalition and the question of the essence of Christianity 
was caused by ‘a breach … between church dogma and personal faith’ and his contemporaries’ 
disagreement ‘with that view of Christianity that was honored in the confession and worship 
of the church.’98 In other words, Bavinck could not compromise the essence of the Christian 
faith for the sake of the theistic coalition. Alternatively, he reinforced the stand that the ‘person 
of Christ determines the essence of Christianity.’99 By doing so, I surmise, Bavinck probably 
intended to draw the coalition’s border lines between Christianity and the other religions. Then, 
Christology should be brought to the foreground, whereas the dogma of the knowledge of God 
fades into the background. This means that in the third stage the dogma of the knowledge of 
God, standing behind Christology, becomes the latent fundamental principle or common idea 
of Bavinck’s theological organism. This explains why Bavinck retained in the second edition 
of Reformed Dogmatics volume 2, which was published in 1908 (the third stage), the exact 
same contestation found in the first edition: 
From the very start of its labors, it faces the incomprehensible One. From him it 
derives its inception, for from him are all things. But also in the remaining loci, 
when it turns its attention to creatures, it views them only in relation to God as they 
exist from him and through him and for him [Rom. 11:36]. So then, the knowledge 
of God is the only dogma, the exclusive content, of the entire field of dogmatics. 
All the doctrines treated in dogmatics … are but the explication of the one central 
 
94 Harinck, “The Religious Character of Modernism and the Modern Character of Religion,” 74-76. Harinck 
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dogma of the knowledge of God. All things are considered in light of God, 
subsumed under him, traced back to him as the starting point.100  
This contextual understanding of the second shift also coincides with Bavinck’s later argument 
that ‘[a]ll these objective means of revelation reaches their high point and also possesses their 
centre in the person of Christ who is the highest appearance of God.’101 
The analysis hitherto illuminates that the dogma of the knowledge of God is the common 
idea of Bavinck’s theological organism in the course of the development of Christology in his 
dogmatic methodology. To describe it in Eglinton’s language, Bavinck provides a ‘one-track’ 
dogmatics, that is, dogmatics that operates by ‘thinking pros ton theon.’102 Granted, this dogma 
became latent, namely moving from the foreground to the background, in the course of the 
systematisation and development of Bavinck’s scientific theology. Also granted, Bavinck 
failed to explain and straighten out his arguments clearly and then transition well from the 
second stage to the third stage. Nonetheless, the principle that the knowledge of God is revealed 
in Jesus Christ rules out the rivalry between the dogma of the knowledge of God and 
Christology. It is always the dogma of the knowledge of God that orchestrates all loci as an 
organic whole. ‘Thus dogmatics is, and can only exist as, the scientific system of the knowledge 
of God.’103 
C. The Growth of Scientific Theology unto the Telos 
The fourth aspect of organicism––the development of organism unto the appointed end–
–is indicative of the expansion, enrichment and development of scientific theology. Bavinck 
has accounted for this point early in his career. He writes: 
The theological science therein is evident to be an organism, which gradually 
grows up and naturally develops. It is explained and unfolded more and more, 
which is understood in that name. It became and becomes clearer increasingly, 
which could and can be recognised much more as part of the doctrine of God in a 
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narrower sense than before. The subjects, taught under this name, continue to 
expand in number and scale.104 
Accordingly, scientific theology is dynamic rather than static. As has been indicated in the 
preceding chapter, the expansion of theology is predicated on the dispensation now underway, 
namely, that of the Holy Spirit.105 Later on, I will explain that the expansion and development 
of scientific theology is also related to Bavinck’s organically critical realism.  
Bavinck argues that the development of theology has its own end. He contends: ‘God 
reveals himself for his own sake: to delight in the glorification of his own attributes.’106 
Inasmuch as theology is grounded in God’s self-revelation, Bavinck asserts that the goal of 
theology is the glory of God.107 Given the ecclesial character of dogma, Bavinck writes: ‘Every 
dogmatics ought to be in full accord with and a part of the doxology sung to God by the church 
of all ages.’108 As will be seen in the next chapter, this doxological goal rounds off Bavinck’s 
grammar of scientific theology. 
D. Summary 
The discourse above has evidenced the interior organicity of Bavinck’s scientific theology. 
That is, Bavinck’s theology is not an aggregate but an organism, being constitutive of 
interconnected theological loci, which is united organically as a whole. Moreover, despite the 
development of Bavinck’s dogmatic thinking (particularly Christology) and the changes of his 
milieu, this theological organism is always orchestrated by the dogma of the knowledge of God, 
no matter whether this is so apparently or latently, and develops towards a particular 
doxological end. 
This interior organicity is generative and then shapes the exterior organicity of theology. 
To put it another way, scientific theology is not insular. Rather, it must have connection to the 
other sciences. In this regard, a Kuyperian influence on Bavinck should not be ignored, which 
made him different from some of his fellow seceders. With Kuyper, Bavinck contends that 
theology should be practised in the university rather than merely in a private seminary (as some 
seceders of his denomination has claimed). As will be seen in chapter 6, Bavinck and Lucas 
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Lindeboom (1845-1933), his colleague at the Theological School in Kampen, were in conflict 
in this regard. For Bavinck, ‘[b]ecause the universe is God’s creation, it is also his revelation 
and self-manifestation. There is not an atom of the world that does not reflect his deity.’109 As 
a result, theology should have a dialogue with the other sciences by virtue of its own organicity 
grounded in the Triune God. That being so, the organicity of scientific theology should show 
the proactive gesture towards its relationship with the other sciences. 
IV. Organically Critical Realism  
Realism is a philosophy or view of the world and life that upholds reality (contra subjective 
idealism), grounds knowledge in experience, and regards experience as a trustworthy path to 
the nature of reality. In general, it can be categorised into two groups: naïve realism and critical 
realism. Naïve realism holds that human experience and perception can directly attain the 
knowledge of objective reality.110 By contrast, critical realism stresses the role that the human 
mind plays in attaining the knowledge of reality, which is mediated to humans and grasped 
through a creative and critical interpretation of what is experienced.111 
Although the definitions of naïve and critical realism are associated with natural science, 
Bavinck’s idea of twofold science allows us to deploy the notion of critical realism here. 
Moreover, the discourse above on Bavinck’s positive revelationalism and the organicity of 
theology shows that his scientific theology is a kind of critical realism in a general sense. On 
the one hand, Bavinck accentuates the reality of God and His revelation, and underscores the 
import of human experience and consciousness to our appropriation God’s revelation. On the 
other hand, Bavinck’s construction of an organic system of dogmatics evidences an intellectual 
effort in assimilating the knowledge of God which is experienced in revelation and mediated 
by the human consciousness.112 
Nonetheless, the term “critical realism” is too broad to display theologically and fully the 
quintessence, logic and metanarrative of Bavinck’s scientific theology. By the qualifier 
“organically”, my intention is to theologise the term “critical realism” so as to demonstrate the 
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realistic constituents of Bavinck’s grammar of scientific theology. In what follows, I will 
explicate organically critical realism and organically critical realism successively. 
A. Organically Critical Realism: The Organic Correspondence between Subjective and 
Objective Revelation  
One significant meaning of organically critical realism consists in the adverb 
“organically”. This means that for Bavinck organicity is characteristic of the critical 
interpretation of the experienced revelation. As has been indicated above, Bavinck emphasises 
the correspondence between subject and object in the human appropriation of revelation. This 
correspondence is crucial for theology and the other sciences alike. Bavinck’s concern about 
the balance between subject and object has already occurred in his early writings. In 
‘Geloofswetenschap’ (1880), Bavinck constantly laid emphasis on the simultaneity of 
objectively certain knowledge and subjective belief. 113  Likewise, in ‘Het Geweten’ 
(Conscience) (1881), he contended that ‘the subjective rule of our life must be brought 
increasingly into agreement with the objective one made known to us in God’s revelation.’114 
As such, Bavinck was attentive to and critical of the blending of subject and object in modern 
philosophy, particularly in Schelling’s idealistic philosophy of the perfect unity of spirit and 
matter and Hegel’s absolute idealism.115  Meanwhile, he expressly appreciated the Ethical 
theologians’ insights into the requirement of the balance of the subject and object of science.116 
Later in Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck argues: ‘Science always consists in a logical 
relation between subject and object. Our view of science depends on the way we relate the 
two.’117 He presents his realism after his critique of rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism 
mistakenly stresses the human subject alone by arguing that the human thinking or mind is the 
source of knowledge, whereas empiricism accents sense perception such that the human 
consciousness is subject to the physical world. To Bavinck’s mind, both rationalism and 
empiricism are unscientific due to their mishandling the correspondence between subject and 
object.118 
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As a particular science, theology displays this correspondence par excellence, which is 
characteristic of its scientificity insofar as the author of the correspondence is its object, namely 
God. Bavinck contends: 
Here, too, there is correspondence between the subject and the object. There is 
revelation of God outside but also in human beings. This revelation of God in 
human beings, however, is not an independent source of knowledge alongside of 
nature and history but serves as subjective organ to enable us to receive and 
understand the revelation of God in nature and history. It is certain that there is an 
indwelling of God in every person, as much as but more strongly than in nature 
and history. 119 
While illustrating positive revelationalism, it has been pointed out that Bavinck describes the 
correspondence between subject and object as the immediate human experience and awareness 
of God’s revelation in the human consciousness. In the above statement, however, Bavinck 
vividly depicts this correspondence as the “indwelling of God in every person.” Eugene 
Heideman argues that Bavinck’s insistence on the close relationship of subject and object 
renders him unable ‘to escape completely the pantheism which he fears and criticizes.’120 In 
my view, Heideman’s estimation is derivative of his omission of the organicity of the 
correspondence. Bavinck explicitly qualifies the correspondence between subject and object as 
organic. 121  Brian Mattson rightly notes that Bavinck’s view of the correspondence is 
characterised by organicity, which is grounded in Bavinck’s Trinitarian ontology. 122  As 
Bavinck argues, 
God is the first principle of being (principium essendi); present in his mind are the 
ideas of all things; all things are based on thoughts and are created by the word. It 
is his good pleasure, however, to reproduce in human beings made in his image an 
ectypal knowledge that reflects this archetypal knowledge (cognitio archetypa) in 
his own divine mind. He does this, not by letting us view the ideas in his being 
(Malebranche) or by passing them all on to us at birth (Plato, the theory of innate 
ideas), but by displaying them to the human mind in the works of his hands.123 
Three observations are worth noting with regard to the statement above. First, by asserting that 
God is the principium essendi, Bavinck grounds the correspondence ultimately in God rather 
than the human being. By doing so, subjectivism and positivism are eradicated. Second, the 
correspondence between subjective and objective revelation is reflective of the archetype-
 
119 RD, 1:341; GD, 1:312-313; emphasis added. 
120 Heideman, The Relation of Revelation and Reason in E. Brunner and H. Bavinck, 144. 
121 Bavinck, “Foundations of Psychology,” 116-117. Also see RD, 1:231. 
122 Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 56. 
123 RD, 1:233; GD, 1:206. 
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ectype model of the knowledge of God, which reaffirms the vertical latitude of God’s 
revelation. Third, God has established the correspondence by His creating the human being 
after the imago Dei. This observation is of significance insofar as it derives another two points: 
(1) the essence of subjective revelation in the human consciousness; (2) the organic 
correspondence established by the Logos. 
First, Bavinck argues that subjective revelation is reflective of human religiosity by virtue 
of the fact that the human being is created in God’s image.124 This means that the reality of 
God’s creation of humans is the foundation of the human subjective appropriation of objective 
revelation. Bavinck’s positive revelationalism has unveiled that this subjective appropriation 
consists in the human consciousness, which incorporates the cognitive capacity for God’s 
revelation, both the general and the special.125 This subjective capacity is crucial to such an 
extent that the human consciousness is ‘[t]he only path by which we are able to attain’ the 
reality of God’s revelation.126  Therefore, the reality of God’s creation safeguards human 
subjectivity in knowing God so that the correspondence between subjective and objective 
revelation will lapse neither into mechanism nor into divine determinism, both of which deny 
human volitional action. For Bavinck, the human subject is always active in appropriating 
God’s revelation. This coincides with the third aspect of his definition of dogmatics, that is, its 
divine-human quality.127 
Second, Bavinck maintains that the Logos is the architect of the correspondence between 
subjective and objective revelation.128 ‘It is one Logos that created both man and world in 
relation to each other and for each other.’129 In terms of general epistemology, there is the 
 
124 RD, 1:278; GD, 1:253. 
125 Bavinck argues that ‘[o]ne can call [the human religious propensity] by various names: “the seed of 
religion,” “a sense of divinity” (Calvin), religious feeling (Schleiermacher, Opzoomer), belief (Hartmann), 
a feeling for infinity (Tiele), etc., but there is always in humans a certain capacity for perceiving the divine.’ 
RD, 1:278; GD, 1:252. Hence, Bavinck repudiates the theory of the innate ideas; RD, 2:68-70. 
126 PR, 56. 
127 See chapter three, III. 
128 This Logosological view is also characteristic of Kuyper’s view of the organic relationship between 
subject and object; see EST, 63-83; EHG, 2:8-29; also see Jacob Klapwijk, “Abraham Kuyper on Science, 
Theology and University,” Philosophia Reformata 78 (2013): 18-46. 
The role of the Logos in this correspondence seems not to be laid out in Bavinck’s early writings. 
Indeed, the development of the role of the Logos in the correspondence is underexplored. Nonetheless, it 
could be assured that the idea of the Logos as the architect of the correspondence was shaped in Bavinck’s 
preparation for Reformed Dogmatics by 1895. 
129 Bavinck, “Herman Bavinck’s Foundations of Psychology,” 75. Also see RD, 1:231. Wolter points out 
that Logosology is the common feature of the ontological framework of the early neo-Calvinists; Albert 
Wolters, “Dutch Neo-Calvinism: Worldview, Philosophy and Rationality,” in Rationality in the Calvinian 
Tradition, ed. Hendrik Hart, Johan van der Hoeven, and Nicholas Wolterstorff (London: University Press of 
America, 1983), 126. 
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correspondence can be seen between the logos in the human mind and the logos in the 
phenomenal world, which is actualised via the Logos’s enlightening of human reason (logos 
within).130  
This correspondence sustained by the Logos’s enlightening is prominent in Bavinck’s 
account of scientific theology. For him, the correspondence between subjective and objective 
revelation is the work of the Triune God.131 Here, we need to reckon with the difference 
between general and special revelation from the perspective of the role of the Logos. 
[Special Revelation:] The Holy Spirit is the great and powerful witness to Christ 
[the Logos], objectively in Scripture, subjectively in the human own spirit (geest). 
By that Spirit we receive a fitting organ [faith/believing consciousness] for the 
reception of external revelation.132 
[General Revelation:] it is the Logos himself who through our spirit bears witness 
to the Logos in the world. It is the one selfsame Spirit who objectively displays the 
truth to us and subjectively elevates it into certainty in our spirit. It is his witness 
given in our consciousness to the thoughts God embodied in the creatures around 
us.133 
It is striking that in respect of scientific theology the correspondence posited by Bavinck 
between subject and object operates with a Spirit-Logos model. Bavinck seems to envisage a 
Spirit-Christology, as claimed by Cornelis van der Kooi, which complements a Logos-
Christology and spells more fully out the identity and work of the Son from the angle of the 
work of the Holy Spirit.134 Moreover, this Spirit-Logos model refrains scientific theology from 
collapsing into subjectivism because of the assumption of the existence of the self-revealed 
God and the human appropriation of divine revelation in faith.135 
This Spirit-Logos model of the correspondence between subjective and objective 
revelation, however, gives rise to a question: What is the difference between general and 
special revelation? We need to recall what has already been set out––that is, the regeneration 
 
130 CW, 37; RD, 1:586-589; RD, 1:232, 384; 2:69; 3:280; Sutanto, God and Knowledge, 144-145. Further on 
Bavinck’s Logos-epistemology, see O'Donnell, “‘Bavinck’s Bug’ or ‘Van Tilian’ Hypochondria?,” 139-171; 
O'Donnell's article examines Oliphint's critique of Bavinck's cognitive realism as conflating principium with 
method (152); see K. Scott Oliphint, “Bavinck's Realism, the Logos Principle, and Sola Scriptura,” The 
Westminster Theological Journal 72, no. 2 (2010): 359-390. 
131 RD, 1:214. 
132 GD, 1:471; RD, 1:506; rev. 
133 RD, 1:587; GD, 1:557. 
134 Cornelis Van der Kooi, This Incredibly Benevolent Force (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2018), 22-70. It is 
apparent that Bavinck’s Spirit-Logos model is free from Christopher Holmes’s critique that a Spirit 
Christology ‘is to confuse immanent processions and temporal missions’ since ‘word (and presence) is a 
function of identity and being’; Christopher R. J. Holmes, The Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015), 
127-129. 
135 See chapter 3, IV.B.b. 
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taking place in the unconscious animates the understanding of the immediately experienced 
revelation in the human consciousness. This point of view is the key to our comprehension of 
the following statement by Bavinck: 
But the moment we pass from the subconscious to the conscious level and want to 
learn to know the indwelling of God as a revelation, we as subject are bound to the 
“object” around us and ascend by way of the creatures to the Creator (Ps. 19:1; Isa. 
40:26; Rom. 1:20).136 
It is apparent that the terms “indwelling”, “creatures” and “Creator” can refer to general 
revelation, as further proved by the cited scriptural texts. This means that Bavinck relates the 
“pass from the subconscious to the conscious level” to the proper comprehension of general 
revelation, to having God as the object of our knowing, and to our ascension to God. 
Specifically, by the regenerative work, the Holy Spirit illumines the human consciousness 
(becoming the believing consciousness) to receive and comprehend God’s general revelation 
through the lens of special revelation.137 In this light, Richard Muller’s point in his critique of 
Sutanto is justified. Muller points out that Sutanto’s view of ‘primordial and precognitive’ 
general revelation neglects that in the period of early modern Reformed orthodoxy truth is ‘the 
adequation of the mind to the thing and the most basic knowledge.’ As such, revelation is 
‘intuitive and pre-ratiocinative’ and can be ‘expressed in propositional forms’ (rather than ‘pre-
cognitive’ or ‘primordial’), which is activated in the human being through immediate 
experience.138 In terms of scientific theology, this activation is embodied in the “pass from the 
subconscious to the conscious level.” It requires the animation accomplished by the Spirit. 
Thereby, the Spirit is venerated as the principia cognoscendi internum of scientific theology.139 
B. Organically Critical Realism: The Dispensation of the Holy Spirit 
The work of the Holy Spirit not only underlies organically critical realism. It is also central 
to the nature of organically critical realism. In terms of the latter, the adjective “critical” is 
 
136 RD, 1:341; GD, 1:313; emphasis. 
137 RD, 1:304, 384. 
138 Richard A. Muller, “Kuyper and Bavinck on Natural Theology,” TBR 10 (2019): 23, note 67; 30-31; 
Nathaniel Gray Sutanto, “Neo-Calvinism on General Revelation: A Dogmatic Sketch,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 20, no. 4 (2018): 495-516. For general epistemology, Muller argues against 
Sutanto that ‘the mind has a capacity for knowledge that is “activated” by something external. Thus, common 
notions are better understood as implanted via an immediate apprehension.’ It should be noted that Muller 
probably misreads Sutanto’s view in that Sutanto’s emphasis is on the conceptualisation of revelation within 
the human being. However, Muller’s emphasis seems to be on the objective truth itself. 
139 RD, 1:384, 506. In this vein, this study refrains from Muller’s criticism: ‘It is also a mistake to read 
Bavinck’s stress on common notions as a precognitive or primordial in an effort to sever its connection with 
the older tradition while at the same time linking his thought to nineteenth-century theories of self-
consciousness.’ Muller, “Kuyper and Bavinck on Natural Theology,” 23. 
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qualified by “organically” but in turn modifies realism. This means, on the one hand, that the 
“critical” is reflective of the organicity of scientific theology, and on the other hand, that it is 
rooted in the reality of God’s revelation. Meanwhile, as explicated above, Bavinck’s realism 
can be characterised as critical in a general sense. Hence, organically critical realism should 
resemble the character of critical realism in general, which means ‘that the real knowledge that 
we have of another is, from our side, always fallible knowledge whose truth and trustworthiness 
are dependent upon that other that we are making knowledge claims about.’140 As will be seen 
anon, according to Bavinck’s project of scientific theology, this critical character of scientific 
theology has its roots in the dispensation of the Holy Spirit. This critical gesture targets the 
ecclesial tradition rather than God’s revelation. 
On the basis of the viewpoint that revelation is an organic whole, Bavinck divides 
revelation into two dispensations: the dispensation of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit. 
Whereas the former refers to the already-completed objective revelation by inscripturation, the 
latter means the human subjective appropriation of revelation.141 As that the first dispensation 
has been completed, the Holy Spirit now applies revelation to humans by regeneration and 
illumination.142 Bavinck elsewhere calls the Spirit’s twofold work as being to “apply the work 
of Christ” and to “explain the word of Christ.”143 He relates the tradition of the Church to the 
latter. That is, the Holy Spirit makes use of God’s revelation as an organic whole to form the 
tradition of the Church. Bavinck contends: 
After Jesus completed his work, he sent forth the Holy Spirit who, while adding 
nothing new to the revelation, still guides the church into the truth (John 16:12–15) 
until it passes through all its diversity and arrives at the unity of faith and the 
knowledge of the Son of God (Eph. 3:18, 19; 4:13). In this sense there is a good, 
true, and glorious tradition. It is the method by which the Holy Spirit causes the 
truth of Scripture to pass into the consciousness and life of the church.144 
Accordingly, the dispensation of the Holy Spirit shapes the tradition of the Church, that is, the 
tradition of the interpretation of the word of God. ‘Tradition in its proper sense is the 
interpretation and application of the eternal truth in the vernacular and life of the present 
 
140 La Montagne, Barth and Rationality, 127.  
141 RD, 1:382-383. The view of two dispensations clearly manifests Bavinck’s reception of Calvin’s and the 
post-Reformation Reformed tradition; Calvin, Institutes, I.ix.3; Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed 
Dogmatics, Volume Two: Holy Scripture, The Cognitive Foundation of Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 2003), 202-204. 
142 RD, 1:383-384. 
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generation.’145 As Michael Allen and Scott Swain argue, ‘[t]he products and processes of 
tradition may be regarded … as instruments of the Spirit’s illuminating presence.’146 In this 
light, the whole history of theology is de facto the history of the Holy Spirit. 
Bavinck maintains that ecclesial confessions epitomise the tradition of the Church and the 
history of theology. Under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the truth of Holy Scripture is 
universally accepted and recognised by the Church, which leads to the formation of the 
Church’s confessions.147 At the centre of gravity, organically critical realism, in essence, refers 
to the critical reception of the legacies of the Church, which is the interpretative result of God’s 
organic revelation in history. To put it differently, ‘our appropriation of ecclesial tradition must 
always be a critical traditioning wherein we seek to be shaped by the truth, goodness, and 
beauty of our heritage and not to be drawn into a pathology of untruth, evil, and ugliness by 
our native resources.’148 This critical attitude toward the ecclesial tradition raises the question: 
How can scientific theology be critical of the tradition of the Church which is shaped by the 
Holy Spirit? It is arguable that Bavinck’s answer to this question is grounded in the principle 
that the tradition and confessions of the Church are fallible by virtue of Holy Scripture as the 
sole principium cognoscendi externum. 
Although the tradition of the Church, particularly embodying in its confessions, is shaped 
by the work of the Holy Spirit, Bavinck does not define the confession of the Church as the 
principium of scientific theology. In his critique of François Daubanton (1853-1920), Bavinck 
resolutely rejected Daubanton’s identification of the Church’s confession as the source of 
dogmatics and Holy Scripture as the norm.149 On the contrary, Bavinck maintains that Holy 
Scripture, rather than the Church’s confession, is the principium of theology and that as such, 
dogmatics should be grounded in Scripture.150 This point is clarified in Reformed Dogmatics: 
‘Objective revelation in Christ, recorded in Scripture, is its external source of knowledge 
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(principium cognoscendi externum).’ 151  Moreover, Bavinck asserts that ‘dogmatics is 
coordinate with confession and stands with it on one line.’152 Note that several pages earlier 
Bavinck has already argued that ‘[e]very dogmatics is not the word of God itself, but a human, 
fallible sketch of the word of God. It is not the original, but always more or less, never a 
completely similar image of the divine truth.’153 The corollary can be drawn that since the 
Church’s confession is not the principium cognoscendi externum that is the objective revelation 
of God, it is fallible. It is susceptible to correction and revision under the infallible authority of 
Holy Scripture because it is actually the fruit of human intellectual work.154 Given Bavinck’s 
saying that ‘[d]ogmatics is nothing other than the scientific description of the confession of the 
church,’ it is clear that scientific theology is critical of the Church’s confession and tradition 
according to the criteria of Holy Scripture, which has inscripturated God’s objective revelation 
as an organic whole.155 This organically critical realism, on the one hand, guarantees the 
continuity of theology, and on the other hand, boosts the development of theology towards its 
end under the authority of Holy Scripture in the dispensation of the Holy Spirit. 
Thus, theology is essentially conservative. It accepts the legacies of former 
generations, not to throw them away but to augment them as soon as possible and 
pass them to the ensuing generations much more Reformed. It receives the acquired 
treasures not to throw them over and over again into the melting pot of criticism, 
but to present them to us if we can find in our soul their truth and beauty as strong 
as in the previous centuries. It is an illusion that one always wants to find something 
new in its field. … But at the same time, it is a progressive science. Respecting the 
past, it builds on the laid foundation until it is completed and reaches the final 
goal. … Theology is penetrated by the conviction that God is willing to ignite in 
this and following ages more lights about what was hitherto still hidden in Holy 
Scripture and wrapped in mystery. As long as theology has not fulfilled its task, it 
does not reach its final end. Meanwhile, the history of this dispensation does not 
yet have an end, which is consecrated to the interpretation of the Word.156 
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This critical reception of the past traditions of the Church is exercised in the Holy Spirit 
and aims for the fuller comprehension of the Word of God. Nonetheless, this still raises the 
question of the certainty of the knowledge acquired via the tradition and confessions of the 
Church. In this regard, one needs to bear in mind the fundamental principle of epistemic 
certainty, namely the testimonium internum of the Holy Spirit: ‘All cognition of truth is 
essentially a witness that the human spirit bears to it and at bottom a witness of the Spirit of 
God to the Word, by whom all things are made.’157 While applying this principle to the 
epistemic certainty of theology, as demonstrated above, Bavinck stresses the twofold work of 
the Holy Spirit: regeneration and illumination. Donald Macleod rightly notes that for Bavinck 
‘[t]he Spirit regenerates by witnessing: witnessing both to scripture and to Christ. This means 
that the testimonium is not merely given to faith: it is given in faith.’158 Given that Bavinck’s 
notion of faith is both religious and epistemological, Bavinck contends with the Reformers that 
‘faith is not hope and opinion, not guess and conjecture, not even knowledge and assent, but 
certain knowledge and firm trust, a consciousness and conviction so strong and final[ly] it 
excludes all doubt and fear.’159 From this argument, it can be deduced that faith, as the fruit of 
the Spirit’s work, inherently carries the epistemic certainty of the tradition and confessions of 
the Church. 
Furthermore, we observe a correspondence between the consciousness of the Church and 
that of individual dogmaticians, which further enhances the certainty of the knowledge of the 
ecclesial tradition and confessions. 
Both of these—Scripture and confession—are objective and exist independently of 
the dogmatician. In order that they receive subjective force for him as well, and can 
be reproduced, he must also sense within himself the testimony of the Holy Spirit—
that testimony, however, as discerned not only in his heart but as discerned in the 
whole church that is now living, of which he is but one individual member.160 
 
157 RD, 1:587; GD, 1:557. On this, Veenhof argues that Bavinck grounds the doctrine of testimonium on 
general epistemology; Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspiratie, 490-491. However, this study proves that Bavinck’s 
intention is to afford a parallel between theology as a particular science and science in general. 
158 Donald Macleod, “Bavinck’s Prolegomena: Fresh Light on Amsterdam, Old Princeton, and Cornelius 
Van Til,” The Westminster Theological Journal 68, no. 2 (2006): 282; also see G. C. Berkouwer, Holy 
Scripture, trans. Jack B. Rogers (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 51-53. 
159 Bavinck, The Certainty of Faith, 40. Further on Bavinck’s view of the certainty of faith, see Donald 
Macleod, “Herman Bavinck and the Basis of Christian Certainty,” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 
29, no. 1 (2011): 92-107; Henk Van den Belt, “Herman Bavinck's Lectures on the Certainty of Faith (1891),” 
TBR 8 (2017): 35-63; Henk Van den Belt, “Geloofszekerheid tussen Objectief en Subjectief,” in 
Geloofszekerheid, ed. Henk van den Belt (Soesterberg: Uitgeverij Aspekt, 2016), particularly 289-294. 
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Notwithstanding that organically critical realism requires a critical study of the tradition and 
confessions of the Church, Bavinck does not repudiate or devalue them insofar as this critical 
action is guarded by the Holy Spirit and always indebted to the Church.161 
And the church is led by the Holy Spirit in such a way that it gradually absorbs this 
content into its consciousness and reproduces it in its own language. The 
interpretation, formulation, and systematization of divine revelation therefore 
advances slowly and not without much aberration to the right and to the left. But it 
does go forward. The Holy Spirit’s leading is the guarantee that it will; he does not 
rest until he has caused the fullness of Christ—which includes the fullness of his 
truth and wisdom—to dwell in the church and has filled that church with all the 
fullness of God (Eph. 3:19). Therefore, just as there is unity and continuity in the 
development of every science, so is this true in theology and dogmatics.162 
Accordingly, as Robert Jenson puts well, the dogmatician’s ‘confidence in the community’s 
communal consciousness is in fact a confidence in the guiding presence of the Spirit.’163 In 
short, the critical reception of the tradition of the Church, for Bavinck, is the Holy Spirit’s 
sublimation of the ecclesial interpretation of God’s revelation in history. 
C. Summary 
Organically critical realism is grounded in the reality of God’s self-revelation. 
Organically critical realism is indicative of the correspondence between subjective revelation 
and objective revelation, which echoes positive revelationalism by clarifying how the human 
consciousness immediately experiences God’s revelation. Moreover, organically critical 
realism sheds light on the way by which the Holy Spirit as the living agent and force develops 
the organism of dogmatics. To paraphrase it with B. A. Gerrish’s language, ‘[t]he dogmatic 
theologian moves on to appraise the beliefs and dogmas in which the church and its theologians 
have embodied Christian faith and, where necessary, ventures to make a case for alternative 
language.’164 For Bavinck, the courage to venture is nurtured by the Holy Spirit. Then, this 
critical activity unveils the fact that no single tradition within the Church dominates universally. 
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This implies that organically critical realism must be concomitant with the catholicity of 
Christianity, which will be explored in the ensuing chapter. 
V. Concluding Remarks on the First Three Rationales 
Before moving on to spelling out the rationales of dialectical catholicity and doxological 
teleology, I would like to offer remarks on the first three rationales by exploring the underlying 
cause of their sequence. 
As noted in the beginning, the five rationales are set in concatenation and are thus shaped 
as a holistic grammar for Bavinck’s scientific theology. However, the sequence of the 
argumentation above is not unintentional. The deliberate sequence rests upon the first aspect 
of the definition of scientific theology: ‘Theology as a particular science assumes that God has 
revealed Himself in an apparent way.’165 Hence, like revelation is the point of departure for 
theology, the revelational character of scientific theology must be the starting point of its 
grammar.  
The organicism is arranged at the second place of the sequence is, on the one hand, due 
to Bavinck’s contention that the organic is essentially characteristic of divine revelation. On 
the other hand, it is grounded on the first and the third factors of the definition of scientific 
theology: (1) God as the real object, and (3) divine object-defining.166 The reality of God as 
knowable is grounded in the reality of the organic divine revelation, the appropriation of which 
requires human experience and consciousness. Therefore, organically critical realism should 
come after theological organicism. 
How are the first three rationales related to the last two? Is divine revelation also the 
ground of the last two rationales? In what sense do the five rationales constitute the holistic 
grammar of scientific theology? By answering the three questions in the next chapter, the meta-
paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s system through the lens of wetenschappelijke theology will 
come to the fore. 
 
165 GD, 1:13; RD, 1:37-38; rev.; see chapter 3, IV.B. 
166 See chapter 3, IV.B.a, c. 
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Chapter 5 The Grammar of Scientific Theology (II) 
It is rather that the Reformed tradition made the honor of God the fundamental 
principle of all doctrine and conduct, of dogmatics and morality, of the family, 
society, and the state, of science and art. Nowhere was this principle of the glory 




This chapter is intended to account for the last two aspects of the grammar of Bavinck’s 
scientific theology: dialectical catholicity and doxological teleology. At this point, I suspect 
that the question might arise: Why group the last two rationales together at this point? The 
quotation used to introduce this chapter has clearly set forth the intimate relationship between 
catholicity and God’s glory, which is characteristic of the Gereformeerde tradition. It is in this 
tradition that Bavinck stands. 
How are the last two rationales related to the other three? Once again, the issue centres on 
divine revelation. Bavinck argues, ‘The realization of the counsel of God begins with 
creation.’2 Accordingly, he maintains that ‘[c]reation was the first revelation, the principle and 
foundation of all revelation.’3 Following this, it could be argued that inasmuch as God’s 
revelation is universal, scientific theology that is grounded in revelation must be catholic. 
Likewise, as God’s revelation aims for the glorification of God,4 scientific theology should 
have doxology as its telos. 
In what follows, I will successively examine the rationales of dialectical catholicity and 
doxological teleology. The sequence is determined by the following:  while positive 
revelationalism as the starting point of Bavinck’s theological grammar means that scientific 
theology is from God and by God, the doxological telos as the end point indicates that scientific 
theology is for God and to God. In this way, the grammar’s exitus-reditus scheme comes to the 
fore. The scheme’s closed circle compacts the five rationales and is modelled as the meta-
paradigm of Bavinck’s scientific theology. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that Bavinck’s 
scientific theology is fundamentally Trinitarian. 
 
1 RD, 2:434; GD, 2:398. 
2 RD, 2:407; GD, 2:250. 
3 PR, 265; also see RD, 1:307. 
4 RD, 1:346. 
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II. Dialectical Catholicity 
Bavinck’s comprehensive discussion on the catholicity of Christianity is presented in his 
rectorial address delivered at the Theological School in Kampen in 1888.5 Therein Bavinck 
lays down threefold definition of the catholicity of the Church according to the Patristic fathers. 
In the first place, they use it to refer to the church as a unified whole in contrast to 
the dispersed local congregations that make up the whole and are included in it. … 
Secondly, the term expresses the unity of the church as inclusive of all believers 
from every nation, in all times and places. … And finally, the church is sometimes 
referred to as catholic because it embraces the whole of human experience. It 
possesses perfectly all doctrines concerning either invisible and visible things that 
human beings need to know; it provides a cure for all kinds of sin, either of body 
or soul; it produces all virtues and good works, and partakes of all spiritual gifts.6 
The first two points respectively denote temporal and historical catholicity. Temporally, all 
churches around the world are united, and historically all true believers constitute a unity 
throughout history. These two aspects correspond to the Reformers’ theology of the visible and 
invisible Church, according to which visible churches have communion with each other. The 
third point does not pertain to the interior of the Church. Rather, it unveils the responsibility of 
a visible church to engage with the other spheres of human life.  
Cory Brock has also summed up Bavinck’s view of catholicity in three points. First, 
catholicity carries the connotation of universal communion, that is, ‘to commune, to fellowship 
with the generations of the saints of the past and present.’ Second, it refers to ecumenical 
polemics, which aims to achieve ‘the purity of the church catholic.’ Third, catholicity is 
indicative of the hunt for truth. That is, ‘[t]he search for the truth transcends the retreat to 
structures of institutional authority, but stands on the authority of God’s self-manifestation and 
theological reason.’7 In spite of being somewhat similar to Brock’s summary of this notion, 
this study differs from Brock’s by stressing the dialectical feature that is implicitly inherent in 
Bavinck’s view of catholicity, which is going to be demonstrated below. 
A closer look at Bavinck’s three points will entail the estimation that his notion of 
catholicity is dialectical. The first two points presuppose the existence of individual entities 
(churches) which are part of the holistic one (the Church). The third point does the same. The 
catholicity of the Church that ‘embraces the whole of human experience’ should be actually 
 
5 Herman Bavinck, De Katholiciteit van Christendom en Kerk. Rede bij de overdracht van het rectoraat aan 
de Theol. School te Kampen (Kampen: G.Ph. Zalsman, 1888); Herman Bavinck, “The Catholicity of 
Christianity and the Church,” trans. John Bolt, Calvin Theological Journal 27, no. 2 (1992): 220-251. 
6 Bavinck, “The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church,” 221. 
7 Brock, Orthodox yet Modern, 54-58. 
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practised in every local church. Note that Bavinck resolutely refuses to limit this ecclesial 
catholicity within the confines of a particular church in a specific place or time.8 On the one 
hand, the broader notion of ecclesial catholicity reflects issues faced in Bavinck’s own 
particular context. Two years before the publication of Bavinck’s De Katholiciteit van 
Christendom en Kerk, the Doleantie Church, which was the peak of the campaign to defend 
Reformed confessional orthodoxy and combat bureaucratic polity in the Netherlands, was split 
from the established Dutch Reformed Church under the leadership of Kuyper on 6 January 
1886. In 1887, the possible union between the Doleantie Church and Bavinck’s denomination 
the Christian Reformed Church was proposed. However, efforts to unite these denominations 
were hindered by theological divergences, including, for example, the clash between Kuyper’s 
supralapsarianism and the infralapsarianism of the Christian Reformed Church.9 In this setting, 
Bavinck’s insistence on broader ecclesial catholicity intended to reconcile the two parties. On 
the other hand, theologically, it is indisputable that his accent on catholicity goes to the heart 
of Bavinck’s organic account of the visible church. Bavinck maintains that ‘the ingathering of 
the elect must not be conceived individualistically and atomistically. … The church [gemeente] 
is an organism, not an aggregate; the whole, in its case, precedes the parts.’10 In this light, it 
could be argued that Bavinck seems to envisage an ecumenical union of churches. This can be 
proved by his attendance at the ecumenical council hosted by the Alliance of the Reformed 
Churches in Toronto in 1892.11 
Bavinck’s insistence on the essential affinity between the church and theology ensures the 
application of the notion of ecclesial catholicity to theology, which in turn entails two 
ramifications. One is the organicity of theology, which has been laid out in the preceding 
chapter. The other is dialectical catholicity. To put it more specifically, the catholicity of 
Bavinck’s view of scientific theology is dialectical in (1) that theology should be undertaken 
within a particular visible church and thus in a way that is relevant to a specific ecclesiastical 
tradition; (2) that scientific theology is always moving outwards from its own ecclesiastical 
 
8 Bavinck, “The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church,” 242-243. 
9 On further, see James D. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2013), 167-171. 
10 RD, 3:524; GD, 3:521; emphasis added. Bavinck here apparently refers to the visible church on the ground 
that he never makes the invisible church as the referent of the Dutch gemeente in Reformed Dogmatics. 
While speaking of the invisible church, Bavinck employs the Dutch kerk. On Bavinck’s view of the visible 
church as organism, see RD, 4:329-333; Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 191-195. 
11 Bavinck’s conference paper pointed the audience to the contribution that Calvinism can make to the 
universal and catholic Christian faith. Herman Bavinck, “The Influence of the Protestant Reformation on the 
Moral and Religious Condition of Communities and Nations,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 25 (2014): 
75-81; Eglinton, Bavinck, 184-186. 
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starting point, and should engage not only with other theological traditions but also with the 
other sciences. 
A. Standing in the Tradition 
 The catholicity of theology first denotes that scientific theology must stand within a 
particular theological tradition. According to Bavinck, this commitment to a tradition must 
embody in a dogmatician’s work clearly. 
All dogmaticians, when they go to work, whether they recognise or not, stand in 
the historical manifestation of Christianity, in which they were born and nurtured 
and come to Scripture as Reformed, or Lutheran, or Roman Catholic Christians. In 
this respect as well, we cannot simply divest ourselves of our environment; we are 
always children of our time, the products of our environment. The result, therefore, 
is what one would expect: all the dogmatic handbooks that have been published by 
the biblical direction in light of their givens faithfully reflect the personal and 
ecclesiastical viewpoint of their authors. They cannot, therefore, claim to be more 
objective than those of explicitly ecclesiastical dogmaticians.12 
As has been indicated in chapter 3, Bavinck stresses the confessions of the Church as the 
starting point of the interpretation of the word of God.13 By arguing so, he opposes the idea of 
neutrality in theological studies as commended by some of his contemporary biblical 
scholars.14 The object of Bavinck’s criticism was probably his de facto supervisor Abraham 
Kuenen (1828-1891), who was a well-known biblical scholar around the world and highly 
commended a neutral approach to biblical studies. According to Herman Paul, Kuenen’s 
neutral methodology consists in his historical-critical ethos. It is historical insofar as Kuenen 
attempts to undertake a purely historical scientific study, like inquiring merely into the 
authorship and provenance of different books of the Bible. It is critical insofar as he resolutely 
distances himself from faith authorities, like the confessions of the Nederlandse Hervormde 
Kerk.15 It could be argued that it is Kuenen’s critical gesture that is critiqued by Bavinck. As 
 
12 GD, 1:58-59; RD, 1:82; rev. Bavinck also argues that ‘the dogmatician receives the content of his faith 
from the hands of the church;’ RD, 1:93. 
13 Chapter 3, III. 
14 Bavinck’s contemporary German theologian Adolf Schlatter (1852-1938), who is the scholar of New 
Testament theology and systematic theology, repudiates the objective neutrality in biblical hermeneutics. He 
argues that one must have ‘certain convictions’ that exert influence upon his perception, observation and 
judgment. Adolf Schlatter, “The Theology of the New Testament and Dogmatics,” ed. and trans. Robert 
Morgan in The Nature of New Testament Theology: The Contribution of William Wrede and Adolf Schlatter 
(London: SCM, 1973), 122. In Reformed Dogmatics, Bavinck consults Schlatter’s work to demonstrate that 
knowledge is grounded in faith; RD, 1:566. 
15 Herman Paul, “Waarheidszin en Waarheidsliefde. Een Vrijzinnige Synthese van Geloof en Wetenschap,” 
in Theologie, Waarheidsliefde en Religiekritiek: Over Geloof en Wetenschap aan de Nederlandse 
Universiteiten sedert 1815, ed. L. J. Dorsman and P. J. Knegtmans (Hilversum: Verloren, 2014), 27-28. 
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such, in contrast to Kuenen’s saying, “I am nothing if not critical”, Bavinck would say, “I am 
nothing if not confessional.”16 
Moreover, ecclesial traditions and confessions are guided by the Holy Spirit to serve the 
Church’s interpretation and proclamation of the word of God, as indicated by organically 
critical realism. Therefore, Bavinck maintains that every dogmatician comes to interpret Holy 
Scripture with specific confessional commitments. 17  He opposes biblicism––by Scripture 
alone––and meanwhile confirms the importance of the traditions of the Church for articulating 
scientific theology, though Holy Scripture is still the principium cognoscendi externum.18 To 
put it differently, notwithstanding Holy Scripture as the norma normans non normata, tradition 
is the norma normans as it is vivified by the Holy Spirit. In short, standing in the tradition and 
ecclesial confessions is of methodological significance to dogmatics. 
Although Bavinck’s subordination of biblical theology to dogmatics is challenged by 
many contemporary scholars, 19  his argument for standing within ecclesial traditions and 
confessions to articulate dogmatics and interpret the word of God will find many resonances 
in theological works nowadays. According to Kevin Vanhoozer, ‘[as] the result of sustained 
listening to Scripture and sustained thinking about its meaning, truth, and significance,’ the 
ecclesial tradition has the testimonial authority to guide the individual believer’s understanding 
of Scripture.20 Likewise, Michael Allen and Scott Swain propose a ‘ruled reading’ of Holy 
Scripture, which operates with Reformed theological and ecclesiological principles. They 
contend that the interpretation of Holy Scripture from the perspective of Reformed confessions 
coincides with the Trinitarian faith and recognises both sola Scriptura and tota Scriptura in the 
course of biblical interpretation.21 
 
16 Kuenen’s saying is cited in Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, 1:17. There, Tiele also says, “I am 
nothing if not historical.” This is typical of Tiele’s deployment of the idea of development in religious studies, 
as has unfolded in chapter two. 
17 Bolt, “Bavinck's Use of Wisdom Literature in Systematic Theology,” 12-3. 
18 Cf. John Bolt, “Sola Scriptura as an Evangelical Theological Method?,” in Reforming or Conforming: 
Post-Conservative Evangelicals and the Emerging Church, ed. Gary L. W. Johnson and Ron N. Gleason 
(Wheaton: Crossway, 2008), 154-165. 
19 See chapter 3, III. 
20 Vanhoozer, Biblical Authority after Babel, 139-143. 
21 Allen and Swain, Reformed Catholicity, 95-116. The ruled reading of Holy Scripture has been unpacked 
in detail in Daniel J. Treier, Introducing Theological Interpretation of Scripture: Recovering a Christian 
Practice (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), chapter 2; also see Michael Horton, “The Sola’s of the 
Reformation,” in Here We Stand!: A Call from Confessing Evangelicals for a Modern Reformation, ed. 
James Montgomery Boice and Benjamin Sasse (Phillipsburg: P&R, 1996), 107. 
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Like Allen and Swain, Bavinck means that his account of scientific theology stands in the 
Reformed tradition, which belongs to the sixteenth-century Reformation, particularly Swiss 
Reformed theology. In his foreword to the first edition of Reformed Dogmatics, he announces:  
This work of dogmatic theology is especially tied to the type of Christian religion 
and theology that arose in the Reformation of the sixteenth century, notably in 
Switzerland. Not because this tradition claims to be an exclusively true expression 
of the truth but because the author is convinced that it is relatively the purest 
statement of the truth. In no other confession does the Christian faith in its religious, 
ethical, and theological character come as clearly into its own; nowhere else is it 
acknowledged as deeply and broadly, so widely and freely, is it so truly catholic, 
as in the churches of the Reformed tradition.22 
To Bavinck’s mind, it is clear that a scientific theology that is rooted in the Reformed tradition 
can be truly catholic to the maximum extent. This coincides with Bavinck’s conviction in his 
rectorial address in 1888 that the Reformed tradition––more precisely Calvinism––leads to the 
truest interpretation of catholicity. Barend Kamphuis is critical of this stand, arguing that ‘only 
Calvinism does justice to the catholicity of the church is itself not a very catholic judgment.’23 
The logic underlying Kamphuis’s critique concerns the question: If catholicity presupposes 
various ecclesial traditions, how could Bavinck claim the truest expression of catholicity for 
Calvinism? Berkouwer’s estimation is partly correct that Bavinck has not resolved the problem 
of the ‘multiformity’ of ecclesial traditions and achieved the unity, but emphatically objects to 
theological ‘non-commitment.’24 Nonetheless, I would suggest that Bavinck’s retaining the 
“multiformity” is deliberate. On the one hand, he asserts that “Roman Catholic” is an oxymoron 
because it connects Christian catholicity to one specific place, to one specific person, and to 
one specific church.25 As such, by arguing for the multiformity of ecclesial traditions, Bavinck 
intends to disclose the mistaken notion of catholicity advocated by the Roman Catholic Church. 
On the other hand, this idea of multiformity adds weight to his organically critical realism that 
is characteristic of his notion of scientific theology, as has been unpacked in the previous 
chapter. 
 
22 Herman Bavinck, “Foreword to the First Edition (volume 1) of the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek,” trans. 
Bolt, John, Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 9-10. 
23 Barend Kamphuis, “Herman Bavinck on Catholicity,” Mid-America Journal of Theology 24 (2013): 102. 
24  Berkouwer, Zoeken en Vinden, 55. In this sense, Bavinck argues for the affinity of a church’s 
confessionality and identity, as explicated in Conrad Wethmar, “Confessionality and Identity of the Church,” 
in Christian Identity, ed. Eduardus Van der Borght (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 135-149. Meanwhile, it should be 
noted that Kamphuis’s critique of Bavinck’s position neglects Bavinck’s saying that Calvinism is not the 
only truth, which will be explicated in the next section. 
25 RD, 4:322-323. 
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Granted, Bavinck’s emphasis in standing in the Reformed tradition, or more specifically 
Calvinism, is on commitment. However, his view of the dispensation of the Holy Spirit, as 
demonstrated above, has clearly described ecclesial traditions as vivified by Holy Spirit in 
history. What is more, the following examination of the second aspect of catholicity––the move 
outwards from a particular ecclesiastical starting point––will demonstrate Bavinck’s belief that 
moving outwards from one’s own tradition is the divinely appointed approach to the multiform 
traditions of the Church. 
B. Moving Outwards 
Presupposed in the notion of the catholicity of theology is the idea of standing in one’s 
ecclesial tradition or theological commitment. In some sense, this tradition or commitment 
stands in the background. By contrast, moving outwards from it is prominent in the catholicity 
of theology. For Bavinck, this outwards direction is determined by the essence of dogma and 
confessions. ‘The dogma that the church confesses and the dogmatician develops is not 
identical with the absolute truth of God itself.’26 In this light, dogmatic statements and ecclesial 
confessions do not constrain believers’ freedom and independence. They have true free 
conscience which can only be bound by the Almighty God.27 
And to stay in one’s own church despite much impurity in doctrine and life is our 
duty as long as it does not prevent us from being faithful to our own confession and 
does not force us, even indirectly, to obey humans more than God. For a church 
that pressured its members to do that would, at that very moment and to the extent 
it did that, reveal itself to the conscience of its members as a false church, which 
accorded itself and its ordinances more power and authority than the Word of 
God.28 
This outward action gives rise to a question about the method of engagement with one’s 
own ecclesial confession and tradition. The aforementioned organically critical realism points 
to the belief that to be critical of a tradition is to have faith in the Holy Spirit’s guidance. 
Nonetheless, the methodology involved in this requires further attention. Of course, Holy 
Scripture is the norma normans non normata. On this basis, Bavinck stresses the importance 
of the contextual reading of ecclesial confessions. In his early journal article ‘De 
Wetenschappelijke Roeping Onzer Kerk’ (The Scientific Calling of Our Church) (1882), 
Bavinck argues that Reformed confessions can explain the essence of Reformed faith. However, 
he cautions against defining Reformed faith by a reductionist reading of these confessions on 
 
26 RD, 1:32; GD, 1:7. 
27 Bavinck, “Confessie en Dogmatiek,” 270-271. 
28 RD, 4:319; GD, 4:303-304. 
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their own. In like manner, the Three Forms of Unity––that is, the Belgic Confession, the 
Canons of Dort, and the Heidelberg Catechism––cannot lay bare the essence of Reformed faith 
completely.29 Rather, Bavinck maintains that, 
we must put these in the framework of their time, explain, clarify and comment on 
them through historical circumstances, where they exist. Then, we have to consider 
and compare them in relation with the confessions of other Reformed churches, to 
trace and elucidate their peculiarity, and to penetrate into the spirit that animates 
them.30 
What matters for Bavinck is not the literal meaning of Reformed confessions but rather their 
ethos and spirit. In advancing this argument, it could be said that Bavinck seems to deviate 
from his theological tradition. To the contrary, however, Bavinck’s sentiment above is 
indicative of a contextual reading of Reformed confessions. As Richard Muller points out, ‘it 
is the historical and cultural location of a particular statement or doctrine or theory that makes 
it intelligible to a particular culture at a particular time in history.’31 Hence, the contexts of the 
formation of Reformed confessions are of great importance for a proper understanding of their 
quintessence. What is more, inasmuch as these confessions were symbols and served to unite 
churches, they often fall short of characteristics, theological scientific definiteness and 
sharpness. 32  In this light, the outward action is necessary to attain a scientific study of 
Reformed theology, which objects to a mechanical way of applying Reformed confessions. 
This contextual reading is not only requisite for theological studies within Reformed 
traditions but is also indispensable to the outwards-facing direction of a catholic theology. 
Bavinck contends:  
the task of the dogmatician is not to draw the material for his dogmatics exclusively 
from the written confession of his own church but to view it in the total context of 
 
29 Bavinck, “De Wetenschappelijke Roeping Onzer Kerk,” 103. It should be noted that in his early career 
Bavinck preferred the term “Reformed” (Gereformeerde). When it comes to the 1890s, Bavinck chose to 
employ the word “Calvinism” (Calvinisme). He made a clear differentiation between the meaning of the two 
words: ‘Reformed expresses merely a religious and ecclesiastical distinction; it is a purely theological 
conception. The term Calvinism is of wider application and denotes a specifie type in the political, social 
and civil spheres. It stands for that characteristic view of life and the world as a whole, which was born from 
the powerful mind of the French Reformer.’ Bavinck, “The Future of Calvinism,” 3. 
30 Bavinck, “De Wetenschappelijke Roeping Onzer Kerk,” 103. Dutch original: ‘Dan moeten wij deze zelve 
plaatsen in het raam van haar tijd, haar verklaren, toelichten, commentariëeren door de historische 
omstandigheden, waarin zij ontstaan is. Dan hebben wij haar in verband te beschouwen en te vergelijken 
met de belijdenisschriften van andere Gereformeerde Kerken, haar eigenaardigheid op te sporen en te 
verklaren, en in te dringen in den geest, die haar bezielt.’ 
31 Richard A. Muller, “The Role of Church History in the Study of Systematic Theology,” in Doing Theology 
in Today’s World: Essays in Honor of Kenneth S. Kantzer, ed. John D. Woodbridge and Thomas Edward 
McComiskey (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1991), 91. 
32 Bavinck, “De Wetenschappelijke Roeping Onzer Kerk,” 103. 
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the unique faith and life of his church, and then again in the context of the history 
of the whole church of Christ. He therefore stands on the shoulders of previous 
generations. He knows he is surrounded by a cloud of witnesses and lets his witness 
merge with the voice of these many waters. Every dogmatics ought to be in full 
accord with and a part of the doxology sung to God by the church of all ages.33 
It is evident that the outward action of catholicity is not limited within the confines of Reformed 
traditions. Rather, it encompasses the whole realm of the Church of Christ. As Brock and 
Sutanto remark, for Bavinck, ‘the catholic dogmatician is to commune, to live in fellowship 
with the generations of the saints of the past.’34 Added to this is that the fellowship should be 
built between a dogmatician and his contemporaries as well since catholicity involves with 
churches throughout the centuries. This is reminiscent of John Macquarrie’s perspective of the 
nature of theological language. Macquarrie argues that theological language is both 
confessional and critical. It is confessional because ‘[i]t brings to expression the confession of 
the community as it acknowledges its experience of God.’35 Meanwhile, it is critical because, 
in order to articulate the communal faith as clearly as possible, theologians will seek to 
understand other confessions and explore the compatibility between them.36 
When combined, this outwards-directed impulse and the view that theology now develops 
in the dispensation of the Holy Spirit, can be used to argue that catholically scientific theology 
is marked deeply by humility. The practitioner of scientific theology should be obedient to the 
freedom of God, who wills to impart His knowledge through the Holy Spirit in various 
historical and ecclesial contexts. In this light, Bavinck and Todd Billings reach a consensus in 
that the latter argues that the Holy Spirit’s ‘varied yet bounded work’ in different historical 
contexts has shaped various traditions of the interpretation of Holy Scripture, which are God’s 
calling of all cultures to be transformed according to the Word of God.37 By the same token, 
David Willis asserts that ecclesial catholicity means the confession that ‘God will shape the 
future in ways which go far beyond what one can imagine in the present but which will be used 
 
33 RD, 1:86; GD, 1:62; emphasis added. 
34 Brock and Sutanto, “Herman Bavinck's Reformed Eclecticism,” 315. Berkouwer points out that Bavinck 
warns against rigorous judgment on others. One key difference between Bavinck and Kuyper is that ‘Bavinck 
always goes to the extreme limit of appreciation, whereas Kuyper extends the limit less far;’ Berkouwer, 
Zoeken en Vinden, 54. 
35 John Macquarrie, Thinking about God (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 9. 
36 Ibid., 10. Macquarrie also argues that this critical action will engage with other religious studies. This 
viewpoint coincides with Bavinck’s view of catholicity in a universal sense, which will be elaborated on 
below. In addition, he argues for another three features of the nature of theological language: existential-
ontological, particular-universal, symbolic-conceptual (10-14). 
37 J. Todd Billings, The Word of God for the People of God: An Entryway to the Theological Interpretation 
of Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 105-148. Given this ecumenicity, Puchinger describes 
Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics as ‘the most ecumenical work of protestant dogmatics’; George Puchinger, 
Ontmoetingen met Theologen (Zutphen: Uitgeverij Terra, 1980), 113. 
140 
by God for this future with his people and his world.’38 From this vantage point, we might 
better understand why Bavinck said ‘Calvinism, after all, is not the only truth!’ after his 1898 
journey to North America.39 Although Bavinck found something concerning Christianity in the 
United States that was very much non-Calvinist, he still believed that ‘God has entrusted 
America with its own high and great calling.’ 40  Moreover, Bavinck contends that this 
outwards-facing impulse is significant in safeguarding a dogmatician’s scientific study of 
theology. 
The dogmaticians moves forward most safely when he does not exegete Scripture 
and work it through dogmaticly on his own, but maintains fellowship with the 
Christian church of all centuries and with his own Church in particular, and is led 
by this dogmatic-historical labour and thereby attains most benefits.41 
Accordingly, Bavinck suggests the outward-facing action that aims at the Christian (and not 
merely Reformed) ressourcement. 
This outward-facing action within catholically scientific theology is reminiscent of 
Thomas Torrance’s critique of the Reformed ‘legalistic employment of Confession of Faith as 
systems of doctrinal propositions inseparable from specific forms in their systematic 
formalisation.’ 42  Torrance contends that there are two approaches to ecclesial tradition: 
Irenaeus’s ‘canon of truth’ and Tertullian’s ‘the rule of faith.’ The former is the truth itself, 
whereas the latter is ‘a fixed formula of truth for belief’ in a legalistic manner.43 Torrance 
maintains that Irenaeus helps us know that the ecclesial tradition is ‘the living embodiment of 
faith and truth in the corporate life and structure of the Church.’ Thereby, space can be created 
for the cooperation between various denominations. 44  In this light, Bavinck’s Christian 
 
38  David Willis, “The Ecumenical Future of Reformed Theology,” in Toward the Future of Reformed 
Theology: Tasks, Topics, Traditions, ed. David Willis and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 
191. 
39 On this journey, see George Harinck, “Calvinism Isn't the Only Truth: Herman Bavinck's Impressions of 
the USA” (paper presented at the The Sesquicentennial of Dutch Immigration: 150 Years of Ethnic Heritage, 
Hope College, Holland Michigan, 1997), 151-160. For a fuller account of this journey, see Eglinton, Bavinck, 
301-314. 
40 Herman Bavinck, “Herman Bavinck’s ‘My Journey to America’,” trans. James Eglinton, Dutch Crossing 
4, no. 2 (2017): 191-192; also see Harinck, “Calvinism Isn't the Only Truth: Herman Bavinck's Impressions 
of the USA,” 151-160. 
41 Bavinck, “Confessie en Dogmatiek,” 268-269; emphasis added. Dutch original: ‘de dogmaticus zal het 
veiligst gaan, wanneer hij niet op eigen houtje de Schrift exegetiseert en dogmatisch verwerkt, maar wanneer 
hij de gemeenschap onderhoudt met de Christelijke kerk aller eeuwen en met zijne Kerk in het bijzonder, en 
door dien dogmen-historischen arbeid zich leiden laat en daarmede winste doet.’ 
42 T. F. Torrance, “The Deposit of Faith,” Scottish Journal of Theology 36, no. 1 (1983): 26-27. 
43 Ibid., 15. 
44 Ibid., 22, 27-28. In this regard, Torrance particularly criticises Charles Hodge (26). Hodge argues that ‘our 
theory of the Church, depends on our theory of doctrine. If we hold a particular system of doctrine, we must 
hold a corresponding theory of the Church. The two are so intimately connected that they cannot be 
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ressourcement is resonant with Torrance’s Irenaean approach to the tradition of the Church in 
the contemporary ecumenical movement. 
It is worth noting that the catholicity of Bavinck’s scientific theology does not set 
Christianity as its frontier line. Rather, catholically scientific theology should extend to all 
creation. This stand is clearly expressed in Bavinck’s rectorial address on the catholicity of 
Christianity in 1888. Therein, Bavinck maintains that if the death of Christ has influenced the 
entire creation, his resurrection should be equally influential. Accordingly, he qualifies the 
Christian faith as not only ‘a pearl of great price’ but also ‘a mustard seed’ and ‘yeast.’45 This 
means that the catholicity of the Christian faith implies Christian participation into the world, 
like yeast that leavens all in the world. ‘The Christian faith,’ Bavinck contends, ‘is not a 
quantitative reality that spreads itself in a transcendent fashion over the natural but a religious 
and ethical power that enters the natural in an immanent fashion and eliminates only that which 
is unholy. The kingdom of heaven may be a treasure and a pearl of great price, but it is also a 
mustard seed and a leaven.’46 To paraphrase it in Eglinton’s language, ‘while the gospel (as 
the transcendent pearl of great price) provides an institutional haven for Christians in the world, 
it also (as the transforming leaven) provides the impetus and rationale for their involvement 
therein.’47 
Now that the Christian faith is catholic in the sense that it works as a leavening agent in 
the world, scientific theology should commit to such a character of leaven or yeast, wielding 
religious and ethical influences in the world. Hence, as Bavinck asserts, ‘[t]he Gospel is a joyful 
tiding, not only for the individual person but also for humanity, for the family, for society, for 
the state, for art and science, for the entire cosmos, for the whole groaning creation.’48 One 
would observe that Bavinck’s sentiment more or less echoes Barth’s view of theology as a 
joyful science (fröhliche Wissenschaft). For Barth, theology is joyful insofar as, like missionary 
 
separated.’ Charles Hodge, The Church and Its Polity (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1879), 38. 
Torrance estimates that Hodge’s point of view fails to ‘[adore] respect for the Truth of God revealed in Jesus 
Christ which far transcends human conceptions and expressions of it, and in order to guard its objective 
reality and character from time-conditioned, distorting interpretations of it in the mission of the Church’ (26). 
Colin Gunton holds a similar viewpoint about confessions, the Church and the ecumenical movement, see 
Colin Gunton, “Confessions, Dogmas and Doctrine: An Exploration of Some Interactions,” in Reformed 
Theology in Contemporary Perspective: Westminster: Yesterday, Today–and Tomorrow, ed. Lynn Quigley 
(Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 2006), 221-227; this ecumenical involvement with other confessions are 
intrinsic to the Reformed tradition; see Willis, “The Ecumenical Future of Reformed Theology,” 187-190. 
45 Bavinck, “The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church,” 223-224. 
46 Ibid., 236. Emphasis added. 
47 James Eglinton, “To Transcend and to Transform: The Neo-Calvinist Relationship of Church and Cultural 
Transformation,” in Calvinism and Culture, ed. Gordon Graham, The Kuyper Center Review, vol. 3 (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 180. 
48 Bavinck, “The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church,” 224. 
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work, theology ‘can only aim to serve … by rendering a certain limited and transitory 
assistance to the cause of the community and therefore of all Christians and the world as a 
whole.’49 Like Barth, Bavinck shows that this catholicity demonstrates how scientific theology 
can be a joyful undertaking for the whole creation. Hence, John Bolt remarks correctly that 
‘Christian theology is not only––and certainly not in the first place––a summary of what 
Christians believe, but an attempt to state what is really true about God and the world.’50 A 
catholically scientific theology seeks to bear testimony to God in every sphere of human life. 
“Reformed” is an entire world-and-life view. It puts humans in a particular 
relationship with God, and thus also in a peculiar relationship with all things, with 
family, state, society, art, science and so forth. In addition to [its principles 
regarding] dogmatics, therefore, there are also principles regarding the moral, 
political, social, scientific and artistic. There is nothing on which the Reformed 
principles do not press their peculiar stamp.51 
The catholicity that goes beyond the borders of the Christian religion corresponds with 
Bavinck’s theological organicism. As briefly mentioned earlier, the interior organic character 
of scientific theology must generate the exterior organic outreach. The coordination between 
the outward trajectory that marks catholicity, and theological organicism, reinforces that 
scientific theology must proactively engage with the other sciences. That is, scientific theology 
that is the Queen of the sciences should exercise her spiritual and moral dominion in the sphere 
of science, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
C. Summary 
The catholicity of Bavinck’s scientific theology indicates that, whereas his location in the 
Reformed, or better Calvinist, tradition is standing in the background, his move outwards from 
this tradition is present in the foreground. These two factors constitute the dialectical essence 
of Bavinck’s catholicity. In other words, dialectical catholicity consists in the simultaneity of 
standing and moving. 
 
49 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Volume IV: The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Part 3.2, trans. Geoffrey 
William Bromiley, ed. Geoffrey William Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 
881. 
50 Bolt, “Sola Scriptura as an Evangelical Theological Method?,” 82. 
51 Bavinck, “De Wetenschappelijke Roeping Onzer Kerk,” 104. Dutch original: ‘Het Gereformeerde is eene 
gansche wereld- en levensbeschouwing. Het stelt den mensch in eene bijzondere verhouding tot God, en dus 
ook in eene eigenaardige verhouding tot alle dingen, tot huisgezin, staat, maatschappij, kunst, wetenschap 
enz. Behalve dogmatische, zijn er dus ook zedelijke, staatkundige, maatschappelijke, wetenschappelijke en 
kunstbeschouwende beginselen. Niets is er, waarop de Geref. beginselen niet hun eigenaardigen stempel 
drukken.’ The same point of view is laid out in Bavinck, “The Future of Calvinism,” 3, 5. 
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To be sure, Bavinck holds fast to his own Calvinist tradition. He clarifies that ‘the 
Calvinistic rigorism was born from the desire to consecrate the whole life to God’ on the ground 
of its ‘sobriety and healthfulness of its entire view of life and of the world.’52 In fact, Bavinck’s 
dialectical catholicity could be understood as a centrifugal movement. His own Calvinist 
tradition is the centre, from which scientific theology is moving outwards and going beyond 
the borders of Christianity to reach the ends of the world. In so doing, scientific theology 
glorifies God within the dogmatician’s own tradition, in the territories of Christianity, and more 
importantly, around the world. ‘The doxological character of dogmatic statement,’ Wolfhart 
Pannenberg argues, ‘is related to their peculiar universality as statements about the eternal God 
and his acts.’53 Then, what humans praise is not that theological tradition, but rather the God–
–the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit––who has revealed Himself universally. 
III. Doxological Teleology 
Thus far, the analysis has emphasised that Bavinck seems primarily to articulate an 
intellectually scientific theology. To be sure, the first four aspects of the grammar have set out 
the rationality of Bavinck’s scientific theology. However, Bavinck does not wish to restrain 
this scientificity within the sphere of intelligence. To his mind, the idiosyncrasy of this 
scientificity consists in the fact that theology’s intellectual and doxological natures cannot ever 
be ruptured. I would like to employ the term “perichoresis” to qualify the affinity of the 
intellectual and the doxological natures. For Bavinck, “perichoresis” is inclined to focus on the 
incarnation and Christ’s divine nature and commingles the divine and human natures. 54 
Nonetheless, “perichoresis” is employed here in view of the intratrinitarian life rather than 
Bavinck’s Christological concern. According to Torrance’s account of the Patristic use of 
perichoresis in articulating the doctrine of the Trinity, perichoresis means the intratrinitarian 
life that the three differing divine Persons ‘exist in one another and dwell in one another.’55  In 
like manner, according to Bavinck, theology’s intellectual and doxological natures do mutually 
exist and indwell. More specifically, “perichoresis” connotes that theological intelligence and 
doxology belong together without confusion or identification. 
 
52  Bavinck, “The Influence of the Protestant Reformation on the Moral and Religious Condition of 
Communities and Nations,” 80, 78. 
53 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “What is a Dogmatic Statement?,” in Basic Questions in Theology, Volume One 
(London: SCM, 1970), 202. 
54 RD, 3:256, 258-259. 
55  Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1996), 168-202. 
144 
A. Knowing God in Praising 
The perichoretic relationship between the intellectual and doxological natures of scientific 
theology is fundamentally grounded in the purpose of revelation. Bavinck contends: 
In revelation God becomes knowable. And it is always also the purpose of 
revelation that human beings should know, serve, and honor God. Revelation 
indeed has God as its author and content and so also as its final end; God does all 
things ultimately for his own sake: of him, through him, and to him are all things 
(Rom. 11:36).56 
In revelation, intelligence and doxology go hand in hand insofar as God who reveals Himself 
is knowable and praisable. Given that ‘[t]heology as a particular science assumes that God has 
revealed Himself,’ Bavinck of course holds firmly to the belief that the telos of theology is the 
glorification of God.57 
The aim of theology, after all, can be no other than that the rational creature[s] 
know God and, knowing him, glorify God (Prov. 16:4; Rom. 11:36; 1 Cor. 8:6; 
Col. 3:17). It is his good pleasure (εὐδοκια) to be known by human beings (Matt. 
11:25, 26). The object of God’s self-revelation, accordingly, is to introduce his 
knowledge into the human consciousness and through it again to set the stage for 
the glorification of God himself.58 
Two significant observations are worth noting with respect to the statement above. First, since 
divine glorification is the object of God’s revelation, revelation must enter into human 
consciousness in order to bring the fallen human person back to glorifying God. In this light, 
the doxological teleology and positive revelationalism of scientific theology are mutually 
enhanced. Second, to know God is not the final end of theology. Rather, the doxological 
teleology keeps scientificity intact and elevates the intellectual nature of theology to such a 
high degree that knowing God is in praising Him. With regard to this perichoresis of the 
intellectual and the doxological actions, a question arises: How does Bavinck combine 
knowing God with praising God? Does this perichoresis risk assimilating the intellectual aspect 
of theology into the doxological so that theology exclusively belongs to the Church? In order 
to answer these questions, we need first to examine Bavinck’s conception of God’s glory. 
Bavinck presents a lengthy discourse on God’s glory in the second volume of Reformed 
Dogmatics. He is preoccupied with the biblical notion of glory. After developing an 
 
56 RD, 1:341-342; GD, 1:313. 
57 RD, 1:37-38; GD, 1:13. 
58 RD, 1:213; GD, 1:184.  
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etymological study of the Hebrew and Greek words for glory, he defines the term “glory” as 
follows. 
The ‘glory of YHWH’ or ‘glory of God’ indicates the splendour and magnificence 
that is inseparable from all of God’s virtues and his self-revelation in nature and 
foremost in grace, the glorious form in which he everywhere appears to his 
creatures.  This glory and majesty in which God is clothed and which characterizes 
all his work (1 Chron. 16:27; Ps. 29:4; 96:6; 104:1; 111:3; 113:4; etc.), reveals 
throughout his creation (Ps. 8; Isa. 6:3), but nevertheless is especially visible in the 
realm of grace.59 
Three points stand out in reference to this definition. First, God’s glory and self-revelation are 
perichoretic and essentially inseparable. God’s glory is revealed and God’s self-revelation is 
glorious. While scientific theology has God as its object and draws its content from His self-
revelation, the revealed glory of the Revealer cannot be left out. In this light, when one asks if 
knowing God in praising assimilates theology into doxology, what is presupposed is the 
dichotomy between them. To Bavinck’s mind, there is no such a dualistic viewpoint inherent 
to the scientificity of theology. Knowing God and praising God are two sides of the same coin, 
which is, the true scientific theology. 
Second, given that God’s glory is revealed throughout his creation, in nature and grace, 
both general and special revelation constitute the manifestation of God’s glory. In this sense, 
doxology is not something limited within the Church. If such were the case, doxology would 
become a tool for dividing the organism of revelation––separating general revelation from 
special revelation––and pitting grace against nature. This would contradict the Bavinckian 
axiom that “grace restores and renews nature.” 60  Moreover, while reckoning with the 
universality of revelation and doxology, Bavinck infers that science is not limited to private 
seminaries but belongs to universities. 
Science exists also for God’s sake and finds its final goal in his glory. Specifically, 
this then is true of theology; in a special sense it is from God and by God, and hence 
for God as well. … theology and dogmatics do not belong … in a church seminary, 
but in the university of the sciences (universitas scientiarum).61 
 
59 GD, 2:222; RD, 2:252; rev. 
60 On Bavinck's view of nature and grace, see Jon Stanley, “Restoration and Renewal: The Nature of Grace 
in the Theology of Herman Bavinck,” in Revelation and Common Grace, ed. John Bowlin, The Kuyper 
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61  RD, 1:53-54; GD, 1:31; also see Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 135. Bavinck also argues in his 
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With this in mind, it is arguable that for Bavinck to speak of knowing God in praising is not to 
restrict scientific theology within the ecclesial confines. Conversely, doxologically scientific 
theology should be extended to the ends of the world. In this regard, the first four aspects of 
the grammar––positive revelationalism, theological organicism, organically critical realism 
and dialectical catholicity––converge into the doxological teleology of the scientificity of 
theology.  
Given the revealedness and visibility of God’s glory, Bavinck’s definition of “glory” 
derives the third point that God’s glory is communicable. ‘Like all God’s perfections, so also 
that of God’s glory is reflected in his creatures. It is communicable. In the created world there 
is a faint reflection of the inexpressible glory and majesty that God possesses.’62 It is explicit 
that the communication of God’s glory is not ontological but rather analogical, which is 
reflective of Bavinck’s positive use of the term vestigia Dei. ‘All creatures are embodiments 
of divine thoughts, and all of them display the footsteps or the vestigia Dei.’63 On this basis, 
Bavinck accounts for the communicability of God’s glory in the aesthetic language. 
Speaking of creatures, we call them pretty, beautiful, or splendid; but for the beauty 
of God Scripture has a special word: glory. For that reason it is not advisable to 
speak … of God’s beauty. Augustine already spoke in this vein, proceeding from 
the basic premise that “whatever is, insofar as it has being, is true, good, and 
beautiful.” He reasons as follows: in the realm of being and therefore in the realm 
of the true, the good, and the beautiful, there are distinctions, rankings, and 
ascendance. To the degree that a thing has more being, to that extent it also has 
more truth, goodness, and beauty. Everything is beautiful in its kind. …All 
creatures, accordingly, contribute to the beauty of the whole. But all creaturely 
beauty is transitory and changeable; it is not beautiful by itself but by participation 
in a higher, absolute beauty. … The pinnacle of beauty, the beauty toward which 
all creatures point, is God. He is supreme being, supreme truth, supreme goodness, 
and also the apex of unchanging beauty.64 
Bavinck here draws primarily on Augustine’s Christianised Neo-Platonic ontology. Bavinck’s 
use of Augustinian Platonism can be explained by his appreciation of Plato’s philosophy of 
beauty. In the retrospect of the idea of beauty in history, Bavinck asserts that Plato laid the 
foundation of aesthetics for future generations.  
[Plato] especially tried to give a metaphysical foundation to beauty and to derive it 
from the world of ideas. … The ideas that belong there are more-or-less imprinted 
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on the material world by the demiurge and shine through the visible, and we 
therefore behold the beauty also in nature around us. … Beauty thus lies first of all 
in the content, in the idea, but harmony characterizes its appearance. Wherever in 
the world it in its various forms shows a finite expression of the infinite, beauty is 
absolute idea.65 
In Bavinck’s reading, Plato’s idea of beauty was enriched by Aristotle and Plotinus and then 
introduced into Christianity, exerting a great influence on church fathers, including 
Augustine.66 
Augustine’s use of Plato’s idea of beauty is grounded on his theological ontology. 
Augustine relates being with truth and describes God as the Being. Following this, he sets out 
the relationship between the Being and beings, arguing that to be is to participate in the Being. 
Moreover, Augustine maintains that there is the degree of beings, the zenith of which is God 
who is the supreme Being.67 Bavinck applies Augustine’s notions of “degree of beings” and 
ontological participation to his theological aesthetics. For Bavinck, there is the degree of beauty; 
the supreme beauty is called glory. The existence of beauty is due to its participation in the 
supreme beauty (the pinnacle of beauty) ––the divine glory. Moreover, the degree of beauty is 
reflective of God’s revelation in nature. As with Augustine, Bavinck elegantly says, ‘Ask all 
creatures and “they will answer: ‘look and see, we are beautiful!’ Their beauty is their 
confession.”’68 By arguing so, as Robert Covolo remarks, Bavinck aims to ‘[reclaim] created 
beauty as a revelation of God designed to direct us toward a transcendent beauty—the beauty 
that God alone possess in his categorically distinct trinitarian glory.’69 Bavinck’s theological 
aesthetics ensures that the aesthetic understanding of God’s glory heightens the sentiment that 
scientific theology is doxological in a universal sense.  
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The threefold aspect of Bavinck’s definition of glory unveils the fact that for Bavinck the 
intellectual and the doxological natures of scientific theology exist in one another. In this light, 
to be scientific is to be both intellectual and doxological. More importantly, as the final telos 
of scientific theology, doxology can be seen as the navigator of the intellectual aspect of 
scientific theology. This move is reminiscent of John Webster’s saying that the ‘proper calling 
of [the Christian dogmatic] … is the praise of God by crafting concepts to turn the mind to the 
divine splendor. … [C]oncepts are only serviceable as the instruments of spiritual 
apprehension.’70 In this sense, doxology is the hallmark of scientific theology. 
B. Theocentricism and Relationality 
While considering Bavinck’s scientific theology through the lens of doxology, it is not 
difficult to observe that both theology’s starting point and end point are God and His glory. As 
Bavinck argues,  
Science exists also for God’s sake and finds its final goal in his glory. Specifically, 
this then is true of theology; in a special sense it is from God and by God, and hence 
for God as well. But precisely because its final purpose does not lie in any creature, 
not in practice, or in piety, or in the church, amidst all the [other] sciences it 
maintains its own character and nature. Truth as such has value. Knowledge as such 
is a good.71 
The phrases “from God”, “by God” and “for God” make plain the theocentric foundation of 
doxologically scientific theology. Theology is the scientific study of God in His self-revelation 
and then to ascribe the glory and honour to God. The principal purpose and task of scientific 
theology are doxological––that is, to make God known to us so that we will revere and worship 
Him.72 Then, scientific theology reveals the glorious telos of the other sciences. ‘[F]or Bavinck,’ 
Marinus de Jong says, ‘science is part of worship; through it we discover more of the beauty 
of God and his creation.’73 
Moreover, the identification of the starting point and the end point displays the divine 
initiative in scientific theology. This means that the glorious purpose and task of theology are 
ultimately determined by God: ‘The object of God’s self-revelation … is to introduce his 
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knowledge into the human consciousness and through it again to set the stage for the 
glorification of God himself.’74 Kuyper argues in a similar way: ‘From the finite no conclusion 
can be drawn to the infinite, neither can a Divine reality be known from external or internal 
phenomena, unless that real God reveals Himself in my consciousness to my ego; reveals 
Himself as God; and thereby moves and impels me to see in these finite phenomena a 
brightness of His glory.’75 Kuyper and Bavinck concur that the divinely initiated revelation 
does not merely desire for the human reception of the knowledge of God. The ultimate goal is 
the glory of God. One can clearly observe the exitus-reditus scheme, which is constructed by 
the divine initiative and the divine glorification. 
We need to pause to clarify that for Bavinck, the truth that God and His glory are the 
starting point and end point of scientific theology does not mean divine determinism. If 
everything concerning scientific theology has been determined by God, one could perhaps 
conclude that humans always passively, statically and mechanically receive the knowledge that 
has been revealed. For Bavinck, such is not the case. Doxology implies a bilateral action. This 
means that doxologically scientific theology is characterised as bilateral. On the one hand, the 
bilateral implication indicates that God is the Revealer and should be glorified and, 
concurrently, the human being is the recipient of revelation and should glorify God: ‘Because 
it is God’s right to be served and worshipped by human beings, it is, therefore, the human 
being’s due obligation.’76 This obligation claims for the involvement of the whole human 
person into doxologically scientific theology. Thereby, theology as a science proves that the 
Christian faith reconciles the whole human being with God, not only the human mind and 
reason but also the heart and conscience.77 On the other hand, the bilateral implication denotes 
that scientific theology is relational. Theology’s task is not merely to spell out the knowledge 
of God, but to impel one to actualise and concretise this knowledge in the relationship between 
God who is praised and human beings who praise. Bavinck thus argues ‘the scientific system 
of the knowledge of God’ is grounded in God’s revelation ‘concerning himself and all creatures 
as they stand in relation to him.’78 According to Bavinck, this relational aspect of doxologically 
scientific theology is developed in the human scientific study of the opera ad extra Trinitatis. 
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He asserts that ‘the essence of the Christian religion consists in the reality that the creation of 
the Father, ruined by sin, is restored in the death of the Son of God and re-created by the grace 
of the Holy Spirit into a kingdom of God.’79 With the scientific knowledge of the Triune God’s 
work (God as Creator, Redeemer and Perfecter) whereby God’s attributes are revealed to 
humans, humans stand in relation to God, and praise and glorify the Father, the Son and the 
Holy Spirit. This argument seems to anticipate Jürgen Moltmann’s view of theology and 
doxology: ‘Real theology, which means the knowledge of God, finds expression in thanks, 
praise and adoration. And it is what finds expression in doxology that is the real theology.’80 
In this way, as Thomas Torrance contends, scientific theology ‘is a form of intense intellectual 
communion with God in which our minds are taken captive by his Love and we come to know 
God more and more through himself.’81 
More importantly, according to Bavinck, the relational aspect of doxologically scientific 
theology pertains to dogmaticians––the practitioners of scientific theology. As has been argued 
earlier, in regeneration, the Holy Spirit illuminates the human consciousness to receive God’s 
revelation by faith (the believing consciousness): ‘And because revelation is of such a nature 
that it can only be truly accepted and appropriated by a saving faith, it is absolutely imperative 
that the dogmatician be active as believer not only in the beginning but also in the continuation 
and at the end of his work.’82 What is the meaning of the dogmatician’s ever-believing status? 
We need to recall Bavinck’s account of the Holy Spirit’s twofold work: regeneration and 
illumination. The fruit of regeneration is the believing consciousness (faith), and illumination 
operates with the testimony of the Holy Spirit. This means that faith and testimony cannot be 
ruptured. Thus, for Bavinck, the dogmatician’s lasting faith is significant because they need 
‘the [continuing] testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the dogmatician himself and of 
the church from which he draws life.’83 Note that the immediate context of this argument is 
concerning Bavinck’s view of the provisionality of dogmatic statements and the continuing 
expansion of dogmatics by the Spirit. Hence, it can be inferred that the relational aspect of 
doxologically scientific theology is reflective of the dogmatician’s humility before God. As 
Michael Horton contends, ‘doxology challenges our intellectual pride and curbs our thirst for 
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speculation.’84 Like Bavinck, Wolfhart Pannenberg presents an exquisite statement on this 
matter. 
The knowledge of Christian theology is always partial in comparison to the 
definitive revelation of God in the future of his kingdom. … Recognizing the 
finitude and inappropriateness of all human talk about God is an essential part of 
theological sobriety. … With this recognition our talk about God becomes 
doxology in which the speakers rise above the limits of their own finitude to the 
thought of the infinite God. In the process the conceptual contours do not have to 
lose their sharpness. Doxology can also have the form of systematic reflection.85 
We can perceive here that knowing and praising God converge. To recognise the finitude of 
scientific theology is to praise the infinity of God; to concede the provisionality of dogmatics 
is to adore the freedom of God’s work in the dispensation of the Holy Spirit.  
This high view of doxology might raise a question about the Christian reception of non-
Christian scholarship. Bavinck’s aesthetic understanding of glory implies that the knowledge 
of God is somewhat perceived by humans universally. This means that non-Christian scholars 
may to some extent present truths about God that do not have the Triune God as their object.86 
Accordingly, an issue arises concerning the validity of the knowledge of God articulated 
through the lens of general revelation alone. To be sure, Bavinck’s theological aesthetics 
corresponds with his theology of general revelation.87 His doxologically scientific theology is 
grounded in God’s special revelation, the Word of God in Holy Scripture, which enables 
humans to reach the final goal of theology––the glorification of God.88 Given that general and 
special revelation shapes an organic whole without contradictions, the non-Christian 
presentation of truths about God and Christian knowledge of God as expressed by 
doxologically scientific theology could be harmonious. Although non-Christian truths about 
 
84 Michael Horton, The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrim on the Way (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 2011), 23. 
85 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume 1, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1991), 55; also see Pannenberg, “What is a Dogmatic Statement?,” 202-203. 
86  Bavinck’s theological aesthetics could be used as an indirect response to Bruce Pass’s remark that 
‘Bavinck does not elaborate on the difference between a theology that has mystery for its lifeblood and the 
theology of the unregenerate.’ Pass, “Revelation and Reason in Herman Bavinck,” 257. 
87 Robert Covolo points out that one idiosyncratic character of Bavinck’s theological aesthetics consists in 
‘his articulation of beauty as a distinct kind of general revelation;’ Covolo, “Herman Bavinck’s Theological 
Aesthetics,” 52. 
88 RD, 1:346; ‘God reveals himself for his own sake: to delight in the glorification of his own attributes. But 
on the journey toward this final end we do after all encounter the creature, particularly the human being, 
who serves as instrument to bring to manifestation the glory of God’s name before the eyes of God. Precisely 
in order to reach this final goal, the glorification of God’s name, special revelation must strive to the end of 
re-creating the whole person after God’s image and likeness and thus to transform that person into a mirror 
of God’s attributes and perfections.’ 
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God fall short of doxology, Christian scholars can appreciate them according to the Holy 
Scriptures, the principium cognoscendi externum.  
This appreciation is the action of the human response to God’s grace. Bavinck avers that 
the non-Christian knowledge of God, which is embodied particularly in religion, is the result 
of God’s common grace and the work of the Holy Spirit.89 He also insists that revelation is 
common to all religions.90 Jan Veenhof points out that ‘[Bavinck’s] notions of common grace 
and general revelation basically function as correlata, just like special grace and special 
revelation.’91 In this light, the Christian appreciation of the non-Christian knowledge of God, 
as derived from God’s general revelation, is the Christian praise of God’s common grace and 
the working of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, despite his objection to the substitution of theology 
for religious science, Bavinck recognises the value of religion. He contends:  
religion and theology are not to be related to one another as mother and daughter, 
much less still as daughter and mother. Rather, they are two sisters who each have 
to fulfil a special task and calling in the household of God's Church. They are like 
Mary and Martha in the household of Lazarus. Mary had chosen the good portion, 
which would not be taken away from her, and Martha was cumbered with much 
serving. Nevertheless, Martha served the Lord, too, and Jesus loved them both. 
Mutual independence does not, however, ultimately nullify reciprocal relationship 
and cooperation.92 
What does the phrase “the good portion” mean by Bavinck? What do the words “cumbered 
with much serving” refer to? Several pages later, Bavinck implicitly explains their meanings. 
‘To practise theology – it is a holy work. It is a priestly service in the house of the Lord. It is 
itself religion, a serving of God in His temple, a devotion of heart and mind to the glory of His 
Name.’93 The rhetorical language used by Bavinck here indicates the doxological nature of 
theology. From this vantage point, “the good portion” means that theology is knowing God in 
praising; hence, theology is the true service, the priestly service. Although religion has certain 
knowledge of God, it is disorientated and does not have the doxological telos so that it is 
‘cumbered with much serving.’ Thus, the Christian appreciation of the non-Christian 
 
89  RD, 1:319, 587; 2:71. On Bavinck’s pneumatological approach to religion, see Robert S. Covolo, 
“Advancing a Neo-Calvinist Pneumatology of Religions: The Role of Recent Yongian Contribution,” in 
Revelation and Common Grace, ed. John Bowlin, The Kuyper Center Review, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2011), 316-322. 
90 RD, 1:284-287; PR, 159-160; also see RD, 1:318. 
91 Jan Veenhof, “Revelation and Grace in Herman Bavinck,” in Revelation and Common Grace, ed. John 
Bowlin, The Kuyper Center Review, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 7. 
92 Bavinck, “Religion and Theology,” 126. It is worth noting that by religion (religie), Bavinck here refers 
narrowly to the practice of Christian piety and meanwhile broadly to ‘the fear of God’, which can refer to 
religion in general (131). As such, he occasionally calls Christianity the absolute religion (116-117). 
93 Ibid., 131; emphasis. 
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knowledge of God is not only praising the grace of God, but also showcases the glory of the 
Triune God who should have been all religions’ objective. 
In short, doxologically scientific theology is theocentric, that is, being initiated by God 
and moving towards His glory. God is both the starting point and the end point. In this process, 
the practitioner of scientific theology is fascinated by and admires the richer and fuller 
knowledge of God. All in all, ‘[theology] is not just a knowing, much less a comprehending; it 
is better and more glorious than that: it is the knowledge which is life, “eternal life” (John 
17:3).’94 
C. Summary 
Bavinck’s scientific theology is built up with both the intellectual and the doxological 
natures. It is probable that this is reflective of the continuing effect of Bavinck’s editing work 
of Synopsis of a Purer Theology on himself. According to Synopsis, ‘The glory of God is the 
highest goal of Theology, whereby He has prepared this glory only for himself, because He is 
all-sufficient unto himself and is in want of nothing, and because not a thing can be added to 
Him by our doing.’95 The perichoresis of knowing and praising God consists in the reality of 
revelation––that is, God’s self-revelation is inseparable from His glory. This reminds us of the 
truth that doxology and theological intelligence belong together. This distinctly corresponds 
with Bavinck’s twofold notion of faith, that is, as intellectual and religious. Thus, scientific 
theology should not merely be the pearl of great price but also the yeast that leavens the whole 
human life; of course, this leavening effect should be actualised in the sphere of science, the 
university par excellence. Furthermore, Bavinck defines doxology as universal rather than 
merely ecclesial. In so doing, his doxologically scientific theology goes beyond the borders of 
the Church and comes to engagement with the other sciences so as to glorify God in every 
sphere of science. Furthermore, for Bavinck, doxologically scientific theology is initiated by 
God for His glory. By this exitus-reditus scheme, the practitioner of doxologically scientific 
theology is obedient to the testimony of the Holy Spirit, actively probes into the Word of God, 
and wholeheartedly enjoys what God has revealed. ‘Dogmatics, therefore, is not a dull and arid 
 
94 RD, 1:621; GD, 1:591. Bavinck’s saying here enriches what he wrote in a letter to Snouck Hurgronje in 
1883. There, Bavinck argued that according to the nature of theology, ‘theology is knowing about God.’ 
Theolog is concerning the two questions: ‘How can I know God? And, how can I obtain the eternal life?’ 
He added that one cannot have the eternal life without knowing God. “Bavinck aan Snouck Hurgronje, 
Kampen, 8 februari 1883,” in de Bruijn and Harinck, Een Leidse Vriendschap, 110-111. By comparison, it 
can be seen that the idea of perichoresis of theology’s intellectual and doxological natures has not emerged 
in Bavinck’s early career but emerged later in his Reformed Dogmatics. 
95 Te Velde, Synopsis of a Purer Theology, Volume 1, 43. 
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science. It is a theodicy, a doxology to all God’s virtues and perfections, a hymn of adoration 
and thanksgiving, a “glory to God in the highest.”’96 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter and chapter four together seek to trace the affinity of the five rationales left by 
chapter three in order to describe the grammar of Bavinck’s scientific theology. As mentioned 
in the beginning of chapter four, the singularity of the word “grammar” implies that these 
rationales are correlative such that they constitute an indivisible unity. Expressed organically, 
the grammar is an organism, and the five rationales are interconnected and intertwined, and 
make up an exitus-reditus scheme.  
Viewed in this light, Pass’s suggestion of organismectomy is cast into doubt. He contends 
that ‘the organism’s purpose is the reconciliation of subject and object, the real and the ideal, 
and the mechanical and the teleological, and that the correspondence of these pairs is ordered 
to the organism’s teleology.’ Then, he estimates that ‘the organism drives the psychologizing 
impulse which shifts the centre of the system away from the person of Christ toward immediate 
self-consciousness.’97 Having pointed out this defect, Pass sets forth four reasons to justify his 
argument for the removal of organism. 98  First, the idea of organism belongs solely to 
philosophical apparatus of Bavinck’s system. Second, organismectomy will strengthen ‘the 
correlation of dogmatics with general criteria’, which are, as Hans Frei defines, ‘general criteria 
of intelligibility, coherence, and truth that [theology] must share with other academic 
discipline.’99 Third, organismectomy refrains dogmatics from being usurped by general criteria. 
Fourth, newer philosophical grammars––for example, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
language––could lend support to Bavinck’s dogmatic system to defend the correspondence 
between subject and object without the idea of organism.  
The weakness of Pass’s suggestion lies in his reduction of Bavinck’s organic thinking as 
serving primarily for the reconciliation of subject and object. The exitus-reditus scheme and 
the singular grammar of Bavinck’s scientific theology robustly demonstrate that the idea of 
organism cannot operate on its own. Instead, organicism has to be concatenated with the other 
four rationales. As such, organicism does not belong solely to philosophical apparatus; the 
doxological teleology and dialectical catholicity together guarantee a healthy correlation of 
 
96 RD, 1:112; GD, 1:89-90; emphasis added. 
97 Pass, “‘The Heart of Dogmatics’,” 195. 
98 Ibid., 196-199. 
99 Hans W. Frei, The Types of Christian Theology, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 2. 
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dogmatics and general criteria without the risk of usurping the former by the latter. The fall of 
Pass’s first three reasons invalidates the fourth. In short, Pass’s suggestion of organismectomy 
stems from his neglect of the exitus-reditus scheme that characterises the grammar of 
Bavinck’s scientific theology. 
Moreover, the analysis of each rationale above manifests the fact that both the texture and 
the apparatus of the grammar are grounded in the doctrine of the Trinity. This Trinitarian 
character of the grammar of Bavinck’s scientific theology can be formulated by the four 
statements below. 
(1) The grammar of scientific theology is Trinitarian insofar as scientific theology 
is embedded with the exitus-reditus scheme, that is, being grounded in the self-
revelation of the Triune God and moving on to glorify Him. 
(2) The grammar of scientific theology is Trinitarian insofar as scientific theology 
is orchestrated by the dogma of the knowledge of the Triune God and expands 
continuously by the Holy Spirit to bear a richer testimony to the work of Jesus 
Christ and the glory of the Triune God. 
(3) The grammar of scientific theology is Trinitarian insofar as both the Logos and 
the Holy Spirit involve into the human subjective appropriation of the objective 
revelation of God so that humans are enlightened (by the Logos) and illuminated 
(by the Holy Spirit) to knowing God in praising. 
(4) The grammar of scientific theology is Trinitarian insofar as the practitioner of 
scientific theology commits to the church of Christ, is driven by the Holy Spirit to 
cherish the divine revelation as introduced into the consciousness of the Church, 
and catholically glorifies the Triune God in places where God has revealed Himself. 
The four statements are reflective of the exitus-reditus scheme that is innate to the grammar. 
Scientific theology must flow from the Triune God on account of God’s self-revelation and 
return to the Triune God by virtue of the divine self-glorification. The exitus-reditus scheme 
displays how the dogma of the knowledge of the Triune God occupies the central place in 
Bavinck’s dogmatics on the one hand, and on the other hand, corresponds with the reason for 
Bavinck’s adoption of the Trinitarian scheme to articulate the content of dogmatics. That is, 
‘God is beginning and end, alpha and omega. … All things are from God and unto God. The 
trinitarian scheme guards against a barren uniformity and guarantees life, development, 
process.’100 It suffices to draw a conclusion that the Trinitarian grammar proves Bavinck’s 
 
100 RD, 1:111; GD, 1:89. This trinitarian scheme is summarised well by Eglinton as follows: ‘Following its 
setting forth of theology’s firs principles (Volume One: Prolegomena), Bavinck’s Dogmatics unfolds along 
an explicitly theocentric pattern. Volume Two, God and Creation is overwhelmingly concerned with God 
the Father. Volume Three, Sin and Salvation in Christ emphasizes the redemptive work of God the Son. The 
onus of Volume Four, Holy Spirit, Church and New Creation, is God the Spirit, who applies everything 
accomplished by the Son.’ Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 89-90. This Trinitarian thought is also applied 
156 
identity of Trinitarian theologian. What is more, the singular Trinitarian grammar of scientific 
theology gives shape to a meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s system, which not only 
incorporates the paradigm of the organic reading but also epitomises the methodological 
characteristics and fundamental themes of Bavinck’s theology. 
On this basis, it must be asked: How broad is the range of the exitus-reditus scheme of 
Bavinck’s enterprise of scientific theology? The grammar into which the five rationales 
integrated has shown that Bavinck’s scientific theology is not limited to the circle of the 
Christian religion. Rather, it has the inside-outside movement, which starts from the Christian 
faith and aims to reach the end of the scientific world. The scientificity of theology, for Bavinck, 
does not only consist in theology per se, but is also embodied in its interaction with the other 
sciences, to which we now turn. 
 
to Bavinck’s Christian worldview; John Bolt, Bavinck On the Christian Life (Wheaton: Crossway, 2015), 
138-143; Ragusa, “The Trinity at the Center of Thought and Life,” 162-165. In this light, Eric Bristley rightly 
notes that ‘[o]ne of the strengths of Bavinck’s theology is his profound understanding of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. He developed what may be termed a “Trinitarian methodology.”’ Bristley, Guide to the Writings of 
Herman Bavinck (1854-1921), 21-22.  
Elsewhere, Bavinck also expresses this exitus-reditus scheme: ‘From God all things are, and 
accordingly they all return to Him. …  For this reason the Calvinist in all things recurs upon God, and does 
not rest satisfied before he has traced back everything to the sovereign good-pleasure of God as its ultimate 
and deepest cause.’ Bavinck, “The Future of Calvinism,” 4. 
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Chapter 6 ‘The Unassumed Is the Unhealed’: Bavinck’s Christological Approach 
to the Relationship between Theology and the Other Sciences 
[I]t is absolutely not that theology would want to rule its sisters by coercion or by 
force to bind them to her proclamations. It only befits her as Regina, like Christ the 
King, to rule and win over with moral and spiritual weapons.1 
Herman Bavinck 
I. Introduction 
In his defence of the two natures of Jesus Christ against Apollinarius’s Christology, Gregory 
Nazianzus upholds the basic principle: ‘The unassumed is the unhealed, but what is united with 
God is also being saved.’2 Gregory makes it clear that the theology of the incarnation is pivotal 
for the restoration of the human communion with God. 
Gregory’s slogan is an interpretative instrument by which Bavinck’s view of the 
relationship between theology and the other sciences can be comprehended in a better way for 
the following three reasons. First, as the quote used to introduce this chapter shows, Bavinck 
does apply the office of Christ to the description of this relationship metaphorically. Moreover, 
the Logos Christology that is so significant to scientific theology (as has been argued in chapter 
4) is indispensable for the articulation of the dialogue between theology and the other sciences. 
Second, insofar as dogmatics for Bavinck is characterised by its divine-human quality––that is, 
dogma is grounded in the Word of God but articulated by human beings3––scientific theology 
or dogmatics certainly resembles the other sciences in that the latter is also made up of human 
intellectual activities. In this light, Gregory’s “the unassumed” corresponds to Bavinck’s 
critique of a separatist theology that is thoroughly divorced from the other sciences and merely 
stays within the bulwark of the Church. Third, Bavinck stresses that theology is responsible for 
regaining the other sciences in such a sense that theology as the humble Queen will lead the 
other science and sing praise to God with them at the eschaton. On this score, Gregory’s “the 
unhealed” represents Bavinck’s condemnation of theology’s failure to exert spiritual and moral 
impact on the other sciences.  
 
1 WHG, 34-35. Dutch original: ‘Er ligt hierin volstrekt niet, dat de Theologie hare zusteren zou willen 
beheerschen door dwang of met geweld binden aan haar uitspraak. Haar als »Regina” past het, evenals 
Christus den Koning, alleen te regeeren en te verwinnen door zedelijke en geestelijke wapenen.’ 
2 Gregory of Nazianzus, “Letter 101: The First Letter to Cledonius the Presbyter,” in On God and Christ: 
The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius, trans. Frederick Williams and Lionel Wickham, 
ed. John Behr (Crestwood: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2002), 101.5. 
3 Chapter 3, III. 
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From the vantage point of Gregory’s slogan, my intention is to demonstrate that based on 
his Trinitarian scientific theology, Bavinck adopts a Christological model to build the 
relationship between theology and the other sciences. In what follows, I will locate Bavinck’s 
point of view in what was for him a life-defining historical context, namely the Kuyper-
Lindeboom debates, of which he was at the centre. Then, I proceed to explore Bavinck’s view 
of the relationship between theology and the other sciences according to the themes debated 
by Kuyper and Lindeboom. In so doing, Bavinck-Lindeboom debates come to the fore. Finally, 
I will examine Bavinck’s perspective on theology as the Queen of the sciences, which unveils 
the Christological and eschatological character. 
II. The University or the Seminary: The Kuyper-Lindeboom Debates 
Lucas Lindeboom (1845-1933) was appointed alongside Bavinck as a professor at the 
Theological School in Kampen on 9 January 1883.4 Unlike his colleague Bavinck, who aligned 
himself with Kuyper, Lindeboom was Kuyper’s public antagonist. The causes of Lindeboom’s 
disagreement with Kuyper were multifaceted. R. H. Bremmer observes that Lindeboom’s 
resolved and goal-oriented personality largely shaped his sectarian or separatist character.5 
Indeed, this strong personality played a vital role in the Kuyper-Lindeboom debates. 
 Given this chapter’s focus on Bavinck’s view of the relationship between theology and 
the other sciences, I shall single out the two themes of the Kuyper-Lindeboom debates––
Kuyper’s notions of sphere sovereignty and theological encyclopaedia. 
A. Sphere Sovereignty: Modern or Orthodox? 
The foremost controversial topic between Lindeboom and Kuyper was concerning the 
latter’s idea of sphere sovereignty. Kuyper officially announced the idea of sphere sovereignty 
by the inaugural speech on Souvereiniteit in eigen kring (literally: Sovereignty in its own circle) 
in 1880.6 By sphere sovereignty, he means that ‘this supreme Sovereign [the Triune God] once 
and still delegates his authority to human beings, so that on earth one never directly encounters 
God Himself in visible things but always sees his sovereign authority exercised in human 
 
4 On further, see Eglinton, Bavinck, 136-137; Gleason, Herman Bavinck, 94-95, 107-108. 
5 R. H. Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en Zijn Tijdgenoten (Kampen: Kok, 1966), 48-49. 
6 Abraham Kuyper, Souvereiniteit in eigen kring. Rede ter inwijding van de Vrije Universiteit (Amsterdam: 
J. H. Kruyt, 1880); Abraham Kuyper, “Sphere Sovereignty,” ed. and trans. James D. Bratt in Abrahan 
Kuyper: A Centennial Reader (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 461-490. Kuyper has already elaborated on 
some themes of this speech six year earlier; Abraham Kuyper, Het Calvinisme, oorsprong en waarborg 
onzer constitutioneele vrijheden (Amsterdam: B. van der Land, 1874). A helpful analysis on the connection 
between these two texts, see James D. Bratt, “Sphere Sovereignty among Abraham Kuyper’s Other Political 
Theories,” in Politics, Religion, and Sphere Sovereignty, ed. Gordon Graham, Kuyper Center Review, vol.1 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 36-44. 
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office.’7 As per human office, there are different spheres of human life, such as the spheres of 
morality and science, which have their own sovereignty within their own domain.8 George 
Harinck points out that Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty at the time did not draw wide 
academic attention.9 It was Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) who reconstructed the idea into 
full-fledged philosophy. 10  Nonetheless, the idea of sphere sovereignty has become the 
battlefield between Lindeboom and Kuyper in the late nineteenth century. 
In his speech on the thirty-ninth anniversary of the founding of the Theological School in 
Kampen in 1894, Lindeboom explicitly attacked Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty. This 
attack reflected the differences between the views of theology held at the Theological School 
in Kampen and at Kuyper’s own Free University. Basically, Kuyper maintains that scientific 
theology functions in a university department without reference to the church, whereas for 
Lindeboom theology is entirely churchly in character. Lindeboom contended: 
The alleged “sovereignty of science” … seems to me to originate more from the 
circle of Descartes and Spinoza’s thoughts than from the Word of God. In the entire 
Scripture, I do not read a single word on knowledge or science as an independent 
power, much less of a theological science outside and above the Church. … A 
higher unity of sciences other than in Christ … can only be imagined by the 
philosophy of the world, which always intended to put the sacred theology under 
its laws and to mock it, as Hagar and Ishmael have done to Sarah and Isaac.11 
It is explicit that central to Lindeboom’s critique is the claim that the idea of sphere sovereignty 
(as applied in this instance to scientific theology) does not issue from the Holy Scriptures and 
subordinates theology to the standard of the other sciences. R. H. Bremmer remarks that 
Lindeboom feared that Kuyper’s encyclopaedic views and the Free University would lead to 
the secularisation of theology and the neo-Kantian ideal of science, which would entail by 
consequence that a new scientific yoke would be imposed on the Church and theology would 
 
7 Kuyper, “Sphere Sovereignty,” 466. 
8 Ibid., 467. 
9 Nonetheless, Kuyper’s notion of sphere sovereignty did obtain certain scholarly attention at the time, 
especially among the neo-Calvinist circle; Bavinck, “The Kingdom of God, the Highest Good,” 159; P. 
Biesterveld, Zelfzucht en Zelfverloochening (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1896), 74. 
10 George Harinck, “A Historian's Comment on the Use of Abraham Kuyper's Idea of Sphere Sovereignty,” 
Journal of Markets & Morality 5, no. 1 (2002): 279. 
11  Lucas Lindeboom, Godgeleerden (Heusden: A. Gezelle Meerburg, 1894), 33. Dutch original: ‘De 
zoogenaamde „Souvereiniteit der Wetenschap” … schijnt mij toe meer uit den gedachtenkring van Cartesius 
en Spinoza dan uit het Woord Gods te zijn ontsproten. In geheel de Schrift lees ik geen enkel woord van 
kennis of wetenschap als zelfstandige macht, veel min van een theologische wetenschap buiten en boven de 
Gemeente … Een hoogere eenheid der wetenschappen anders dan in Christus … kan alleen de wijsbegeerte 
der wereld zich inbeelden, die steeds er op uit was, de Sancta Theologia onder hare wetten te stellen en te 
bespotten, gelijk Hagar en Ismaël aan Sara en Izak hebben gedaan.’ 
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be detached from its root of faith.12 In order to avoid such a subordination, Lindeboom believed, 
theology must be practised within the orbit of the Church alone rather than in the university. 
As Lindeboom argued one page earlier, the idea of sphere sovereignty eventually coordinates 
God and the divine things with the sense-perceptible and finite things.13 
Lindeboom offered further clarification in the note on the quotation above. He 
straightforwardly pointed to Kuyper’s Souvereiniteit in eigen kring, arguing that the Reformed 
fathers who were free from Cartesian philosophy did not agree with the sovereignty of science. 
According to him, moreover, theological modernism results from applying Cartesian and 
Spinoza’s thoughts to theology.14 Hence, it is only through the subordinating of theological 
studies to the governance of the Church that Reformed theology can accord to the Reformed 
tradition.15 
Lindeboom’s critique comes down to this question: Is Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty 
modern or orthodox? In other words, is this idea really the consequence of Cartesian and 
Spinoza’s philosophies? In order to answer this question, we should locate Kuyper’s argument 
in the context of Kuyper’s speech on sphere sovereignty in 1880. Lindeboom’s criticism was 
caused by Kuyper’s endorsement of Spinoza in that address: 
Spinoza grasped the sovereignty of [science] in its own sphere, and therefore, 
measured on a moral scale, our admiration for Spinoza’s character is as great as 
our disapproval of the insipid Erasmus. Both organ and perception were faulty with 
Spinoza, so his conclusion had to be false as well. But seeing what he did and as 
he did, he steadfastly refused to lend himself to a violation of the sovereignty of 
[science] in its own sphere.16 
Despite Kuyper’s positive evaluation of Spinoza’s insistence on the sovereignty of science, we 
still need to ask: What is the essence of Kuyper’s appreciative attitude toward Spinoza in the 
immediate context of the speech? This question is substantially related to Kuyper’s notions of 
sphere and sovereignty. To put it another way, Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty can be 
identified as modern (rather than orthodox) provided that the immediate context of the 
statement above shows that Cartesian and Spinoza’s philosophies are the origin of Kuyper’s 
notions of both sphere and sovereignty. 
 
12 Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en Zijn Tijdgenoten, 85. 
13 Lindeboom, Godgeleerden, 32. 
14 Ibid., 33, note 22. 
15 Ibid., 79-80. 
16 Kuyper, “Sphere Sovereignty,” 476-477. Here, I revise the English translation, substituting “science” for 
“learning” as the equivalent of wetenschap. The quotation from this English edition will translate the Dutch 
wetenschap to science consistently. 
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A close look at Kuyper’s speech unveils the fact that Kuyper never grounds the notions 
of sphere and sovereignty in modern philosophy. One paragraph immediately before Kuyper’s 
appreciation of Spinoza, Kuyper has clearly stated: ‘[Science] creates its own life sphere in 
which truth is sovereign. Under no circumstances may violation of its life-law be tolerated. 
That would not only dishonor [science] but be sin before God.’17 Inasmuch as God has created 
a life-law within the sphere of science, He is the ultimate foundation of the notions of both 
sphere and sovereignty. This theocentric essence of sphere sovereignty has been plainly set 
forth several pages earlier. There, Kuyper raises a challenge to his audiences: 
If you believe in Him as Deviser and Creator, as Founder and Director of all things, 
your soul must also proclaim the Triune God as the only absolute Sovereign. 
Provided—and this I would emphasize—we acknowledge at the same time that 
this supreme Sovereign once and still delegates his authority to human beings, so 
that on earth one never directly encounters God Himself in visible things but 
always sees his sovereign authority exercised in human office.18 
Needless to say, for Kuyper, sphere sovereignty is rooted in the divine delegation which has 
come to pass via creation and confirms God’s sovereignty as supreme. Given the diverse 
activities of human beings, Kuyper argues for various spheres––for example, the sphere of 
morality, the sphere of science and the sphere of social life. ‘And because each comprises its 
own domain, each has its own Sovereign within its bounds.’19 
Kuyper’s insistence on the sovereignty of each sphere must be read together with his 
emphasis on God’s absolute sovereignty. The connection between the two sorts of sovereignty 
is actualised by the Kingship of Jesus Christ.20 Hence, whilst arguing for the sovereignty of 
science and the independence of theological studies in the university (not governed by the 
Church), Kuyper recognises the Kingship of Christ over scientific theology. That is to say, 
theological studies in the university are directly accountable to Christ rather than to the Church. 
The analysis of Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty hitherto has demonstrated that 
Lindeboom’s critique is de facto the consequence of his misreading of Kuyper. He seems to 
exaggerate Kuyper’s appreciation of Spinoza. 21  In Kuyper’s speech, the name “Spinoza” 
 
17 Ibid., 476. 
18 Ibid., 466. 
19 Ibid., 467. 
20 Ibid., 464-467. The relationship between the Kingship of Christ and sphere sovereignty is also clarified in 
Abraham Kuyper, Pro Rege: Living Under Christ’s Kingship, Volume 1: The Exalted Nature of Christ’s 
Kingship (Bellingham: Lexham, 2016), 352-360. Therein, Kuyper sets forth the order of kingdoms or spheres, 
arguing that Christ occupies the highest place. 
21  Indeed, neo-Calvinism led by Kuyper and Bavinck is different to Spinoza’s philosophy. Bavinck’s 
contemporary theologian Bastiaan Wielenga sets forth seven pairs of the essentially different ideas between 
neo-Calvinism and Spinozism: theistic versus naturally pantheistic, personal and supernatural God who 
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appears only four times but in one paragraph. In view of the publication date of Lindeboom’s 
Godgeleerden (1894) (the year when the Kuyper-Lindeboom debates became more drastic), I 
suspect that Lindeboom’s misreading was probably deliberate to lend support to his own 
argument that defended the Theological School in Kampen and opposed the theological faculty 
of the Free University. 
In 1892, the Christian Reformed Church (Bavinck’s denomination) and the Doleantie 
churches (Kuyper’s denomination) were united as the Reformed Church in the Netherlands 
(Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland). Nonetheless, the union of theological training was 
lagging. The question about the relationship between the two theological institutions had 
already been raised at the Synod of Amsterdam in 1882 and discussed in the Synod of 
Dordrecht in 1893 and the Synod of Middelburg in 1896.22 The deputies of the Christian 
Reformed Church who sided themselves with Lindeboom rejected a kind of scientific theology 
in the university. Although there were also seceders like Bavinck and Petrus Biesterveld (1863-
1908)––who was Bavinck’s colleague and moved to the Free University together with 
Bavinck––who were more open to Kuyper and the Free University, the separatist and 
conservative constantly stressed that theological studies should be practised under the 
supervision of the Church. In this light, it appears that by asserting that Kuyper’s idea of sphere 
sovereignty was grounded in modern philosophy, Lindeboom was bolstering his efforts to 
denounce Kuyper’s claim that scientific theology should be undertaken in the university 
without the supervision the Church. 
On this issue, Lindeboom’s efforts were preoccupied with his immediate ecclesial context, 
and ignored the wider historical context of Kuyper’s claims. George Harinck reminds us of the 
significance of the French Revolution for grasping Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty. In the 
post-Revolution age, ‘[s]overeignty was no longer seen as a religious matter; it was a purely 
rational matter. The word sovereignty became closely related to the word autonomy. It was no 
longer God who was king of kings, but reason.’23 In my estimation, Kuyper’s intention was to 
restore the religious implication and foundation of sovereignty at the time. As Harinck 
 
reveals Himself versus world-event as natural event, confessional versus the human defining of God’s 
essence, the incarnation versus the denial of the incarnation, repentance as the starting point of the moral life 
versus repentance having no moral value, the antithesis between good and evil versus moral law identified 
with natural law, doxologically teleological life versus non-teleological and non-doxological life; Bastiaan 
Wielenga, “Calvinisme en Spinozisme,” Stemmen des tijds 1 (1911): 669-670. 
22  See George Harinck and Wim Berkelaar, Domineesfabriek: Geschiedenis van de Theologische 
Universiteit Kampen (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2018), 111-114; Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en Zijn 
Tijdgenoten, 77-109; Gleason, Herman Bavinck, 154-169, 200-202. 
23 Harinck, “A Historian's Comment on the Use of Abraham Kuyper's Idea of Sphere Sovereignty,” 280. 
Kuyper’s view of the French Revolution can be seen in Kuyper, Calvinism, 3. 
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insightfully observes, the emphasis of Kuyper’s methodology falls on the order of creation. 
‘Sovereignty is authority, delegated to man by his Creator. Understood in this way, sovereignty 
has more to do with responsibility than with right. Sovereignty is the vocation of different 
spheres to follow Christ. God delegated his sovereignty equally to all.’24 
Harinck’s observation on the Christocentric character of the idea of sphere sovereignty 
coincides with Kuyper’s concluding prayer in his inaugural speech on sphere sovereignty in 
1880, which was omitted in its eventual English translation. Kuyper said: 
And you who test our soul, O also the Judge (Rechter) of our nation and also the 
Judge (Oordeelaar) of the schools of science, demolish the walls of this Institution 
and nullify it before Your countenance by yourself, if it ever means something else, 
ever would desire something else other than the boast in the sovereign, the freely 
mighty grace, which is in the cross of the Son, Your tenderest love!25 
Clearly, while stressing the sovereignty of science and scientific theology, Kuyper ultimately 
surrendered the Free University to the absolute divine sovereignty as revealed in Jesus Christ.  
What has been demonstrated suffices to highlight the theocentric and Christocentric 
essence of Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty. Granted that Lindeboom offered a misleading 
critique of Kuyper, it is still true that their views of the location (and nature) of theological 
studies fundamentally differed and were irreconcilable. This is further evidenced by 
Lindeboom’s critique of Kuyper’s view of theological encyclopaedia. 
B. Theological Encyclopaedia: Religious Science? 
In a booklet that was probably published in 1885, Lindeboom expressly put forth his 
negative estimation on theological encyclopaedia in Dutch universities. (It should be noted that 
the Free University was founded in 1880.) It could be argued that Lindeboom’s critique directly 
challenged Kuyper’s theological encyclopaedia, though Kuyper’s work was published nine 
years later. Lindeboom drew a verdict that the encyclopaedia taught in Dutch universities at 
the time was not pure insofar as it taught not only theology but also religious science that was 
 
24 Harinck, “A Historian's Comment on the Use of Abraham Kuyper's Idea of Sphere Sovereignty,” 281. 
25 Kuyper, Souvereiniteit in eigen kring, 44. Dutch original: ‘En Gij die ons de nieren proeft, o Rechter ook 
van onze natie en Oordeelaar ook van de scholen der wetenschap, breek zelf de muren dezer Stichting af, en 
delg ze uit van voor Uw aangezicht, indien ze ooit iets anders bedoelen, ooit iets anders willen zou, dan te 
roemen in die souvereine, die vrijmachtige genade, die er is in het kruis van den Zoon Uwer teederste liefde!’ 
Kuyperian scholarship seems to ignore that Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty is also intimately 
related to his spirituality and devotional life. Kuyper’s meditation on Luke 2:8 leads to the conclusion that 
each sphere of human life has its own shepherd; Abraham Kuyper, Honey from the Rock: Daily Devotions 
from Young Kuyper, trans. James A. De Jong (Bellingham: Lexham Press, 2018), 342. 
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heartless and headless in the modern form and material. 26  In other words, the idea of 
encyclopaedia gave Lindeboom the impression that it confused theology with religious science. 
Lindeboom’s critique of encyclopaedia in 1885 was not closely related to his rejection of 
Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty. However, this connection became clear later in 
Godgeleerden (Theologians) (1894). It may be that this was due to the publication of Kuyper’s 
three-volume Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid shortly before.27  
Following the principle of his rejection of sphere sovereignty, Lindeboom proceeded to 
spell out his criticism of theological encyclopaedia after explicating his own notion of scientific 
theology. Again, he maintained that theology is a science only in terms of the knowledge of 
God. This means that theology as a science only serves the Church and the ministry of the 
Word of God.28 In other words, inasmuch as the Word of God and the knowledge of God have 
been bestowed to the Church, theology can only be scientifically undertaken under the 
supervision of the Church. Based on this rationale, Lindeboom recognised a theological 
encyclopaedia within the orbit of the Church. He argued: 
And I also hope that you will realise that however one might be able to or wish to 
widen the circle of theological science, all the sciences that one joins into 
theological encyclopaedia must be only in service to the knowledge of God and to 
its meaning before God and the Church and thus derives its value.29 
From this vantage point, it can be inferred that for Lindeboom there is no so-called theological 
encyclopaedia in the university; the only bona fide theological encyclopaedia thoroughly 
derives its existence from the Church. Thus, Lindeboom asserted that theological 
encyclopaedia retains its independence only within the Church and has nothing to do with 
general encyclopaedia in the university. In this light, he insisted, the idea of university as 
manifested by the Free University at the time, was false.30 
Kuyper’s contradistinction with Lindeboom is clear. To a large extent, the divergence 
between their views is due to Kuyper’s definition of encyclopaedia. Kuyper contends: ‘The 
idea of Encyclopaedia lies in the conception that the several parts of human knowledge are 
 
26 Lucas Lindeboom, Het doctoraat in de heilige godgeleerdheid aan de Theologische School der Christ. 
Geref. Kerk (Netherlands: [s. n.], [1885]), 13. 
27 The preface of the first edition of Kuyper’s Encyclopaedie is dated 20 December 1893, whereas the 
Godgeleerden was Lindeboom’s speech on 8 or 9 December 1894 (39th anniversary of the establishment of 
the Theological School in Kampen). 
28 Lindeboom, Godgeleerden, 40. 
29 Ibid., 42. Dutch original: ‘En ook dit zult gij, hoop ik, beseffen, dat, hoe men den kring der Theol. 
wetenschap ook mocht kunnen of willen verbroeden, al de wetenschappen, die men in de theol. 
encyclopaedie vereenigt, allen dienstbaar moeten zijn aan de Godskennis, en aan haar heur beteekenis voor 
God en de Gemeente en dus hare waarde ontleenen.’ 
30 Ibid., 74. 
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related to each other, and that it is possible and necessary for our mind to penetrate into this 
relation and to explicate it.’31 Following this, a specifically theological encyclopaedia refers to 
‘the scientific investigation into the organic existence and relation of Theology in itself and as 
an integral part of the organism of science.’32 Hence, theological encyclopaedia cannot rest 
until it is located within the organism of general science.33 From this vantage point, it can be 
perceived that Kuyper aims to confirm an organic view of science, in which theology has a due 
place. Granted, Kuyper’s effort reflects the struggle for the freedom of education in the 
nineteenth-century Netherlands, which should be freed from the domination of the State and 
the Church.34 
Lindeboom is partly correct in that Kuyper painstakingly makes an attempt to liberate 
theological encyclopaedia from the Church. However, Lindeboom fails to discern the 
idiosyncrasy of Kuyper’s ecclesiology. Kuyper contends: 
The Church as an institute, founded by man, is built after the rule of the special 
principium, as this speaks to us from the Holy Scripture. Hence the churchly 
institute can borrow support from the special principium, but not the special 
principium from the churchly institute. But what is true on the other hand—and 
this is the position which we defend—is, that faith in this special principium is 
supported and maintained by the churchly community, i.e. by the non-instituted but 
organically present communion mutual among believers.35 
Clearly, there is twofold aspect of Kuyper’s notion of the visible Church: the institutional and 
the organic. 
The institutional church finds her province bounded by her offices, and these 
offices are limited to the ministry of the Word, the Sacraments, Benevolence, and 
Church government. These are the only offices that have been appointed as special 
functions in her life. All other expressions of Christian life do not work by the 
organ of the special offices, but by the organs of the re-created natural life.36 
James Eglinton offers an incisive observation that for Kuyper ‘the church as institution serves 
as a safe haven for believers in the world, whereas the visible church organically spreads 
throughout the wider culture,’ which underlies the way by which and the reason why believers 
 
31 EST, 15; EHG, 1:16. 
32 EHG, 1:55-56; EST, 54; rev. 
33 EST, 58; EHG, 2:3. 
34 Kuyper, Calvinism, 167-168; cf. Peter S. Heslam, Creating a Christian Worldview: Abraham Kuyper's 
Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 181. 
35 EST, 392-393; EHG, 2:346-347. 
36 EST, 588; EHG, 2:542. 
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should step into the world outside the institutional church.37 As John Wood observes, for 
Kuyper, ‘the institution belonged not to the being or essence of the church (wezen or esse) but 
to the well-being of the church (welwezen or bene esse).’38 On this basis, we come to the 
corollary that for Kuyper the Church from which theology should be liberated is the 
institutional insofar as many factors of human life outside institutional church–––science being 
a crucial one––exert a significant impact on the Christian faith.39 Grounded in the theology of 
the organically visible church, the genuine scientific theology should be conducted in the 
university since it must engage with the other sciences. 
Lindeboom’s neglect of Kuyper’s organically visible church is already latent in their 
earlier debate on the Office of Doctrine within the Church. Kuyper maintains that the ecclesial 
Office of Doctor serves to train the ministers of the word of God and has its place in the 
seminary; therefore, it differs from the university title of Doctor. If the ecclesial Doctors who 
are appointed by the Church wish to obtain the university doctorate, they should take part in 
the proper university examination of studies and godliness.40 The principle of the examination 
of one’s godliness indirectly attests Kuyper’s concern regarding the organically visible church. 
Lindeboom offers a serious response to Kuyper’s insistence on the scientific authority of the 
university. He restrains the freedom of scientific theology within the confines of the Church, 
arguing that a sound theological education is only to serve the Church. On this basis, the status 
of doctor is also granted by the Church ‘through its courtyard of holy science’, that is, the 
Theological School in Kampen.41 It is clear that, to speak in Kuyper’s language, Lindeboom’s 
concern is about the ecclesiastical institution. In other words, Lindeboom fails to discern 
Kuyper’s hidden connection between theological encyclopaedia in the university and the 
church that is organically a visible communion. 
C. Summary 
While Lindeboom argues that theological studies can only be properly carried out under 
the governance of the Church, Kuyper stands starkly on the opposite side, arguing that 
scientific theology only exists in the university. To speak in Gregory of Nazianzus’s 
 
37 Eglinton, “To Transcend and to Transform,” 178-179. Cf. John Halsey Wood, Going Dutch in the Modern 
Age: Abraham Kuyper's Struggle for a Free Church in the Netherlands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 172-173. 
38 Wood, Going Dutch in the Modern Age, 89. 
39 Cf. EST, 577-578; EHG, 2:532. 
40 Abraham Kuyper, Tractaat van de Reformatie der Kerken. Aan de Zonen der Reformatie Hier te Lande 
op Luthers Vierde Eeuwfeest (Amsterdam: Höveker & Zoon, 1884), 64. 
41 Lindeboom, Het doctoraat in de heilige godgeleerdheid, 11. 
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Christological formula, Lindeboom offers the stance of “the unassumed” that theology is 
sacred and within the Church insofar as it totally concerns the knowledge of God and divine 
things and thus has nothing to do with the other sciences that are secular. On the contrary, 
Kuyper’s stance stresses “the assumed” but seems to belittle the importance of “what is united 
with God” so that he underscores the independence of theological studies in the university and 
the close relationship between theology and the other sciences, but seems to cut off the 
relationship between scientific theology and the institutional church. 
The ideas of sphere sovereignty and theological encyclopaedia unveil one significant 
cause of Lindeboom and Kuyper’s divergence, that is, their differing notions of the Church. 
Lindeboom stresses the church as institution so that theology must be undertaken under 
ecclesial supervision. By contrast, Kuyper lays emphasis on the organically visible church. 
Hence, theological encyclopaedia and scientific theology can be actualised in the university 
alone, for theology can be practised in freedom from the institutional church. In what follows, 
I will demonstrate that Bavinck neither thoroughly follows Kuyper nor approves of 
Lindeboom’s strategy to deal with the relationship between scientific theology and the other 
sciences, that is, the question on where scientific theology should be practised. 
III. Bavinck’s Middle Way 
As a leading neo-Calvinist theologian, it is beyond doubt that Bavinck was closely connected 
to yet not identical with Kuyper in this respect. Lindeboom also realised that Bavinck was the 
leading figure of his opponents.42 However, this does not mean that Bavinck agreed with 
Kuyper in toto. In what follows, I will demonstrate that if we liken Lindeboom’s and Kuyper’s 
viewpoints as two extremes, Bavinck’s stance is somewhere between them, albeit certainly 
closer to Kuyper’s. This also combats a conventional argument that Bavinck’s theology 
imitates or even is identical with Kuyper’s.43 
I will explicate Bavinck’s mediating position according to the two debated themes: sphere 
sovereignty and theological encyclopaedia. My primary intention is to lay out the difference 
between Kuyper and Bavinck in these perspectives, in the course of which the Lindeboom-
Bavinck debates will be evident.44 
 
42 Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en Zijn Tijdgenoten, 89. 
43 For example, Bastian Kruithof, “The Relation of Christianity and Culture in the Teaching of Herman 
Bavinck” (PhD dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1955), 12. 
44 Bremmer points out that Lindeboom’s opposition to Bavinck was caused by his controversy with Kuyper; 
Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en Zijn Tijdgenoten, 49. 
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A. Sphere Sovereignty 
Kuyper’s speech on sphere sovereignty is so well-known that Bavinck’s discourse on this 
theme is generally ignored. Bavinck furnished a concise discussion on the notions of 
sovereignty and the sovereignty of science in a short newspaper article on 11 April 1902.45 The 
publication date is critical as Bavinck resigned his post in Theological School in Kampen on 
30 October 1902 and moved to the Free University to take the post of the Professor of Theology, 
delivering his inaugural address there on 17 December 1902. 46  Bavinck’s action clearly 
evidences his eventual alignment with Kuyper and rejection of Lindeboom’s stance. Viewed 
in this light, Bavinck’s ‘Souvereiniteit der wetenschap’ (The Sovereignty of Science) is one 
significant manifesto of his movement to Amsterdam. 
Bavinck unambiguously unveils his stand at the outset: ‘The sovereignty of science is a 
beautiful word, a charming slogan and also an expression of a glorious undertaking. But it can 
easily serve as a resounding phrase, which, by its fascinating strength, makes forgotten what it 
is to express.’47 Two points stand out in this statement. First, Bavinck was supportive of the 
debated theme of sphere sovereignty, which was primarily focused on the sovereignty of 
science at the time. This was consistent with his siding with Kuyper that scientific theology 
should be undertaken in the universitas scientiarum.48  Second, Bavinck’s purpose was to 
clarify the idea of the sovereignty of science. He was not unaware of the Kuyper-Lindeboom 
debate in this regard. In explicating this idea, it could be argued, Bavinck wished to ask 
Lindeboom to do justice to the sovereignty of science, and also to justify his own move to the 
Free University. Apart from the two points, one would anticipate that Bavinck implicitly took 
issue with Kuyper’s idea of the sovereignty of science in several perspectives, as will be shown 
below. 
Having set forth his basic stance in the article, Bavinck argued alongside Kuyper that the 
absolute sovereignty belongs only to the God who is the Creator, the Sustainer, the Ruler and 
the Lord of all things. Sovereignty on the creaturely level is understood in a derived sense––
that is, creaturely sovereignty is the derivative of divine sovereignty.49 Again, Bavinck argued 
 
45 Herman Bavinck, “Souvereiniteit der wetenschap,” De Bazuin 50, no. 15 (11 April 1902). The typesetting 
splits the page into five columns; Bavinck’s article occupies the 2-4 columns. Citations hereafter will refer 
to the column number. 
46 Bavinck, Godsdienst en Godgeleerdheid.; Bavinck, “Religion and Theology,” 75-135.  
47 Bavinck, “Souvereiniteit der wetenschap,” column 2. 
48 RD, 1:54. In his biography of Bavinck, Eglinton points out that there was a contrast about Bavinck’s public 
and private statements concerning theological studies in a university or a seminary. ‘Privately, Bavinck was 
less than convinced of what might be accomplished [at the Free University].’ Eglinton, Bavinck, 220-222.  
49 Bavinck, “Souvereiniteit der wetenschap,” column 2. 
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alongside Kuyper that there are different kinds of sovereignty on the creaturely level, such as 
the sovereignty of the state and the sovereignty of father in a family. And as such, there is also 
the sovereignty of science. Bavinck maintained that by recognising various sorts of sovereignty, 
we believe that ‘in all these we have to do with phenomena, which have received from God 
their own life and in this life their own law, which we cannot violate without impunity.’50 
The analysis hitherto shows the similarities between Kuyper and Bavinck from the 
perspectives of the idea of sphere sovereignty. Then, Bavinck implicitly puts forth his 
divergence with Kuyper. Bavinck contends: 
There is no human being, no corporation, no school, which can act and speak in 
the name of science. Science has no infallible prophet. There are only scientific 
persons, who, no matter how inspired with desire and diligence for the research of 
truth, still always remain to be fallible, subject to mistakes and errors. Science is 
sovereign, but the persons who practise it have no different or higher authority 
than the power of the arguments, which they bring forward for their propositions 
and which may be freely examined and tested by everyone.51 
What we can perceive in the quotation above but that disappears in Kuyper’s idea of sphere 
sovereignty is the clear differentiation between science and the practitioner of science. 
Specifically, Bavinck distinctly ascribes sovereignty to science per se, whereas Kuyper blurs 
the differentiation and seems to confer a certain degree of sovereignty on the practitioner of 
science. 
In explicating the sovereignty of science, Kuyper stresses the role that the human 
consciousness plays. He contends: ‘To be able to think of something that is, and thus to be able 
to put together in our reason what is mirrored in our consciousness, is an honor bestowed by 
God on our human existence. To possess wisdom is a divine trait in our being.’52 Clearly, 
Kuyper’s point of view is grounded in the doctrine of creation, on which the notions of 
sovereignty and sphere develop. As sphere sovereignty has been established by God’s creation, 
the human consciousness that is created by God functions well in correspondence with the life-
law in each sphere. In this regard, Kuyper lays more emphasis on the human subject rather than 
the objectivity of science. Thus, in the paragraph immediately before his commendation of 
 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., columns 2-3. Dutch original: ‘Er is geen enkel mensch, geen enkele corporatie, geen enkele school, 
die in naam van de wetenschap optreden en spreken kan. De wetenschap heeft geen onfeilbaar profeet. Er 
zijn slechts wetenschappelijke mannen, mannen, die, hoezeer ook met lust en ijver tot onderzoek der 
waarheid bezield, toch altijd feilbaar, aan vergissing en dwaling onderworpen blijven. De wetenschap is 
souverein, maar de mannen, die haar beoefenen, hebben geen andere of hoogere autoriteit, dan de kracht der 
argumenten, die zij voor hun stellingen bijbrengen en die vrij door elk onderzocht en beproefd mogen 
worden.’ 
52 Kuyper, “Sphere Sovereignty,” 476. 
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Spinoza, after setting forth the claim that ‘[s]cholarship creates its own life sphere in which 
truth is sovereign’, Kuyper demonstrates how the human consciousness works in acquiring the 
harmonious knowledge and wisdom of the world around humans, the world of the human being, 
the spiritual world by aesthesis (sense perception) and noesis (intelligent thought).53 In this 
light, Kuyper’s endorsement of Spinoza’s character seems to confirm that the practitioner of 
science can share the sovereignty of science somewhat. This can be taken further to arrive at 
the corollary that the human consciousness cooperates with the sovereignty of science rather 
than operates under the sovereignty of science essentially. 
Kuyper’s claim for the Reformed principle lends robust support to his emphasis on the 
practitioner of science with regard to sphere sovereignty. He maintains that ‘considering that 
something begins from principle [met een beginsel iets begint] and that a distinct entity takes 
rise from a distinct principle, we shall maintain a distinct sovereignty for our own principle [a 
Reformed principle] and for that of our opponents across the whole sphere of thought.’54 
Kuyper makes it plain that what he claims in the speech on sphere sovereignty is the 
sovereignty of science that is accepted by the Reformed person. This is distinguished from 
Bavinck’s insistence on the object-defining character of science and the dialectical catholicity 
of scientific theology.55 Hence, Bavinck emphatically repudiates that Kuyper crosses from the 
territory of principle to that of person, which leads Kuyper to bring forth the notion of the two 
kinds of science, that is, the regenerate and the unregenerate.56 In other words, Kuyper’s 
assertion on two kinds of science further enhances the difference between Bavinck and Kuyper 
in respect of sphere sovereignty. Kuyper asserts that the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit 
gives rise to two kinds of human consciousness. The regenerate consciousness entails 
regenerate science, whereas the unregenerate consciousness gives rise to unregenerate 
science.57 He then draws a conclusion that ‘the effort which reveals itself in our nature to obtain 
a scientific knowledge of the cosmos by investigation and demonstration, is ever bound to the 
premises in our nature from which this effort starts out.’58 As John Bolt remarks well, for 
Kuyper, ‘[d]ifferent religious perceptions of reality result in completely different scientific 
conceptions. And, by extension, they result in different cultural, social, and political visions, 
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56 A. Terpstra, Dictaat, 74; cited in Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, 40. Terpstra’s Dictaat is the 
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strategies, and policies.’59 In the end, Kuyper’s viewpoint of two kinds of wetenschap raises 
the significance of epistemology above that of ontology in this regard. For him, the idea of 
sphere sovereignty seems to do more with epistemology than with ontology. This can be 
evidenced by Kuyper’s argument in Strikt genomen (1880), which was published to declare the 
right to found the Free University. Therein, Kuyper sets forth eight principles to settle the 
relationship between the church and the Free University. The first principle is the university’s 
right of self-employment and to ‘enjoy sphere sovereignty.’ Following this, Kuyper recognises 
in the second principle that the Church cannot exercise jurisdiction over any part of the 
University other than the employee who is the church’s member and thus under the 
ecclesiastical discipline.60 Clearly, in terms of the University-Church relationship, Kuyper 
places the University where knowing takes place at a superior position to the Church which the 
human being belongs to; thus, epistemology surpasses ontology. 
Unlike Kuyper’s combination of the sovereignty of science with the practitioner of science, 
Bavinck lays much more stress on theocentrism and Christocentrism by bringing forth the 
threefold meaning of the sovereignty of science. The first facet of the meaning is the same as 
Kuyper’s. That is, ‘all love for truth, all desire and passion, all power and capacity, all time and 
opportunity to practice science and come to truth along this way, is solely owed to God. … 
Science is a gift in its origin, a gift in an absolute sense, a gift that descends from the Father of 
lights.’61  
The second facet of Bavinck’s notion unveils his divergence from Kuyper. Bavinck 
contends: 
Second, the sovereignty of science implies that it has received from God its own 
life and in that life its own law. So it is with law, with religion, with morality, with 
commerce, with industry, with agriculture, with art, so it is with all things that are 
created by God with their own nature. So it is also with science. Whoever wants to 
practise it must observe rules that God has laid down for it; he must go to work 
according to the method, which is determined by the Lord for science in general 
and for every science in particular, and which he has to trace and deduce precisely 
from the nature of science. Whoever holds to these rules and labours according to 
this method has the chance that he will arrive at truth. Whoever despises it 
surrenders himself in advance to errors and mistakes. The person of science is not 
 
59 John Bolt, “Doubting Reformational Anti-Thomism,” in Aquinas Among the Protestants, ed. Manfred 
Svensson and David VanDrunen (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017), 133. 
60  Abraham Kuyper, Strikt genomen. Het recht tot Universiteitsstichting, staatsrechtelijk en historisch 
getoetst (Amsterdam: J. H. Kruyt, 1880), 209-210. 
61 Bavinck, “Souvereiniteit der wetenschap,” column 3. 
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free; he cannot do it with what he wants to do; he is bound to the object of his 
research that God has presented to his glance.62  
On the one hand, Bavinck sets forth the foundation on which theology as a particular science 
should be connected to the other sciences, which is supportive of his claim that theology should 
be practised in the university. On the other hand, Bavinck’s statement is clearly antithetical to 
Kuyper’s two kinds of science. The life-law of the sphere of science, which has been laid down 
by God objectively in creation, is workable for both the regenerate and the unregenerate. This 
means that the sovereignty of science has nothing to do with the practitioner of science but 
with science per se. In this way, Bavinck denies the subordination of ontology to epistemology. 
If the second facet of Bavinck’s notion of the sovereignty of science is to counter Kuyper, 
the third could be reckoned as the protest against Lindeboom. Bavinck argues:  
And third, science can also be called sovereign in this sense that God leads and 
steers science in its progress in the history of humankind. It is His pleasure to 
maintain science and to bring to light its evermore richer truth. In its origin but also 
in its development, science is a gift of God. … . [God] often do it against the will 
and the sense of schools and universities, notwithstanding the decrees and canons 
of popes and churches, notwithstanding the prohibitions of emperors and princes. 
The power of truth is great; it will triumph because God bears and sustains it and 
will gain victory over all lies and errors.63 
On this score, Bavinck resolutely defends the idea of sphere sovereignty and opposes 
Lindeboom’s effort to bring theological studies thoroughly under the guardianship and 
supervision of the institutional church. However, it is worth noting that Bavinck does not 
separate theological studies from the institutional church in such a way that Kuyper advocates. 
 
62 Ibid.; emphasis added. Dutch original: ‘Ten tweede sluit de souvereiniteit der wetenschap in, dat deze van 
God een eigen leven en in dat leven een eigen wet heeft ontvangen. Zoo is het met het recht, met den 
godsdienst, met de zedelijkheid, met den handel, met de nijverheid, met den landbouw, met de kunst, zoo is 
het met alle dingen, die door God met een eigen aard geschapen zijn. Zoo is het ook met de wetenschap. 
Wie haar beoefenen wil, moet de regelen in acht nemen, welke God daarvoor vastgesteld heeft; hij moet te 
werk gaan naar de methode, welke voor de wetenschap in het algemeen en voor iedere wetenschap in het 
bijzonder door den Heere is bepaald en die hij juist uit de natuur der wetenschap heeft op te sporen en af te 
leiden. Wie aan deze regelen zich houdt en naar deze methode arbeidt, heeft kans, dat hij tot waarheid komt. 
Wie ze versmaadt, geeft zich van tevoren aan vergissing en dwaling over. De man der wetenschap is niet vij; 
hij kan met haar niet doen, wat hij wil; hij is gebonden aan het voorwerp van zijn onderzoek, dat God aan 
zijn blik heeft aangeboden.’ 
63 Ibid.; emphasis added. Dutch original: ‘En ten derde kan de wetenschap ook in dien zin souverein heeten, 
dat God die wetenschap in haar voortgang in de geschiedenis der menschheid leidt en bestuurt. Het is zijn 
welbehagen, om die wetenscnap in stand te houden en door haar altijd rijkere waarheid aan het licht te 
brengen. De wetenschap is, in haar oorsprong, maar ook in hare ontwikkeling eene gave Gods. … Hij doet 
het menigmaal, tegen den wil en den zin van scholen en universiteiten in, ondanks de decreten en canones 
van pausen en kerken, niettegenstaande de verboden van keizers en vorsten. De macht der waarheid is groot; 
zij zal zegevieren, omdat God haar draagt en instandhoudt en over alle leugen en dwaling de overwinning 
zal doen be halen. In dezen zin belijden wij zeker allen gaarne en van harte de souvereiniteit der wetenschap.’ 
173 
In tackling the relationship between scientific theology and the institutional church, 
Bavinck again accentuates the competition between the sovereignty of science and the 
sovereignty of university professors (as the practitioners of science). By ascribing sovereignty 
to science per se, Bavinck leaves room for the Scripture-based confessions to which the 
practitioner of science is committed.64 Needless to say, this corresponds with Bavinck’s view 
of the presuppositional character of science, of both the general and the particular (theology) 
sorts.65 Accordingly, granted that the institutional church and science have their own sphere 
sovereignty that is endowed by God, the human agent has a responsibility to undertake 
activities in each sphere under its respective sovereignty.  
This brings about two important outcomes. First, the focal point in practising scientific 
theology is laid more on ontology than epistemology. That is to say, it is not theology but the 
theologian who should practise scientific theology in view of various sorts of sphere 
sovereignty. Second, the ecclesial authority is exercised first on a human’s state of being, rather 
than a human’s particular knowing. To put it another way, the institutional church upholds the 
priority of ontology over epistemology. Hence, Bavinck recognises the importance of the 
ecclesial authority to appoint, suspend, and dismiss theological professors in the university. 
We consider the close bond of the University with the churches, determined in the 
appointment and the dismissal of professors in theology, to be highly desirable for 
the future of the University––not a sacrifice, no decline, but an improvement for 
the University; and also not a sacrifice, but the ideal for “its own training” of the 
churches. The congregation of the Lord, if it may exist according to the Word of 
God, is still the pillar and firmness of truth.66 
In short, in contrast with Kuyper and Lindeboom, Bavinck’s via media is to defend the 
sovereignty of science vigorously (contra Lindeboom) by laying emphasis on the human agent 
(the practitioner of science) who serves as the junction of the institutional church and the 
university (contra Kuyper). For Bavinck, human beings deserve this honourable place on the 
ground of their creation in the imago Dei, whereby they receive the dominion over the earth 
and everything on it.67 
 
64 Ibid., column 4. 
65 Chapter 3, II.B, IV.B.b. 
66 Bavinck, “Souvereiniteit der wetenschap,” column 4. Dutch original: ‘Wij achten den nauweren band der 
Universiteit met de Kerken, bepaald in de benoeming en het ontslag van Hoogleeraren in de Theologie voor 
de toekomst der Universiteit hoogst gewenscht,—niet een offer, geen achteruitgang, maar een vooruitgang 
voor de Universiteit; en ook niet een offer, maar het ideaal voor „eigen opleiding” der Kerken. De Gemeente 
des Heeren, zoo zij naar het Woord Gods mag bestaan, is toch de pilaar en vastigheid der waarheid.’ 
67 Ibid., column 2. 
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B. Theological Encyclopaedia  
As the idea of sphere sovereignty is combined with that of theological encyclopaedia in 
Kuyper’s system, Bavinck’s divergence with Kuyper in the former must be concomitant with 
their differences in the latter. Indeed, that Bavinck did not move to the Free University until 
1902 was partly and significantly associated with his silent reservation with Kuyper’s project 
of theological encyclopaedia. In December 1893, Bavinck was invited to be a professor at the 
Free University. He finally declined the invitation. Harinck and Berkelaar argue that one reason 
would be the publication of Kuyper’s Encyclopaedia of Sacred Theology in 1894, which 
stresses the freedom of theological studies without the supervision of the Church.68 
Bavinck’s disagreement with Kuyper in this regard was testified by Maarten Noordtzij 
(1840-1915), who was the professor of Old Testament at the Theological School in Kampen 
and involved deeply in the Anti-Revolutionary Party led by Kuyper. According to Noordtzij, 
even though Bavinck appreciated Kuyper’s Encyclopaedia as the first Reformed encyclopaedia, 
he would not ‘have held back comments, reservations and questions that occur while reading.’ 
Bavinck kept silent publicly at the time, for he completely disagreed with the common 
suspicion of Kuyper’s work, the common charge Kuyper of pantheism and falsifying theology, 
which threatened the existence of the Church.69 In this light, Bavinck and Lindeboom differ. 
Whereas the latter is thoroughly antithetical to Kuyper’s work, Bavinck sides with Kuyper and 
approves of Kuyper’s Encyclopaedia in principle. This can be evidenced by Bavinck’s addition 
that theological encyclopaedia and religious science differ fundamentally in the section of ‘The 
Encyclopedic Place of Dogmatic Theology’ of the second edition of Reformed Dogmatics. In 
the same section, Bavinck also stresses that theology as the Queen of the sciences should not 
be practised in the seminary but rather in the universitas scientiarum.70 By arguing so, Bavinck 
refutes Lindeboom’s critique that theological encyclopaedia is confused with religious science. 
Meanwhile, Bavinck points out that a purport of theological encyclopaedia is to seek for the 
relationship between theology and the other sciences. 
Another reason underlying Bavinck’s silent reservation was to keep the union of the 
Reformed Churches in the Netherlands (Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland), which was 
achieved in 1892 between the Christian Reformed Church (Bavinck’s denomination) and the 
 
68 Harinck and Berkelaar, Domineesfabriek, 113. Vos’s letter to Bavinck is another important cause of 
Bavinck’s rejection of the appointment (112-113); also see “To Herman Bavinck, March 28, 1894,” in Vos, 
The Letters of Geerhardus Vos, 185. 
69 M. Noordtzij, “Aan Ds. J. Westerhuis te Groningen,” De Bazuin 44, no. 13 (27 Maart 1896). Noordtzij 
does not name the persons who were critical of Kuyper. 
70 RD, 1:50-54; GD, 1:27-31. Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, Eerste deel, Eerste druk, 9-14. 
175 
Doleantie churches (Kuyper’s denomination). It can be imagined that Bavinck’s public critique 
of Kuyper would have weakened the ecclesial union, which has been being swung by the 
debates on the relationship between the theological faculty of the Free University and the 
Theological School in Kampen. Eglinton’s biography of Bavinck provides another two 
(probable) causes of Bavinck’ refusal to critique Kuyper publicaly. First, Kuyper’s strong 
personality and self-assurance drove him to outmanoeuvre his opponents and make their life 
difficult. This can be seen in the public conflict between Kuyper and Alexander de Savornin 
Lohman (1837-1924), who was one of Kuyper’s most important collaborators in founding the 
Anti-Revolutionary Party (1879) and the Free University. Lohman’s disagreement with 
Kuyper’s suggestion of mass democracy and the expansion of voting right resulted in the 
discharge of Lohman’s professorship at the Free University by Kuyper’s manipulation, and 
Lohman’s break with the Anti-Revolutionary Party.71 It is probable that Bavinck was aware 
that he would become the next Lohman if he criticised Kuyper in public.  Second, Bavinck was 
increasingly aware of the revival of Calvinism so that the Netherlands returned to Christianity, 
particularly to Calvinism.72  Indeed, this belief in the re-conversion of the Netherlands to 
Calvinism was salient in Bavinck’s ‘The Future of Calvinism’ (1894). There, he argued that 
‘the significance of this revival [the revival of Calvinism] lies in this, that it preserves and 
protects the Christian religion and the Christian Church in our country. Calvinism is the 
religion of the Dutch nation, and he that would take our Calvinism away from us, would rob 
us of the Christian religion and prepare the way among us for unbelief and revolution.’73 Thus, 
Bavinck’s public silence means his unwillingness to risk upsetting this re-conversion. 
Bavinck nevertheless offered some private critiques of Kuyper in his class according to 
A. Terpstra’s notes on Bavinck’s lectures. Concerning the relationship between theology and 
the other sciences, Bavinck and Kuyper differ primarily in four perspectives. First, Bavinck 
takes issue with Kuyper’s method of figuring out the conceptual relationship between theology 
as a particular science and science in general. Kuyper begins with the notion of science and 
moves on to explicate that of theology. Although this method is consistent with Reformed 
principles, Bavinck casts doubt on Kuyper’s method of fitting theology within the notion of 
science.74 Hence, Bremmer comments that Bavinck would start from the concept of theology 
 
71 Eglinton, Bavinck, 200-202. 
72  Ibid., 80, 185-186, 188-189, 193-196. 
73 Bavinck, “The Future of Calvinism,” 14; emphasis added. 
74 Terpstra, Dictaat, 64; cited in Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, 38-39. 
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and then explain that of science, asking if theology is worthy of the name “science.”75 This 
sequence is clearly present in Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics volume 1.  
Second, Bavinck criticises Kuyper for adopting a speculative approach to formulating the 
concept of science. Bavinck contends that ‘[Kuyper] does not try to infer the concept of science 
from the phenomena in human life, which are summarised under the name science, but he tries 
to lay down it outside the empirical from the idea. One feels that Kuyper reasons in a more 
Platonic than Aristotelian way.’76  Kuyper’s approach is opposite to Bavinck’s claim that 
science starts from positive experience, as has been noted in previous chapters. Bavinck 
diagnoses that ‘in [Kuyper’s] way a concept of science is obtained that is totally abstract and 
goes beyond reality.’77 One can perceive that Kuyper’s speculative or idealistic approach fits 
well with his viewpoint of two kinds of science, which is grounded in the Spirit’s regenerative 
work. Hence, Bremmer observes that this point is Bavinck’s major criticism of Kuyper.78 
Third, Bavinck opposes Kuyper’s willingness to grant Kant a highly significant place in 
the rise of scientific theology, for in so doing, Augustine, Athanasius, the church fathers, 
Thomas Aquinas, and the Reformers are not theologians in a good sense.79 This is because for 
Kuyper it was until Kant that the criterion of science was laid down, which means the figures 
before Kant were incapable of working out scientific theologies. Following this, as Bavinck 
has noted, Kuyper fails to account for ‘whether or not the notion of theology differs from, or 
is subordinated to, or coordinate with the notion of science.’80 Note that this was Bavinck’s 
private critique of Kuyper in class. In public, he showed apparent sympathy with Kuyper, 
which can be evidenced by the positive evaluation of Kuyper’s appreciation of Kant in 
Opleiding en Theologie (Education and Theology) (1896).  
This brochure was co-authored by Bavinck, Douwe Klazes Wielenga (1842-1902), 
Maarten Noordtzij and Petrus Biesterveld. However, Bremmer remarks that ‘the style and 
intention’ unveils that the brochure was written by Bavinck.81 Bavinck and the other authors 
together argue: 
 
75 Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, 39. 
76 Terpstra, Dictaat, 68, cited in Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, 39-40. 
77 Terpstra, Dictaat, 79, cited in Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, 40. 
78 Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, 40.  
79 Terpstra, Dictaat, 102, cited in Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, 42. 
80 Terpstra, Dictaat, 105, cited in Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, 42. 
81 Bremmer, Herman Bavinck en Zijn Tijdgenoten, 86. This brochure was intended to show a moderate 
stance on the Kuyper-Lindeboom debates. However, as Bremmer notes, the authors showed great sympathy 
to Kuyper (89). 
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Finally, it is … admitted that the name “theology” in scientific sense really only 
indicates the so-called dogmatics nowadays. … The other subjects, which were 
counted into theology, were not yet included in the organism of theology; they were 
not yet constructed out of one organic theological principle. This has first come to 
pass in this century since the concept of science is imagined more clearly. In this 
respect, Kant holds a significant place. Not materially but formally, much is owed 
to him and the later German philosophy. Dr. Kuyper certainly means this and 
nothing else as he says that the science of theology has first come to its full 
consciousness in this century. And this can and will be denied by nobody that has 
make any acquittance with the new philosophy.82 
This statement seems to employ the principle of the presumption of innocence. Based on the 
common viewpoint that ‘the science of theology has first come to its full consciousness in this 
century’, the authors believe that Kuyper is innocent in this regard because he follows the 
common stance so as to grant Kant such a highly significant place in the history of scientific 
theology in a formal rather than material sense. Of course, Bavinck’s public endorsement and 
private critique of Kuyper indicate indelible tensions. A possible explanation is that the other 
authors might be inclined to favour Kuyper’s innocence. 
Fourth, Bavinck is critical of Kuyper’s view of the relationship between the church and 
the theological school and the theological faculty, which is grounded in Kuyper’s threefold 
taxonomy of theology.83 In this regard, Bavinck targets Kuyper’s contention that,  
sufficient knowledge of God ad hoc flows from the Holy Scripture in a threefold 
way: personal, ecclesiastical and scientific. … Distinction meanwhile is readily 
made between this personal, churchly and scientific theology (or knowledge of 
God). The first tends to supply each child of God his comfort in life and in death. 
The second, to enable the Church to preach and to maintain her confession in the 
face of the world. And the third is charged with the introduction of the knowledge 
of God into the human consciousness. The first has for its circle the lifesphere of 
the individual, the second the circle of the institutional church, and the third the 
circle of the church taken as an organism.84 
 
82 Herman Bavinck et al., Opleiding en Theologie (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1896), 58. Dutch original: ‘Eindelijk 
is het … bekend, dat de naam Theologie in wetenschappelijken zin eigenlijk alleen aanduidde de thans 
zoogenaamde Dogmatiek. … De andere vakken, die thans tot de Theologie gerekend worden, waren nog 
niet in het organisme der Theologie opgenomen; ze werden nog niet van uit één organisch Theologisch 
beginsel geconstrueerd. Dit is eerst geschied in deze eeuw, sedert het begrip van wetenschap helderder is 
ingedacht. Kant bekleedt in dit opzicht eene beteekenisvolle plaats. Materieel niet, maar formeel is aan hem 
en de latere Duitsche wijsbegeerte veel te danken. Dit en niets anders bedoelt voorzeker ook Dr. Kuyper, als 
hij zegt, dat de wetenschap der Theologie eerst in deze eeuw tot haar volle bewustheid is gekomen. En dat 
kan en zal door niemand worden ontkend, die met de nieuwere wijsbegeerte ook maar eenige kennis heeft 
gemaakt. 
83 Terpstra, Dictaat, 134, cited in Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, 44. 
84 EST, 588, 589-590; EHG, 2:543, 544. 
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By arguing so, Kuyper makes it clear that scientific theology has nothing to do with the 
institutional church insofar as the scientific knowledge of God that entails scientific theology 
is not afforded to the institutional church. Instead, the organically visible church is pertinent to 
scientific theology. As Harinck and Berkelaar observe, ‘the responsibility for all science, thus 
including theology, was not transferred by Kuyper from the government to the Church, but to 
the Christian community. Thus, the church as an institution had no task in relation to 
theological science.’85 Bavinck could not agree with Kuyper on the separation between the 
institutional church and scientific theology, though they concur that scientific theology should 
be practised in the university. Contra Kuyper, Bavinck argues that scientific theology has been 
associated with the church from the beginning.86 
Bavinck’s stance is set out in Opleiding en Theologie. First of all, Bavinck argues that 
‘theology is given by Christ to the Church and must originate from the Church, especially the 
institutional church. There is no theology outside it.’87 Nonetheless, Bavinck and his co-authors 
do not align themselves with Lindeboom. Rather, they contend that the intimate bond between 
theology and the institutional church by no means implies that every member of the 
institutional church or every ecclesiastical office holder practises scientific theology.88 Bavinck 
clarifies that theology’s origination from the (institutional) church does not mean the 
ecclesiastical office as the threshold of theology. He says, ‘Here we do not yet discuss the 
question if [the practice of scientific theology] is also in relation to the office but refute that the 
practice of theology in the scientific sense as such comes out of and is an essential component 
of the office.’89 Interestingly, Bavinck refrains from elaborating on the relationship between 
theology and the ecclesiastical office. It is probable that he wants to avoid triggering a sharper 
conflict between Lindeboom and Kuyper as well as with himself. In so doing, moreover, 
Bavinck differentiates theology in the narrower sense from that in the broader sense.90 For him, 
the former refers to scientific theology in the Free University. In any case, theology in the 
narrower sense, namely scientific theology, is not a churchly activity, as professors in theology 
are not responsible for taking pastoral care in churches. This does not mean that Bavinck 
intends to separate scientific theology from the institutional church. On the contrary, he asserts 
that the institutional church––rather than the ecclesiastical office holder––is responsible for 
 
85 Harinck and Berkelaar, Domineesfabriek, 113. 
86 Terpstra, Dictaat, 134, cited in Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus, 44. 
87 Bavinck et al., Opleiding en Theologie, 47. 
88 Ibid., 47-48. 
89 Ibid., 48. 
90 Ibid. 
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ensuring scientific theology in such a way that the practice of scientific theology is always a 
highly valued objective of the care of the institutional church.91 More specifically, Bavinck 
accentuates that God has endowed the institutional church with a better understanding of the 
calling to practise scientific theology than the university. On this score, the institutional church 
should release the gifted practitioners of scientific theology from much churchly labour and 
offer them much time and opportunities to undertake scientific studies of theology. Thereby, 
scientific theology is more closely related to the institutional church.92 
Taking into consideration his public discourse on Kuyper’s theological encyclopaedia, 
Bavinck’s private fourfold critique above shows his several basic points. First, Bavinck 
emphatically affirms the scientificity of theology and the theological legitimacy of the 
theological faculty of the Free University, though he and Kuyper differ in the notion and 
method of science somewhat. This point is resonant with Bavinck’s insistence on the 
sovereignty of science. Second, Bavinck holds fast to the fact that scientific theology is closely 
related to the institutional church, which is deeply rooted in the history of Christianity. Third, 
as noted in the analysis of ‘Souvereiniteit der wetenschap’ earlier, Bavinck again accentuates 
the importance of the human agent (the practitioner of scientific theology), who must be a 
member of the institutional church and to whom the institutional church should do its best to 
lend support. As such, the practitioner of scientific theology becomes the junction of the 
institutional church and the university. 
C. Summary 
By focusing on the themes of sphere sovereignty and theological encyclopaedia, it has 
been demonstrated that Bavinck’s middle way is characterised by the following: (1) that he 
aligns himself with Kuyper in locating scientific theology in the university and holds fast to 
the relationship between theology and the other sciences; and (2) that scientific theology cannot 
be separated from the institutional church due to the fact that the true practitioner of scientific 
theology must be a member of the institutional church, thus committing himself to a specific 
ecclesial tradition.  
These two points pave the way for our following elaboration on Bavinck’s view of the 
relationship between theology and the other sciences. To Bavinck’s mind, this relationship 
cannot be illustrated (1) without a church-committed theology or (2) with a separatist theology. 
 
91 Ibid., 48-49. 
92 Ibid., 49. One can find Bavinck’s consistent stance on the church’s calling of scientific theology since the 
early years of his career. This calling has been delineated as concerning the Christian Reformed Church; 
Bavinck, “De Wetenschappelijke Roeping Onzer Kerk,” 88-93, 97-106.  
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On balance, the practitioner of scientific theology has the responsibility to commit to the church 
and introduce the knowledge of God to the world for divine glorification.93  To speak in 
Gregory’s language, theology must be ‘the assumed.’ Then, as will be demonstrated below, for 
Bavinck theology should ‘heal’ the other sciences insofar as ‘what is united with God is also 
being saved.’ 
IV. Bavinck on Theology as the Regina Scientiarum 
The Kuyper-Lindeboom debates have attested that for Bavinck the relationship between 
theology and the other sciences should be understood within the context of the Christian faith. 
In Bavinck’s age, this relationship involved theological education, the union of the Reformed 
churches and the legitimacy of the Free University (which was Christian and Reformed). Given 
this, Bavinck’s approach to sorting out the issue of this relationship cannot but begin from the 
theological perspective. By doing so, he took pains to persuade his separatist colleagues (e.g. 
Lindeboom) to do justice to the other sciences and engage in the general Dutch academia.  
Bavinck’s appropriation of the Medieval slogan “theology as the Regina Scientiarum” 
epitomises his theological account of the interaction between theology and the other sciences. 
Unlike the Medieval ethos that theology is the Queen and the other sciences are the handmaiden, 
Bavinck maintains that theology is the humble Queen and the servant of the other sciences. 
This innovative appropriation of the Medieval slogan is embodied in Bavinck’s Christological 
and eschatological description of theology’s Queenship. 
A. The Logos-Christological Account 
Having argued that theology must be connected to the other sciences, Bavinck clarifies 
that ‘[i]t only befits [theology] as Regina, like Christ the King, to rule and win over with moral 
and spiritual weapons.’94 The terms “moral” and “spiritual” are so fascinating that one would 
dismiss the further inquiry into why Bavinck adopts a Christological account of theology’s 
Queenship and relationship with the other sciences. Indeed, the statement above is reflective 
of Christ’s identity of Redeemer. However, a proper understanding of Bavinck’s Christological 
account cannot dismiss the identity of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, as the Creator. ‘It is the 
Father who, through the Son as Logos, imparts himself to his creatures in the Spirit.’95 
 
93 See chapter 5, II-III. 
94 WHG, 34-35. 
95 RD, 1:214; also see 1:336; 4:33. 
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Bavinck explains that the Son’s identity as Creator and Re-Creator consists in the truth 
that ‘He is not only the mediator of re-creation but also of creation.’96 More specifically, 
Bavinck contends that, 
the world was surely not eternal but its idea was yet eternally in the mind of God. 
The Father expresses all his thoughts and his entire being in the one personal Word, 
and thus the idea of the world is contained in the Logos … In Him the Father 
contemplates the idea of the world itself, not as though it were identical with the 
Son, but so that He envisions and meets it in the Son in whom His perfect fullness 
dwells. Contained in the divine wisdom, as a part and in sum, lies also the private 
wisdom that will be realized in the creatures. He is the Logos by whom the Father 
creates all things.97 
This statement on creation is not merely Logosological but also, fundamentally, Trinitarian. 
‘The creation thus proceeds from the Father through the Son in the Spirit in order that, in the 
Spirit and through the Son, it may return to the Father.’98 Moreover, given God’s creation by 
the Logos, all things are knowable insofar as they were first thought by God.99 On this score, 
we can draw the corollary, as Brian Mattson has pointed out, that Bavinck’s ‘Trinitarian 
creational ontology is … the external foundation for all science, not just theology.’100 
The nature of the external foundation embodies in Bavinck’s statement that ‘[s]cience 
always consists in a logical relation between subject and object.’101 As has been argued earlier, 
the organic correspondence between subjective and objective revelation that is established by 
the Logos is characteristic of scientific theology. 102  Likewise, the Logos created such 
correspondence for all science. 
That subject and object so meet and agree with each other is grounded in the fact 
that both originate with the same God—a God who created the reality outside of 
us, who created the laws of thinking in us, and who placed these in an organic 
relation to each other. As a compendium of nature, man is designed for and related 
to the whole world. ... It is one Logos that created both man and world in relation 
to each other and for each other. It is in that same Logos that all things have their 
existence.103 
 
96 RD, 2:423; GD, 2:387. 
97 GD, 2:388-389; RD, 2:425; rev. 
98 RD, 2:426; GD, 2:389. 
99 CWB, 27-28; CWV, 45. 
100 Mattson, Restored to Our Destiny, 56. 
101 RD, 1:214; GD, 1:186. 
102 Chapter 4, IV.A. 
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This cogently rebuts K. Scott Oliphint’s observation on Bavinck that ‘the Logos principle just 
is the knowledge of God, through the Logos, that all men, by virtue of their being created, 
necessarily and for eternity, have.’104 Bavinck’s theology of the Logos is first of all concerned 
with ontology rather than epistemology; hence, Oliphint does injustice to qualify the Logos 
principle as epistemological alone. For Bavinck, the Logos provides the ontological foundation 
of the unity of creation. This Logos-based ontology is in tune with Ian McFarland’s 
appropriation of Maximus the Confessor’s theology to elaborate on the unity of creation. 
McFarland contends: 
The creation is a whole insofar as, to use Maximus’s analogy, it serves as the 
temporal clothing of God’s eternal Word. Here its unity is not conceived … in 
terms of the certain characteristics shared by all creatures, but rather by reference 
to the Word, in relation to whom the creation acquires its shape as a garment, and 
apart from whom its true form cannot be perceived.105 
Both Bavinck and McFarland ground human cognitive activities in the Logos-based ontology. 
Furthermore, Bavinck’s realism enhances the priority of ontology over epistemology.  
Realism … was doubtlessly correct in assuming the reality of universal concepts, 
not in a Platonic or ontological sense prior to the thing itself (ante rem), but in an 
Aristotelian sense in the thing itself (in re) and therefore also in the human mind 
subsequent to the thing itself (in mente hominis post rem). The universality we 
express in a concept does not exist as such, as a universal, apart from us. In every 
specimen of a genus, particularly individualized and specialized, however, it has 
its basis in things and is abstracted from it and expressed in a concept by the activity 
of the intellect.106 
The language of the statement, “the thing itself” and “basis in things”, points to the priority of 
ontology over epistemology in Bavinck’s general realism. Hence, he stresses the third aspect 
of the notion of science that ‘the science is … bound to that object as rigorously as possible.’107 
Following this, it could be inferred that the variegated natures of various sciences have been 
created via the Logos. As such, the other sciences cannot epistemologically be reduced to 
theology (the science of God) that is pertinent to the knowledge of God and divine things. 
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Based on this Logosological foundation, the theology of the Logos is of considerable 
importance to science: ‘The “logos” implicit in creatures corresponds to the “logos” in human 
beings and makes science possible.’108 
The analysis hitherto logically shows that the Logos provides the ontological foundation 
on which the unity of theology and the other sciences is constituted. This observation is 
consistent with Bavinck’s view of the organic unity of science: ‘There was the whole before 
parts, and the members of the organism of science are gradually developed and grown from 
the whole.’109 Hence, ‘the dualism and duality’ of theology and the other sciences ‘comes to a 
deep unity’ in the Creator-Logos as Mediator.110 In this light, Sutanto’s observation needs to 
be strengthened by the Logos-based ontology: ‘Beneath the distinctions and particularities of 
each field of knowledge is a [Logosologically ontologically] harmonious view of the whole.’111 
Bavinck Logos-Christological account of science mirrors the Logosology in a wider neo-
Calvinism. Although Kuyper set forth his theology of the Logos in Encyclopaedia in 1894, 
Bavinck’s colleague at the Free University Jan Woltjer (1849-1917) was more influential in 
this regard. As a neo-Calvinist philosopher, his ‘De Wetenschap van den Logos’ (1891) (The 
Science of the Logos) came out three years earlier than Kuyper’s Encyclopaedia. Robert 
Arnoldus Nijhoff’s recent study shows that central to Woltjer’s philosophy are the terms “logos” 
and “Logos”, whereby Woltjer repudiates absolute idealism (e.g. Berkeley’s philosophy) and 
articulates a form of idealism in order to explicate the relationship between the spiritual and 
the material.112 Needless to say, Woltjer’s Logosology should impinge on Bavinck’s Logos-
Christological account of science. 
Woltjer argues that ‘[t]he Logos, the Word, which was with God in the beginning, through 
which all things are made, is purely mirrored in the logos of human beings to a creaturely 
degree. Only the logos knows the Logos.’113 Woltjer makes it clear that the human logos 
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implies the human cognitive capacity, which is essential to every science. Hence, he describes 
each science as the science of the logos, that is, as the inquiry into what the Logos reveals in 
human life and the cosmos.114 On his Logosology, Woltjer contends: 
Since the human logos is a part, if you would prefer, an organ or a function of the 
soul, and the soul, according to the customary used expression, dwells in the body 
and this body is a part of cosmos, it is naturally that these sciences of the logos 
have their border region, where they come into touch and intercourse with other 
objects of knowing. To my way of thinking, however, its own field is so fixed with 
sufficient certainty, and the bond, which connects them mutually as a whole, is 
indicated clearly.115 
To read Bavinck’s argument along with Woltjer’s, it is perceptible that the two neo-Calvinist 
thinkers ground the unity of science in the work of the Logos internally in the human being 
and externally in the cosmos. 
It is on the basis of this Logos-based organic unity of science that Bavinck furnishes his 
Christological account of theology’s Queenship. We should concede that the Logosological 
account of theology as the Queen is not straightforwardly delineated and explicated in 
Bavinck’s works. Nevertheless, this Logos-Christological hallmark is implied and central, 
which can be deduced affirmatively for two reasons. First, as has been demonstrated in length 
above, the Logos affords the ontological foundation of the organic unity of science, which 
shapes the territory of the Queen. Second, we need to recall the revelationalism which is central 
to Bavinck’s scientific theology. Theology is grounded in God’s revelation, the centre and 
culmination of which is in Jesus Christ, the Logos, who ‘is the principium cognoscendi, in a 
general sense of all science, in a special sense, as Logos asarkos, of all knowledge of God, of 
religion and theology.’116 
The second point demonstrates that due to the bond between theology and the other 
sciences, the Logos establishes and sustains the Queenship of theology. In a special sense, the 
Logos asarkos enables theology alone to have God as its unique object. Hence, Bavinck 
maintains that ‘in the circle of the sciences, theology is entitled to the place of honour, not 
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because of the persons who practice it, but because of the object with which it is preoccupied; 
it is and remains––provided it is understood in a proper sense—the Queen of the sciences.’117 
Whilst arguing that God as its defining-object is determinative for theology as the Queen, 
Bavinck deploys the notion of Queenship to the differentiation between theology and the other 
sciences. He contends: 
[Theology] is the science, “the Queen of the sciences” (Regina Scientiarum). It 
stands highly above all sciences. For all these sciences only have a special field of 
creation as the object of their research. They make themselves preoccupied with 
the cosmos of the human beings, and thus associate all things with creatures. 
However, our science leaves them far behind itself, directing the eye of the creation 
to the Creator. Born from God, it has Him as the object. Just as other sciences have 
only one principle, so it also has only one, distinct and identifiable object, which is 
nothing other than God Himself, the Creator and Sustainer of all things, and claims 
the honour of theology in the circle of sciences.118 
Bavinck makes it clear that by having God as its unique object, theology differentiates itself 
from the other sciences in the circle of sciences. However, this particularity should be read 
together with the doctrine of creation. From the vantage point of God as the Creator and 
Sustainer, Bavinck asserts that all science is characterised as theological on the ground that all 
science is the inquiry into the created life and the cosmos and thus has its root in God 
Himself.119 
It is in this context that Bavinck argues that theology should imitate Christ to rule over 
the other sciences spiritually and morally.120 This gives rise to the question: How is theology’s 
spiritual and moral dominion actualised? Clearly, the block quote above has shown that the 
spiritual and moral reign is embodied in theology’s directing the other sciences to the Creator. 
Nonetheless, Bavinck is meticulous in explicating theology’s Queenship in reminding us of the 
differing roles of theology and Scripture. In the booklet that sets forth his proposal of the union 
of the Theological School in Kampen and the theological faculty of the Free University, while 
defending the independence of each science, Bavinck asserts that ‘Scripture but not theology 
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is the lamp for the foot of the other sciences. Theology has no right to prescribe the laws for 
the other, nor to rule over its sisters like a Queen.’121 On this score, it could be argued that 
Bavinck locates theology’s Queenship in its mediating Holy Scripture to the other sciences in 
terms of spirituality and morality. This mediation becomes vivid in Bavinck’s eschatological 
account of theology as the Regina scientiarum. 
B. The Eschatological Account 
Bavinck’s eschatological account of theology’s Queenship must follow the Logos-
Christological account. On the one hand, given the priority of Bavinck’s Trinitarian ontology, 
the latter lays the ontological foundation that makes possible the progress and development of 
all science towards the eschaton. On the other hand, the theological implication of the 
eschatological character of theology’s Queenship is rooted in Jesus Christ insofar as theology 
mediates Holy Scripture, which bears witness to the incarnate Logos, to the other sciences. 
In De Wetenschap der Heilige Godgeleerdheid (1883), Bavinck elaborates explicitly on 
the eschatological idiosyncrasy of theology’s Queenship. First of all, as has been demonstrated 
earlier, he argues that the scientificity and excellence of theology is mirrored in its dedication 
to the interpretation of the Word of God (the Logos) in order to find out what is hidden in Holy 
Scripture.122 Immediately following this argument, Bavinck offers a lengthy eschatological 
account of theology’s Queenship. 
Also in the goal that theology pursues, [theology’s] excellence surpasses the other 
sciences. As the principles and objects of differing sciences are lied in the creature, 
so are their standing point and goal. They have their destiny on this earth: they 
move within the finite; they do not go beyond time. However, theology, striving 
for far above all these particular ends, finds its end and standing point first in God. 
But so it should also be the Queen, leading all the particular ends towards and also 
finding their ultimate and highest end in Him, from whom and to whom all things 
are, for whose glorification everything must serve. The Queen that is also the 
prophetess points to a glorious prospect and the jubilee of a blessed future, to which 
it looks forward with full hope and desire. … Once [theology] leads all those who 
cherish it onto the glorious terrain, … [e]very distinction between the sacred and 
the profane, between the Church and the world is then cancelled. Now, this 
distinction must be preserved, and towards the other sciences theology is still 
bounded and well defined. Then, however, the ranking struggle of faculties has an 
end. There are no separate, no sacred and profane sciences anymore. Then, there is 
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only one holy, glorious science that is theology: knowing all things in God and of 
God in all things.123 
Three observations can be made here. First, the Queenship means that theology reminds the 
other sciences, which have finite goals, of the infinite goal that the end of science is in God. 
This gives rise to the question: How can theology share its infinite goal with the other sciences? 
The answer to this question is based on Bavinck’s conception of the organic unity of science. 
He avers elsewhere: 
All science is one … and science searches for the principle and the system that 
connects and supports all things. … Even those specialty sciences search for the 
principle and the system that must lie at the foundation of those special kinds of 
phenomena as well. They attempt, as it were, to uncover the basic idea, the life 
force of those phenomena, in order from that point of view to describe and 
illuminate everything belonging to a particular field, in order to know each thing 
not only in itself but also—and this too is required for genuine science in the light 
of, and in connection with, and from the standpoint of, the whole.124 
The idea of unity and diversity refers clearly to Bavinck’s organicism. Granted that creation is 
the organic unity that is grounded in the Trinity, all science is one in virtue of the fact that the 
created things as the investigated objects of sciences are united. The interconnectedness within 
the organism of science implies the mutual participation of sciences. Given the fourth principle 
of Bavinck’s organicism that the organism develops towards its own definite telos, the 
members of the organism of science participate into one goal that is the definite telos of the 
whole organism, that is, the doxological telos according to God’s revelation in Holy 
Scripture.125 In this light, the other sciences participate in their Queen’s telos. Theology is 
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established as ‘a mystical vision’ and ‘intensifies and concentrates the movement of knowing 
in which all the sciences share.’126 
The second aspect of the eschatological idiosyncrasy of theology’s Queenship indicates 
that theology’s reminder does not end until the eschaton. Bavinck’s comparison between “Now” 
and “Then” in the quotation above shows that the Queen’s reminder is something that continues 
to be practised until its completion at the eschaton. This is because ‘knowing all things in God 
and of God in all things’ cannot be actualised in the temporal world. By arguing such, Bavinck 
seems to echo Isaiah’s description of the eschatological image on the Lord’s holy mountain: 
‘for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the LORD as the waters cover the sea’ (Isaiah 
11:9; NRSV). On the other hand, to contrast “Now” with “Then” unveils the fact that we can 
have a glance into what the other sciences ultimately hope for and will finally come to pass at 
the eschaton. As such, Wolter Huttinga puts it well: ‘[Theology] should be called the 
eschatology or telos of the sciences. Science, realizing itself in the deepest and fulfilled sense, 
becomes theology.’127 This also explains why Bavinck argues that ‘there is only one holy, 
glorious science that is theology’ at the eschaton. By doing so, Bavinck maintains a critical 
distance from Kuyper’s view of two kinds of science––the regenerate and the unregenerate––
which, borrowing Gordon Graham’s language, ‘implies some sort of academic apartheid.’128 
Furthermore, theology’s continuing reminder strengthens its affinity with the other sciences. 
In this regard, Bavinck’s discourse is moving: ‘Theology is not the enemy of any one science. 
In its independence, it recognises and honours them all, and gratefully makes use of them for 
its own development, and with sisterly affection, it wants to be a blessing to them all.’129 
Third, in approaching the eschaton, theology is responsible for serving the progression of 
all science towards the infinite glorious goal. In the block quote above, Bavinck adds that 
theology’s Queenship needs to be qualified by the identity of theology as the prophetess that 
‘points to a glorious prospect and the jubilee of a blessed future’ for the other sciences that are 
moving within the finite. To speak in the organic language, the organism of science can 
continue to develop and expand towards the proper eschatological goal only under the 
guidance of theology.  
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If we read the third point along with Bavinck’s De algemeene genade (Common Grace) 
(1894), it can be seen that theology’s Queenship serves as part of God’s common grace. 
Bavinck insists that, due to divine love and compassion, common grace is bestowed to restrain 
sin and sustain good. ‘All that is good and true has its origin in this grace, including the good 
we see in fallen man. … The spirit of God makes its home and works in all the creation. … 
The arts and sciences are good, useful, and of great value.’130 On the one hand, the progression 
of all science is sustained by God’s common grace. On the other hand, we discern that in the 
locus of common grace that science is married with the operation of the Holy Spirit. In fact, 
Bavinck’s view has already taken the root in his Trinitarian creational ontology. He also argues 
elsewhere that ‘an operation of God’s Spirit and of his common grace is discernible … in 
science.’131 In this sense, theology’s Queenship is destined by the Triune God and actualised 
by the Spirit’s operation as a component of common grace. 
Combined with the Logos-Christological account of theology’s Queenship, Bavinck 
forms a Spirit-Logos model––which is also present in Bavinck’s articulation of organically 
critical realism––to justify theology’s service to the progression of all science towards the 
aforementioned glorious goal.132 The Holy Spirit is the driving force of the organism of science 
as that of organically scientific theology. For Bavinck, as has been demonstrated, theology as 
a science is the work of the Triune God who grants the theologian special grace; meanwhile, 
theology as a science cannot dispense with the operation of the Spirit in the world by common 
grace. Hence, theology’s Queenship embodies in its service of leading the other sciences into 
divine grace until the eschaton. As Bavinck contends in the elaboration on the theology of 
common grace, 
Theology’s honor is not that she sits enthroned above them as Regina scientiarum 
[Queen of the sciences] and waves her scepter over them but that she is permitted 
to serve them all with her gifts. Theology also can rule only by serving. She is 
strong when she is weak; she is greatest when she seeks to be least. She can be 
glorious when she seeks to know nothing save Christ and him crucified. Theology 
is ultimately nothing other than [the] interpretation of the gratia Dei [grace of God] 
in the arena of science.133 
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C. Summary 
While arguing for theology as the Queen of the sciences, Bavinck takes a differing 
approach to that of the Medieval Christianity. Rather than considering the other sciences as 
handmaidens, Bavinck argues that theology should cherish them as its sisters. According to 
him, this innovative idea of theology as the Queen of the sciences is characterised as Logos-
Christological, and eschatological. These two hallmarks are correlative in such a way that the 
eschatological is the extension of and supplement to the Logos-Christological. The latter lays 
the ontological foundation of the organic unity of science by virtue of the fact that Bavinck’s 
Trinitarian creational ontology determines the priority of ontology over epistemology. Other 
than the ontological significance, the Logos-Christological idiosyncrasy is indicative of 
theology’s spiritual and moral reign over the other sciences, which is embodied in the threefold 
aspect of the eschatological peculiarity of theology’s Queenship that is essentially related to its 
commitment to the interpretation of the word of God. Therefore, Bavinck’s articulation of the 
relationship between theology and the other sciences is fundamentally Christological.  
By the idea of Queenship, Bavinck delineates a kingdom of science, in which the Queen 
leads the other sciences to achieve divine glorification by mediating Holy Scripture to them. In 
this sense, to speak in Gregory’s language, theology must be ‘the assumed’ in order to gain 
‘the healed.’ That is, inasmuch as the other sciences are united with theology, they are saved 
in the sense that they attain their ultimate and infinite foundation. ‘And for that reason theology 
and dogmatics do not belong … in a church seminary, but in the university of the sciences 
(universitas scientiarum).’134 
It is worth noting that the affinity of theology and the other sciences, which is established 
by theology’s Queenship, cannot get rid of the vitality of the practitioner of science. As has 
been demonstrated earlier, Bavinck’s ideas of sphere sovereignty and theological 
encyclopaedia manifest his emphasis on the human agent in scientific activities. In this light, 
the practitioner of scientific theology is indispensable to the Queen as it mediates Holy 
Scripture to the other sciences. Otherwise, human ontology would be subject to scientific 
epistemology insofar as the mediation of Holy Scripture to the other sciences has nothing to do 
with the being of humans. On this score, Sutanto seems ambiguous in arguing that ‘the 
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principia of all of the sciences are found in Scripture and its content.’135 He finds supportive 
words in Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics: ‘Scripture has much to say also to the other sciences. 
It is a light on our path and a lamp for our feet, also with respect to science and art. … At every 
moment science and art come into contact with Scripture; the primary principles [principia] 
for all of life are given us in Scripture.’136 However, Sutanto does not explain how the principia 
in Scripture are given to human beings. In this regard, Bavinck’s disagreement with Kuyper in 
the notion of sphere sovereignty––that is, Bavinck’s emphasis on the human agent’s obedience 
to the sovereignty of science––can be used to fill in Sutanto’s omission. That is, these principia 
are mediated to the life of science via the agency of the practitioner of science.137 This point of 
view fits in well with the immediate context of Sutanto’s quotation in Reformed Dogmatics. In 
the paragraphs after this quotation, Bavinck explicitly relates the given principia to the being 
of humans. Having demonstrated that Jesus Christ came not for science but for saving human 
beings, Bavinck contends: 
[Scripture] too is religious through and through, the word of God unto salvation, 
but for that very reason a word for family and society, for science and art. Scripture 
is a book for the whole of humankind in all its ranks and classes, in all its 
generations and peoples. But for that very reason too it is not a scientific book in 
the strict sense. Wisdom, not learning, speaks in it. It does not speak the exact 
language of science and the academy but the language of observation and daily 
life.138 
Accordingly, Bavinck’s stance is that grounded in the salvation of Jesus Christ, the principia 
of Scripture for science were given through the being of the scientific theologian, which has 
been transformed by the religious Scripture. Following this, the affinity between Bavinck’s 
middle way between Kuyper and Lindeboom and Bavinck’s view of theology’s Queenship 
comes to the fore under the auspices of Jesus Christ. They together show that a scientific 
theologian who is transformed by God’s grace in Jesus Christ is enthusiastic about interpreting 
the grace of God in the arena of science. They together show that a genuine scientific theologian 
cannot be a separatist due to the belief that his mediation of the principia of Scripture to the 
other sciences will finally lead them to behold God’s glory in eternity. By doing so, the spiritual 
 
135 Sutanto, God and Knowledge, 65. 
136 RD, 1:445; GD, 1:416; Sutanto’s quotation is much longer, see Sutanto, God and Knowledge, 65-66. 
137 Indeed, Sutanto perceives the correlation between ontology and epistemology in Bavinck’s system; see 
Sutanto, God and Knowledge, 100. However, he seems not to pay close heed to the priority of ontology over 
epistemology in his doctoral thesis. 
138 RD, 1:445; GD, 1:417. 
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and moral reign of the Queen is concretised in the scientific theologian’s life that engages in 
the other sciences. 
V. Conclusion 
The Kuyper-Lindeboom debates on the ideas of sphere sovereignty and theological 
encyclopaedia shed light on the context wherein Bavinck’s belief that theology must be related 
to the other sciences was shaped. Granted that Bavinck sought intentionally to protect the union 
of the Reformed churches achieved in 1892 from these serious debates, his via media is not 
merely contextually determined but also rooted in his scientific theology. The previous 
chapters have painstakingly demonstrated that Bavinck by no means thinks of scientific 
theology as insular. The grammar of scientific theology manifests its responsibility to reach 
out. In this light, the meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s thought through the lens of 
scientific theology is embedded with a public hallmark. That is, the meta-paradigm of scientific 
theology is inevitable to deal with theology’s engagement with the other sciences and 
theology’s place in the academy. 
Like Kuyper, Bavinck holds fast to the sovereignty of science and theological 
encyclopaedia, to the extent that Lindeboom’s separatist stance is repudiated in their arguments. 
However, unlike Kuyper, Bavinck stresses the connection between the institutional church and 
scientific theology for the sake of the role that the theologian plays in the practice of scientific 
theology. Taken together, these two facets mean that, in Gregory’s language, theology must be 
‘the assumed’, that is, being related to the institutional church but existing in the academy. 
With Bavinck’s middle way in mind, it can be argued that “the assumed is the healed” is 
characteristic of Bavinck’s notion of theology as the Queen of the sciences. Theology’s 
Queenship is first Logos-Christological and then eschatological. Like the servant Christ’s 
spiritual and moral dominion, theology is the Queen that serves to lead the other sciences via 
the agency of the scientific theologian to go beyond the finite to attain divine glorification. As 
the servant, the Queen needs to be incarnate in the circle of science, as Christ the King was 
and continues to be incarnate among humans who need to be healed. Since what is united with 
God is being saved, the science that is united with theology is being healed and led to the 
glorious eschaton. 
This chapter has shown and explicated Bavinck’s Christological approach to articulating 
the relationship between theology and the other sciences. However, due to the focus on 
theology’s Queenship per se in Bavinck’s own context, it does not explore whether scientific 
theology can be relevant in the current day. Therefore, the following chapter will explore a 
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Bavinckian way to practise scientific theology in the contemporary university in view of 
theology as the Queen of the sciences. 
194 
Chapter 7 A Bavinckian Approach to Scientific Theology in the University of the 
Twenty-First Century 
Once [theology] leads all those that cherish it into the glorious territory, … there is 
only one holy, glorious science that is theology: knowing all things in God and of 
God in all things.1 
Herman Bavinck 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we have explored Bavinck’s notion of theology as the wetenschap of 
God, following which an attempt was made to work out the singular Trinitarian grammar of 
Bavinck’s scientific theology. Thereby, the meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s system 
through the lens of scientific theology has been constructed. By doing so, we have seen the 
emergence of Bavinck’s view of the identity of the Trinitarian theologian who elaborates on 
the scientific nature of theology in the modern world. This system of scientific theology 
unavoidably has to wrestle with the challenges both to the place of theology in the university 
and to the affinity between theology and the institutional church. Chapter 6 has analysed 
Bavinck’s stance on where theology belongs in view of his immediate contextual issues (the 
Kuyper-Lindeboom debates). As has been stated at the outset, this study leads to a relevant 
promise, that is, appropriating Bavinck’s thinking to benefit the contemporary theological 
agenda. This chapter is intended to deploy Bavinck’s theological insights to the articulation of 
the scientific integrity of theology in the contemporary university. What Bavinck has 
confronted in the nineteenth century––the attempt to subordinate theology to religious science 
and natural science––remains the same and even becomes more severe in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. This chapter’s purpose is to respond the contemporary challenge to 
theology––that is, theology is under the threat of being assimilated into the humanities, social 
sciences, and religious studies. Moreover, the now commonplace view in support of alleged 
academic neutrality heightens the challenge in such a way that university theologians are 
required to ignore their confessional faith when setting about theological studies. Therefore, 
this chapter seeks to articulate a Bavinckian account of confessional scientific theology in the 
university of the twenty-first century. 
Based on the observations made in the previous chapters, this chapter shall put forward 
three suggestions for the contemporary university theologian. (1) The wetenschappelijke 
 
1 WHG, 48-49. 
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theologian should be humble yet courageous. (2) At root, the question on theology’s place in 
the university should be considered as ontological, more so than epistemological. (3) Bavinck’s 
viewpoint that theology’s Queenship is moral and spiritual leads to a corollary that theological 
ethics can be used as a point of contact between theology and the other sciences. In what 
follows, I will first take a survey of the history of theology in the university. Then, the three 
suggestions will be elucidated. 
II. The Queen Being Dethroned: A Historical Survey of Theology in the University 
Any study on the university cannot ignore the history of the university. This is because what is 
at issue in the contemporary era does not emerge ex nihilo. The potentiality of the emergence 
of the issues in the university has already come to pass in history. So is the debate on theology’s 
place in the contemporary university. 
A. The Honoured Queen 
On the matter of the place of theology in the university, relevant historical ressourcement 
needs to start with the twelfth century, when and after which the first universities (the 
University of Bologna as the very first) came into existence. The emergence of the university 
was the consequence of the development of both Medieval education and Christianity. In the 
course of the shift from the ancient to the medieval world, an adjustment was made on ‘classical 
education principles and existing courses of study’, in order to meet the needs of the Medieval 
church.2 R. I. Moore’s study shows that the Church of the twelfth century encountered serious 
heretics, for example, Eon de l’Etoile (d. 1150), who destroyed the monasteries in Brittany and 
laid claim to being the one who came to judge the quick and the dead.3 It goes beyond the doubt 
that the defence of doctrinal orthodoxy at the time warranted the development of theological 
education leaning in a polemical and speculative direction.4 
Of the first universities, the University of Paris was the most prominent.5 The prominence 
of the University was associated with the rise of the city. At the turn of the eleventh century, 
Paris gained increasing commercial and political status in Europe, which facilitated the 
 
2 G. R. Evans, Old Arts and New Theology: The Beginnings of Theology as an Academic Discipline (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1980), 3. Evans points out another adjustment ‘the freemasonry of culture’ came to the end (1). 
3 R. I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Authority and Deviance in Western Europe 950-
1250, 2nd ed. (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 23-25. 
4 Spencer E. Young, “Queen of the Faculties: Theology and Theologians at the University pf Paris, c. 1215 
0 c. 1250” (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2009), 20-22. 
5 Hastings Rashdall pays it a great compliment: ‘The University [of Paris], no less than the Roman Church 
and the feudal Hierarchy headed by the Roman Emperor, represents an attempt to realise in concrete form 
an ideal of life in one of its aspects.’ Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages: 
Volume 1: Salerno, Bologna, Paris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5. 
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development of local education, drawing a large number of students from other countries who 
came to study in Paris. The liberal arts became preliminary for the study of theology in the 
twelfth century. Around the turn of the twelfth century, more than 10% of the Parisian 
population were students, who could be deemed as a distinct social group. In this sense, the 
emergence of the university was the consequence of social changes. Specifically, like other 
social guilds or unions, ‘the university developed to protect the collective interest of one group 
of people against other forces in society.’6 It should be noted that in the University, there were 
various communities that consisted of masters and their students. Each student was attracted 
by and consequently followed one particular master. 
With an eye to this thesis, however, what is more noteworthy is that the University of 
Paris was the first one that established a faculty of theology. The institutionalisation of the 
University was, however, not yet accomplished until the enaction of the Papal Bull Parens 
scientiarum (1231). 7  This Bull endowed the University of Paris with several significant 
privileges, whereby the university was entitled to enact its own statutes. This authority 
promoted the organisation of the faculties of the University. In 1252, the theological faculty as 
one of the higher faculties had its own right to admit students to the degree of master.8 Thereby, 
Paris became the seat and heart of theological studies; the University of Paris took the first and 
the most important step in shaping theology as an academic discipline. That is to say, the 
analysis of the theology’s position in the contemporary university, which is to practise 
wetenschap (scientia), cannot break away from the Medieval origin. 
The term “Reformation” connotes the desire to pursue something better. For the Protestant 
Reformers, this desire ranged over the intellectual, which involved with not only doctrinal 
purity but also godly learning. This was salient in the Reformed circle. As Yudha Thianto 
observes, ‘Reformed education in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries always took 
into consideration the integration of the knowledge of the content of the Christian faith and the 
knowledge of the world surrounding believers.’9 This intention was intrinsic to the education 
institutions at the time, albeit the fact that there might be some tensions. For example, in 
 
6 Anders Piltz, The World of Medieval Learning, trans. David Jones (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 126-
128; also see Helene Wieruszowski, The Medieval University: Masters, Students, Learning (Princeton: D. 
Van Nostrand Company, 1966), 27-38. 
7 Further on Parens scientiarum, see Ian P. Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: Theologians and 
the University c. 1100-1330 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 104-110. 
8 Piltz, The World of Medieval Learning, 135-137. 
9 Yudha Thianto, “Reformed Education from Geneva through the Netherlands to the East Indies,” in Church 
and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a 
Theological Tradition, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, David S. Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 491. 
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Geneva, the Academy was founded with double task. While Calvin considered that the 
Academy’s principal purpose is to train learned ministers, the Genevans expected to advance 
the local education in a full-scale way.10 Notwithstanding these two differing purposes of the 
Geneva Academy, the Academy indeed improved the local education.11 This can be evidenced 
by the career prospects of students at the Geneva Academy from 1591 to 1599, as the table 
below shows. 
Years Minister/Professor Civil Service Lawyer Noble Not known 
1591 2 1 0 0 0 
1592 14 9 1 1 12 
1593 7 12 1 6 15 
1594 10 11 1 11 11 
1595 9 13 0 1 7 
1596 19 12 1 2 2 
1597 31 28 2 15 0 
1598 20 10 2 9 18 
1599 24 8 0 3 12 
Table 3: Students’ later career, 1591-9912 
The Protestant Reformation’s contribution to general education should not overshadow 
its pastoral purpose. In order to train learned minsters of the future generations, the Protestant 
churches laid emphasis on the confessional character of education, which was characteristic of 
Protestant higher education. 
If the Medieval age can be seen as the age of faith, indicating that the theology of the time 
was superior to the other sciences and championed as the Queen of the sciences, 13  the 
Protestant Reformation still safeguarded the honourable place of theological training in the 
academy. ‘In Reformed and Lutheran territories, older universities were transformed, new 
universities and academies were created, and while the curricula in the humanities in particular 
 
10 Karin Maag, Seminary or University? The Genevan Academy and Reformed Higher Education, 1560-
1620 (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1995), 9. Hence, Michael Mullett is wrong by saying that the Genevan 
Academy had ‘a single-minded purpose, training ministers for the Reformed Churches, above all for 
congregations of France.’ Michael A. Mullett, John Calvin (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 213. 
11 For instance, after Theodore Beza (1519-1605) succeeded Calvin’s position, the civil authorities make 
more investment into the Academy so as to promote the teaching of law at the schola publica; Maag, 
Seminary or University?, 23-27. 
12 Stelling-Michaud, 1959-1980, Le Livre du Recteur de l’Académie de Genève, cited in Maag, Seminary or 
University?, 84. Stelling-Michaud also provides the statistics of medical doctor, merchant/artisan, died 
young and military. 
13 Chapter one, III.B.a. 
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followed traditional models, these Protestant institutions did innovate in terms of the academic 
subjects and practical training considered vital for future pastors.’14 This observation strongly 
combats Brad Gregory’s provocative claim that the Reformation derived to the secularity of 
the knowledge in the contemporary Western World.15 In any case, the Reformation retained 
the Medieval honour (not hegemony) for theology and meanwhile improved the education of 
the populace.  
B. The Enlightened Humans, the Humiliated Queen 
Theology as a scientia and its honourable status continued in the post-Reformation era.16 
However, with Kant’s concluding observation (Sapere aude) on the Enlightenment, the 
dramatic change of the scientific status of theology was declared to be true.17 Human courage 
to use understanding without the guidance from another determines the destiny of theology to 
be examined under the authority of human reason regardless of the given divine revelation. 
Kant’s Der Streit der Fakultäten (1798) epitomises theology in the university that was 
under the sway of the Enlightenment. Kant regarded the faculty of theology from a political 
perspective. He asserted that the three higher faculties (theology, law, medicine) were 
established for the end of the government.18 This politically-oriented function of the higher 
faculties fell short of the freedom of human reason. Viewed as such, the philosophical faculty 
at the university was necessitated insofar as this lower faculty was genuinely politically 
independent and exhibits free human reason. 
It is absolutely essential that the learned community at the university also contain 
a faculty that is independent of the government's command with regard to its 
teachings; one that, having no commands to give, is free to evaluate everything, 
and concerns itself with the interests of the sciences, that is, with truth: one in which 
reason is authorized to speak out publicly. For without a faculty of this kind, the 
truth would not come to light (and this would be to the government's own 
 
14 Karin Maag, “The Reformation and Higher Education,” in Protestantism after 500 Years, ed. Thomas 
Albert Howard and Mark A. Noll (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 127-128. 
15  Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 299, 304. Another two features of the knowledge in the 
Western world today are specialisation and segmentation, and ‘the separability from the rest of the life.’ 
Goroncy responds potently that the Reformers did not bring about the secularity of knowledge, but cultivated 
the Christian concern of ‘nonecclesial vocations’; Jason Goroncy, “Reformation and Secularity,” Journal of 
Reformed Theology 12 (2018): 7. 
16  See chapter 1, III.B.a; also see Zachary Purvis, Theology and the University in Nineteenth-Century 
Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 29. 
17 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784),” in Practical Philosophy, 
ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 17. 
18 Immanuel Kant, “The Conflict of the Faculties (1798),” in Religion and Rational Theology, ed. and trans. 
Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 250. 
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detriment); but reason is by its nature free and admits of no command to hold 
something as true (no imperative "Believe!" but only a free credo).19 
Following this, Kant criticised the faculty of theology on the grounds that the theologian 
infused Holy Scripture with the faith of the church, which was grounded ‘on laws proceeding 
from another person’s act of choice.’ Such a biblical theologian differed from the rational 
theologian who undertook the exegesis of Scripture according to inner laws embedded in 
human reason. In this light, the rational theologian infused human reason with religious faith.20 
The difference drawn by Kant between a biblical theologian and a rational theologian was 
contingent upon his definition of religion: ‘for religion is not the sum of certain teachings 
regarded as divine revelations (that is called theology), but the sum of all our duties regarded 
as divine commands (and, on the subject's part, the maxim of fulfilling them as such).’21 
Therefore, Kant drew a conclusion that philosophy was eligible and legitimate to lay claim to 
‘the prerogative of deciding [the] meaning’ of scriptural texts.22 
Whilst upholding the faculty of philosophy, Kant came up with a defiant question on the 
Medieval slogan “theology as the Queen of sciences”. ‘We can also grant the theology faculty’s 
proud claim that the philosophy faculty is its handmaid,’ Kant argued, ‘though the question 
remains, whether the servant carries her lady’s torch before or her train behind.’23 Apparently, 
for Kant, the faculty of philosophy as the handmaid was to carry the torch of theology before. 
The Queen was humiliated since she was blind to truth. The handmaid needed to hold the torch 
and walk before the Queen so as to light up the path to truth. 
Arguing from the political autonomy to the rational autonomy of the faculty of philosophy, 
Kant emphasised the attempt to establish philosophy and autonomous inquiry as the governing 
principle in the university. Applying Kant’s rationale broadly, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-
1835) stressed that the university as the higher scientific institution could not achieve its 
purpose unless it held fast to ‘the pure idea of Wissenschaft’, namely that solitude (Einsamkeit) 
and freedom (Freiheit) make up of the principles.24 By arguing so, Humboldt categorically 
 
19 Ibid., 249. 
20 Ibid., 262. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 264. 
23 Ibid., 255; emphasis original. 
24  Wilhelm von Humboldt, “Über die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen 
Anstalten in Berlin,” in Die Idee der deutschen Universität. Die fünf Grundschriften aus der Zeit ihrer 
Neubegründung durch klassischen Idealismus und romantischen Realismus, ed. Ernst Anrich (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956), 377. On von Humboldt’s view of the faculty of philosophy and 
his role in the University of Berlin, see Thomas Albert Howard, Protestant Theology and the Making of the 
Modern German University (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 151-155; Purvis, Theology and the 
University in Nineteenth-Century Germany, 122-124. 
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took issue with the alleged Queenship of theology, and repudiated any attempt to set scientific 
inquiry in the bondage of theology. 
As with Humboldt, Schleiermacher was not immune to Kant’s influence. Thomas Howard 
puts it well in claiming that, ‘Schleiermacher offered the most constructive vision of the 
theological faculty, traditionalist in some respects, but also intimately tied to the new ethos of 
Wissenschaft and to a regard of the philosophical faculty similar to Kant’s.’25 Schleiermacher 
laid emphasis on the unity of knowledge as the essence of the university and the idea of 
Wissenschaft. 26  In this united system of knowledge, he afforded philosophy rather than 
theology the prominent place, thus arguing that the philosophical faculty should be put at the 
first place in the university.27 Schleiermacher construed the reason to uphold the prominence 
of the philosophical faculty as follows:  
Therefore, [the philosophical faculty] is still primary because everyone must 
recognise and admit its independence that, as soon as one sees over from a 
particular external relationship, it will not be able to disintegrate and dissolve in 
diverse dissimilar ways like the [other faculties]. Therefore, it is also primary and 
actually the Mistress of all others, since all members of the university, to whatever 
faculties they belong, have to be rooted in [the philosophical faculty] deeply.28 
Schleiermacher made it clear that the prominence of the philosophical faculty was derived from 
its function as the sustainer of the independence of scientific inquiry. 
It should be conceded that Schleiermacher and his colleagues alike sought to defend the 
place of theology in the university. Nonetheless, their efforts in essence oppose the honourable 
place of theology, let alone the Medieval insistence on the Queenship of theology. This 
idiosyncrasy resonates with the characteristic feature of the general development of the 
 
25 Howard, Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University, 155. 
26 Friedrich Schleiermacher, “Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn. Nebst einem 
Anhang über eine neu zu errichtende,” in Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: Universitätsschriften; 
Herakleitos; Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums, ed. Dirk Schmid, Friedrich Daniel Ernst 
Schleiermacher: Kritische Gesamtausgabe: Abt. 1., Schriften und Entwürfe, vol. 6 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1998), 35. 
27 Ibid., 55. 
28 Ibid., 56. German original: ‘Sie ist doch die Erste deshalb, weil Jedermann ihre Selbstständigkeit einsehen 
und gestehen muß, daß sie nicht wie die übrigen, sobald man von einer bestimmten äußeren Beziehung 
hinwegsieht, in ein ungleichartiges mannigfaltiges zerfällt und aufgelöst werden kann. Sie ist auch deshalb 
die Erste und in der That Herrin aller übrigen, weil alle Mitglieder der Universität, zu welcher Facultät sie 
auch gehören, in ihr müssen eingewurzelt sein.’  
This does not mean that, as a prince of the church, Schleiermacher deprived the church of its eligibility 
to practice theology. As Purvis remarks, ‘[i]n the modern world, Schleiermacher reckoned, theology had to 
shift some of its focus from ecclesial traditions to “the spirit of Wissenschaft”. Yet this shift in orientation 
was not a turn entirely away from the church, but rather a combining of theology’s ecclesial interests with 
scientific ones.’ Purvis, Theology and the University in Nineteenth-Century Germany, 132-133. 
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university in the modern world. All disciplines of the university should be practised in the ethos 
of critical inquiry.29 By this, the Queen was humiliated by her Enlightened subjects. 
C. The Stubborn Queen 
It was in the age of the humiliated Queen that Bavinck diligently constructed his scientific 
theology. If we attempt to appropriate Bavinck’s thought to work out a Bavinckian way to 
defend the scientificity of theology in the contemporary university, the status quo of the 
humiliated Queen in the contemporary world should be taken into account. In the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, the Queen is not merely humiliated. Rather, she is stubborn in that 
numerous theologians strive to make out a case for its legitimacy in the university in 
confrontation with the challenges of other disciplines. 
One recent defence of theology’s place in the university comes from Denys Turner. His 
intention is to illustrate how theology should be practised in the university in view of the 
challenges of religious studies. Turner’s argument is registered on the basis of two rationales. 
First, theology can be undertaken provided that the scholar has ‘credally and Ecclesially 
interested spirit.’30 Second, religious studies refers to ‘a theoretical discipline with no existence 
outside places of learning, a discipline defined not so much by its method as by its object––the 
religions of the world.’31 
With these two principles in mind, Turner moves on to elaborate on the difference 
between theology and religion. He argues that inasmuch as theology is the study of God (‘how 
to talk about God’ and ‘how God talks’), it cannot be restrained by ‘subject-neutral terms’ but 
makes use of ‘subject-specific terms.’32  By contrast, as ‘the theorised object’, religion is 
something that we can study.33 In this regard, Turner casts religious studies into doubt due to 
the vagueness of its criteria and scope, namely, the shortage of a standard conception of 
religion.34 This means that the object in religious studies is not clear and even obscure. 
 
29 As Howard remarks, ‘the development of Protestant university theology from an apologetic, praxis-
oriented, confessional enterprise in the post-Reformation period to one increasingly ‘liberal’, expressive of 
the ethos of modern critical knowledge, or Wissenschaft.’ Howard, Protestant Theology and the Making of 
the Modern German University, 7. 
30 Denys Turner, “Doing Theology in the University,” in Fields of Faith: Theology and Religious Studies 
for Twenty-First Century, ed. David F. Ford, Ben Quash, and Janet Martin Soskice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 25. 
31 Ibid., 25. 
32 Ibid., 26, 28. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 28-30. Turner recognises that to describe some commonalities of various religions is of significance 
to religious studies. However, he judges that such a methodology fails to entail a standard definition of 
religion. 
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Turner’s comparison underscores God as the specific object of theology. This means that 
theology is more eligible to be practised in the university than religious studies. This claim 
relies upon Turner’s idea of university. He contends that 
universities ought to be still what they were in their medieval origins, places of 
disputation, and that whatever else they do, it is their business to do it by means of 
argument. In which case, the quality of the work they do will consist, still today as 
then, in the quality of the questions they ask and in the general strategy of calling 
every answer back to the question it is an answer to, and so to the possibility of 
rival answers. And that precisely is the reason why any university should want to 
have in its midst the presence of theologians: for the ‘Religious Studies’ people ask 
only the same old sorts of questions that anthropologists, or psychologists, or 
historians, or sociologists ask, as it happens about religions, whatever we decide 
they are.35 
In this light, Turner justifies the place of theology in the university on the ground that theology 
is more eligible in disputation and argument than religious studies due to theology’s specific 
object––God. Therefore, he uses ‘the family of theologians’ as the referent of university 
theologians: ‘it is the kinship of those who occupy the common territory of theological 
disagreement, of those who know how to disagree about God.’36 
Turner’s strategy of argumentation is astute. He recognises the Department of Religious 
Studies and the Department of Theology and Religious Studies in many universities. If 
religious studies legitimately occupies a position in the university, theology that is more 
competent in disputation accords much more with the spirit of the university. Consequently, it 
is reasonable for theology to be practised in the university. 
The Roman Catholic theologian Gavin D’Costa furnishes a different approach to the 
justification of theology in the university, in the context of modern British and American 
universities. D’Costa begins his argument from the status quo of contemporary theology, which 
he describes as ‘Theology’s Babylonian Captivity in the Modern University.’37 In taking a 
survey of the development of the university and theology therein, D’Costa makes one 
significant observation that the encyclopaedic tradition of previous centuries signifies ‘the 
Oedipal configuration between theology and religious studies’, which means religious studies, 
on the one hand, ‘claim[s] Enlightenment privileges and sought to exclude theology from the 
university’, and on the other hand, ‘cohabit[s] the academic territory with theology.’ 38 
 
35 Ibid., 36-37. 
36 Ibid., 34. Emphasis added. 
37 Gavin D’Costa, Theology in the Public Square: Church, Academy, and Nation (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 
chapter 1. 
38 Ibid., 6, 20, 31-32. 
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However, it was the Enlightenment that caused a revolution in the study of theology in the 
university that led to religious studies and its “Oedipal” relationship to theology. First, theology 
and the contemporary university live in the shadow of the Enlightenment and the secularisation 
it evoked. Second, the exploration on a new type of university is underdeveloped. On the one 
side, ‘with funding ever tighter and a market-led economy becoming pervasive … the Arts are 
seen increasingly as a luxury.’ On the other side, ‘the instrumentalist culture of modernity and 
the fragmentation of the disciplines’ result in the fact that theology seems to lose its 
independence, and that its relationship to other disciplines remains to be explored; so does its 
relationship to religious studies.39 Meanwhile, this also indicates the possibility for theology to 
act in self-defence. 
D’Costa’s response to the shadow of the Enlightenment is to evoke the ideal of the 
Medieval university. He suggests establishing a Christian Catholic university where various 
disciplines are married.40 In such a Christian university, both theology––which ‘must function 
as a servant “queen of the sciences”’––and philosophy serve as the central discipline that aims 
at articulating holistic and unified Christian scholarship, which has nothing but the glory of 
God as its telos.41 Following this, he asserts that some basic theological and philosophical 
training should be compulsory for all academics regardless of disciplinary specialisation. 
Similarly, all theologians should acquire some elementary knowledge of the other sciences in 
order to make their contribution to the Catholic university.42 To D’Costa, the centrality of 
theology in the university is of considerable significance when wrestling with the tension 
between theology and religious studies. He comes up with the idea of “theological religious 
studies”, that is, the theological assessment of the assertions raised in other religions.43 Viewed 
in this light, D’Costa attempts to avoid the Oedipal configuration between theology and 
religious studies, and intends to theologise religious studies in order that the latter can serve 
the former.44 Moreover, he is convinced that such a theological approach to religious studies is 
the true spirit of tolerance. ‘What is genuinely tolerant and pluralistic here is that the claims of 
 
39 Ibid., 17-18. 
40 Ibid., 183. 
41 Ibid., 184-193; also see Gavin D’Costa, “Theology and Religious Studies OR Theology versus Religious 
Studies?,” in Theology and Religious Studies in Higher Education: Global Perspectives, ed. Darlene L. Bird 
and Simon G. Smith (London: Continuum, 2009), 51. 
42 D’Costa, Theology in the Public Square, 194. 
43 Ibid., chapter 5. 
44 Ibid., x. In fact, this theological religious studies is part of D’Costa’s larger project of Christian university. 
He argues, ‘If the Christian university is worth its salt, it requires a transformation of the curriculum so that 
the Christian vision can illumine every aspect of created reality’ (216); emphasis added. 
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Others are taken with proper intellectual seriousness, rather than simply bracketed off or 
assimilated and assessed by disciplines alien to the religion making such claims.’45 
Clearly, D’Costa argues in a strongly Medieval tone. In his ideal Catholic university, 
theology occupies the very central position. Although he recognises that philosophy is crucial 
to the entire curriculum, philosophy’s mediatorship between theology and other disciplines 
evidences that philosophy serves for theology.46  In this light, it is not surprising that he 
describes theology as the servant Queen of the sciences yet also ‘a petulant interventionist’, 
who will intervenes by addressing the other disciplines when they ‘are [not] true to their 
subject.’47 
In summary, both Denys Turner and Gavin D’Costa seek to safeguard the position of 
theology in the university, doing so at a time in which from the Enlightenment onwards, the 
Queen is being dethroned without being utterly defeated. She is stubborn and seated in the 
academy. Hence, more efforts need to be made in order to fight back various challenges.48 A 
similarity between Turner and D’Costa is that both appeal to the Medieval university as the 
example for the contemporary university. In this sense, Bavinck takes a similar strategy since 
he appropriates the Medieval slogan “theology as the Queen of the sciences.” However, 
Bavinck does not simply speak of the university as the place of disputation and arguing, as it 
is portrayed by Turner. Bavinck’s attempts to enrich the Medieval slogan took place in the 
context of neo-Calvinism, as a movement that reformulated the Reformed faith in a clearly 
modern way––which might mean his account has untapped potential in the twenty-first century. 
On the other hand, notwithstanding that Bavinck would agree with D’Costa on theology as the 
servant Queen, Bavinck’s understanding of spiritual and moral Queenship necessarily rejects 
D’Costa’s version of theology’s very central place in the university. With the similarities and 
dissimilarties between Bavinck and Denys Turner and Gavin D’Costa, how can we appropriate 
Bavinck’s wetenschappelijke theology to develop a Bavinckian approach to the practice of 
scientific theology in the twentieth-first-century university? 
 
45 D’Costa, “Theology and Religious Studies OR Theology versus Religious Studies?,” 52. 
46 D’Costa, Theology in the Public Square, 192. 
47 Ibid., 194. 
48 This is reminiscent of other theologians’ effort, say, John Webster’s theological theology; John Webster, 
Theological Theology: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 27 October 1997 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).  
205 
III. A Bavinckian Account of a Contemporary University Theologian 
Whilst considering a Bavinckian argument for scientific theology in the context of the 
contemporary university, I would like to sum up three compelling points of Bavinck’s stance 
according to what has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, especially chapter six. While 
doing this, it should be acknowledged that these three observations does not exhaust Bavinck’s 
potential contributions to contemporary scholarship in this respect. Yet, I am convinced that 
the three principles belong to the sine qua non of the Bavinckian approach to university 
theology. 
A. To Be Humble yet Courageous 
In the analysis of Bavinck’s organically critical realism, it has been demonstrated that for 
Bavinck the dispensation of the Holy Spirit determines the humble character of the 
theologian.49 On the one hand, the theologian should critically receive Christian traditions and 
pursue fuller understanding of the Word of God. On the other hand, the theologian should be 
self-critical and humble since no theologian can fathom the truth of God. By the work of the 
Spirit, God continues to ignite more lights of truth among His people until the eschaton. 
According to Bavinck, this humble character is indispensable to practising theology 
scientifically (in the university).  
Given that theology is grounded in revelation, creation as God’s first revelation is of 
considerable importance for the development of theology. That being so, the interaction 
between theology and the other sciences, say natural science, will advance theological studies. 
In this light, the humble character refers not only to the theologian’s continuing obedience to 
the guidance of the Spirit in knowing special revelation, but also to listening to the findings of 
the other sciences carefully. After all, ‘Scripture but not theology is the lamp for the foot of the 
other sciences.’50 This means that the achievements of the other sciences can lend support to 
theological studies in such way that God’s revelation in Scripture will be unfolded more 
clearly.51 Thus, Bavinck contends in his later years that the theologian’s exegesis of Holy 
Scripture may need to be revised due to the new findings of the other sciences. ‘While the 
 
49 Chapter four, IV.B. 
50 Bavinck, Het Recht der Kerken en de Vrijheid der Wetenschap, 19. 
51 This can be seen in Bavinck’s appropriation of the findings of geology in his elaboration on creation: 
‘Geology, it must be said, may render excellent service to us in the interpretation of the creation story. … 
Scripture and theology have nothing to fear from the facts brought to light by geology and paleontology. 
The world, too, is a book whose pages have been inscribed by God’s almighty hand.’ (RD, 2:496); also see 
D. A. Young, “The Reception of Geology in the Dutch Reformed Tradition: The Case of Herman Bavinck 
(1854-1921),” in Geology and Religion: A History of Harmony and Hostility, ed. Martina Kölbl-Ebert 
(London: The Geological Society, 2009), 293-296. 
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trustworthy results of the new natural and historical science are irreconcilable with the ordinary 
exegesis of the biblical story of creation, it is necessary to review this exegesis particularly 
with respect to the time, duration and order of the work of creation.’52 Bavinck’s bold saying 
at the time should not be construed in the light of the conventional model of two Bavincks. The 
humble character of the scientific theologian suffices to display the underlying rationale of 
Bavinck’s assertion. Bavinck intends not to devalue Scripture, the external principium of 
theology. Rather, he appeals for the theologian’s self-critical study. 
To be humble is not to be timid in the sense that the theologian has to subordinate the 
principium cognoscendi externum of theology to the other sciences. According to Bavinck, 
sola Scriptura must be upheld in practising theology in the university.53 On this ground, he 
attempts to engage with the other sciences. At this point, Bavinck’s accent on courage, which 
is grounded in the theologian’s belief in Scripture and which the university theologian should 
have, comes to the fore. This courage can be spelled out by figuring out the following questions: 
How does the humble theologian argue courageously in the university? In what aspects the 
theologian should be courageous?  
a. The Humble yet Courageous Theologian: God-vision 
First, based on the eschatological account of the Queenship,54 the humble theologian 
should be courageous in that theology has a God-vision which helps orient the other sciences 
to the proper telos. The theocentric foundation of the theologian’s courage possesses double 
significance. In the first place, the other sciences perceive ‘the reality of an eternal and 
imperishable truth’ through the lens of theology that is devoted to the exegesis of the truth in 
the gospel. Bavinck argues that science originated not in Christianity but in Greek philosophy. 
In the course of history, science became practical and incapable of offering a unity and 
satisfying the human heart. By gospel, ‘an eternal, unquestionable and absolute truth’ was 
revealed in Jesus Christ. In other words, theology showcases ‘an objective reality, standing 
highly above but still attainable for humans. Thereby, science has been given a firm, solid and 
essential foundation.’55 With this in mind, the theologian should be confident and bold in 
 
52 Herman Bavinck, 'Als Bavinck nu maar eens kleur bekende': Aantekeningen van H. Bavinck over de zaak-
Netelenbos, het Schriftgezag en de situatie van de Gereformeerde Kerken (november 1919), ed. George 
Harinck, Cornelis van der Kooi, and J. Vree (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1994), 77. 
53 A helpful discussion on Bavinck and sola Scriptura, see Bruce Pass, “Upholding Sola Scriptura Today: 
Some Unturned Stones in Herman Bavinck's Doctrine of Inspiration,” International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 20, no. 4 (2018): 517-536. 
54 Chapter six, IV.B. 
55 CW, 96. 
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declaring something that is of the highest standing reality. This means that the theological 
faculty of university is organised on a different ground than the other faculties. For the 
theological faculty, it is abnormal to seek its justification as the other faculties do. This 
resonates with Barth’s insistence on the integrity of the theological faculty. 
Obviously, the existence of theology in the academy is not to be justified and 
established a priori but is only an emergency measure, a permanent exception to 
the rule, because the need will never be remedied. As such, however, the existence 
of theology is justified and established, as is the existence of the Church in society, 
out of a notion that is not its own. It is paradoxically but inevitably true that 
theology has no right to exist in the academy the way other sciences do. It is a 
completely unnecessary duplication of a few disciplines that belong to other 
faculties. A theological faculty has a reason to be in the academy only when it is 
charged with the task of expressing that which the others dare not say under the 
circumstances, or say it in a way that is not heard, or when it at least signals that 
such things must be said.56 
It is explicit that both Bavinck and Barth insist on a top-down approach to explicating the 
wetenschappelijke or wissenschaftliche nature of theology in the university. That is, the place 
of theology in the university is contingent upon its God-vision. This leads to the second 
significance of the theocentric foundation, which helps theology orient the other sciences to 
the telos. 
In the second place, the theocentric foundation of the theologian’s courage confirms the 
limits of the other sciences and the potential contribution that theology can make to the 
university. In other words, theology’s God-vision lays bare the impossibility that the other 
sciences can approach God by themselves. This impossibility is the causa finalis of the limits 
of the other sciences. To be sure, the second significance of the theocentric foundation 
safeguards the metaphysical foundation of all science, the shortage of which is, for Bavinck, 
the proof of the captivity of modern science to positivism.57 
Although positivism has been repudiated as the dominant account of reality in the 1950s 
and replaced by contextualist approach to scientific rationality, Bavinck’s view of the humble 
theologian’s courage is still telling in the twenty-first century. Nicholas Wolterstorff argues 
that the challenge to theology’s position in the contemporary university is triggered by the 
continuing ‘Enlightenment idea of the university’, which seeks to establish ‘generically human 
scholarship.’ According to this paradigm, the university’s academics and students should be 
indifferent to their own ‘beliefs, purposes, and affects.’ What they can use in the academy is 
 
56 Karl Barth, “The Word of God as the Task of Theology, 1922,” trans. Amy Marga, in The Word of God 
and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 181. 
57 Bavinck, “Religion and Theology,” 89-90. 
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their ‘indigenous, generically human hardwiring’, namely, their human perceptible, rational 
and memorial capacities. 58  In this sense, the contemporary university holds fast to 
anthropological optimism, which makes use of human indigenous capacities to overcome the 
limits of all wetenschap or Wissenschaft. Hence, Bavinck’s ideal of the humble yet courageous 
theologian has potential to combat such scholarly anthropocentrism. 
Bavinck’s ideal is resonant with the physicist William G. Pollard (1911-1989). Pollard 
contends for the limits of physics and all natural sciences alike, and recognises the necessity of 
studies that go beyond nature. 
When I am working or thinking as a physicist, I am automatically confined to 
objects or phenomena in three-dimensional space and time. Whatever reality 
transcendent to space and time there may be, I would not even know where to begin 
to observe or explore it by the methods of physics. The whole theoretical structure 
of modern physics is spatiotemporal. Every discovery of some new particle or anti 
particle or of some new phenomenon is a discovery of some aspect of nature 
previously unknown. … Science is by definition the study of nature. It possesses 
no means whatever of deciding either for or against any aspect of external reality 
which transcends the realm of nature. If the realm of supernature exists at all it 
must be known and experienced in ways which lie wholly outside the scope of 
science.59 
The theologian who gives credence to the existence of the supernatural realm should be 
courageous to speak of what goes beyond the borders of other disciplines in the university. 
This leads to the second significance of being a humble yet courageous theologian. 
b. The Humble yet Courageous Theologian: Interdisciplinary Interaction 
The humble theologian should be courageous to engage in interdisciplinary interaction. 
The university theologian cannot take a deistic attitude to stand far away from the other 
sciences while speaking of what is beyond their limits. Rather, the courage to speak of his own 
subject should go hand in hand with the humility required in order to converse with the other 
sciences.  
Despite of the shortage of the language “interdisciplinary” in Bavinck’s writings, talk of 
the courageous to be an interdisciplines-engaged theologian can be justified with recourse to 
Bavinck’s system. As has been argued earlier, Bavinck holds fast to the organic unity of 
 
58 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Public Theology or Christian Learning?,” in A Passion for God’s Reign: Theology, 
Christian Learning, and the Christian Self, ed. Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 81-83. 
59 William G. Pollard, “The Recovery of Theological Perspective in a Scientific Age,” in Religion and the 
University (Toranto: University of Toranto Press, 1964), 32-33; emphasis added. Similar statements can also 
been seen in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “Men Have Forgotten God,” National Review 35, no. 14 (1983): 872-
876. 
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science.60 ‘All science is one, just as the creation is one, and science searches for the principle 
and the system that connects and supports all things.’ 61  In this sense, the theologian’s 
interdisciplinary engagement evidences the personal faith in the goodness of God’s creation. 
Moreover, Bavinck stresses that theology and the other sciences alike have their own principles 
and objects.62 As the defamed (gesmaad) servant Queen, therefore, theology cannot impose 
coercion on the practice of the other sciences, which yields the possibility of the interaction 
between theology and the other sciences provided that theology does not knee before other 
disciplines to safeguard its own place.63 As such, it could be inferred that Bavinck’s thinking 
potentially recognises interdisciplinary interaction as a way to defend the servant Queenship 
of theology in the nineteenth-century academy and the contemporary university alike. 
Bavinck’s humble yet courageous theologian anticipates Stanley Grenz’s (1950-2005) 
idea of scientist theologian in the postmodern world. Concentrating on the relationship between 
theology and natural science in his Templeton lecture, Grenz seeks to address the question, 
‘how are theologians scientists?’, or ‘Why do theologians need to be scientists?’64 Having 
examined the sway of empirical science on theology from the seventeenth to twentieth 
centuries and the modern appropriation of the Medieval slogan “theology as the Queen of the 
sciences”, Grenz explores the postmodern paradigm of science as theology. He observes that 
the post-empirical philosophy of science developed in the twentieth century makes scientists 
resemble theologians. While scientists come up with proposed theories of reality, they need to 
believe the previously unknown aspects of reality that they discover now.65 ‘Theologians need 
to be scientists because scientists are theologians.’66 At this point, a similarity between Grenz 
and Bavinck comes to be seen. As noted in chapter three, Bavinck underscores faith as 
indispensable to all science. 67  Hence, the Bavinckian approach will endorse Grenz that 
theologians need to be scientists, and vice versa, in terms of the role of faith. 
The need of faith in both science and theology, for Grenz, displays the fact that theology 
and natural science ‘are of the same order.’ Moreover, it demonstrates the mysteriousness of 
the natural world, which means the cosmos still remains to be explored. ‘For this reason, in 
offering their models of the universe, scientists repeatedly cross over the boundaries that 
 
60 Chapter six, IV.B. 
61 PCDS, 93. 
62 WHG, 34. 
63 WHG, 33-35. 
64 Stanley J. Grenz, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?,” Zygon 35, no. 2 (2000): 332. 
65 Ibid., 345-348. Here Grenz draws on Peacocke, Intimations of Reality, 25. 
66 Grenz, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?,” 348. 
67 Chapter three, II.B. 
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traditionally divided their discipline from the realm of theologians. In essence, they become 
theologians.’68 In this sense, the language “theologian scientists” indicates the interdisciplinary 
interaction between theology and natural science. 
Grenz describes this interdisciplinary interaction as the cooperation of the theologian and 
the scientist to construct the world by their respective linguistic models. Both the theologian 
and the scientist expect others to inhabit this linguistically constructed universe.69 Following 
this, Grenz pinpoints the divergence of their linguistic models. He argues that ‘the objectivity 
of the world about which [the theologian] can truly speak is an objectivity of a future, 
eschatological world.’ Thus, the theologian is responsible for the interdisciplinary engagement 
in order to display ‘God’s own eschatological will for creation.’70 Moreover, the theologian’s 
linguistic model is fundamentally dependent upon the Logos, the Word, ‘the ordering principle 
of the cosmos as God intends it to be,’ and developed under the power of the Spirit.71 Grenz 
concludes his lecture with an observation on the nature of this interdisciplinary interaction: 
‘Viewed from the perspective of Christian theology, this suggests that science devises models 
of a universe that is the embryo of the eschatological new creation. In so doing, science gives 
evidence to proleptic experiences and dimensions within the present of the future new creation 
that God is already in the process of fashioning.’72 
It suffices to say that the eschatological, Christocentric and pneumatological tones of 
Grenz’s argument resonate with Bavinck’s Christological approach to the relationship between 
theology and the other sciences. Moreover, Grenz is unfamiliar with Bavinck’s system. He 
draws on various twentieth-century thinkers––including Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) and T. 
F. Torrance––without a mention of Bavinck. However, we can discern many resonances 
between them. In this sense, Grenz’s lecture would be a useful entry point through which the 
Bavinckian approach to the practice of scientific theology finds at home in the academia of the 
twenty-first century. Then, the Bavinckian ideal of humble yet courageous theologian 
heightens the contemporary theologian’s obligation to undertake interdisciplinary engagement, 
as Grenz claims. 
 
68 Grenz, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?,” 348. 
69 Ibid., 350-351. 
70 Ibid., 352. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 353. 
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c. The Humble yet Courageous Theologian: Scholarly Appropriation 
The interdisciplinary interaction that the university theologian should participate in 
implies that the theologian can learn from the other sciences. To put it another way, the humble 
yet courageous theologian should appropriate the achievements of the other sciences. This has 
a double implication. First, the university theologian should be humble in being taught by 
scholars of other disciplines. The God-vision should not become the cause of the theologian’s 
arrogance in the sense that Scripture alone is supernatural revelation, which is enough for 
theological studies. As noted earlier, Bavinck insists on the dialectical catholicity of scientific 
theology and Holy Scripture as the norma normans non normata. 73  Such a rationale for 
scientific theology opens the way for the appropriation of not only theological tradition but 
also other results of scientific research.  
Second, the university theologian should be courageous in appropriating other scholarly 
achievements. According to Bavinck, the doctrines of revelation and creation lay the dogmatic 
foundation of the theologian’s confident appropriation of other disciplinary scholarship. 
Christianity is the first to make us understand that the world is one, that humankind 
is one, that science is one. Therefore, revelation cannot be limited to the religious-
ethical, but from this midpoint its light also falls on the whole natural life, on earth 
and heaven, plant and animal, angel and humans, on all creatures. And thus, the 
object of theology is not merely the knowledge of God, but also that of creatures 
insofar as they are related to God and reveal Him.74 
In this light, the scientific theologian’s courage in appropriating other scientific achievements, 
in essence, exhibits the faith in the Triune God who creates, preserves and consummates 
creation. This courageous scholarly action is evident in Bavinck’s system. Two examples can 
be cited. 
Bavinck’s study on μυστηριον and dogmatics is a strong evidence for his humble yet 
courageous scholarly appropriation. Whilst construing the meaning of μυστηριον, as Eglinton 
remarks, Bavinck adopted the research results ‘at the cutting edge of Greco-Roman studies’ at 
the time.75 He points out that, albeit the Greek etymological origin, the meaning of μυστηριον 
 
73 Chapter five, II.A. 
74 Bavinck, “Christendom en Natuurwetenschap,” 197. Dutch original: ‘het Christendom heeft het ons ’t 
eerst doen verstaan, dat de wereld, dat de menschheid, dat de wetenschap ééne is. Daarom kan de openbaring 
niet strikt tot het religieus-ethische beperkt wezen, maar laat van dit middelpunt uit haar licht ook vallen 
over heel het natuurlijke leven, over aarde en hemel, plant en dier, engel en mensch, over al het geschapene. 
En daarom is object der Theologie niet bloot de kennis Gods, maar ook die der creatuur inzoover zij tot God 
in relatie staat en Hem openbaart.’ 
75 Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 98, note 69. Bavinck drew on three most recent publications in this field 
RD, 1:619, note 47; Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church, 
Sixth Edition ed., ed. A. M. Fairbairn (London; Edinburgh; Oxford: Williams and Norgate, 1897), (the 
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was refashioned in the New Testament. Rather than referring to something like the ‘secret 
religious-political doctrine’ in Greek literature, ‘the word consistently has a religious meaning 
and refers to a matter belonging to the kingdom of God,’ which had been unknown and 
concealed yet was revealed to God’s people in Christ.76 ‘The NT term μυστηριον, accordingly, 
does not denote an intellectually uncomprehended and incomprehensible truth of faith but a 
matter that was formerly hidden in God, was then made known in the gospel, and is now 
understood by believers.’77 By doing so, Bavinck shows his scholarly integrity in rejecting the 
mysterious character of dogma from both etymological and historical perspectives. Meanwhile, 
he showcases how the New Testament authors were courageous in refashioning the terms of 
their time yet without distorting the gospel. 
A stronger case for Bavinck’s humble yet courageous scholarly appropriation is his 
appreciative use of religious studies. As noted in chapter two, Bavinck vigorously denounced 
the Higher Education Act (1876) that sought to substitute the faculty of religious science for 
the theological faculty in Dutch universities in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Bavinck 
appreciatively appropriated Tiele’s scholarly output of religious studies many times in 
Reformed Dogmatics. 
Bavinck’s reference to Tiele in Reformed Dogmatics falls within nineteen sections across 
the four volumes. Of them, only three places are in Bavinck’s critique of religious science. The 
first one is Bavinck’s critique of the Higher Education Act and its consequent effect. 78 
Bavinck’s second criticism of Tiele is grounded in his assessment that Tiele holds a pantheistic 
notion of revelation.79 The third critique of Tiele is derived from the latter’s misunderstanding 
of the visible church.80 
On a detailed reading of Reformed Dogmatics, it can be seen that the three negative 
estimations are overwhelmed by another fifteen positive appraisals of Tiele’s religious science. 
Basically, these sympathetic assessments can be divided into three categories. First, Bavinck 
frequently draws support from Tiele’s religious science to confirm the validity and value of 
 
source Bavinck cited was the original edition published in 1892); Gustav Anrich, Das antike Mysteriewesen 
in Seinim Einfluss auf das Christenthum (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1894); Georg Wobbermin, 
Religionsgeschichtliche Studien zur Frage nach der Beeinflussung des Urchristenthum durch das antike 
Mysterienwesen (Berlin: E. Ebering, 1896). 
76 RD, 1:619; GD, 1:589. 
77 RD, 1:620; GD, 1:589. 
78 RD, 1:49. 
79 RD, 1:292. 
80  RD, 4:296. According to Bavinck, Tiele understands the visible church ‘as a form of existence the 
believing community has assumed for itself and can alter as circumstances change.’ Bavinck maintains that 
this point of view opposes ‘the divine institution of the church.’ (4:295) What Bavinck criticises can be seen 
on Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, 165-166. 
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religion.81 In this respect, it is interesting to find that Bavinck believes that Tiele’s research had 
falsified Feuerbach’s view of theology as anthropological.82 Second, Bavinck references to 
Tiele to demonstrate that revelation is essential to religion.83 This means that religion seeks for 
truth so that religious conceptions should not underestimated.84 Third, Bavinck uses Tiele’s 
sentiments to spell out several aspects of God’s salvation, such as Tiele’s insistence on 
universal belief in mediator,85 universal notion of sacrifice,86 and general human belief in the 
immortality of soul.87 Moreover, as religion has a social element, God’s salvation of course 
gives birth to the Church.88 Apart from the fifteen sympathetic appraisals, Bavinck makes 
recourse to Tiele to reject the sentiment that Persian doctrine of angels came from Judaism.89 
Bavinck’s sympathy with Tiele’s scholarly output, of course, exhibits the catholicity of 
scientific theology, that is, theology’s extending to all creation.90 In some sense, Bavinck’s 
appreciative way of appropriating religious science offers a more moderate approach to 
religious studies in the contemporary university than Turner and D’Costa. In the construal of 
theology’s due place in the nineteenth-century Dutch university, Bavinck did not attempt to 
devalue the other disciplines, even the one that threatened theology’s existence. This is a 
noteworthy reminder for the contemporary university, where theology is confronted by various 
challenges from other disciplines. 
My discourse thus far emphasises that both humility and courage are indispensable for 
being a university theologian. As Eglinton argues, boldness and humility are in concatenation 
in such a sense that ‘boldness without humility soon collapses into arrogance, whereas humility 
without boldness quickly takes its place on a spectrum of relativism, indifference and 
unbelief.’91 Moreover, it can be seen clearly that the humility and courage are not merely the 
performance of theology qua discipline but also the character of the university theologian qua 
human being. This leads to the second principle of the Bavinckian approach to the practice of 
theology in the contemporary university, which will enrich the first one. 
 
81 RD, 1:248, 1:269, 1:274, 1:278, 1:316, 2:57, 2:531, 3:184. 
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B. The Ontological Priority of Human Agent 
Since Descartes’ dictum Cogito ergo sum, Western philosophy and metaphysics 
embarked on the shift of the emphasis from ontology to epistemology. For Descartes, all the 
methods to prove human existence can be reduced to Cogito ergo sum, insofar as anything used 
as the proof is first of all conceptual and intellectual. Thereby, what we can prove first is not 
the existence of body but rather the nature that thinks.92 The precedence of the nature that thinks 
was enhanced by Kant’s refashioning metaphysics by prioritising the question on the 
possibility of knowing over the question on the being. Hence, as Bonhoeffer sketches Western 
philosophy since the seventeenth century, ‘[w]herever the capacity of human beings to know 
is attacked, nothing less than being human itself is at stake, which is the reason why, ever since 
Descartes, the passion of philosophy has burnt so strongly here.’93 
It was in this philosophical climate that Bavinck took pains to account for the relationship 
between theology and the other sciences. As construed in chapter six while explaining 
Bavinck’s idea of the sovereignty of science, I have made the observation that due to the 
respective God-given sphere sovereignty in the institutional church and science, the human 
agent is responsible for undertaking activities in each sphere under its respective sovereignty. 
Human knowing should be bound to objective reality per se, thereby revealing the increated 
imago Dei and the received dominion over or stewardship of creation.94 Granted that being and 
knowing are inseparable, being is nevertheless not subject to knowing. Accordingly, Bavinck’s 
ontological primacy was squarely antagonistic to the mainstream of epistemological priority at 
his time. In like manner, it stands in opposition to present day university education, which, 
according to John Webster, is gradually shifting from Bildung to Wissenschaft. Bildung aims 
at ‘the cultivation of a particular kind of person who has acquired certain habits of mind and 
will, a certain cast or temper of the soul, and so is oriented what is considered to be the good 
and the true.’95 By contrast, Wissenschaft lays emphasis on the ‘the activities of enquiry’, 
which accentuates the independence of reason and ‘transcend all localities and instead summon 
those localities for review.’96 The landscape of contemporary university education painted by 
Webster is reflective of the consequence of prioritising knowing over being. Therefore, while 
 
92 René Descartes, “To Reneri for Pollot, April or May 1638,” The Correspondence, trans. John Cottingham 
et al., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 98. 
93 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology in Systematic Theology, 
ed. Hans-Richard Reuter and Wayne Whitson Floyd, Jr., Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 2 (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 1996), 30. 
94 Chapter 6, III.A. 
95 Webster, Theological Theology, 6; emphasis added. 
96 Ibid., 6-7. 
215 
considering whether a Bavinckian approach to academic theology might be possible in the 
contemporary university, we cannot but examine how and to what extent Bavinck’s ontological 
priority benefits contemporary scholarship and learning.  
Bavinck’s ontological priority over epistemology is, as noted earlier, related to his 
theology of the imago Dei. The lengthy quotation below is a core thesis concerning the 
ontological significance of the image of God. 
Thus man forms a unity of the material and spiritual world, a mirror of the universe, 
a connecting link, compendium, the epitome of all of nature, a microcosm, and, 
precisely on that account, also the image and likeness of God, his son and heir, a 
micro-divine-being (mikrotheos). He is the prophet who explains God and 
proclaims his excellencies; he is the priest who consecrates himself with all that is 
created to God as a holy offering; he is the king who guides and governs all things 
in justice and rectitude. And in all this he points to One who in a still higher and 
richer sense is the revelation and image of God, to him who is the only begotten of 
the Father, and the firstborn of all creatures. Adam, the son of God, was a type of 
Christ.97 
Accordingly, the imago Dei entails a double implication for our understanding of the 
theologian’s role in the university: the human agent qua theologian and the human agent qua 
university academic. 
a. The Human Agent qua Theologian 
The core thesis shows that, as the imago Dei, the human agent qua theologian is 
responsible for pointing everything to the true image of God, which is Christ, and to the 
archetype of the human imago Dei, God Himself. That being so, the human agent cannot 
dispense with religious faith while practising theological studies in the academy if the agent is 
a true theologian. At this point, I point back to my analysis in chapters 3-5, which depicted the 
considerable importance of faith to a scientific theologian. This is more salient in Bavinck’s 
description of general wetenschap––in the underlying assumption that the object of science is 
knowable98––and of particular wetenschap (theology)––in its assumptions of God’s existence 
and self-revelation. 99  As all science requires faith prior to studies, theological studies 
necessitates the theologian’s faith. More importantly, Bavinck associates the theologian’s 
Christian faith and confessions with the falling or standing of the independence of theology. 
He asserts that theology will not be incorporated into the faculty of religious science or other 
 
97 RD, 2:562; GD, 2:524. 
98 RD, 1:90; GD, 1:66; chapter 3, II.B. 
99 Chapter 3, IV.B.b. 
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faculties provided that believing and knowing are not separated. 100  In other words, the 
independence of theology is contingent upon the cooperation of the theologian’s believing and 
knowing, rather than upon intellectual activities alone. Therefore, we can imagine that a 
Bavinckian view would not subscribe to the contemporary idea that the theologian should cast 
aside all presuppositions, especially the religious, and enter into academia in neutrality and 
with neutral reason. 
In fact, Bavinck’s work is replete with the rejection of the alleged academic neutrality. 
According to him, such neutrality cannot be imposed upon theology by any person, 
organisation or institution. In his own context, he stressed that the State could not even 
guarantee neutrality since it had its own confessions, that is, its political liberalism. In this 
regard, Bavinck targeted at the Higher Education Act of 1876. Bavinck believed that the 
purpose of the Act to refrain wetenschap from developing in one direction (theology) was 
reflective of the confession of the Dutch State on higher education. That is to say, the Act itself 
was not neutral. Any external coercion ipso facto overthrew the alleged neutrality.101 Viewed 
in this light, human subjective belief and presuppositions are, at least, latent in one’s research. 
They are something that ontologically consists in the human agent regardless of external 
coercion. Thus, there is no absolute objective neutrality. 
It should be mentioned, however, that Bavinck does retain a type of academic neutrality, 
which is ontologically determined by the being of the human agent.  
However, there is no science without assumptions, which, either as the point of 
departure or as working hypotheses, first make possible the work of studies. The 
human mind (geest) never works as a merely logical machine and can never 
withdraw from the influence of his emotional and volitional life. Neither may even 
the most sober thinker be able to detach himself from what is put in his soul upon 
the conviction of heart (gemoedsovertuiging), deeper judgement and insight, higher 
conception and intimate conviction. But the man of science would make use of his 
assumptions as long as they serve him, he maintains his standpoint as long as it 
proves tenable. Neutrality in the sense of being disconnected from and indifferent 
to one’s holiest beliefs is either absurd or, if possible, a sin. But neutrality in the 
sense of objectivity vis-à-vis traditional and one’s own ideas, albeit so cherished 
conceptions, is both a scientific and a religious duty.102 
 
100 Bavinck, “Geloofswetenschap,” 11. 
101 CW, 33. 
102 CW, 26-27. Dutch origina: ‘Wel is er geen wetenschap zonder onderstellingen, die of als uitgangspunt of 
als werkhypothesen het studiewerk eerst mogelijk maken. Ook arbeidt de menschelijke geest nooit als eene 
louter logische machine en kan hij zich nooit aan den invloed van zijn aandoenings- en wilsleven onttrekken. 
Ook de nuchterste denker kan noch mag zich los maken van wat er aan gemoedsovertuiging, aan dieper 
inzicht en doorzicht, aan hooger conceptie en intieme convictie in zijne ziel leeft. Maar de wetenschappelijke 
mensch gebruikt zijne onderstellingen slechts zoolang ze hem dienen, hij behoudt zijn standpunt alleen 
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Bavinck makes it clear that the true academic neutrality is something that is concerned with 
the being of academics (theologians). That is, the neutrality is shaped after the formation and 
on the ground of the intellectual, emotional and volitional life of the human agent. In other 
words, the academic neutrality for the university theologian is pertinent to the omnibearing life 
of the human agent qua theologian. To be sure, the theologian’s Christian faith, dispositions 
and confessions should not be counted out.103 
Bavinck’s emphasis on the ontological priority in academic life is imperative and 
beneficial to the contemporary university. One salient case can be seen in Nicholas 
Wolterstorff’s work. Wolterstorff acknowledges that ‘[the neo-Calvinist] denial of the 
neutrality and autonomy of scholarship with respect to religion was something [he] embraced 
early on, and which [he] continue[s] to embrace.’104 Under the influence of neo-Calvinism (in 
which Bavinck was one of the leading figures), Wolterstorff repudiates classical 
foundationalism’s search for value-neutral knowledge. Instead, he comes up with the notion of 
control beliefs: ‘Everyone who weighs a theory has certain beliefs as to what constitutes an 
acceptable sort of theory on the matter under consideration.’105 By the notion of control beliefs, 
he construes human rationality as, according to Andrew Sloane, ‘defeasible, person– and 
situation-specific.’106 In short, Wolterstorff is an exemplar which shows how a Bavinckian 
approach to scientific theology could be applied to the contemporary university. 
Outwith the neo-Calvinist circle, Andrew Torrance’s article on analytic theology presents 
the same stance. In this article, Torrance suggests a scientific approach to analytic theology: 
‘an approach to analytic theology in which the theologian is expected to approach and give an 
account of [God and all things in relation to God] in a way that seeks to correspond to or track 
 
zoolang het houdbaar blijkt. Neutraliteit in den zin van los-zijn van en onverschillig-zijn voor zijne heiligste 
overtuigingen, is Of eene ongerijmdheid, Of, zoo al mogelijk, eene zonde. Maar neutraliteit in den zin van 
objectiviteit tegenover traditioneele voorstellingen en tegenover eigen, zij het nog zoo geliefkoosde 
begrippen, is zoowel wetenschappelijke als godsdienstige plicht.’ 
103 This characteristic feature of ontological priority can also be seen in Bavinck’s discourse on eloquence: 
‘In order to speak well, one must exist well. Our word then becomes what it must be, as the image and 
likeness of ourselves, and we ourselves once again the image and likeness of God. Then it is not empty, idle, 
or hollow, but rather the revelation of the most intimate part of one’s person, soul of one’s soul, spirit of 
one’s spirit.’ Herman Bavinck, “Eloquence,” in Herman Bavinck on Preaching and Preachers, ed. and trans. 
James Eglinton (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2017), 27. 
104 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “On Christian Learning,” in Stained Glass: Worldviews and Social Science, ed. 
Paul A. Marshall, S. Griffioen, and Richard J. Mouw (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989), 68. 
105 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 
67. 
106  Andrew Sloane, On Being a Christian in the Academy: Nicholas Wolterstorff and the Practice of 
Christian Scholarship (Eugene: Wipf&Stock, 2003), 79-110. 
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the reality of [God and all things in relation to God].’107 Clearly, Torrance’s basis for argument 
is theocentrism, which necessitates the Christian faith in God for the analytic theologian. 
Moreover, he contends that this faith commitment does not undermine the scientificity of 
analytic theology. On the contrary, this confessionally committed theology is more scientific 
‘because of its commitment to being true to the mind-independent object (or subject) of 
theology (God), in a way that is accountable to the self-revelation of that object.’108 Thereby, 
the analytic theologian qua Christian can offer valuable ‘argumentative rigor, clarity, and 
precision.’109 
Torrance knows well about the idiosyncrasy of contemporary university education, which 
seems to eradicate the possibility of his scientific approach. Interestingly, Torrance defines his 
scientific analytic theology as corresponding to the marrow of university education. He 
contends: 
Given that the university is obliged to treat most truth-claims as provisional (so as 
to invite falsification), the university should be open to diverse approaches to the 
theological task, and this will require scholars to recognize the mutual exclusivity 
of their divergent epistemic bases. To take the above seriously and not fall prey to 
the prevailing “-ism” of a particular academic culture, theology departments should 
allow theologians to make exclusive truth claims about [God and all things in 
relation to God] in their particular study of [God and all things in relation to God]. 
If the university does not welcome such an approach, then it is, in effect, requiring 
academics, who operate from a particular epistemic base, to disguise or conceal 
what they recognize to be true and thereby deny or compromise their intellectual 
integrity.110 
Conjoining Torrance’s and Bavinck’s shared contentions, it could be argued that the 
contemporary university should actively safeguard the theologian’s religious confession in 
order to cultivate the intellectual integrity of the academic qua theologian. Meanwhile, 
university theologians should demonstrate and construe their Christian confession on God 
courageously and scholarly. As Kristensen argues, 
The foundation of all science is faith. But there is an ascending order of sciences, 
and the personal factor in research plays a greater role the higher we ascend, the 
more comprehensive the field, and the more the science ceases to be merely formal. 
Bavinck returns to this personal factor time and time again. None of our spiritual 
faculties come into their own in isolation. This is especially true in theology, the 
central science, which demands one’s whole personality for itself. For theology is 
 
107 Andrew Torrance, “The Possibility of a Scientific Approach to Analytic Theology,” Journal of Analytic 
Theology 7 (2019): 179. 
108 Ibid., 184. 
109 Ibid., 186. 
110 Ibid., 186-187. 
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itself religion. It is not the science of Christianity but Christianity itself as science. 
And it is a general rule that when the richest thoughts, the boldest concepts, the 
most important discoveries of imagination, of intuition, derive from divination, 
then the true theologian holds that the Holy Spirit is leading in the truth.111 
Only by the faith in and confession of the Triune God can a university theologian fulfil his or 
her role of the academic qua theologian, which leads to the second implication of the role of 
university theologian. 
b. The Human Agent qua University Academic 
The discussion on the human agent qua theologian is articulated from the perspective of 
the theologian’s religious identity. This entails a question: How is the theologian part of the 
broader group of university academics? In the previous section on the humble yet courageous 
theologian, I have illustrated the role of the theologian in the university via the lens of 
interdisciplinary interaction and scholarly appropriation. Nonetheless, a question remains to be 
addressed: What response can the university theologian expect from the academics of other 
disciplines? As the earlier lengthy quotation shows, the human being as the imago Dei is 
responsible to point all things to Christ and God.112 Given God as the unique object of theology, 
the theologian is responsible for pointing all things to the Triune God in terms of both creation 
and recreation. This weighty obligation may induce the theologian to impose her stance upon 
other disciplines normatively. Needless to say, a Bavinckian approach would not take such an 
aggressive step in view of Bavinck’s idea of the sovereignty of science. 
In order to avoid such a hegemonic gesture, the human agent qua university academic 
should figure out what the theologian can convey within the orbit of his or her Christian 
commitment in light of a Bavinckian view of scientific theology. The Trinitarian grammar, as 
articulated in chapters 4-5, demonstrates that scientific theology is characterised by the exitus-
reditus scheme: scientific theology must flow from the Triune God on account of God’s self-
revelation and return to the Triune God by virtue of the divine self-glorification. This scheme 
is perfectly congruent with Bavinck’s Christological construal of theology’s Queenship, 
namely theology’s ruling over the other sciences spiritually and morally. 113  Another of 
Bavinck’s assertions further explicates and then heightens the implication of theology’s moral 
and spiritual Queenship. Whilst arguing for the blessing of Christianity for wetenschap, 
Bavinck contends: 
 
111 Kristensen, “On Herman Bavinck's Scientific Work,” 42. 
112 RD, 2:562; GD, 2:524. 
113 Chapter 6, IV.A. 
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Yet, there is no doubt that Jesus did not act as a reformer of the state and society, 
nor dedicated his life to the practice of art and science. What [Jesus Christ] brought 
was something completely different and higher. He has brought to us the gospel of 
God’s grace in His person, in His Word and in His work. He has founded the 
kingdom of God on earth and by His justice opened up the entrance for us to it. 
The gospel is the message of blessing for the guilty and lost sinner. … Therefore, 
it is precisely an abundant blessing for the whole human being, for the world and 
humankind, for state and society, for art and science.114 
According to Bavinck, granted that Holy Scripture is the principium of theology and that Christ 
is the organic centre of God’s revelation, university theologians who point all things to Christ 
and God must follow Jesus’s path in not dedicating themselves entirely to the practice of art 
and science. Rather, a theologian qua university academic ought to export the redemptive 
message and blessing of the gospel to the sphere of every science. It should be noted that 
Bavinck’s account of the spiritual and moral blessing is by no means deprived of an intellectual 
dimension. While illustrating the doxological teleology of scientific theology in chapter five, 
it has been demonstrated that intelligence and doxology belong together in scientific theology; 
hence, scientific theology belongs to the university rather than the private seminary. In other 
words, the unity of spirituality and intelligence underlies the university theologian’s way of 
interacting with the academics from other disciplines. Thus, Bavinck argues, 
Indeed, the Scripture does not mean to teach us all kinds of human science. The 
Bible is not a source of knowledge for the secular sciences and arts, but solely and 
only for theology. It is impossible to draw from the Holy Scripture a system of 
logic, philosophy, astronomy, geology, jurisprudence, natural science, etc. … But 
it is equally true on the other side that the Scripture, just to give us a purely 
“spiritual” knowledge, often comes into contact with other mundane sciences. It is 
not dualistic. It well distinguishes the natural and the spiritual but does not separate 
them. … Therefore, revelation cannot be limited to the religious-ethical, but from 
this midpoint its light also falls on the whole natural life, on earth and heaven, plant 
and animal, angel and humans, on all creatures. And thus, the object of theology is 
not merely the knowledge of God, but also that of creatures insofar as they are 
related to God and reveal Him.115 
 
114 CW, 95. Dutch original: ‘Toch is het aan geen twijfel onderhevig, dat Jezus niet opgetreden is als een 
hervormer van staat en maatschappij en evenmin aan de beoefening van kunst en wetenschap zijn leven heeft 
gewijd. Wat Hij brengen kwam, was iets geheel anders en hoogers. Hij heeft in zijn persoon, in zijn woord 
en in zijn werk, ons het Evangelie van Gods genade gebracht; Hij heeft het koninkrijk Gods op aarde gesticht 
en door zijne gerechtigheid ons den toegang ertoe ontsloten. Het Evangelie is de boodschap der zaligheid 
voor schuldige en verlorene zondaren. ... Maar juist daardoor is het voor den ganschen mensch, is het voor 
wereld en menschheid, voor staat en maatschappij, voor kunst en wetenschap tot een overvloedigen zegen.’ 
115 Bavinck, “Christendom en Natuurwetenschap,” 196-197; emphasis added. Dutch original: ‘inderdaad de 
Schrift niet bedoelt, ons allerlei menschelijke wetenschap te leeren. De Bijbel is geen kenbron voor de 
seculaire wetenschappen en kunsten, maar enkel en alleen voor de Theologie. Een systeem van logika, 
philosophie, astronomie, geologie, rechtsgeleerdheid, natuurwetenschap enz. uit de H. Schriften te putten, is 
onmogelijk. … Maar nu is het ter anderer zijde evenzeer waar, dat de Schrift, juist om ons eene zuivere 
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A significant observation can be made that, using the religious-ethical as the midpoint, all 
human life is spiritualised and moralised. In this light, the Christian theologian qua academic 
can contribute a well-constructed system of Christianised knowledge regarding the created 
order. Again, Bavinck’s emphasis on the ontological priority comes to the fore. Being a 
Christian determines the modus operandi of the theologian’s intelligence. Being is the 
determiner for knowing. In this light, the Christian theologian qua university academic offers 
an alternative angle from which the academics of other disciplines can learn another 
epistemological approach to the objects investigated. 
Bavinck’s stance lends support to an important recent theory of the theology of science in 
studies on the relationship between theology and natural science. By repudiating the 
complementary relationship of religion and natural science, the physicist and natural 
philosopher Tom McLeish has suggested that theology and natural science are ‘of each 
other.’116 Inasmuch as ‘[natural science] involves the negotiation of a new relationship between 
human minds and the physical world’, and inasmuch as Holy Scripture applies the theme of 
reconciliation to the relationship ‘between humankind and nature itself’, McLeish defines the 
theology of science as follows: ‘Science is the participative, relational, cocreative work within 
the kingdom of God of healing the fallen relationship of humans with nature.’117 Apparently, 
both Bavinck and McLeish accentuate the academic qua Christian who offers an unusual 
spiritualised narrative of nature and natural science. Also evidently, McLeish’s construal of the 
theology of science is thin in terms of ontology. It remains to be unanswered that to what extent 
the academic is justified to bring forth a theology of science. Thus, the Bavinckian account of 
the ontological priority of human agent and the notion of the sovereignty of science behind it 
can underpin McLeish’s explication of “of each other”. 
 
“geestelijke” kennis te geven, dikwerf met al die andere mundane wetenschappen in aanraking komt. 
Dualistisch is zij niet; … Daarom kan de openbaring niet strikt tot het religieus-ethische beperkt wezen, 
maar laat van dit middelpunt uit haar licht ook vallen over heel het natuurlijke leven, over aarde en hemel, 
plant en dier, engel en mensch, over al het geschapene. En daarom is object der Theologie niet bloot de 
kennis Gods, maar ook die der creatuur inzoover zij tot God in relatie staat en Hem openbaart.’ 
116 Tom McLeish, “The Science-and-Religion Delusion: Towards a Theology of Science,” in Knowing 
Creation, ed. Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall, Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and 
Science, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 305. 
117 Ibid., 319-320; also see Tom McLeish, Faith and Wisdom in Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 166-212. The idea of the theology of science is used by Ruth Bancewicz to develop a notion of 
“scientist-believer”, which demonstrates that ‘science is something a Christian can do alongside all the other 
pursuits that are part of an active life of worshipping God.’ Ruth M. Bancewicz, “The Scientist-Believer: 
Following Christ as We Uncover the Wonders of the Living World,” in Christ and the Created Order, ed. 
Andrew B. Torrance and Thomas H. McCall, Perspectives from Theology, Philosophy, and Science, vol. 2 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 273-288, particularly 274-276. 
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In summary, the Bavinckian ontological priority of the human agent draws one’s attention 
to theologian qua academic first, and then to theologian qua academic. Being is always prior 
to knowing. Nonetheless, the benefits of a Bavinckian system for the contemporary university 
theologian are more than this. Bavinck’s viewpoint of theology’s Queenship furnishes a 
specific intersection where theology and the other disciplines meet in the university. 
C. Theological Ethics as the Interdisciplinary Point of Contact 
In Bavinck’s dispute with Lindeboom and Kuyper, it has been shown that Bavinck’s 
ontological priority prevents scientific theology from being subordinate to the institutional 
church. Moreover, this stance is strengthened by his spiritual and moral qualification of 
theology’s Queenship. By doing so, Bavinck creates space for an intellectually egalitarian 
interaction between theology qua discipline and the other disciplines. In other words, albeit 
serving for the church, theology cannot impose its statements upon the other disciplines as the 
guiding principles for practising other sciences. Bavinck’s viewpoint warrants further 
clarification, inasmuch as he fails to account clearly for the interdisciplinary point of contact 
between theology and the other disciplines in the university. Nonetheless, a clue to pinning 
down the point of contact can be found in Bavinck’s writings, and can be used to articulate a 
Bavinckian approach to the interdisciplinary point of contact in the contemporary university. 
While delivering the lecture Het Doctorenambt (The Office of Doctor) on 6 December 1899, 
when Bavinck was appointed as the rector of the Theological School in Kampen, his construal 
of the relationship between the institutional church and the university is heuristic on this matter. 
However, the Church does not predetermine the means of coercion, but can only 
bear testimony and make this testimony agreeable to the human conscience. It can 
only overcome by the Word and the Spirit. It is permitted to restrict the freedom of 
the word, the freedom of learning, the freedom of science by no other way than by 
the moral power, which emanates from its own confession; the license for teaching 
(licentia docendi), which it grants, is ethical, not legal in character.118 
Although Bavinck’s contention here is pertinent to the debates on the right of the institutional 
church to appoint theological professors of the Free University in Amsterdam at the time, a 
basic principle can be discerned that the moral and ethical doctrines that are displayed by the 
confession of the Church can be established as the interdisciplinary point of contact between 
 
118  Bavinck, Doctorenambt, 54; emphasis added. Dutch original: ‘De kerk echter beschikt over geen 
middelen van dwang, kan alleen getuigen en deze getuigenis aangenaam maken aan de gewetens der 
menschen. Zij kan alleen overwinnen door het Woord en den Geest. Zij mag de vrijheid des woords, de 
vrijheid der leer, de vrijheid der wetenschap op geen andere wijze beperken dan door de zedelijke kracht, 
die van haar eigen belijdenis uitgaat; de licentia docendi, welke zij verleent, is ethisch, niet juridisch van 
aard.’ 
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theology and the other disciplines. This observation can be further solidified by Bavinck’s 
lengthy discourse on the relationship of the church and the world. 
Accordingly, the relationship that has to exist between the church and the world is 
in the first place organic, moral, and spiritual in character. Christ—even now—is 
prophet, priest, and king; and by his Word and Spirit he persuasively impacts the 
entire world. Because of him there radiates from everyone who believes in him a 
renewing and sanctifying influence upon the family, society, state, occupation, 
business, art, science, and so forth. The spiritual life is meant to refashion the 
natural and moral life in its full depth and scope according to the laws of God. 
Along this organic path Christian truth and the Christian life are introduced into all 
the circles of the natural life, so that life in the household and the extended family 
is restored to honor, the wife (woman) is again viewed as the equal of the husband 
(man), the sciences and arts are Christianized, the level of the moral life is elevated, 
society and state are reformed, laws and institutions, morals and customs are made 
Christian.119 
Accordingly, it can be seen that this organic, moral and spiritual relationship is the 
metanarrative of all relationship between the Christian and the non-Christian. In this light, the 
organic, moral and spiritual relationship between the church and the world lays the foundation 
for the interdisciplinary relationship between theology and the other sciences in the university. 
Given the shortage of clarification on this interdisciplinary point of contact in Bavinck’s system, 
I attempt to define and illustrate theological ethics as this point. 
a. Theological Ethics in Bavinck’s System 
If we grasp the role that theological ethics plays in Bavinck’s system, its function as the 
interdisciplinary point of contact spontaneously comes to be seen. The recently published 
Gereformeerde Ethiek (Reformed Ethics) by Bavinck offers us critical materials on this 
matter.120 
According to Bavinck, dogmatics and ethics cannot be identified; nor one is subordinate 
to the other. He qualifies their relationship as follows: 
In dogmatics we are concerned with what God does for us and in us. In dogmatics 
God is everything. Dogmatics is a word from God to us, coming from outside us 
and above us; we are passive, listening, and opening ourselves to being directed by 
God. In ethics, we are interested in the question of what it is that God now expects 
of us when he does his work in us. What do we do for him? Here we are active, 
precisely because of and on the grounds of God’s deeds in us; we sing psalms in 
thanks and praise to God. In dogmatics, God descends to us; in ethics, we ascend 
 
119 RD, 4:437; GD, 4:418. 
120 It is worth noting that Gereformeerde Ethiek is edited and published according to Bavinck’s manuscripts 
on Reformed ethics; for a helpful introduction in this respect, see Dirk van Keulen and John Bolt, 
“Introduction to Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Ethics,” in Bavinck, Reformed Ethics, Vol. 1, xxi-xliii. 
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to God. In dogmatics, he is ours; in ethics, we are his. In dogmatics, we know we 
shall see his face; in ethics, his name will be written on our foreheads (Rev. 22:4). 
Dogmatics proceeds from God; ethics returns to God. In dogmatics, God loves us; 
in ethics, therefore, we love him.121 
Bavinck makes it clear that a certain difference can be drawn between dogmatics and 
theological ethics, which is caused by their peculiarities. As such, theological ethics is not a 
subdiscipline of dogmatics, which fall shorts of its independence. Hence, Bavinck refuses to 
link theological ethics to dogmatics, but suggests linking it to practical theology.122 
It does not mean that Bavinck ruptures theological ethics from dogmatics. The claim that 
‘[d]ogmatics proceeds from God; ethics returns to God’ has laid a solid theocentric foundation 
for the affinity between these two disciplines. The positive revelationalism of Bavinck’s 
scientific theology has illustrated that God’s self-revelation as recorded in Holy Scripture is 
the point of departure for dogmatics.123 In like manner, Bavinck speaks of revelation as the 
principium of theological ethics: ‘Theological ethics does not proceed from a nature in 
humanity, in a principle embedded in creation, but from a revealed principle that comes from 
God and his deeds, his words for and to us, deeds and words that lead us back to God and find 
in him their goal.’ 124  Given the divine initiative, Bavinck argues with the exactly same 
language in Reformed Dogmatics and Reformed Ethics that both dogmatics and ethics is ‘uit, 
door, tot God’, namely, ‘from God, by God, for God.’125 ‘Ethics is as closely related to and 
fully dependent on Holy Scripture as is dogmatics.’126  
Bavinck employs organic language in Reformed Dogmatics to describe the affinity of 
dogmatics and ethics. He contends: ‘Dogmatics is the system of the knowledge of God; ethics 
is that of the service of God. The two sciences [wetenschappen] does not stand independently 
against each other, but together form one system, are related members of one organism.’127 The 
organic relationship of the two disciplines indicates that, as Eglinton describes, theological 
ethics ‘gave shape to’ dogmatics––that is, despite the precedence of dogmatics to theological 
ethics, the former can only be fulfilled in ethics.128 To put it another way, theological ethics is 
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the embodiment of dogmatics. That is, the system of the service of God, which is constructed 
by theological ethics and is visible, embodies the invisible system of the knowledge of God. 
How can we develop a Bavinckian approach to the practice of scientific theology in the 
contemporary university? The analysis above proves that the answer to this question cannot 
dispense with Bavinck’s theological ethics. He endows theological ethics with considerable 
importance that, as a science and discipline, theological ethics reveals scientific theology to the 
fellow university disciplines in a concrete way. In this sense, the Bavinckian approach makes 
theological ethics the interdisciplinary point of contact whereby the treasures of the Christian 
faith are introduced and proclaimed to the other sciences. 
b. Theological Ethics as Operative in the University  
How and to what extent is the interdisciplinary point of contact operative within the life 
of the university? Prior to tackling this question, we need first to reckon with what the life of 
the contemporary university is. At this point, we should recall the brief survey of the history of 
theology in the university at the outset of this chapter. This is because theology and the 
emergence of the university are historically inseparable. The dethroning Queenship exposes 
the essence of the life of the contemporary university, that is, the life of secularism. According 
to Charles Taylor, the secularism of the contemporary world ‘takes us from a society in which 
it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest 
believer, is one human possibility among others.’129 The divine authority has gone, and the 
human self-judgement and autonomous research usurp the throne. This is the cause of the life 
of the contemporary university. John Webster puts it well: 
The modern research university conducts its business on the basis of a particular 
“anthropology of enquiry”. That is to say, underlying its specific practices and 
preferred modes of research, its norms of acceptability and its structures of 
evaluation, is an account of the intellectual life, of what intellectual selfhood ought 
to look like. That anthropology, largely implicit but nevertheless possessed of 
enormous authority, is bound up with some of the most potent moral and spiritual 
ideals of freedom from determination by situation, which is one of the deep 
foundations of liberal culture.130 
Two observations can be made here. First, both the selfhood and freedom hold sway on both 
the intellectual and moral dimensions. Indeed, the university serves not only for intellectual 
formation but also for moral cultivation. While the university undergoes revolution, both 
dimensions will be transformed. Second, the notions of selfhood and freedom imply the 
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intellectual and moral plurality in the university. In that setting, it seems that intellectual and 
moral judgements can be made by every single person. Clearly, such individualism is reflective 
of the shift in the emphasis from Bildung to Wissenschaft in the university, as noted earlier 
according to Webster. In discussing the failure of the contemporary university, Stanley 
Hauerwas is critical of this individualism as one crucial cause of the corruption of youth. The 
university endorses a world-and life-view in which moral life is shaped by personal choice––
that is ‘consumer choice’––rather than ‘through the disciplined discovery of the good.’131  
To be clear, the secularised university threatens the status of Christian theology as a 
university discipline. Nonetheless, secularism cannot be defined reductively as anti-religious 
reduction. In fact, the aforementioned intellectual and moral individualism signifies a type of 
disciplinary inclusiveness, which makes room for teaching theology in the university. From 
this vantage point, it can be seen that there is an awkward tension in the contemporary 
university. That is, its opposition to theology at the disciplinary level is the warrant for teaching 
theology. If every academic and student in the university is entitled to take the anthropology 
of enquiry and make moral and intellectual choice autonomously, university theologians are of 
course guaranteed to practise theology by their own religious choice to commit to God’s 
revelation in Holy Scripture both dogmaticly (intellectually) and morally. In this sense, to 
paraphrase Taylor’s language, Christian theology which is grounded in ‘belief in God is 
understood to be one [discipline] among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace.’132 
One would note that, ironically, contemporary secular universities seem to operate in the way 
of the Medieval university that they criticise––that is, the university is composed by various 
communities, which are established according to similar individualist intellectual and moral 
choice in the contemporary century. 
The disciplinary inclusiveness of the contemporary university entails another significance. 
As the secularist moral inclusiveness becomes the outlook of the contemporary university, no 
particular ethical ideal or choice can be privileged as official. However, the rejection of external 
coercion should be followed by pursuing a common ethics for the university as unity. As Paul 
Macdonald remarks, the secularist university aims for ‘a purely secular ethics that presumably 
anybody in the secular university could endorse.’ 133  On the one hand, this means every 
university discipline will be swayed by the common secular ethics insofar as, as noted earlier, 
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the relevant intellectual and moral dimensions are intertwined in the university. On the other 
hand, every single ethics chosen by individuals serves for the common ethics of the university, 
which seeks for common good for the citizenry and flourishing life of the university. As such, 
the common ethics is related to all university disciplines; thus, theological ethics deserves a 
significant place in the university. Paul Macdonald’s syllogism fleshes out this observation: 
‘theology helps engender knowledge of the Good; knowledge of the Good affords liberal 
learners the knowledge that they need to promote the common good; therefore, theology also 
helps engender the knowledge that liberal learners need to promote the common good. As such, 
it belongs in the secular university.’134 
Following this train of thought, a Bavinckian theological ethics is operative in bringing 
Christian theology and dogmatics into contact with other disciplines. This can be clearly seen 
in Bavinck’s description of the human desire for the common ethics. 
There has to be another, higher, absolute standard. People looked for the essence 
of morality, for what is moral in se, independent of society’s judgment and moral 
for all people at all times. There has to be a principe for ethics, a supreme principe, 
a comprehensive and all-regulating principle that governs the conduct of all people 
and at all times. Morality, in other words, is not custom but an idea, something that 
is not “is” but comes to being, something that has to be concretized in real life. This 
is the idea of the Good, the ethical ideal, the idea of the truly human, the humane.135 
Combining Bavinck’s assertion with the analysis above, a syllogism can be formulated as 
follows: (1) Inasmuch as theological ethics is organically related to and the embodiment of 
dogmatics, and (2) inasmuch as theological ethics cooperates with other types of ethics––which 
is related to individual citizens of the university and then to every discipline––to develop the 
common good and flourishing life of the university, (3) therefore Christian theology 
(dogmatics) implicitly engages with other disciplines by the dissemination of the knowledge 
of God who is the highest Good. 
Recent scholarship lends much support to a Bavinckian view of theological ethics as an 
operative interdisciplinary point of contact in the contemporary situation. To cite one example. 
Gerald McKenny’s recent article on the biotechnological enhancement of human beings 
conjoins Christian theological anthropology, biotechnology and ethics. With respect to the 
former two, he observes that biotechnological enhancement does not belittle the created order, 
neither does it necessarily instrumentalise human biological nature or devalue the human 
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person.136 Moreover, he points out that ‘certain capabilities and states for which our nature in 
its present form is not adequate’ can be regarded as good via biotechnological enhancement.137 
By arguing so, biotechnological enhancement is justified morally as well as theologically. In 
reading McKenny’s article, it should be noted how theological anthropology’s engagement 
with biotechnological enhancement finally drives us to make the moral judgment that the 
enhancement is good and so justified morally. The theologically ethical conclusion may draw 
others’ attention to the contribution that Christian theology can make to the broader discipline 
of biotechnology. 
My analysis and demonstration hitherto have illustrated the Bavinckian meaning of 
theology’s Queenship in terms of morality in the contemporary university. Theological ethics 
as the embodiment of Christian theology is a working channel via which the knowledge of God 
and all thing in relation to Him are presented before the other disciplines in the interdisciplinary 
interaction. As contributing to the construction of the university’s common ethics and good, 
theological ethics reminds university academics of the reality of the ethical ideal, which will 
deepen and consolidate the value, direction and purpose of every wetenschap. By doing so, the 
catholicity of Christian theology is concretised in the academy; the gospel is the pearl and 
leaven in the sphere of wetenschap. 
IV. Concluding Appraisal 
As constructing scientific theology in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Bavinck spoke routinely of theology’s place in the academy with indisputable tone. In those 
years, Christianity was still dominant, though its influence was declining considerably. Hence, 
he denied the pre-eminence of the faculty of religious science or religious studies in the Dutch 
university from a Christian perspective. Such a mode of argumentation seems outdated in the 
contemporary century.138 After all, belief in the Christian God is just one option among others. 
Although the Queen is stubborn, the truth is that she has been dethroned. 
However, Bavinck’s system is still relevant in the contemporary century. From his 
theological insights and arguments, I deduce three rationales which are used to articulate a 
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Bavinckian approach to the practice of theological studies in the contemporary secular 
university. In the analysis of the three rationales, the foremost point we can learn is the 
personality of Bavinck qua theologian, which I reckon as the most beneficial to university 
theologians in the twenty-first century. Through the three rationales as suggested in this chapter, 
one is impressed that Bavinck is of great confidence in his identity of a wetenschappelijke 
theologian. This confidence hinges upon his faith in the Triune God, which is indispensable to 
and the object of scientific theology. 
Such a personality is heuristic. Contemporary university theologians should remember 
that theology is the Queen in spite of being defamed. As with Bavinck, they should confidently 
practise theological studies with a faith commitment to the Triune God. Scientific theology 
should be first the pearl of the great price and then be the leavening agent in the sphere of 
science. In so doing, theology does not seek to usurp others’ throne that belongs to any other 
originally. Rather, theology aims for moral and spiritual dominion among university disciplines. 
In this course, university theologians by no means subordinate theology to the other sciences: 
‘If God is for us, who is against us?’ (Rom. 8:31; NRSV) In the meantime, university 
theologians should recall Paul’s saying as they confidently seek out interdisciplinary 
engagement: ‘For everything created by God is good, and nothing is to be rejected, provided it 
is received with thanksgiving.’ (1 Tim. 4:4; NRSV)
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Conclusion 
After James Eglinton’s new organic reading of Bavinck’s theology, interpreting Bavinck’s 
system as a united whole has become the industry standard of Bavinck studies. This new 
interpretative paradigm has generated the promise to new studies on Bavinck’s theological 
system. This can be evidenced by Cory Brock’s, Nathaniel Gray Sutanto’s and Bruce Pass’s 
doctoral theses, which were supervised by Eglinton. Following this new reading, this study 
holds to a basic hermeneutical principle that Bavinck’s theology is a united system. In contrast 
with the three aforementioned theses, which respectively focus on one particular theme in 
Bavinck’s system, this study seeks for a big-picture understanding of his system. In other words, 
it attempts to move from the new reading to the meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s system 
through the lens of scientific theology. By doing so, the idea of scientific theology as explained 
in this study furnishes an apparatus that coordinates various fundamental characteristics and 
themes of Bavinck’s thought. 
Granted that organic thinking is an interpretative paradigm, this study has demonstrated 
thus far that Bavinck’s organic language seems not to be the meta-language, which serves to 
shape the hermeneutical meta-paradigm for understanding Bavinck’s system. Rather, it is 
wetenschap (science) which is chosen as the meta-language for two reasons. On the one hand, 
standing firmly in the Reformed and Calvinistic tradition, which confirms theology as a 
scientia, Bavinck did not ignore the wetenschappelijke nature of dogmatics or theology at the 
outset of his theological career. On the other hand, Bavinck’s pervasive use of wetenschap to 
qualify theology further proves that science is eligible to be the meta-language.  
To put Bavinck’s view of theology as a science in his historical context strengthens the 
meta-paradigmatic reading insofar as doing such exhibits how Bavinck constructed his system 
in view of the challenges he confronted in the Netherlands in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Of various contextual factors, the rise of religiewetenschap (religious science) and 
theological modernism are prominent. The former challenged the scientificity of theology 
directly, and even attempted to expel theology from the sphere of science––Dutch universities. 
This historical factor reminds us to watch how Bavinck constructed his particular account of 
scientific theology to combat those who endorsed the faculty of religious science in Dutch 
universities. In contrast with the view of religious science that challenged theology externally, 
theological modernism seems to turn theology upside down internally. That is, it depended on 
positivism and natural science, to which the Christian faith was made subordinate. This 
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reminds us to watch how Bavinck upheld the scientificity of theology to rule out the erosion of 
theological modernism.  
In view of the two outstanding contextual factors, Bavinck defines theology as the science 
of God. This definition hinges upon his notion of twofold wetenschap––the visible and the 
invisible. Inasmuch as God created the spiritual and physical worlds, there must be two kinds 
of science, the object of which exist in the two worlds respectively. Kristensen remarks well: 
‘The name “science” includes a greater richness of types than those of which we are generally 
aware, and the diversity of types is connected with the deepest factors in our spiritual life. 
Bavinck’s science has allowed us to behold this richness with extraordinary lucidity.’1 The rich 
connotation of Bavinck’s wetenschap implies that science must have general definitive 
elements: the real object, the presupposition in faith, and connection to the object investigated. 
In parallel, scientific theology has God as the real object, takes assumptions of God’s existence 
and self-revelation in faith, and is bound up with God. This theocentric essence of scientific 
theology determines its task. Scientific theology is responsible to construct an organic system 
of dogmas, uses it to serve God’s congregation, and finally leads God’s people to worship and 
glorify Himself. 
The basic account of Bavinck’s scientific theology warrants a detailed explication. In this 
regard, the thesis attempts to carry out constructive work. That is to say, the five rationales of 
scientific theology demonstrated in the thesis are not originally spoke of by Bavinck. Rather, 
they can be deduced from Bavinck’s definition of scientific theology and the development of 
his idea of theology as the wetenschap of God since his early career onwards. 
As theology takes assumption of God’s self-revelation in faith, the first and most salient 
rationale of the science of God is positive revelationalism––that is, the objective revelation of 
God, which is axiomatic for theology, can be immediately experienced by humans in such a 
way that it can be appropriated by the human subjective believing consciousness (faith); 
thereby, scientific theology can be developed. It is worth noting that the positive 
revelationalism is not positivistic, thereby differing from theological modernism and avoiding 
subordinating scientific theology to the nineteenth-century positivistic science. 
The second rationale of scientific theology is theological organicism. In elaborating on 
this rationale, one is impressed how Bavinck utilises the organic language as secondary to 
wetenschap; as such, wetenschappelijke theology as meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s 
system is justified. Having appropriated the fourfold principle of Bavinck’s organic thinking, 
 
1 Kristensen, “On Herman Bavinck's Scientific Work,” 42. 
232 
as laid clearly out in Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing and Gereformeerde Ethiek, the thesis 
showcases the double organic character of scientific theology. The interior organicity indicates 
that scientific theology is not an aggregate but an organism, being constitutive of 
interconnected theological loci, which is orchestrated organically as a whole by the dogma of 
the knowledge of God and develops towards the doxological telos. The exterior organicity 
signifies that scientific theology must engage with the other sciences, which underscores the 
due place of theology in the university. This is a heuristic point that the contemporary 
university theologian can learn. 
The third rationale of scientific theology is organically critical realism. While taking 
assumption of revelation in faith, Bavinck’s system implies organically critical realism, that is, 
that the Logos collaborates with the Spirit to establish the organic correspondence between 
subjective and objective revelation. The Logos-Spirit model directs one to reckon with 
organically critical realism. That is, the Holy Spirit is the living agent and force that develops 
the organism of scientific theology towards its end. In this light, scientific theology is both 
conservative and progressive. The scientific theologian should appropriate the tradition of the 
Church critically, which proves his or her faith in the continuing work of the Spirit. 
The fourth rationale refers to dialectical catholicity. As a catholic theologian, Bavinck 
defines catholicity as essential to the Church and Christianity. Whilst discussing the catholicity 
of theology, we need to take a nuanced reading that Bavinck’s view of catholicity is dialectical. 
Bavinck holds fast to his own Gereformeerde tradition, rejecting alleged non-committed 
theological studies. Notwithstanding the theological commitment, he suggests that scientific 
theologians must be moving outwards and cannot be restricted within the confines of their own 
traditions. This outward action means that scientific theology not only touches the boundaries 
of Christian theological world, but also goes beyond the borders of the Christian religion and 
extends to the end of creation. In short, the dialectical catholicity of scientific theology signifies 
a centrifugal movement, which has the theologian’s own tradition as the centre and spreads out 
towards the end of creation. 
The fifth rationale is doxological teleology. As an organism, scientific theology is 
developing towards the end with the aid of the continuing work of the Spirit. Bavinck’s 
theocentric essence of scientific theology means that divine glorification is the unique telos. 
By arguing so, the thesis demonstrates that, according to Bavinck, the idiosyncrasy of 
theology’s scientificity is the perichoresis of its intellectual and doxological natures. This 
means, on the one hand, that scientific theology is indicative of knowing God in praising. On 
the other hand, this rationale underscores that scientific theology should be practised by the 
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dogmatician who is in relation to God and receives God’s revelation by the believing 
consciousness. 
It should be noted that the five rationales are not discrete. On the contrary, they are in 
concatenation and make up the singular grammar of scientific theology. In turn, this grammar 
evidences the interpretative meta-paradigm of Bavinck’s thought, which coordinates and 
integrates various fundamental characteristics and themes of Bavinck’s system. (Thus, 
theological organicism is secondary to the idea of wetenschap in Bavinck’s theology.) That is 
to say, only with five rationales can one enjoy the whole landscape of Bavinck’s scientific 
theology. Moreover, the five rationales together prove the Trinitarian character and exitus-
reditus scheme of the grammar. That is, scientific theology is from God, by God, and for God; 
it is the human work that is contingent upon the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.  
The meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s system through the lens of wetenschap is 
more than to figure out the character of scientific theology. How Bavinck’s scientific theology 
was actually operative in his milieu is worth noting. To put it another way, this study puts 
forward the meta-paradigmatic reading whereby Bavinck’s wetenschappelijke theology was 
and is working in the academy. 
Other than the challenge of religious science, Bavinck’s concern on theology’s place in 
the university was pertinent to the Kuyper-Lindeboom debates. The antithesis between Kuyper 
and Lindeboom consisted in that the former maintained the place of theology in the university 
alone, freeing from the governance of the institutional church, whereas the latter insisted that 
theological studies should be supervised and governed by the church. Using Christological 
formula, Kuyper stressed the humanity of theology, whereas Lindeboom highlighted the 
divinity. By contrast, Bavinck took a middle way by the notions of the sovereignty of science 
and theological encyclopaedia. According to him, scientific theology should be practised in the 
university yet not be ruptured from the institutional church since the scientific theologian 
should commit to the institutional church and a particular tradition. Moreover, Bavinck’s 
reformulation of the Medieval slogan “theology as the Regina Scientiarum” explains that 
scientific theology should exercise its moral and spiritual dominion in the academy. The other 
sciences are no longer her handmaiden; rather, they are sisters. Both the via media and the 
reimagining of theology’s Queenship come down to the emphasis on the ontological 
importance of the practitioner of scientific theology. 
The meta-paradigmatic reading of Bavinck’s theology recognises that a Bavinckian 
account of scientific theology is still relevant in the contemporary secular university. From 
Bavinck’s scientific theology, the thesis again attempts to sum up three principles that are 
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applicable for contemporary university theologians. First, university theologians should be 
humble yet courageous. This means that they should hold fast to the God-vision (from God, by 
God, and for God) and then speak of what the other sciences are incapable of grasping. 
Meanwhile, university theologians should engage in interdisciplinary interaction and 
appropriate the findings of the other sciences courageously. Second, the ontological priority of 
the human agent in the university is of importance to theologians if they are to practise theology 
in a scientific way. The human agent qua theologian indicates that religious confession is 
indispensable to the intellectual integrity of the university theologian. On the other hand, the 
human agent qua academic signifies how the spiritualised intelligence of the theologian offers 
an alternative angle from which the academics of other disciplines can learn another 
epistemological approach to the objects investigated. Third, given the moral character of 
theology’s Queenship, theological ethics can serve as the interdisciplinary point of contact. 
This is because in Bavinck’s system theological ethics is organically related to and the 
embodiment of dogmatics. Meanwhile, that the contemporary secular university seeks for 
common ethics and good guarantees the place of theological ethics through which the 
knowledge of God who is the highest Good is presented before the other disciplines. In short, 
a Bavinckian account of scientific theology showcases that to be a university theologian, one 
must practise scientific theology confidently by faith in the Triune God.  
The meta-paradigmatic reading, which coordinates and integrates various fundamental 
characteristics and themes of Bavinck’s thought, offered in the thesis can prove two things. 
First, to read Bavinck’s system in terms of wetenschap strengthens the new reading and the 
reality of a united Bavinck (rather than two Bavincks). Like the organic new reading, the meta-
paradigmatic reading generates the promise to Bavinck studies ensuing that the tensions within 
Bavinck’s system can be addressed through the lens of the wetenschappelijke nature of 
Bavinck’s theology. Second, the meta-paradigmatic reading shows that Bavinck’s dogmatics 
is not merely restricted to Christian doctrines. Rather, Bavinck’s scientific theology, which 
starts from dogmatics, intends to embrace the whole universe and engage with all things, so 
that it can consecrate what is sanctified to the Triune God. Kristensen thus remarks, ‘Many can 
parrot Bavinck. Few can prove the truth thereof as he did: through a life lived in the service of 
science.’2 
This thesis must also recognise, of course, that Bavinck’s scientific theology has certain 
limitations. A significant one is that, as it was constructed in a culture that had historically and 
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deeply been influenced by Christianity, Bavinck’s ideal of scientific theology and its place in 
the university is at variance with the contexts of many contemporary theologians who are 
undertaking theological studies in atheistic countries. Like theologians in mainland China, 
many of them practise theology in underground seminaries due to anti-Christian religious 
policies.3 However, this does not mean that a Bavinckian account of scientific theology must 
necessarily be ineffective in those contexts. Rather, more studies need to be undertaken to 
explore the possible benefits of such an account to those theologians. Hence, I would like to 
argue alongside Eglinton that this thesis ‘has only begun to scratch the surface’ of Bavinck’s 
system of scientific theology.4 Further studies on Bavinck’s wetenschappelijke theology are 
warranted. In particular, to deploy the meta-paradigmatic reading to particular loci or themes 
of Bavinck’s system would be intriguing. Such inquiries will lay out how Bavinck construes 
each locus in the wetenschappelijke way. Then, the five rationales will be deployed specifically. 
On the other hand, such inquiries will ascertain whether or not the Trinitarian grammar needs 
be supplemented. What is more, further studies on the fecundity of a Bavinckian view of 
scientific theology for the contemporary interdisciplinary interaction are demanded as well. 
How would a Bavinckian account engage in the dialogue between theology and politics? How 
would such an account deal with theistic evolution? Would it argue for or against the 
collegiality of theology and religious studies in British universities? 
 
3 On an attempt to apply Bavinck’s theology in Chinese context, see Ximian Xu, “The Scientific Calling of 
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Christianity (forthcoming, 2021). 
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